FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hua v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 158
Appeal from: Hua v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 94 File number: VID 187 of 2019 Judges: BESANKO, MURPHY AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 10 September 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from single judge of Federal Court – no appellable error by the primary judge – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 93 ALJR 252 Date of hearing: 21 August 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: S M Kelly Solicitor for the Appellant: Legal Aid Victoria Counsel for the Respondent: C J Tran Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
VID 187 of 2019 BETWEEN: VAN PHAT HUA
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGES:
BESANKO, MURPHY AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
10 SEPTEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, to be assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This is an appeal from orders made by a single judge of this court on 12 February 2019, dismissing the appellant’s amended originating application for judicial review of a decision of the respondent (by his delegate, the Assistant Minister) (the Minister) not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the appellant’s Class BB Subclass 155 Five Year Resident Return visa pursuant to s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam. He has normally resided in Australia since 18 September 1987, and had been the holder of a Class BB Subclass 155 Five Year Resident Return visa, until it was cancelled on 4 January 2016. It was cancelled under the mandatory cancellation provision in s 501(3A) of the Act, which applied because he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more, and he was serving a sentence of imprisonment on a full-time basis.
The appellant has an extensive criminal record dating back 30 years. As the primary judge recorded (Hua v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 94 at [1]):
In 1989 he was convicted of armed robbery and thereafter made regular appearances in the Magistrates and County Courts, with convictions for theft, burglary, assault, trafficking heroin and the handling of stolen goods, to name but a few. On 30 July 2014, he was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of arson, reckless conduct endangering life, making threats to kill, recklessly causing injury, intentionally destroying property, theft and cultivation of cannabis. He was sentenced to a cumulative total of three years and six months imprisonment.
The primary judge summarised the offending that led to his imprisonment as follows (at [5]):
On 5 November 2013,…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 158
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's failure to directly consider the appellant's statutory declaration constituted a material error that warranted overturning the decision. The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Minister may have overlooked the statutory declaration, any such error was not material as the Minister had clearly understood that the appellant was remorseful. The court found that the primary judge did not err in his assessment, as the statutory declaration, although direct, was not the sole or necessarily the best evidence of remorse. The Minister had considered other factors and evidence, including secondary expressions of remorse and the appellant's overall conduct.
The court held that the primary judge's conclusion that any error by the Minister was not material was correct. The court found that the Minister's decision was not influenced by the absence of direct evidence of remorse from the appellant, as the Minister had already acknowledged the appellant's remorse through other means. The court concluded that the Minister's assessment of the appellant's rehabilitation potential was reasonable and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the respondent's costs. The decision affirmed the primary judge's findings and upheld the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, to be assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant also contends that the primary judge erred by holding, in the alternative, that any error, if there be one, was not material and therefore did not rise to the level of jurisdictional error. The submissions to that effect were as follows:The Minister was aware of the appellant’s submission, in general terms, that he was remorseful. So much follows from paragraph 12 of the Minister’s reasons, and the discussion in paragraph [60] of those reasons. But it was the Minister who elevated the significance of remorse by declaring that “remorse is a salient part of the rehabilitation process”. In giving content to the question of rehabilitation (in part) by reference to remorse, the Minister signalled the importance that he intended to attach, in the deliberative process, to such remorse. In what the Minister understood to be an absence of direct evidence from the appellant, he proceeded to assess this factor by reference to secondary expressions of remorse and a posited inability on the part of the appellant to express remorse by reason of his schizophrenia. The Minister did not take into account the best evidence on this question, which was that of the appellant himself.The Minister’s error was material. The appellant’s expression of remorse, made by way of a statement sworn under the pain and penalties of perjury, may have affected the Minister’s assessment of the degree to which the appellant was remorseful (and the degree to which the appellant was capable of expressing such remorse) and the weight to be attached to the appellant’s remorse when considering the risk the appellant posed to the Australian community. If the Minister had reached a different conclusion about either of those matters the Minister may have reached a different conclusion on the degree of risk to the Australian community posed by the appellant or may have placed different weight on his conclusion as to that risk when evaluating how to exercise the discretion conferred by s 501CA(4). If any of these things had occurred, the discretion may have been exercised differently.(Emphasis in original). Consideration of statutory declaration grounds of appeal We accept that it is more likely than not, in all the circumstances, that the Minister did overlook the fact that the appellant had given “direct” evidence of his remorse in the form of the statutory declaration referred to at [8] above. In our view, however, that omission was not material. In our view, the fundamental premise that underpins the submissions in relation to grounds 1-3, namely that a personal, sworn statement of remorse is the “best” evidence of remorse, is a false one, at least in the circumstances of this case. During the course of her oral submissions, counsel for the appellant submitted that the “best” evidence of remorse is that which comes from the person claiming to be rehabilitated, and that the Minister was wrong to give weight instead only to the “secondary” evidence of others that the appellant was genuinely remorseful. During her oral submissions, counsel for the appellant put the contention as follows:And this, in my submission, is also why the error, if it be an error, was material, because a direct expression of remorse in the words of the appellant, in a detailed statutory declaration that set out the offending, his experience of remorse in several different contexts, remorse for breaking Australian law, but also remorse for what he did for his family, is the best evidence of, one, the appellant’s remorse and, two, the genuineness of that remorse.