HTX v Commissioner of Police

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

HTX v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 195

PARTIES:

HTX

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

808 of 2024

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

21 November 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 September 2024

JUDGE:

Sheridan DCJ

ORDER:

1.    Appeal allowed.

2.   Set aside the verdict of guilty, enter a verdict of not guilty and discharge the appellant.

3.   No order as to costs.   

CATCHWORDS:

MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AND REVIEW – QUEENSLAND – APPEAL – where the appeal was brought pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where appellant was charged with one charge of stalking contrary to s 359E(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where appellant appeals conviction and sentence – where one of the acts referred to was outside the charged period - whether there was sufficient evidence for Magistrate to find appellant guilty – whether sentence manifestly excessive

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 359A, s 359B, s 359C, s 359E

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 40, s 222, s 223, s 226, s 232, s 232A

CASES:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612

R v Briggs [2013] QCA 110

R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550

Rowe v Kemper [2009] 1 Qd R 247
Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489
White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584

COUNSEL:

M J Jackson for the appellant

M F Christensen for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Fisher Dore for the appellant

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) instructed by the Queensland Police Service for the respondent

The Charges

  1. The appellant appeals against his conviction for one charge of stalking (contrary to s 359E of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (the Code)) between 1 November 2020 and 9 March 2022 at Brisbane in the State of Queensland. The original charge based on conduct between 1 November 2021 and 3 March 2023 was dismissed on the morning of the trial.

  2. Particulars were provided of the charge. Paragraph 1 of the particulars (as amended) alleged that between 1 November 2020 and 9 March 2022, the appellant unlawfully stalked the complainant by engaging in one or more of the following acts which were intentionally directed at her, namely:

    1.Intimidate and/or harass the complainant by recording her walking from the shower to a bedroom whilst naked;

    2.Intimidate and/or harass the complainant by uploading still images of her naked to his Facebook account;

    3.Harass the complainant by searching through her mobile telephone;

    4.Harass the complainant by reading her diary and making it known to her;

    5.Harass the complainant by contacting her work supervisor and discussing with…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 195
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of HTX v Commissioner of Police, the appellant was charged with stalking contrary to section 359E(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). The appellant brought an appeal against both the conviction and the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court. The appeal was brought pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The central legal issues were whether there was sufficient evidence to find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The court examined the evidence presented, particularly the element of detriment, which is essential for a stalking conviction. The Magistrate did not consider the complainant's emotional state and changes in demeanour in the context of the breakup of her relationship with the appellant, rather than the alleged stalking. The court found that the Magistrate did not properly consider the evidence relating to detriment, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of stalking. Consequently, the appeal on the first ground was upheld. The court also noted that the appeal should be decided as a rehearing on the existing evidence, rather than ordering a new trial before a different Magistrate.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the verdict of guilty, and entered a verdict of not guilty, discharging the appellant. There was no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the verdict of guilty, enter a verdict of not guilty and discharge the appellant.

3. No order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The timing is also relevant to the alleged change in demeanour, but there are other problems with the submission that this provides proof of detriment. The complainant said that she became more withdrawn, but it is clear that this change was because she did not want to talk about the breakdown of the relationship with the appellant either to her family or friends. Her supervisor gave evidence of observing the complainant being emotional, but he made it clear that this occurred during the period, and inferentially because of, the marriage breakdown. The complainant’s friend, who had known the complainant since primary school, gave direct evidence that she observed the complainant being emotional during this period and said that the complainant explained to her that this was because she was going through her separation and divorce. Her friend described the complainant as a really strong, kind, beautiful person, and later as a fairly private person.Conclusion as regards Detriment The evidence and the considerations relating to detriment, to which I have referred, were not considered by the Magistrate. Section 225 of the Justices Act allows this court to set aside an order, and remit the proceedings to the person who made the original order with directions for the further conduct of the proceedings including directions for rehearing and reconsideration. I do not consider, given the way that the matter was approached by the learned Magistrate, however, that he could fairly reconsider whether the charge was made out having proper regard to the element of detriment. It is technically possible that an order could be made for a new trial before a different Magistrate, but neither party advocated that course and both, consistently with the provisions of the Justices Act and quite properly, were prepared to have the appeal decided as a rehearing on the existing evidence. In my view, having regard to the requirements of the legislation, the nature and timing of the changes in the physical behaviours, the delay in and background to the making of the criminal complaint, the fact that the changes in demeanour were explicable for reasons unrelated to the alleged harassment and all the evidence offered at trial, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence of detriment within the meaning of the Code to hold the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of stalking.Ground 1 of the Appeal I accordingly uphold ground 1 of the appeal. That is sufficient to dispose of the appeal but it is necessary to make findings on the other grounds in case an alternate conclusion is reached as to ground 1.Ground 2 of the Appeal As previously indicated, there were findings by the learned Magistrate that the conduct would have caused the stalked person fear, but there is no actual finding by the Magistrate that the appellant caused the complainant apprehension or fear of violence within the meaning of s 359B(d)(i) or s 359B(d)(ii) (in so far as detriment is defined in s 359A to include apprehension or fear of violence). Nor do I consider that the Magistrate would have been entitled to do so given the way the trial was run by the respondent and having regard to the evidence of the complainant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established