FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
HPZB v Minister for Home Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 297
File number: MLG 257 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS Date of judgment: 3 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – costs – where applicant sought mandamus for alleged breach by respondents of s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where on day of final hearing applicant conceded that respondents no longer in breach of duty – where applicant sought costs of proceeding – whether Court should make determination of merits when original application and relief no longer pursued – where none of the parties was unreasonable in its commencement, maintenance or defence of the proceeding – where despite some evidence before the Court not possible to reach concluded view on merits of the case – principle identified in Ex parte Lai Qin applied – no order for costs – application for mandamus dismissed Legislation: Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 9
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 19, 36, 91W, 198, 501, 501A
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 214
Cases cited: BHL19 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 313
CEU19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2019) 165 ALD 566; [2019] FCA 1050
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; [1997] HCA 6
Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for Local Government [2017] HCA Trans 244
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of last submissions: 16 May 2022 Date of hearing: 16 May 2022 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the applicant: Mr A Aleksov and Ms D Gang Solicitor for the applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the respondents: Mr C Horan KC and Mr N Swan Solicitor for the respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
MLG257 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: HPZB
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SYMONS
DATE OF ORDER:
4 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application filed on 1 February 2022 seeking final orders, including a writ of mandamus, be dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SYMONS:
INTRODUCTION
By an application filed on 1 February 2022, the applicant sought relief that included the following orders:
1. a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs requiring the Secretary…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 297
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the respondents breached their statutory duty under section 198(1) of the Act. The court considered the submissions and affidavits from both parties, including the affidavits of Mr Michael Carey and Mr Paul Wyllie, who detailed the actions taken by the respondents in response to the applicant’s request. The applicant argued that the respondents had not acted with sufficient urgency in processing his removal request, while the respondents contended that they had acted reasonably and within the scope of their statutory obligations.
The court exercised its discretion under section 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) to decide on the costs of the proceeding. The court concluded that neither party acted unreasonably in commencing, maintaining, or defending the proceedings. The court found that the applicant’s frustration with the pace of his removal did not justify an order for costs against the respondents. Additionally, the court could not reach a concluded view on the merits of the case due to insufficient evidence. Applying the principles from Ex parte Lai Qin, the court determined that no order for costs should be made, and the application for mandamus was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents submitted that the applicant had not proved the facts and circumstances necessary to establish an entitlement to mandamus so that the default position should prevail. CONSIDERATION This Court has a broad discretion in relation to the award of costs under s 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). It falls to be exercised in a particular context in the present case, being that the substantive proceeding has been rendered moot following a concession made by the applicant that the conditions for the grant of mandamus did not exist beyond the point in time that an inquiry was made of the Pakistan High Commission. The respondents of course say that the conditions were never present. In Lai Qin, an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (to affirm a decision not to grant her a protection visa) was rendered moot by the Minister exercising a personal discretion to grant her a protection visa under s 417 of the Act. McHugh J explained at 624-625:In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties…To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties had acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action. In administrative law matters, for example, it may appear that the defendant has acted unreasonably in exercising or refusing to exercise a power and that the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative but to commence a litigation.…Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried…If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. In Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for Local Government [2017] HCA Trans 244, Gageler J (as his Honour then was) cited the “guiding principle” in Lai Qin with approval and reiterated that it reflects the position that “if it appears that both parties have acted reasonably until the litigation was settled, or its further prosecution becomes futile, the proper exercise of the discretion as to costs will ordinarily mean that the Court will make no order as to the costs of the proceedings”. In this case, no criticism can be made of the decision taken by the applicant to commence this litigation or to maintain it to the point in time which he did. The applicant undoubtedly was frustrated by the pace at which he perceived the respondents to be taking steps directed at the duty contained in s 198(1) of the Act. Equally however, I am not persuaded, on the evidence that is before the Court, that the respondents’ decision to defend the application and to maintain its defence up to the date of hearing, could be characterised as unreasonable.