HPZB v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

HPZB v Minister for Home Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 297

File number: MLG 257 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 3 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – costs – where applicant sought mandamus for alleged breach by respondents of s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where on day of final hearing applicant conceded that respondents no longer in breach of duty – where applicant sought costs of proceeding – whether Court should make determination of merits when original application and relief no longer pursued – where none of the parties was unreasonable in its commencement, maintenance or defence of the proceeding – where despite some evidence before the Court not possible to reach concluded view on merits of the case – principle identified in Ex parte Lai Qin applied – no order for costs – application for mandamus dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 9

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 19, 36, 91W, 198, 501, 501A

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 214

Cases cited:

BHL19 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 313

CEU19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2019) 165 ALD 566; [2019] FCA 1050

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; [1997] HCA 6

Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for Local Government [2017] HCA Trans 244

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of last submissions: 16 May 2022
Date of hearing: 16 May 2022
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the applicant: Mr A Aleksov and Ms D Gang
Solicitor for the applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
Counsel for the respondents: Mr C Horan KC and Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

MLG257 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

HPZB

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SYMONS

DATE OF ORDER:

4 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application filed on 1 February 2022 seeking final orders, including a writ of mandamus, be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SYMONS:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By an application filed on 1 February 2022, the applicant sought relief that included the following orders:

    1. a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs requiring the Secretary…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read HPZB v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In HPZB v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, an Afghan national, sought a mandamus order compelling the respondents to remove him from Australia. This was pursuant to section 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), after he had requested removal in writing. The applicant alleged that the respondents breached their statutory duty to remove him as soon as reasonably practicable. The respondents, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister for Immigration, argued that they had not failed to perform their statutory duty and that the application should be dismissed. The central issue before the court was whether the respondents had failed to perform their duty to remove the applicant from Australia within a reasonable time after his written request on 13 December 2021.

The court had to determine whether the respondents breached their statutory duty under section 198(1) of the Act. The court considered the submissions and affidavits from both parties, including the affidavits of Mr Michael Carey and Mr Paul Wyllie, who detailed the actions taken by the respondents in response to the applicant’s request. The applicant argued that the respondents had not acted with sufficient urgency in processing his removal request, while the respondents contended that they had acted reasonably and within the scope of their statutory obligations.

The court exercised its discretion under section 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) to decide on the costs of the proceeding. The court concluded that neither party acted unreasonably in commencing, maintaining, or defending the proceedings. The court found that the applicant’s frustration with the pace of his removal did not justify an order for costs against the respondents. Additionally, the court could not reach a concluded view on the merits of the case due to insufficient evidence. Applying the principles from Ex parte Lai Qin, the court determined that no order for costs should be made, and the application for mandamus was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

To understand the change of position adopted by the applicant, it is necessary to record some of the background to the application and evidence relied on by the parties.BACKGROUND The applicant is an Afghan national who arrived in Australia on 19 January 2012 together with his wife and two sons. On 29 May 2015, the applicant, his wife and two sons applied for Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) Visas (the visas). On 15 March 2017, a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister for Immigration) refused to grant the visas. On 23 August 2017, the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) set aside the delegate’s decision, and remitted the matter for reconsideration to the Minister for Immigration with a direction that the applicant satisfied s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and that the grant of the visa was not precluded by s 91W of the Act (which deals with evidence of identity). On 17 December 2018, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration refused to grant the visa to the applicant pursuant to s 501(1) of the Act for the reason that the applicant’s conviction on one count of people smuggling in 2014 meant that he had a “substantial criminal record” and did not pass the character test. On 13 December 2019, the Tribunal set aside the delegate’s decision, and remitted the matter with a direction that the application for the visa not be refused under s 501(1) of the Act. On 10 December 2020, the first respondent (Minister) and Minister for Immigration gave the applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal of his application for a Temporary Visa under s 501A(2) of the Act. On 3 December 2021, the Minister for Immigration set aside the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 501A(2) of the Act and refused to grant the applicant the visa. That decision was communicated to the applicant on 6 December 2021. By an email dated 13 December 2021 to the Minister, copied to the Visa Applicant Character Consideration Unit in the Department of Home Affairs (Department), the applicant requested his removal from Australia under s 198(1) of the Act. It was common ground that s 198(1) of the Act imposes a statutory duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen who asks the Minister, in writing, to be so removed and that the applicant’s email (which amounted to such a written request) engaged s 198(1) of the Act. The central question for determination was whether – assessed across the timeframe commencing on 13 December 2021 and ending (as events transpired) on the day of the final hearing (16 May 2022) – there had been an actual or constructive failure to perform any duty to remove the applicant from Australia.EVIDENCE Counsel for the applicant and the respondents read a number of affidavits in support of their respective submissions. The applicant read (without objection) the affidavit of Abbey Burke dated 1 February 2022. The respondents read the two affidavits of Mr Michael Carey dated 28 April 2022 (First Carey affidavit), and 13 May 2022 (Second Carey affidavit), and the two affidavits of Mr Paul Wyllie dated 27 April 2022 (First Wyllie affidavit), and 13 May 2022 (Second Wyllie affidavit). The respondents also read the affidavit of Ms Ellie Babic dated 29 April 2022.Evidence of Mr Carey

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It was common ground that s 198(1) of the Act imposes a statutory duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen who asks the Minister, in writing, to be so removed and that the applicant’s email (which amounted to such a written request) engaged s 198(1) of the Act. The central question for determination was whether – assessed across the timeframe commencing on 13 December 2021 and ending (as events transpired) on the day of the final hearing (16 May 2022) – there had been an actual or constructive failure to perform any duty to remove the applicant from Australia.EVIDENCE Counsel for the applicant and the respondents read a number of affidavits in support of their respective submissions. The applicant read (without objection) the affidavit of Abbey Burke dated 1 February 2022. The respondents read the two affidavits of Mr Michael Carey dated 28 April 2022 (First Carey affidavit), and 13 May 2022 (Second Carey affidavit), and the two affidavits of Mr Paul Wyllie dated 27 April 2022 (First Wyllie affidavit), and 13 May 2022 (Second Wyllie affidavit). The respondents also read the affidavit of Ms Ellie Babic dated 29 April 2022.Evidence of Mr Carey In the First Carey affidavit, Mr Carey confirmed that he was an Inspector within the Field and Removals Operation Team (Removal Team), a team which is responsible for locating unlawful non-citizens as defined by s 19 of the Act. Mr Carey stated that he became aware of the email sent by the applicant to the Minister (see [10] above) on 14 December 2021. He described the line of inquiry that occurred within the Removal Team to gain information regarding the movement of Afghan citizens to third countries, and whether there were any treaties in place that would in fact permit this occurring. On 22 December 2021, the applicant and his legal representative participated in a removal planning interview with Mr Ockleshaw and completed a Part B form. Mr Carey deposed to this being a standard procedure which addressed removal planning considerations, such as the detainee’s country of citizenship and whether the detainee has a right of residency or long-term stay in other countries other than their home country. On 8 April 2022, Mr Ockleshaw sent an email to the applicant and his legal representative, requesting whether any of the applicant’s family members were entitled to residency or citizenship to a third country. On the same day, the applicant’s legal representative advised that were did not. In the Second Carey affidavit, Mr Carey described how on 11 May 2022, he had referred the applicant’s case to the Department’s Complex Identity Advice Team (CIAT) for advice on whether the applicant was a citizen of or has a right to residency in a country outside of Afghanistan. On 12 May 2022, CIAT accepted the referral and advised it was awaiting the allocation of an Identity Officer. When Mr Carey was called, he adopted the First and Second Carey affidavits and gave evidence that the Removal Team and removals officers have responsibility for fulfilment of the duty under s 198 of the Act in any given case. Those individuals – APS4/5 officers – have responsibility for the day-to-day management of a person’s removal procedure, including the coordination of logistics. The activities of the removal officer are supervised by an APS 6 supervisor to whom matters can be escalated. In this case, Mr Carey was the officer responsible for supervising the activities of Mr John Ockleshaw.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents submitted that the applicant had not proved the facts and circumstances necessary to establish an entitlement to mandamus so that the default position should prevail. CONSIDERATION This Court has a broad discretion in relation to the award of costs under s 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). It falls to be exercised in a particular context in the present case, being that the substantive proceeding has been rendered moot following a concession made by the applicant that the conditions for the grant of mandamus did not exist beyond the point in time that an inquiry was made of the Pakistan High Commission. The respondents of course say that the conditions were never present. In Lai Qin, an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (to affirm a decision not to grant her a protection visa) was rendered moot by the Minister exercising a personal discretion to grant her a protection visa under s 417 of the Act. McHugh J explained at 624-625:In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties…To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties had acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action. In administrative law matters, for example, it may appear that the defendant has acted unreasonably in exercising or refusing to exercise a power and that the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative but to commence a litigation.…Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried…If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. In Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for Local Government [2017] HCA Trans 244, Gageler J (as his Honour then was) cited the “guiding principle” in Lai Qin with approval and reiterated that it reflects the position that “if it appears that both parties have acted reasonably until the litigation was settled, or its further prosecution becomes futile, the proper exercise of the discretion as to costs will ordinarily mean that the Court will make no order as to the costs of the proceedings”. In this case, no criticism can be made of the decision taken by the applicant to commence this litigation or to maintain it to the point in time which he did. The applicant undoubtedly was frustrated by the pace at which he perceived the respondents to be taking steps directed at the duty contained in s 198(1) of the Act. Equally however, I am not persuaded, on the evidence that is before the Court, that the respondents’ decision to defend the application and to maintain its defence up to the date of hearing, could be characterised as unreasonable.