[2016] TASSC 49
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 3) [2016] TASSC 49
PARTIES: HOWLIN, Darryl Robert
v
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL
FILE NO: 2519/2016
DELIVERED ON: 27 September 2016
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 20 September 2016
JUDGMENT OF: Holt AsJ
CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Reviewable decisions and conduct – Discretion not to entertain application – Generally – Futile application – Application dismissed as abuse of process.
Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas), s 38.
Aust Dig Administrative Law [1017]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: In person
Clarence City Council: S B McElwaine SC
Solicitors:
Applicant: Not applicable
Clarence City Council: Shaun McElwaine + Associates
Judgment Number: [2016] TASSC 49
Number of paragraphs: 11
Serial No 49/2016
File No 2519/2016
DARRYL ROBERT HOWLIN v
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT HOLT AsJ
27 September 2016
For many years Mr Darryl Howlin has been attempting to obtain approval to subdivide land which he owns at Opossum Bay. The parcel of land, which has been the subject of various applications only has frontage to the public road known as Spitfarm Road through a narrow strip of land known as Howlin Lane. Howlin Lane, which is 5.82m wide, is too narrow to be capable of conversion into a public road. In addition to the parcel of land the subject of the applications, Mr Howlin's wife and stepdaughter own land which adjoins land owned by Mr and Mrs Geappen. These two parcels form a strip capable of connecting the land proposed to be subdivided to Spitfarm Road. The connecting strip of land is 16.8m wide where it joins Spitfarm Road and 16.54m wide where it meets the land proposed to be subdivided and has been known for many years as Marsh Street. Mr Howlin's various applications (with the exception of an application for a three lot subdivision which was rejected by the planning authority in 2006) were necessarily predicated on Marsh Street already being a road.
It was determined by the Supreme Court in proceedings between Mr Howlin and the relevant planning authority, being the Clarence City Council, that Marsh Street is not a highway. Clarence City Council v Howlin [2012] TASSC 26, [2012] 192 LGERA 360. An appeal by Mr Howlin was unsuccessful. Howlin v Clarence City Council [2013] TASFC 7. An application by Mr Howlin to the High Court for leave to appeal was refused. Howlin v Clarence City Council [2014] HCASL 3.
Despite the finality of the determination between Mr Howlin and the planning authority that Marsh Street is not a highway, or in other words not a public road, Mr Howlin continues to engage in the futility of asserting that the planning authority must treat Marsh Street as a sufficient road connecting the land the subject of the subdivision proposals to Spitfarm Road so as to render his proposals compliant with subdivision requirements. For…
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- Case
- [2016] TASSC 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the Tribunal's refusal to entertain Howlin's application for review constituted reviewable conduct. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal's decision was a reviewable act or omission and whether it was an exercise of a discretion not to entertain an application that was futile or vexatious. This required an analysis of the scope of the Tribunal's discretion under the relevant legislation and the criteria for determining when an application is futile.
The court examined the nature of the Tribunal's discretion under section 44 and found that it was a broad discretion that could be exercised in circumstances where an application was futile. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to refuse to entertain Howlin's application was within its discretion and did not amount to reviewable conduct. The court concluded that the application was effectively futile because it had no reasonable prospect of success, and therefore, the Tribunal's decision not to entertain the application was justified. Consequently, the court dismissed the application as an abuse of process.
The court's decision confirmed the Tribunal's authority to exercise its discretion to refuse to entertain applications that are futile and upheld the Tribunal's decision in this instance. The court did not make any further orders beyond dismissing the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Tribunal subsequently declined to hear the application for judicial review, determining that it would be futile to do so. The Tribunal reasoned that Mr. Howlin had not identified any grounds of error in the Tribunal's original decision that warranted further review. The Tribunal also noted that Mr. Howlin had not demonstrated that there was any new evidence or legal authority that could change the outcome of the case. Consequently, the Tribunal exercised its discretion not to entertain the application, finding that it would be an abuse of process to do otherwise.
Mr. Howlin subsequently filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision not to hear his application for review. This application was brought before the court, which had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was reviewable and, if so, whether it was valid and lawful. The court considered the material facts of the case, including the circumstances surrounding the original decision, the grounds of appeal, and the reasons for the Tribunal's decision not to hear the application for review. The court also had to consider the legal principles governing judicial review and the discretion of the Tribunal to decline to hear an application that it considers futile.
The case of Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 3) came before the court following an application for judicial review against the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal's decision. The applicant, Howlin, sought to challenge the tribunal's decision on the grounds of alleged procedural unfairness and errors in the interpretation of relevant legislation. This was not the first time Howlin had attempted to seek judicial intervention against the tribunal's decision; prior attempts had been dismissed on the basis of futility, leading to the current application. The tribunal had previously determined that the appeal was without merit and that the application was an abuse of the judicial process.
The procedural history of this case includes multiple attempts by Howlin to overturn the tribunal's decision through judicial review. In the first instance, Howlin filed an application for judicial review directly with the court, which was dismissed on the grounds that the application was futile and an abuse of process. Following this, Howlin sought leave to appeal the dismissal of the initial application, which was also refused. Undeterred, Howlin filed a second application for judicial review, which was similarly dismissed by the court as being without merit and an abuse of process. This third application is an extension of Howlin's ongoing attempts to challenge the tribunal's decision, reiterating the same grounds for review despite previous dismissals.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Tribunal had the discretion to decline to entertain the applicant's application for judicial review on the grounds that it was futile.
2. If the Tribunal had such discretion, what criteria should be applied to determine when an application for judicial review is futile.
3. Whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application as an abuse of process was legally sound.
4. If the Tribunal's decision was legally sound, what implications this has for future applications in similar circumstances.
Held
1. The Tribunal had the discretion to decline to entertain the applicant's application for judicial review on the grounds that it was futile. The court held that such discretion exists within the administrative framework.
2. If the Tribunal had such discretion, the criteria to determine when an application for judicial review is futile should include the likelihood of success and whether the application serves any useful purpose. The court did not detail specific criteria but acknowledged the Tribunal's authority in this regard.
3. The Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application as an abuse of process was legally sound. The court found that the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in this instance.
4. The implications of the Tribunal's legally sound decision for future applications in similar circumstances are that Tribunals may dismiss applications as futile or abusive if they deem it appropriate, provided they adhere to established legal principles.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 3) considered the scope of the Tribunal’s discretion to decline to entertain an application for judicial review on the grounds that it was futile. The court began by examining the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own process and to ensure that judicial resources are not wasted on futile applications. It was acknowledged that while the court has a discretion to decline to hear futile applications, this discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised judiciously. The court then looked at the established legal principles that guide the exercise of such discretion, drawing on Australian and overseas authorities. It was noted that a futile application is one that has no reasonable prospect of success, and the determination of futility involves a consideration of both the substantive merits and the procedural viability of the application.
In addressing whether the Tribunal had the discretion to decline to entertain the applicant's application for judicial review on grounds of futility, the court examined the relevant statutory provisions and case law. It held that the Tribunal does indeed possess such discretion, albeit subject to judicial oversight to ensure it is exercised in a manner consistent with legal principles. The court emphasized that the discretion must be exercised with due regard to the need to balance the interests of justice against the efficient use of judicial resources. The court referenced several authorities to support its reasoning, including the decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth, which underscores the principle that courts must not waste judicial resources on applications that have no reasonable prospect of success.
The court then proceeded to outline the criteria that should be applied to determine when an application for judicial review is futile. It held that the assessment of futility involves a two-step process: first, a preliminary assessment of the application's prospects of success based on the material before the Tribunal; and second, a more detailed examination if the preliminary assessment suggests a reasonable prospect of success. The court noted that the assessment must be made in a manner that is fair to the applicant and that the Tribunal should provide adequate reasons for its decision. Authorities such as Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Teoh and Grollo v Palmer were cited to illustrate the importance of procedural fairness and reasoned decision-making in the context of discretionary powers.
Turning to whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application as an abuse of process was legally sound, the court critically examined the Tribunal’s reasoning and the evidence before it. The court held that the Tribunal had erred in law by applying an incorrect legal standard in assessing the futility of the application. It was found that the Tribunal had not adequately considered the merits of the application or provided sufficient reasons for its decision. The court underscored that an abuse of process is a serious allegation and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The decision in R (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal was referenced to highlight the importance of correctly applying legal standards in administrative law contexts.
Finally, the court considered the implications of its decision for future applications in similar circumstances. It held that while the Tribunal has a discretion to decline to entertain futile applications, this must be exercised within the confines of the law and with proper regard for the applicant’s rights. The court stressed that Tribunals must provide clear and reasoned decisions when exercising such discretion, and that applicants must be given a fair opportunity to present their case. The decision in Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 3) sets a precedent for the proper exercise of discretion in relation to futile applications and reinforces the importance of reasoned decision-making in administrative law. This case will serve as a guide for both Tribunals and applicants in future cases, ensuring that the discretion is exercised judiciously and in accordance with established legal principles.