Howell v Rose

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Howell v Rose [2002] FCA 1196

BANKRUPTCY – Appeal against sequestration order – Agreement between parties to “stay of proceedings” pending trial of cross-claim by debtor against creditor – Whether this extended to bankruptcy proceedings – Authority of solicitor to make the agreement – Whether it is necessary for a substituted petitioning creditor to have obtained judgment in order to satisfy s 44(1)(a) of Bankruptcy Act 1966 –Whether debtor able to pay his debts – Whether other sufficient cause for not making a sequestration order – Need to value cross-claim.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss 44(1)(a), 49, 52(2), (4), (5)

PAUL ROCH HOWELL v JOHN EMMANUEL ROSE

N1602 of 2001

WILCOX J
27 SEPTEMBER 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1602 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF A FEDERAL MAGISTRATE OF THE
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PAUL ROCH HOWELL
APPELLANT

AND:

JOHN EMMANUEL ROSE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by Raphael FM on 19 November 2001 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the petition be dismissed with costs.

3.The respondent, John Emmanuel Rose, pay the costs of the appeal of the appellant, Paul Roch Howell.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1602 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF A FEDERAL MAGISTRATE OF THE
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PAUL ROCH HOWELL
APPELLANT

AND:

JOHN EMMANUEL ROSE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

27 SEPTEMBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WILCOX J:

  1. This is an appeal against orders made in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia.  On 19 November 2001 Raphael FM made a sequestration order against the estate of the appellant, Paul Roch Howell, and ancillary orders.  These orders included a stay of proceedings under the sequestration order until 30 November 2001.  Raphael FM later extended the stay until 10 December 2001.  After an appeal was filed in this Court, the stay was further extended, effectively until the determination of the appeal.

  2. On 5 February 2002, pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the Chief Justice determined that the appeal should be heard and determined by a single judge of the Court. The matter was assigned to me. However, I did not immediately set a hearing date, the reason being that the parties wished to engage in negotiations. These negotiations, which included a formal mediation conference, extended over some months. But they were unproductive and I appointed 19 September 2002 for the hearing. On that occasion, Mr B De Buse of counsel appeared for the appellant. The respondent, John Emmanuel Rose, the petitioning creditor, was represented by Mr C Stomo of counsel.

  3. Early in the hearing of the appeal, Mr Stomo…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Paul Roch Howell, was a real estate developer who was involved in a business relationship with Fine Real Estate Network Pty Limited. Following a dispute, Howell was unsuccessful in litigation against Fine Real Estate and two associated individuals, Mervyn Keith Fine and Patricia Joan Fine. The Fine creditors served a bankruptcy notice on Howell which was not satisfied. They subsequently filed a creditor’s petition in the Federal Magistrates Court claiming an indebtedness by Howell of $312,537.55. During this time, the respondent, John Emmanuel Rose, a solicitor who had acted for Howell in the Fine litigation, had also sought to recover costs from Howell. Howell filed a cross-claim alleging negligence against Rose in relation to the Fine litigation. The Federal Magistrates Court heard the appeal against the sequestration order, with issues including whether an agreement to stay proceedings extended to the bankruptcy proceedings, the authority of Rose’s solicitor to make the agreement, whether it was necessary for a substituted petitioning creditor to have obtained judgment in order to satisfy s 44(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, whether Howell was able to pay his debts, whether there was other sufficient cause for not making a sequestration order, and the need to value the cross-claim.

The court found that there was no binding agreement between the parties that prevented it from dealing with the petition. The court was not satisfied that Howell was able to pay his debts and found that the existence of a cross-claim could be sufficient cause for dismissal of a petition. The court noted that it was difficult to make any finding as to the likelihood of success of Howell’s cross-claim in the absence of more information. The court concluded that it was in a far better position to decide the merits of a matter coming before it than a Judge in bankruptcy who had not had the benefit of any of the papers.

The appeal was allowed, the orders made by Raphael FM on 19 November 2001 were set aside and, in lieu thereof, it was ordered that the petition be dismissed with costs. The respondent, John Emmanuel Rose, was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal of the appellant, Paul Roch Howell.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by Raphael FM on 19 November 2001 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the petition be dismissed with costs.

3. The respondent, John Emmanuel Rose, pay the costs of the appeal of the appellant, Paul Roch Howell.

Background

Background to the litigation

Early in the hearing of the appeal, Mr Stomo sought to tender additional evidence, in the form of an affidavit. Mr De Buse objected to the tender on several grounds. During ensuing argument, Mr Stomo withdrew the tender. In the result, therefore, the evidence before this Court is the same as what was before the learned magistrate. That evidence did not give rise to any dispute concerning primary facts, although there were (and remain) issues between the parties concerning the interpretation of some documents and the significance of some primary facts.The facts Mr Howell is a real estate developer/investor. For some time he was involved in a business relationship with Fine Real Estate Network Pty Limited (“Fine Real Estate”). A dispute arose. There was litigation (“the Fine litigation”) in the Supreme Court of New South Wales between Mr Howell, on the one side, and Fine Real Estate, and two individuals associated with that company, Mervyn Keith Fine and Patricia Joan Fine, on the other. Mr Rose is a solicitor. He acted for Mr Howell in the Fine litigation. Mr Howell was unsuccessful in the litigation, both at first instance and on appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The result was that Mr Howell had an indebtedness to Fine Real Estate, and to Mr and Mrs Fine (“the Fine creditors”). The Fine creditors served a bankruptcy notice on Mr Howell. It was not satisfied. On 2 December 1999 they filed in this Court a creditor’s petition in which they claimed an indebtedness by Mr Howell to them of $312,537.55. In the meantime, Mr Rose had been attempting to recover from Mr Howell a balance of costs that he claimed to be owed to him in respect of the Fine litigation. On 6 November 1998 he had obtained summary judgment against Mr Howell in the District Court of New South Wales. But Mr Howell subsequently obtained leave to file a cross-claim alleging that Mr Rose was negligent in his conduct of the Fine litigation. On 30 July 1999 the summary judgment awarded to Mr Rose was set aside on terms that related primarily to prosecution of the cross-claim. On 8 October 1999 judgment was again entered in favour of Mr Rose, this time for $360,877 plus costs. However, this judgment also was set aside. On 10 February 2000 Mr Howell’s solicitors, Dennis and Company, filed in this Court a notice of intention to oppose the creditor’s petition. On 12 May 2000 a third summary judgment was entered in the District Court in favour of Mr Rose. It was stayed until 21 June 2000. There was no subsequent court order, either to stay proceedings on the judgment or to set the judgment aside. On 26 June 2000 the Fine creditors’ bankruptcy proceeding was adjourned to 26 October 2000. On that day an order was made, in this Court, substituting Mr Rose as petitioning creditor. Pursuant to s 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, it was ordered that the period at the end of which the petition would lapse be extended to 24 months from the date of presentation. That meant the petition would lapse on 2 December 2001.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J
In fact the bankruptcy proceeding was not heard on 8 November 2001. Because Mr Howell was ill that day, it was adjourned until 13 November 2001. On that day, Mr Dennis again sought an adjournment. However, his application was refused. The hearing proceeded. At its conclusion Raphael FM reserved his judgment. He delivered judgment, and made orders, on 19 November 2001.The magistrate’s judgment The magistrate set out a summary of the facts, with particular mention of the letter from Mr Dennis to Ms Baxter of 22 March 2001 and the White & Downey letter of 11 October 2001. He went on:“I find this correspondence somewhat confusing. Firstly, the letter from Dennis & Co to Ebsworth & Ebsworth refers to ‘stay of proceedings’ and does not refer specifically to the bankruptcy application. I am aware from an affidavit sworn by Mr Vincent Darcy [sic] of Messrs White & Downey and dated 13 November 2001 that on 20 March 2001 that firm lodged a certified copy of a writ obtained in the District Court matter at the Land Titles Office against a property owned by Mr Howell at 2 Vickar Street Coogee. It is certainly possible that the reference to stay of proceedings could be to a stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment that had previously been obtained by Mr Rose. The issuance and prosecution of a bankruptcy petition is not the enforcement of a judgment (Re Sarina: Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 32 ALR 596, 599). In any event, given the letter from Messrs White & Downey of the 11 October 2001, I would have expected Mr Howell’s lawyers to take immediate steps to enforce the agreement if it had really been extended to the bankruptcy process. I would also have considerable doubt as to whether without further evidence I could be satisfied that Messrs. Ebsworth & Ebsworth whose real client was the insurer, could have bound the creditor to such an arrangement without specific authority when the debtor’s solicitor well knew that the firm was not acting in the bankruptcy proceedings but only in respect of the District Court proceedings. I would not be prepared to find on the evidence before me that there was any binding agreement between the parties that prevents me from dealing with the petition now before me.” Raphael FM indicated he was not satisfied that Mr Howell was able to pay his debts, within the meaning of s 52(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. In relation to the claimed set-off, Raphael FM acknowledged that the “existence of a cross-claim can be sufficient cause” for dismissal of a petition. He cited a decision of a Full Court of this Court, Ling v Enrobook Pty Limited (1997) 74 FCR 19. The learned magistrate went on:“It is the respondent’s argument that his cross claim goes to the very heart of the judgment against him. The judgment is in respect of legal costs for Mr Rose’s representation of Mr Howell in proceedings against Fine Real Estate Network. Mr Howell claims that the conduct of those proceedings was flawed in a number of respects but in particular in relation to the failure to produce evidence. I have read the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case where that court upheld the decision of the primary Judge not to admit evidence which had not been tendered before the referee. These matters are dealt with in pages 15 to 18 of the Reasons for Judgment which are supportive of a strongly critical approach taken to Mr Howell by both the referee and the trial Judge. I did not have before me either the judgment of the referee or of the Judge at first instance. Although I do have the cross claim, this is a document without much particularisation. In the absence of more information it is very difficult for me to make any finding as to the likelihood of success of the respondent in those District Court proceedings. I can say, however, that I am entitled to draw an inference if there was anything that was particularly helpful it would have been produced. I am further assisted in coming to the decision which I reach below by the fact that there is no current stay of execution in respect of the original judgment even though the effect of the cross claim is a direct attack upon it. A stay was originally granted but, for some reason which has not been presented to me, it lapsed in June 2000 and was not renewed. Surely, the most appropriate application that could have been made in this matter was one for a further stay pending the hearing of the cross claim. The District Court would have had before it all particulars relating to the judgment and to the cross claim. That Court would have been in a far better position to decide the merits of a matter coming before it than a Judge in bankruptcy who has not had the benefit of any of the papers.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J

Full text does not contain this section.