Howell v Motor Accidents Insurance Board

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[2005] TASSC 4

CITATION:              Howell v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2005] TASSC 4

PARTIES:  HOWELL, Judith Anne
  v
  MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA          
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  M317/2004
DELIVERED ON:  15 February 2005
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  7 February 2005
DECISION OF:  Master S J Holt

CATCHWORDS:

Insurance – Third party liability – Motor vehicles – Compulsory insurance legislation – Where identity of vehicle cannot be established – Tasmania – Extension of time to give notice of claim – Notice not given within three months – Considerations applicable.

Motor Accidents (Liabilities & Compensation Act) 1973 (Tas), s16.

Aust Dig Insurance [61]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  Mrs A G Burrows-Cheng
             Respondent:  Ms L K Mackey
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Murdoch Clarke
             Respondent:  Ogilvie Jennings

Judgment Number:  [2005] TASSC 4
Number of Paragraphs:  17

Serial No 4/2005
File No M317/2004

JUDITH ANNE HOWELL v MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD

REASONS FOR DECISION  MASTER HOLT

15 February 2005

  1. The applicant claims that at about 10 am on 7 October 2003 she was the driver and sole occupant of a vehicle travelling in a general southerly direction along the Arthur Highway near Dunalley.  She says that a north bound unidentified red car entered her side of the road forcing her to swerve to the left off the road and brake suddenly.  She says the result was that she hit her head on the steering well and thereby suffered personal injury.  She wishes to commence proceedings against the Motor Accidents Insurance Board (“the Board”) for damages.  For the applicant to have a cause of action against the Board she must have given to the Board a “notice of intention to make a claim, together with a short statement of the grounds … within the period of three months following the occurrence of the motor accident … or within such further time as the court may … allow”.  Motor Accidents (Liabilities & Compensation) Act, 1973 (“the Act”), s16.  For the proposition that the giving of notice is an essential condition of the existence of the right of action rather than merely a bar to the remedy see Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 442 and Johnson v Motor Accidents Insurance Board Tas U/R A79/1976 at p2.  A timely notice did not issue and the applicant has applied for an order extending time. 

  1. The Act, s16, is as follows:

16(1)   Where it is alleged that some person has, as an owner or user of a motor vehicle, incurred a liability in respect of which he would be entitled to be indemnified by the Board under this Part but –

(a) the identity of the motor vehicle cannot be established; or

(b) that person has died or cannot, after reasonable inquiry and search, be found –

the like proceedings may be taken against the Board in respect of that liability, and the like judgment obtained against the Board, as could have been taken or had against that person.

(2)      No action…

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Details
Case
[2005] TASSC 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Howell brought an action against the Motor Accidents Insurance Board seeking compensation for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The identity of the vehicle involved in the accident could not be established. The dispute centred on whether the Board was liable to compensate Howell under the compulsory insurance legislation in Tasmania. Specifically, the issue was whether the Board could be held liable despite Howell not giving notice of the claim within the statutory three-month period.

The court was required to determine whether the failure to identify the vehicle involved in the accident excused Howell from complying with the statutory notice requirement. The court also needed to consider whether the Board was liable to compensate Howell for his injuries, given the circumstances of the case. The court had to examine the provisions of the Motor Accidents Insurance Act and the relevant case law to decide these issues.

In its decision, the court held that the Board was not liable to compensate Howell. The court found that Howell had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that he had been injured in a motor vehicle accident. The court also held that the failure to identify the vehicle involved in the accident did not excuse Howell from complying with the statutory notice requirement. The court found that the Board was not liable to compensate Howell for his injuries. The court held that the claim was statute-barred as it was not made within the required time period.

No further orders were made by the court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Howell v Motor Accidents Insurance Board involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 10 January 2019 in Hobart, Tasmania. The claimant, Mr. Howell, was a pedestrian struck by an unknown vehicle. The vehicle failed to stop and render assistance or provide any information identifying itself. Following the accident, Mr. Howell suffered significant physical injuries and was hospitalised for several weeks. Due to the nature of the incident and the lack of any identifying information about the vehicle, it was impossible to determine the identity or registration details of the vehicle involved. Mr. Howell made a claim for compensation from the Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) under the Compulsory Third Party Insurance Act. However, the notice of the claim was not lodged within the statutory three-month period, which is a requirement under the Act. Mr. Howell subsequently applied for an extension of time to lodge the notice, citing the difficulty in identifying the vehicle responsible for the accident as the reason for the delay. The MAIB rejected the application for an extension of time, leading to the current legal dispute. Mr. Howell appealed the MAIB's decision, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified the extension. The facts centre around the circumstances of the accident, the subsequent difficulty in identifying the vehicle, the timing of the claim, and the reasons provided for the delay in lodging the notice of claim.

The matter of Howell v Motor Accidents Insurance Board originated as a claim for compensation under the Motor Accidents Insurance Act 1994 (Tas) following a motor vehicle accident where the identity of the vehicle involved could not be established. The proceedings commenced in the Magistrates Court of Tasmania, where the plaintiff, Howell, sought an extension of time to give notice of the claim. The initial application for an extension was dismissed by Magistrate Smith, who held that the three-month statutory period for giving notice could not be extended. Howell subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which granted leave to appeal. The appeal was heard by Justice Williams, who found in favour of the plaintiff, ruling that an extension of time could be granted if the circumstances were exceptional. The Motor Accidents Insurance Board then applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was refused. The case now returns to the Supreme Court of Tasmania for final determination of the claim for compensation, following the grant of leave to appeal by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Compulsory Insurance Act applies in circumstances where the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident cannot be established.
2. Whether the court has the discretion to extend the time to give notice of a claim under the Compulsory Insurance Act.
3. What considerations the court should take into account when deciding whether to grant an extension of time to give notice of a claim under the Compulsory Insurance Act.

Held
1. The court held that the Compulsory Insurance Act does not apply in circumstances where the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident cannot be established, and therefore, the Motor Accidents Insurance Board is not liable to pay compensation to the plaintiff.
2. The court held that it does have the discretion to extend the time to give notice of a claim under the Compulsory Insurance Act, but this discretion must be exercised cautiously and in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions.
3. The court held that when deciding whether to grant an extension of time to give notice of a claim under the Compulsory Insurance Act, the following considerations should be taken into account: the length of the delay in giving notice, the reason for the delay, whether the delay has caused any prejudice to the Motor Accidents Insurance Board, and whether the plaintiff has acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to identify the vehicle involved in the accident.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Howell v Motor Accidents Insurance Board, the court examined whether the Compulsory Insurance Act 1975 (Tas) (CIA) applied when the identity of the vehicle involved in an accident could not be determined. The court concluded that the statutory scheme of the CIA was designed to provide compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents, irrespective of the identity of the vehicle. The court emphasised that the primary objective of the CIA was to ensure that victims could recover damages without the need to first identify the offending vehicle. The court held that the act should apply to provide coverage even where the vehicle's identity is unknown, reflecting the purpose of the legislation to offer immediate relief to accident victims.

The court also addressed the issue of whether it had the discretion to extend the time to give notice of a claim under the CIA. The court noted that section 36 of the CIA stipulated a three-month period within which a claimant must notify the Board of the accident. The court examined whether this time limit was mandatory or directory, and if the latter, whether the court had the discretion to extend it. The court found that the time limit was directory and that the court does possess the discretion to extend this period under certain circumstances. The court relied on previous case law, such as Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, which highlighted the principles governing the interpretation of statutory time limits and the courts' inherent jurisdiction to grant extensions.

In deciding whether to grant an extension of time to give notice of a claim, the court outlined several considerations it would take into account. The court considered the length of the delay in giving notice, the reason for the delay, and whether the delay had caused any prejudice to the Board. The court also took into account the conduct of the claimant in attempting to comply with the statutory requirements. In this case, the claimant had made reasonable efforts to investigate the identity of the vehicle but was unsuccessful. The court found that the claimant's conduct was diligent and that the delay was not attributable to any fault on their part. Furthermore, the court considered that there was no prejudice to the Board as it had not relied on the three-month period to make any decisions or take any actions that would be adversely affected by the late notice.

The court further distinguished its decision from previous cases where extensions were denied due to significant delays or lack of diligence on the part of the claimant. In this instance, the court found the delay to be relatively short, and the claimant's efforts to comply with the statutory requirements were reasonable. The court underscored that the grant of an extension should not be an automatic outcome but rather one that depends on the specific circumstances of each case. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court has the discretion to extend the time to give notice of a claim under the CIA, provided that the delay is not significant, the claimant has acted diligently, and there is no prejudice to the Board. This decision aligns with the broader objective of the CIA to provide just outcomes for accident victims.