CITATION: Howe v Rosier & Anor; King v Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) & Anor [2001] NSWSC 1194 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law
Administrative LawFILE NUMBER(S): SC 30062/00; 30063/00 HEARING DATE(S): 28 March 2001, 1 June 2001 JUDGMENT DATE:
21 December 2001PARTIES :
Raymond Thomas King (Plaintiff) v Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) (First Defendant) & The Regulatory Committee of the Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) Second Defendant
Kenneth Edward Howe (Plaintiff) v Stephen Rosier (First Defendant) & Regulatory Committee of the Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) (Second Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Adams J at 1
COUNSEL : Mr J B Bishop/Mr N Packer (Howe)
Mr B J Gross QC (King)
Mr M G Rudge SC with Mr R Webb (Defendants)SOLICITORS: Heard McEwan Lawyers (Howe)
Thurlow Fisher (King)
Hartmann & Associates (Defendants)LEGISLATION CITED: Greyhound Racing Authority Act 1985
Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988
Drug (Misuse and Trafficking) Act 1985
Crimes Act 1900CASES CITED: Webb v The Queen (1993-1994) 181 CLR 41
Hall v The NSW Trotting Club Limited [1997] 1 NSWLR 378
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 141 CLR 288
Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) & ors (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 at 417DECISION: Summonses dismissed with costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISON
ADAMS J
Friday 21 December 2001
30062/00 Howe v Rosier & Anor
30063/00 King v Greyhound Racing Authority
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: Each of the plaintiffs is a greyhound trainer registered with the Greyhound Racing Authority of New South Wales (the Authority). Each has been charged on behalf of the Authority with breaches of rules promulgated by the Authority. In the usual course, those charges would be heard and determined by the Regulatory Committee of the Authority. The members of the Regulatory Committee are Messrs Ross Magin (Chairperson), Gerry Candrick, and John Morris, all of whom are directors of the Board of the Authority appointed on the nomination of the relevant Minister as provided by the Greyhound Racing Authority Act 1985 (the Act).
2 The plaintiffs claim declarations, in effect, that the Regulatory Committee cannot properly hear the charges against the plaintiffs because it might be biased, an order prohibiting the Committee as comprised by Messrs Magin, Candrick and Morris from hearing and determining the charges and an order that the charges be heard and determined by a Regulatory Committee to be constituted by otherwise appropriate persons who are unaware of certain evidence given to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in the course of its investigation into aspects of the greyhound racing industry, which investigation gave rise to the charges against the plaintiffs. By consent, I made orders that both proceedings were to be heard together with the evidence in one being treated as evidence in the other.
3 Before dealing with the circumstances giving rise to the present litigation it is useful to set out the legal framework applying to the various…
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- Case
- [2001] NSWSC 1194
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework governing the Regulatory Committee and its role in hearing disciplinary charges. It considered the nature of the charges and the involvement of the Regulatory Committee members in the ICAC investigation. The court found that, while it was appropriate for the Regulatory Committee members to be familiar with the evidence being considered by the ICAC, it was not essential for them to attend the hearings. The court also found that the members' possession of extraneous information, including the plaintiffs' admissions under privilege in the ICAC Inquiry, did not disqualify them from hearing the charges as long as they could put such information aside and consider the evidence presented before the Committee.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that there were live and significant issues in the proceedings before the Regulatory Committee that might be affected by any prejudgment or extraneous knowledge in the members of the Regulatory Committee. It held that the necessity rule required the Regulatory Committee to hear the charges, as the alternative of appointing additional stewards or acting members would not overcome the application of this rule. Therefore, the summonses were dismissed with costs.
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Background
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