Housing Authority v Garlett - [2025] WASC 125 (S)

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION:   HOUSING AUTHORITY -v- GARLETT [2025] WASC 125 (S)
CORAM:   HOWARD J
HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS: LAST SUBMISSIONS 11 JUNE 2025
DELIVERED          :   19 JUNE 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1354 of 2024
BETWEEN:   HOUSING AUTHORITY
Applicant
AND
BARRY GARLETT
Respondent

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Where questions of law reserved by Magistrates Court under s 25(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act - Whether question can be referred back to Magistrates Court for amendment

Legislation:

Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)

Result:

A question reserved to this Court by the Magistrates Court be sent back to the Magistrates Court for amendment

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr A Shuy
Respondent	:	Mr M Albert

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	State Solicitor's Office
Respondent	:	Circle Green Community Legal

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board v Federated Seamans Union of Australasia (1925) 36 CLR 442
Housing Authority v Garlett [2025] WASC 125
Lowe Pty Ltd v Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 180
Martin v Employers Mutual Ltd [2012] SASCFC 36; (2012) 112 SASR 436
Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98
R v Assange [1997] 2 VR 247
Re Minister for Heritage; ex parte City of Fremantle [2000] WASCA 156; (2000) 22 WAR 342
Re Robins SM; ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd [1999] WASCA 16; (1999) 20 WAR 511
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
Waite v Hennah [2021] WASCA 69; (2021) 96 MVR 58

HOWARD J:

On 17 April 2025, I published my reasons in Housing Authority v Garlett [2025] WASC 125 which were reasons in Mr Garlett's matter in CIV 1354 of 2024 and in Ms GT's matter in CIV 1325 of 2024 (principal reasons).
These supplementary reasons assume a familiarity with the principal reasons and use the same abbreviations.
These supplementary reasons concern the final orders which should be made in Mr Garlett's matter. The parties are agreed as to the orders which should be made in Ms GT's matter.
As recited in [9] of the principal reasons, Mr Garlett's matter came to this Court by way of two questions of law reserved by the Magistrates Court by order made 8 March 2024 pursuant to s 25 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA).
The questions reserved were:
QUESTIONS OF LAW
1.For a termination notice issued under section 70A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) (RT Act) to be valid, is the Housing Authority required to:
(a)afford procedural fairness to the tenant or tenants prior to deciding to issue such a notice; and/or
(b)make a decision to issue such a notice that is legally reasonable?
2.If the answer to question 1 is yes, is the determination of the validity of a termination notice under section 70A of the RT Act within the power or jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court, in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Housing Authority v Garlett

Details

AGLC: Housing Authority v Garlett [2025] WASC 125 (S)
Case: [2025] WASC 125 (S)
Decision Date: 19 JUNE 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Housing Authority v Garlett, the dispute involved the interpretation and application of the Residential Tenancies Act, specifically in relation to questions of law reserved by the Magistrates Court. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether such questions could be referred back to the Magistrates Court for amendment. The case revolved around the procedural framework established by Order 31 of the Supreme Court Rules, particularly Rule 8, which pertains to the procedure for stating a case on a question of law.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the procedural rules, specifically Order 31 Rule 8, applied to the reserved questions of law and if the parties' failure to utilize these rules meant that the questions could not be within the scope of the rule. The court had to examine the language and context of the relevant statutory provisions and rules, focusing on the broad operation of Rule 8, which seemed to apply to a wide range of circumstances and tribunals. The court also had to consider the natural reading of the rule and whether it was intended to have a broad operation, as suggested by the language used.

The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the statutory text and context, guided by principles of contextual construction. It was held that the task of construction begins and ends with the statutory text and that context should be regarded in its widest sense. The court noted that the purpose of the legislation must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about its desired or desirable reach. The court concluded that the natural reading of Order 31 Rule 8(1) suggested a broad operation, and the parties' failure to utilize the rules did not preclude the reserved questions from being within the scope of Rule 8(1). Consequently, the procedure under Order 31 Rule 8(4) was available.

The final orders of the court were that the reserved questions of law could be referred back to the Magistrates Court for amendment, and the procedure under Order 31 Rule 8(4) was applicable. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the statutory text and context in interpreting and applying procedural rules.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The task of construction begins and ends with the statutory text and throughout the process the text is construed in its context.[28] The Court of Appeal cited the judgment of Keifel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection:[29] Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[30] (citations omitted and emphasis added)[28] Mohammadi v Bethune [31].[29] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362.[30] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [14]. The second principle particularly relevant here concerns the structure of the subject legislation:The objective discernment of the statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction. The statutory purpose may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions.[31] (citations omitted and emphasis added)[31] Mohammadi v Bethune [33]. In my view, the context and structure in which the meaning and scope of O 31 r 8 falls to be considered is that it is a facilitative provision applying to an apparently broad range of tribunals and, necessarily, to the statutes by which cases may be stated to this Court. Also, while more detailed provisions are made in O 31 rr 1 - 7 as to questions of law stated within this Court or for the Court of Appeal, r 8 apparently operates more generally or to a broader range of circumstances. By O 31 r 8(1), the first issue might be thought to be whether the Questions were relevantly within a case stated on a question of law for determination by this Court. Relevantly, s 25(1) of the RT Act provides as follows:(1) A competent court hearing proceedings may reserve any question of law for the decision of the Supreme Court. As I understand it, Mr Garlett submits effectively that the parties here did not utilise O 31 and so the reserved Questions could not be within O 31 r 8(1) (and so the procedure under O 31 r 8(4) was not available). In my view, the natural reading of O 31 r 8(1) is that 'stating a case' on a question of law is not used in any particular technical manner. It appears to have a broad operation by its references to 'any tribunal' and by a lack of prescription as to how such a tribunal may be 'empowered or may be required' to state a case.