FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HOUSE & ALTIMAS | [2012] FamCA 625 |
| FAMILY LAW – LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – Whether a solicitor should be restrained from representing a party – Where 14 years previously the solicitor acted for the parties in relation a road accident – Where in relation to the applicant the only extant duty is to preserve the confidentiality of information imparted during the relationship - Whether the applicant communicated confidential material to the respondent’s solicitor – Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Reid [2005] FCA 1274 followed - Where applicant did not establish communication of confidential material to the respondent’s solicitor – Application dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Reid [2005] FCA 1274 Bakarich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSW CA 43 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 Kallinicos and Anor v Hunt and Others [2005] NSWSC 1181 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 McMillan & McMillan (2000) 26 Fam LR 653 Neczek v Dowler (2011) FamCAFC Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 1 All ER 527 Strahan & Strahan (Disqualification) (2009) FLC 93-414 Thevenaz & Thevenaz (1986) FLC 91-748 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr House |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Altimas |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 7807 | of | 2011 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 3 August 2012 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Ryan J |
| HEARING DATE: | 16 July 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Watts McCray Lawyers |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Herbert Weller |
Orders
That the application by Mr House for Order 2 and 3 contained in Part B of his Response filed 12 March 2012 is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym House & Altimas has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 7807 of 2011
| Mr House |
Applicant
And
| Ms Altimas |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In the context of defended property settlement proceedings Mr House who is the applicant in this particular application (“the applicant”) applies for an order to restrain his former partner, Ms Altimas’ (“the respondent”) solicitor from continuing to represent her. Although it was initially contentious, there is now no doubt that 14 years ago the respondent’s solicitor represented the applicant in relation to matters arising from a road accident. So that it is clear, there is also no dispute that the respondent’s solicitor also represented the respondent in relation to matters arising out of that accident. It is the respondent’s position that the application should be dismissed.
Background Facts to the Application
In December 1997 the applicant and respondent were involved in a road accident in which the applicant was the driver and the respondent was the passenger. Both were conveyed to hospital where they received treatment for their injuries. The applicant suffered a shoulder injury and the respondent a pelvic injury.
As a result of…
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- Case
- [2012] FamCA 625
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the respondent’s solicitor should be restrained from acting for Ms Altimas. This required the court to consider the test for restraining a legal practitioner, which involves determining whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires such a restraint to protect the integrity of the judicial process and the appearance of justice. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the applicant had established that the solicitor possessed confidential information from the prior retainer, the disclosure or use of which in the current proceedings would be prejudicial to the applicant.
Justice Ryan applied the principles established in cases such as *Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG* and *McMillan & McMillan*, noting that for a former client seeking to restrain a practitioner, the sole extant duty is to preserve confidentiality, and the applicant must demonstrate the possession of confidential material. The court found that while the solicitor had acted for the applicant in relation to the traffic offence and the personal injury claims, these retainers were joint in nature. Consequently, any information imparted by the applicant to the solicitor in that context was not confidential in relation to the respondent, as privilege had been waived due to the joint retainer. The court was not satisfied that the applicant had communicated confidential material to the respondent’s solicitor that could be used to his disadvantage, nor was there a reasonable basis for the assertion that the solicitor might be required to give evidence.
Accordingly, the application by Mr House for an order restraining the respondent’s solicitor from continuing to act for Ms Altimas was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
After several periods of separation and cohabitation, Mr House and Ms Altimas finally separated in January 2011. Once it became clear that they could not agree on property settlement, Mr House's former solicitors informed Ms Altimas's solicitor that Mr House believed the latter should no longer represent her. The respondent's solicitor responded that he had no recollection of acting for Ms Altimas. Shortly thereafter, proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) were initiated, and exchanges continued regarding Mr House's concern about Ms Altimas's solicitor's continued representation of her.
On 12 March 2012, Mr House filed a response in the substantive proceedings, seeking an order to restrain Ms Altimas's solicitor from acting for her. He argued that he had provided detailed instructions and confidential information to the solicitor, which might become available to Ms Altimas, potentially disadvantaging him. He also expressed concern about the manner in which Ms Altimas's solicitor had responded to his request that he cease acting. Ultimately, Mr House argued that if the solicitor continued to represent Ms Altimas, he would have no confidence in the legal process or that justice would be done.
The case of House & Altimas came before the Family Court of Australia as a result of an application filed by Mr House seeking to restrain Ms Altimas' solicitor from continuing to represent her in defended property settlement proceedings. Mr House argued that the respondent's solicitor had previously acted for him in relation to a road accident that occurred 14 years ago and that confidential information might be disclosed to Ms Altimas. The matter proceeded with the filing of the application on 12 March 2012, which was subsequently heard by Ryan J on 16 July 2012. The Court was required to determine whether there was a basis to restrain the respondent's solicitor from continuing to represent Ms Altimas based on the alleged prior retainer and potential disclosure of confidential information. The Court examined the applicable legal principles, which included the test for restraining a solicitor from acting for a former client and the necessity to establish that the solicitor possesses confidential information. Ultimately, the application was dismissed as the Court found that Mr House had not established that confidential material was communicated to the respondent’s solicitor that could be disadvantageous to him in the current proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting for a client in family law proceedings.
2. What is the applicable test for determining whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting.
3. Whether the applicant established that the respondent’s solicitor possesses confidential information that may be used against the applicant or to the applicant’s disadvantage in these current proceedings.
4. Whether the respondent’s solicitor is required to give evidence in relation to the respondent’s assertions about financial contributions made during the relationship, which creates a conflict of interest.
5. Whether there exists a reasonable basis for the applicant’s assertion that the respondent’s solicitor may be required to give evidence and/or produce documents in relation to the respondent’s assertions, which creates a further level of conflict.
Held
1. Whether the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting for a client in family law proceedings. The Court concluded that it does have the inherent jurisdiction to restrain a solicitor from acting for a client in family law proceedings. Result: Application for restraint considered.
2. What is the applicable test for determining whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting. The applicable test was identified as being that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting. Result: Test applied.
3. Whether the applicant established that the respondent’s solicitor possesses confidential information that may be used against the applicant or to the applicant’s disadvantage in these current proceedings. The Court concluded that the applicant did not establish that the respondent’s solicitor possesses confidential information that may be used against the applicant. Result: Application for restraint not supported.
4. Whether the respondent’s solicitor is required to give evidence in relation to the respondent’s assertions about financial contributions made during the relationship, which creates a conflict of interest. The Court concluded that there is no reasonable basis for the applicant’s assertion that the respondent’s solicitor may be required to give evidence in relation to the respondent’s assertions. Result: Application for restraint not supported.
5. Whether there exists a reasonable basis for the applicant’s assertion that the respondent’s solicitor may be required to give evidence and/or produce documents in relation to the respondent’s assertions, which creates a further level of conflict. The Court concluded that there is no reasonable basis for the applicant’s assertion. Result: Application for restraint not supported.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by acknowledging the inherent jurisdiction it possesses to restrain a solicitor from acting for a client in family law proceedings. This jurisdiction is grounded in the need to protect the integrity of the judicial process and the due administration of justice, as articulated in the Full Court case of Neczek v Dowler (2011) FamCAFC. The court referenced the test set out by Brereton J in Kallinicos and Anor v Hunt and Others [2005] NSWSC 1181, which requires a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public to conclude that the proper administration of justice necessitates preventing the legal practitioner from acting. The court distinguished the position of a former client, where the only duty remaining is to preserve confidentiality, as opposed to an existing client where a conflict of interest could be grounds for restraint.
In considering whether the applicant had established that the respondent’s solicitor possessed confidential information that could be used against him, the court examined the historical context of the relationship between the solicitor and the applicant. The court established that 14 years prior, the solicitor had acted for both the applicant and the respondent in relation to a road accident, and any prior fiduciary relationship had since terminated. The applicant's assertion that confidential information had been communicated to the respondent’s solicitor was scrutinized, and the court concluded that due to the joint retainer on the accident-related matters, any information shared was not confidential. The decision in Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Reid [2005] FCA 1274 was followed, where the court emphasized that the applicant needed to demonstrate that the solicitor held confidential information that could be prejudicial.
The court further addressed the applicant’s concern that the respondent’s solicitor might be required to testify regarding the respondent’s assertions about financial contributions during the relationship, which would create a conflict of interest. The court found this concern to be speculative and not well-founded, considering the nature of the joint retainer and the lack of evidence that the solicitor held any confidential information that would necessitate such testimony. The court rejected the argument as an attempt to bolster a weak case rather than a genuine concern for the administration of justice.
Finally, the court considered whether there was a reasonable basis for the applicant’s assertion that the respondent’s solicitor might be required to give evidence or produce documents, which would create a further conflict of interest. The court found no reasonable basis for this assertion and dismissed the application. The court concluded that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would not conclude that the proper administration of justice required the restraint of the respondent’s solicitor from acting in these proceedings. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that to restrain a former solicitor from acting, the applicant must demonstrate that the solicitor possesses confidential information that would be prejudicial in the current proceedings. Absent such evidence, the court will not intervene.