Hough and Willis (No. 2)

[2012] FamCA 442

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HOUGH & WILLIS (NO. 2) [2012] FamCA 442

FAMILY LAW -  INJUNCTIONS - Personal protection - Interim orders

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Hough

RESPONDENT: Mr Willis

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

FILE NUMBER: DGC 2101 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 31 May 2012

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 31 May 2012

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Trim

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Waters Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Crozier-Durham

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: David Stagg Tonkin & Company

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT

CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Mr Eidelsen

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT

CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

CE Family Lawyers

Orders

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hough & Willis (No. 2) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Act.

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: DGC 2101 of 2011

Ms Hough

Applicant

And

Mr Willis

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an oral application made after I have pronounced orders discharging a number of injunctions that were fairly wide reaching and said to be based on s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The oral application seeks orders for the personal protection of the mother, her husband and the two children that she has. One of those children is a child of the marriage to the respondent in this application. Mr Crozier-Durham, on behalf of the husband, neither opposes nor consents to the order and makes the observation that his client’s position is that there is no need for the order. The Independent Children’s Lawyer, through his counsel, Mr Eidelson consents to the orders being made.

2. The Court is obliged to only make an order where it is satisfied that it is proper to do so and as such, that it is necessary for the protection of those named in the application.  What I heard this morning was that there is evidence of allegations of family violence which are made against the husband in these proceedings.  The violence was directed towards the wife and was observed by at least one of the mother’s children, if not all.  The issue which is critical here is whether or not I can be satisfied that there is a basis for the application, and on what I have heard this morning, there clearly is.

3. The injunction should be granted in the terms of the proposed orders. 

I certify that the preceding three (3) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 31 May 2012.

Associate: 

Date:  13 June 2012