Hossain & Karam
[2022] FedCFamC2F 1472
•1 November 2022
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Hossain & Karam [2022] FedCFamC2F 1472
File number(s): PAC 1322 of 2016 Judgment of: JUDGE NEWBRUN Date of judgment: 1 November 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Parenting – fresh orders sought by parties after final parenting Orders made – Rice & Asplund – fresh Orders made as sought by Mother and ICL Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC Cases cited: Defrey & Radnor [2021] FamCAFC 67
Kelly & Otto [2022] FedCFamC1A 144
Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90– 725
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 50 Date of hearing: 19 October 2022 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Seric of Counsel Solicitor for the Applicant: Family Law Group Pty Ltd The Respondent appeared in person Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms Ryan, Legal Aid NSW Parramatta Family Law ORDERS
PAC 1322 of 2016 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS KARAM
Applicant
AND: MR HOSSAIN
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
Order made by:
JUDGE NEWBRUN
DATE OF ORDER:
1 November 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Father’s Amended Response filed 23 June 2022, in which he seeks fresh final and interlocutory orders, is dismissed.
2.Order 2(a)(iii) of the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 is varied by deleting that Order and substituting the following Order:
“(iii) Such time to be supervised by the Q Children’s Contact Centre located at AB Street, City L”.
3.No less than seven (7) days prior to any visit at the Q Children's Contact Centre in City L, the Father pay to the Mother's bank account an amount of $150. In the event of non-compliance with this Order, the Father's visit with X will not take place.
NOTATIONS:
A.The Court notes that there has already been compliance by the Father with Orders 5 (c)–(d) of the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021.
B.The Court notes that there has already been compliance by the Independent Children's Lawyer with Order 6 of the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021.
C.For the purposes of Order 3 above, the Court notes that the mother's bank account details are as follows:
Account Name: Ms Karam
BSB: …00
Account Number: …70
Note: The form of the Order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the Order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Karam & Hossain has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE NEWBRUN:
Introduction
This was a threshold hearing (“the hearing”) to determine whether there has been a material change in circumstances under the principal developed by Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90–725, since the Court made final parenting Orders between the parties on 15 July 2021 and if so, what new Orders should be made. The Mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) sought that the hearing be determined on this basis which was not opposed by the Father.
On 15 July 2021 this Court made final parenting Orders between the parties following six days of final hearing between 5 November 2019 and 30 March 2021. Each party was legally represented and there was an ICL.
The Court had made final parenting Orders providing for the child, X, born in 2015, to spend supervised time with the Father ultimately graduating to unsupervised daytime time. This supervised time was to initially commence at B Families, City C, and comprise monthly Sunday visits over six months. Thereafter, the Father’s further Ordered supervised daytime time was to be supervised by family members or his girlfriend with supervised changeovers to occur in City C.
It was common ground between the parties that there has been at least one material change in circumstances, namely the unwillingness of a supervised contact service in City C (B Families) to provide the initial period of supervision (that is, a Sunday supervised visit occurring once each month for six months; six visits in total) in relation to the child spending time with the Father.
The ICL informed the Court that the City L contact centre could facilitate supervised time occurring at their centre with their usual charges being $43 per parent per visit; that is, a single visit, paid by the Father, would cost him $86. At the hearing the Father (and not disputed by the Mother) was prepared to accept this information provided by the ICL, namely that the cost of the visit would be $86.
Proposals
The Mother and ICL jointly sought two fresh Orders in their proposed Minute of Orders handed up to the Court (“ICL’s proposed Minute of Order”) at the hearing seeking two fresh Orders as follows:
2.1.3.Such time to be supervised by the [Q] Children’s Contact Centre located at [AB Street, City L].
…
3.That no less than 7 days prior to any visit at the [Q] Children’s Contact Centre in [City L], the father pay to the mother’s bank account an amount of $150. In the event of non-compliance with this Order, the father’s visit with [X] will not take place.
The Father’s Amended Response filed 23 June 2022 sought fresh final parenting Orders as set out in paragraph 4b on page two of that document; the Father confirmed at the hearing that those were the fresh Orders he sought. They were as follows:
1.To discharge the consent Order that were made in 2017 that is the mother having sole parenting and make an Order for equal share parenting responsibility.
2.That the child is to spend half of the school holidays with the father failing agreement on every second half of each of the school holiday change overs is to take place in [City C] McDonalds or any other place agreed in writing by the parties and the child is to be returned to [City C] Mcdonalds.
3.Stage 1 the mother makes [X] available at [AC] contact centre in Canberra for a period of 2 hours from 11am to 1.00pm for a period of 6 visits with the cost of the visits payed by the Father if the service of [AC Contact Centre] is not available within 8 weeks of the final Orders i then seek
4.STAGE 2 to use the change over service at [AC Contact Centre] supervised by [Ms G] for a peroid of 3 months if the change over service is not available within 8 weeks of the final Orders i then seek
5.STAGE 2 to follow the concent court Orders filed on the 2nd of March change overs is to occur at the park in [City C] supervised by [Ms G] for a period of 3 months
6.STAGE 3 Once change over stage is completed by [Ms G] at the time when my contact with [X] is moved to unsupervised contact in according to the last stage of the final Orders we then continuie to follow the previous Orders made on 15 of July in accordance to stage 3 Order 2 D 3 there after is change overs is to take place at the location agreed in writing between the parties and failing agreement at [City C] Mcdonalds.
(As per the original)
The Father ultimately, during submissions, indicated to the Court that he agreed to have supervised time with the child at City L and pay for the fees of the contact centre there, but opposed having to pay the Mother $150 for each of the six visits at the contact centre in City L. The Father strenuously contended that he could not afford to pay the Mother $150 for each of the six visits.
Material relied upon
The Mother relied upon the following material:
(a)Mother’s Case Outline filed 14 October 2022;
(b)Initiating Application filed 14 March 2022;
(c)ICL’s proposed Minute of Order (handed up in Court at the hearing);
(d)Affidavit of Mother filed 14 October 2022;
(e)The Court’s Reasons for Judgment dated 15 July 2021.
The Father relied upon the following material, as set out in his email of 18 October 2022 to the Court, together with his Amended Response filed 23 June 2022:
(a)His Affidavits filed 25 August 2022 and 17 October 2022;
(b)His Financial Statements filed 28 October 2016 and 18 March 2022;
(c)The Court’s Reasons for Judgment dated 15 July 2021.
The Mother lives with the child in City C. The Father lives in Suburb K in Sydney. The Father is a disability pensioner and does not work in employment. The Mother works as an administration assistant, part-time, for Employer DD.
The Father is yet to spend supervised time with the child pursuant to the Court’s above Orders of 15 July 2021. The Father has not spent face to face time with the child since November 2019.
The Court’s Reasons for Judgment dated 15 July 2021 were extensive.
The Court refers to its discussion under the need to protect primary consideration (section 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in its above Reasons for Judgment. The Court had found, inter alia, that the Father probably suffered schizophrenia. The Court, in assessing risk of harm to the child in spending time with the Father had taken into account, inter alia, the Father’s lack of insight into his mental health problems.
The Court, in its above Reasons for Judgment, had made detailed findings relating to the Father’s financial circumstances in circumstances where the Father had opposed the Mother and ICL’s proposals that the child’s supervised time with the Father occur in City C rather than City L.
On 12 October 2021 the Father had filed an Initiating Application seeking a variation of the above Orders alleging, inter alia, that B Families were unable to supervise the child’s time with him. That Initiating Application was dismissed on 2 March 2022 by consent. He had also filed a Contravention Application on 24 November 2021 which has been dismissed after the parties agreed that the Father could communicate with the child on 10 December 2021.
Submissions
At the hearing the Father contended that the material changes in circumstances since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 were as follows:
A The Father’s financial circumstances have materially changed (negatively);
In a financial statement filed 18 March 2022, the Father alleged that whilst his weekly income from his disability pension was $493, his weekly personal expenditure was $750. In relation to the alleged weekly expenses of $750, the Father’s alleged average weekly expenses in paragraph 60 of his Financial Statement alleged weekly expenses of $570 (including alleged weekly petrol expenses of $150, gardening/lawn mowing weekly expenses of $30, weekly dry-cleaning expenses of $20, and weekly “other necessary commitments (specify)” of $20).
He alleged in the above Financial Statement that he had a loan repayment of $100 to Mr D, and a further loan repayment of $100 to Mr F, and charity $10. At the hearing he contended that those repayments were weekly commitments despite the Financial Statement being silent in that regard.
The Court observes that the Father’s Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016 was not relied upon by the Father at the previous final hearing. In any event, the most significant change between that Financial Statement and the Father’s above Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 is that in the latter financial statement the Father’s weekly income (his disability pension) was stated to be $493 compared to the earlier stated weekly income of $398. It should be noted that in the Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016 his total weekly personal expenditure was stated to be $750 which weekly expenditure amount was repeated in his Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022. In the Father’s Affidavit filed 25 August 2022 he asserts that there is not much difference in his updated Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 compared to his previous Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016.
In his affidavits relied upon for the hearing, in relation to his financial circumstances, he alleged:
(a)He no longer has the support of his parents due to their death noting that they had supported him financially previously to see the child at a contact Centre at City L;
(b)The death of his parents had impacted his brother’s financial capacity as it has put his brother into financial difficulties. The Father alleged that his brother
shad to come up with the cost of a funeral for his parents which had an effect on his brother supporting him to see the child in accordance with the Court Orders;(c)His brother was willing to make a small contribution for some of his fuel costs to see the child at a contact Centre in Canberra;
(d)He no longer has access to a caravan therefore he would need to pay for a budget hotel of $120.
B B Families is no longer offering supervision services in City C;
C The City L contact Centre has an eight week waiting period, as opposed to a four week waiting period as alleged by the Mother.
Legal principles: Rice v Asplund
In Defrey & Radnor [2021] FamCAFC 67, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia stated:
16The evidence of the father had to be accepted at its highest, and as Warnick J said in SPS and PLS [2008] FamCAFC 16; (2008) FLC 93–363 (“SPS and PLS”) at [81] and [84], the essential question to be asked is, assuming the evidence of the father is accepted, are the “new events” sufficient to provoke a new enquiry (see also Miller & Harrington [2008] FamCAFC 150; (2008) FLC 93–383 at [105], noting that an alternative formulation of the question has been propounded by the Full Court in Marsden v Winch [2009] FamCAFC 152; (2009) 42 Fam LR 1 at [58] with the emphasis on the establishment of a prima facie case of change of circumstances).
…
18 In SPS and PLS, Warnick J said at [48(v)] and [82]–[83]:
48…The application of the rule is closely connected with the nature of, and degree of, change sought to the earlier Order.
…
83Accordingly, the rule may not impede hearing an application for a small alteration, which may require only a short and narrow enquiry, but may properly prevent a hearing in respect of more far-reaching changes.
19In our view, the Rice & Asplund test applies to all applications which seek to revisit parenting Orders. Sometimes the test will be easily satisfied even though the issues to reconsider are major ones and sometimes the test will be easily satisfied even though the issues to be revisited are relatively minor in character. In both situations, the overarching test is to be applied, namely, (having regard to the best interests of the child) new events or changed circumstances have to be sufficient to provoke a new inquiry.
20It is also useful when considering, as a preliminary matter, what issues a parent might be permitted to re-litigate, to remember that under s 69ZQ(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), there is a mandatory requirement to decide which of these issues in the proceedings require full investigation and hearing.
21The rule in Rice & Asplund involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a process of making factual findings. That is because the “rule” is a manifestation of the best interests principle. All s 60CC(2) and (3) matters, so far as they are relevant, must be considered, to the extent that they can be, based on the material before the court. The rule focuses particularly on s 60CC(3)(l) and the preference to make final Orders in parenting matters that are least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child. Axiomatically that is because unless other considerations are more weighty, it is not in the best interests of a child for that child to be the subject of repeated litigation between his/her parents. There is a focus in an application of this kind upon the change(s) in circumstances that outweigh the negative impact of reopening litigation. Although when considering the preliminary issue, if cross-examination is not permitted, then the evidence of the father is to be taken at its highest, and it is not only the father’s evidence that is considered.”
In Kelly & Otto [2022] FedCFamC1A 144, Austin J stated:
11The primary judge correctly acknowledged how the father bore the burden of proving the material changed circumstances justifying further litigation over the Orders (at [25]). Dealing with the dispute as a threshold issue, without the evidence being tested in cross-examination, meant the father’s evidence had to be accepted at its highest (SPS & PLS (2008) FLC 93–363 at [81]; Searson & Searson (2017) FLC 93–788 at [11]). The primary judge acknowledged that was so (at [42] and [67]–[68]).
…
60Far from the search for any material changes in circumstances working to obstruct the attainment of an outcome which promotes children’s best interests, the Rice v Asplund principles embody the paramountcy principle, as the underlying policy is that children’s best interests are not served by their constant immersion in litigation between parties who are interested in their welfare (Marsden v Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1 at [55]; Miller & Harrington (2008) FLC 93–383 at [101]). The principle enjoins the Court to prevent endless litigation over the care and supervision of children, unless there has been a change of circumstances of sufficient magnitude to justify the review of arrangements already determined.
Discussion
Again, it was common ground at the hearing that B Families, City C, cannot provide supervision services for Stage 1 of the Court’s Orders stipulating six supervised visits on a Sunday over the course of six months. Accordingly, it is clear that there has been a material change in circumstances since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 in this respect. The parties are in dispute at this hearing as to the reasons why B Families declined to provide their supervisory services which issue the Court does not need to resolve.
In the above circumstances, again, the Mother sought an Order that the supervisory services for Stage 1 be provided by the Q contact centre at City L. The Court would observe that this is not a significant change to the previous final Orders. The seeking of such Order was consistent with the child having spent supervised time with the Father at that contact centre between 2016 and 2019. The Court observes that the extent of travel for the Father from Suburb K to City L is less onerous than travel from Suburb K to City C.
Again, in final submissions, the Father agreed to attend the above contact Centre at City L City L. This agreement of the Father was consistent with his Case Outline document filed 24 March 2022 when he sought an Order that he spend time with the child at Q in City L for the first six visits.
For abundant caution nevertheless, the Court should state that it would likely not be in the best interests of the child to spend supervised time at the AC Contact Centre in Canberra by reason of having to endure over four hours of car travel from City C to Canberra, then spend supervised time with the Father there, and then endure a further return car trip of over four hours from Canberra to City C; the child would likely have difficulties coping with such travel. In this regard, the Court refers to its findings in its Reasons for Judgment of 15 July 2021 in paragraph 350.
The Father, at the hearing, contended that his girlfriend Ms G could supervise his time with the child in Stage 1. In this regard, the Court refers to its Reasons for Judgment of 15 July 2021, in particular its discussion under the need to protect primary consideration, including paragraphs 309–323, relating to its finding that there was an unacceptable risk of harm posed to the child in spending unsupervised time with the Father and that formal supervision of the child’s time with the Father was required for Stage 1. The ICL had also reminded the Court that Ms G has never met the child.
It will be in the best interests of the child that she spend supervised time with the Father at the Q contact centre in City L.
The Court now turns to the ICL/Mother’s proposed Order 3 set out in the ICL’s proposed Minute of Order and providing:
3.That no less than 7 days prior to any visit at the [Q] Children’s Contact Centre in [City L], the father pay to the mother’s bank account an amount of $150. In the event of non-compliance with this Order, the father’s visit with [X] will not take place.
This proposed Order is now sought by the Mother, as inferentially submitted by the Mother/ICL, by reason of supervision now needing to occur at the contact centre in City L, and by reason of the court’s finding in its Reasons for Judgment of 15 July 2021, specifically paragraph 339, being as follows:
339The Court accepts the Mother’s evidence relating to her inability to afford the cost of travel with the child from [City C] to [City L] and return on a regular if not a monthly basis. In this context, the Court observes that the Father has not paid regular child support to the Mother post separation.
The Mother’s recent Affidavit filed 14 October 2022 (see paragraphs 45–48) confirms this finding of the Court.
The Father, again, at the outset of the hearing, had contended that there been a material change in his financial circumstances since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021, such that he could not afford to pay the Mother $150 on six separate monthly occasions during the Stage 1 supervision. The Court is of the view that there has not been such a material change and it is likely that the Father could afford to pay such monies to the Mother. The Court now explains why it is of this view.
The Father strenuously contends that his present financial circumstances would not enable him to pay the Mother $150 for each of six supervised visits under Stage 1 of the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021. He points, in particular, to the significant difference between his weekly income and weekly expenditure: his Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 alleges weekly income of $493 against weekly expenditure of $750. He contends that if he is required to pay $150 to the Mother for each of those visits he will effectively be unable to spend any time with the child and the prospect of the restoration of his relationship with the child will cease.
Yet the Father, again, ultimately during submissions, agreed to spend Stage 1 supervision at the City L contact centre. This agreement was in the context of the Father alleging that he no longer had the use of a caravan nor did he have the financial assistance of his brother. This agreement of the Father was consistent with his Case Outline document filed 24 March 2022 when he sought an Order that he spend time with the child at Q Contact Centre in City L for the first six visits. Further, in his Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 25 May 2022, the Father sought a Stage 1 Order that the Mother make the child available at Q Contact Centre in City L for a period of two hours for a period of six visits.
(In passing, the Court observes that since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 the Father had sought to implement, together with the Mother, the child spending supervised time at B Families in City C; he would have had to travel to City C and return and meet the expenses in that respect.)
One might then rhetorically ask: if the Father’s usual weekly expenditure significantly exceeds his usual weekly income, and he no longer had the use of a caravan nor financial assistance from his brother, how could he afford to travel to City L and spend supervised time with the child there at the contact centre, and then return to Suburb K? This conundrum was put to the Father at the hearing but he was unable to give a satisfactory explanation.
The Father alleges in his Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 that his current weekly expenditure is about $750 per week. The Court’s first observation in this regard is that such sum of $750 per week is identical to the $750 per week weekly expenditure referred to in his earlier Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016. This does not suggest a material change in the Father’s financial circumstances in relation to his usual weekly expenditure. The increase in the Father’s weekly income, relating to his disability pension, which is presently $493 per week, as opposed to $398 per week, set out in his Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016, does not assist the Father in this context. These comments by the Court are consistent with the Father’s own statement in his Case Outline filed 15 July 2022 that, “I have also updated my financial statement 2022 which there is not much change in that statement compared to the previous financial statement that was filed in 2016.”
Further, as submitted by the Mother and ICL, there is significant discretionary expenditure set out in the Father’s Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 which could be reduced (with such reductions to only occur over the Stage 1 period of six months), further suggesting that there has not been a material change in the Father’s financial circumstances; see Part N, paragraph 60, of his Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 in relation to his average weekly expenses: for example, noting the Father is unemployed as a disability pensioner, his petrol weekly expenses are said to be $150, weekly fares/car parking $20, weekly clothing and shoes $20, weekly entertainment/hobbies $30, weekly gardening/lawn mowing $30, weekly dry-cleaning $20, weekly books and magazines $5, weekly gifts $5, weekly “other necessary commitments” (which are not specified) $20.
The Court observes that the Father was able to spend supervised time with the child in the contact centre at City L between 2016 and 2019, and he has himself in his above Case Outline document and Response to an Application in a Proceeding nominated City L, which is inconsistent with his strenuous contention that the significant excess of his weekly expenditure over weekly income simply does not permit him to meet the ICL/Mother’s proposed fresh Orders.
The Father has failed to explain how, in a financial sense, he was able to spend such supervised time with the child between 2016 and 2019 in City L (and having himself nominated City L in his own documents, above) in circumstances where he contends that since his first Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016 his usual weekly expenditure has significantly exceeded his usual weekly income.
The above discussion relating to the Father’s financial circumstances does not suggest that there has been a material change in the Father’s financial circumstances since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021.
The Court had made detailed findings in its Reasons for Judgment (see paragraphs 336–351) relating to the Father’s ability to afford the supervision fees of B Families being $500 per month, plus his incidental travel and food costs totalling $290, making a total of $790 per month, having taken into account the Father’s disability pension was about $900 per fortnight or $1,800 per month.Again, the Father had not relied upon his Financial Statement filed 28 October 2016 alleging an excessive weekly expenditure over weekly income at the final parenting hearing.
Taking the Father’s present evidence at its highest in relation to the loss of use of the caravan, and accepting for the moment that he is not able to obtain financial assistance from his brother, then by reference to the Court’s above findings, his incidental expenses in travelling and staying in City L for the supervision visitation once each month for Stage 1, would cost him $290 plus $120 totalling $410 per month (in paragraph 343 of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment the Court had found that the Father estimated his accommodation costs at $120 per night).
Noting that the contact centre in City L would charge fees of $86 each visit (being a significant reduction in supervision fees compared to the earlier $500 payable to B Families in City C) the Father’s total monthly expenses in travelling and staying in City L for the supervision visitation once each month for Stage 1 would be $410 plus $86, totalling $496. If he was required to pay $150 to the Mother (but only a payment of $150 once each month for six months) for her round-trip petrol expenses between City C and City L, he would be required to have funds of $646 each month in relation to the supervision visits in Stage 1. His alleged weekly income through the disability pension is $493 or about $2,120 per month.
The difference between these two monthly figures ($2,120-$646) is $1,474 which sum would be available for the Father’s other usual monthly expenditures; translated into a weekly figure the sum of $1,474 can be converted to about $343 per week. Having regard to the above comments relating to the Father reducing his discretionary expenditure each week (but only for a period of six months during Stage 1), the Court would assess that there is a real prospect that the Father could, during the six months of the Stage 1 period, both financially afford the costs of travelling to, and staying at, City L for the six supervision visits during Stage 1, paying the supervision fees to the contact centre there, and paying $150 to the Mother once each month for six months to meet her travel expenses of driving to and from City C and City L.
The Father had contended at the hearing that he would move to City C from Suburb K. There is force to the submission of the ICL that this is unlikely to occur in light of the Father having failed to move to City C since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 and having regard to the Courts Reasons for Judgment of 15 July 2021 in this context.
As to the Father’s contention that a further material change in circumstances is that contrary to the evidence of the Mother that there is only about a four week waiting period at the contact centre at City L, there is an eight week waiting period, there is simply no evidence before the Court that such an eight week waiting period exists. The Mother’s evidence in this regard is the only relevant evidence. Even if there was evidence suggesting such an eight week waiting period, in the view of the Court, this would not constitute a material change in circumstances when one has regard to the period of time since November 2019 that the child has not spent time with the Father.
There is no significant material before the Court to suggest that there has been a relevant material change in circumstances since the Court’s Orders of 15 July 2021 such as would justify the Court making the Father’s proposed fresh Order that the child spend half of the school holidays with the Father. There is force to the Mother’s submissions in her Case Outline filed 14 October 2022 (paragraphs 19, 20 and 21) in this context. In this context the Court also refers to its discussions under the need to protect primary consideration in its Reasons for Judgment dated 15 July 2021 (paragraphs 309–330) together with paragraph 332 of those Reasons.
Summary
Having regard to the above discussions, it will be in the best interests of the child to make the ICL and Mother’s proposed Orders 2.1.3 and 3 set out in the ICL’s proposed Minute of Order. The Court makes Orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Newbrun. Associate:
Dated: 1 November 2022
0
6
1