Hosking v MJ Mahon Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)

Hosking v MJ Mahon Holdings (QLD) Pty Ltd [2021] FedCFamC2G 66

File number(s): BRG 612 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE JARRETT
Date of judgment: 21 September 2021
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Commonwealth – workplace rights and responsibilities – general protections – adverse action – termination.
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 341(1)(c), 341(1)(c)(i), 341(1)(c)(ii), 342, 342(1)(a)
Cases cited: Kubat v Northern Health [2015] FCCA 3050
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 97
Date of last submission/s: 13 July 2021
Date of hearing: 13 July 2021
Place: Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Watters
Solicitor for the Applicant: My Work Rights Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr See
Solicitor for the Respondent: Queensland Trucking Association

ORDERS

BRG 612 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

IAN HOSKING

Applicant

AND:

MJ MAHON HOLDINGS (QLD) PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE JARRETT

DATE OF ORDER:

21 SEPTEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 26 November, 2020 is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE JARRETT:

  1. Ian Hosking is a truck driver by occupation.  Apart from two periods – one of 18 months and the other of five years – he has been a truck driver ever since he joined the Australian Army as a young man in 1984.  He takes his occupation seriously.

  2. Mr Hosking commenced his employment with the respondent, MJ Mahon Holdings (QLD) Pty Ltd, in January, 2006 as a truck driver.  After two years, he was promoted to operations manager.  In that role he was responsible for managing some major accounts for the respondent.  Two in particular are mentioned in the evidence:  Martin Brower – Cold Storage at Rocklea and ALDI Supermarkets.

  3. In April, 2020 Mr Hosking decided to return to his former position as a driver because of what he says was “adverse action being taken against him by the management team”.  He remained in his role as a driver until 28 August, 2020 when his employment was terminated for alleged “serious misconduct”. 

  4. In these proceedings he alleges that some treatment that he perceives was meted out to him by some of the respondent’s employees and the respondent’s managing director, Mr Michael Mahon, constitutes adverse action for the purposes of s.342 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). He says that the termination of this employment was also adverse action.  He claims that the adverse action was taken against him because he exercised a workplace…

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Details
Case
[2021] FedCFamC2G 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hosking v MJ Mahon Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd, the applicant, Mr Hosking, brought proceedings against his former employer, the respondent, MJ Mahon Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd. The central dispute in the case revolved around allegations of adverse action taken by the respondent against Mr Hosking, culminating in his termination of employment. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the respondent had taken adverse action against Mr Hosking, and if so, whether such actions were taken for a proscribed reason under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The applicant claimed that the adverse actions included spreading rumours about him at a Christmas party, preventing him from accessing the respondent’s computer system, and ultimately, his termination of employment. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that Mr Hosking was dismissed due to dishonesty and making false entries into his driving logbooks.

The court found that Mr Hosking failed to prove the occurrence of the adverse actions as he claimed. Regarding the rumours at the Christmas party, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent was responsible for the conduct of its employees in spreading such rumours. Furthermore, the court found that Mr Hosking did not demonstrate how these rumours prejudiced his position in employment. The court also noted that the actions taken by the respondent, such as investigating the rumours, were not adverse but rather supportive of Mr Hosking. Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant did not meet the burden of proof to establish that the respondent engaged in adverse action against him.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Mr Hosking had not successfully demonstrated that the respondent took adverse action against him for a proscribed reason. The dismissal was based on the court's determination that the applicant failed to substantiate the claims of adverse action and that the respondent’s actions, if any, did not amount to adverse action within the meaning of the Fair Work Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application filed on 26 November, 2020 is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent denies Mr Hosking’s claims. It says that the termination of Mr Hosking’s employment was because he was dishonest and made false and incorrect entries into his driving logbooks to disguise his non-compliant driving activities.THE EVIDENCE Mr Hosking gave evidence. I found him to be a witness that tended to exaggerate his evidence. He was short on particularity in respect of many of his claims and in many respects his oral evidence was inconsistent with his written testimony. He called evidence from Mr Crandon Street who, whilst I found him generally reliable, gave no particularly relevant evidence. The respondent gave evidence by its managing director. He too was not particularly reliable. His evidence was demonstrated to be misleading in a number of respects. Mr McDonald also gave evidence, as did Mr Nolan. Both seemed to me to be particularly defensive witnesses. Mr Hosking commenced his employment with the respondent in 2005. During 2007, he began assisting Mr Mahon with the management of the business as an operations manager. According to Mr Mahon’s evidence, which I accept, as operations manager, Mr Hosking was responsible for the day-to-day planning of equipment allocation. His main duties involved ensuring driver’s equipment and loads were operating at the required level, including managing load sizes and despatch times. As operations manager, Mr Hosking was involved in confidential conversations about the operation of the respondent’s business, including discussions about other employees. Mr Hosking was expected to maintain the confidentiality of these discussions. Mr Hosking reported directly to Mr Mahon. In 2013, Mr Mahon arranged for Mr Hosking to obtain further training in basic fatigue management and organised for him to undertake a Diploma of Management so that he could assist further in his role as operations manager. As a result of his training Mr Hosking was designated as an “accredited Basic Fatigue Management Allocator”. In that role he was responsible for ensuring that the respondent met its fatigue management obligations under the Heavy Vehicle National Law. Mr Hosking had a role in the identification of breaches of the Heavy Vehicle National Law by the respondent’s employees, recommending disciplinary action against them for any detected breaches and the implementation of that action. In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Mahon gave evidence about three employees who had been disciplined on Mr Hosking’s recommendations (two of whom were summarily dismissed). It is uncontentious that in February, 2019 the respondent appointed a Business Development Manager named Adam McDonald. Mr Hosking says that Mr McDonald took over the conduct of certain “accounts” that were usually attended to by him. Mr Hosking swore that from the time Mr McDonald arrived, he was never included in any of Mr McDonald’s meetings with representatives from one of those accounts, Martin Brower – Cold Storage. When Mr McDonald came along, he took over handling that account to the exclusion of Mr Hosking. The other account Mr Hosking had handled for the respondent was with ALDI supermarkets. That had initially been handled by another of the respondent’s employees who had passed away. From that point, Mr Hosking and Mr Mahon dealt with the ALDI supermarkets account together. What was meant by the term “account” or how an “account” was handled, was not explained in the evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr Nolan notified Mr Hosking of Mr Mahon’s decision to terminate Mr Hosking’s employment.CONSIDERATION The starting point is to identify which acts that, in these proceedings, Mr Hosking asserts constitute adverse action. That is because, for present purposes, it is only adverse action, taken for a proscribed reason that is actionable. Leaving aside the termination of his employment, the conduct identified by Mr Hosking as the relevant adverse action is:(a)that which he says was taken against him as a direct result of his complaint about Mr Pavlovic’s appointment and his remonstrations with ALDI. He points to the rumours that circulated at the Christmas party and in what occurred when he returned to driving in April, 2020 as the adverse action taken against him; and(b)the moves to stop his access to the respondent’s computer system. There are several difficulties with Mr Hosking’s case. First, as to the April, 2020 incident, I am not satisfied that it occurred as claimed by Mr Hosking. Mr Hosking does not discharge the onus of proof upon him in relation to this factual issue. Second, Mr Hosking seeks to fix the respondent with liability for these rumours without establishing that the respondent is bound by the conduct of the relevant employees. What was said at the Christmas party was conduct constituted by rumour and innuendo. There is no evidence that it was sanctioned by the respondent. It could not be suggested that it was within the ordinary authority of Mr McDonald, Mr Pavlovic or Mr Nolan as employees to spread rumour, innuendo or make defamatory statements of Mr Hosking. Third, when it was brought to the attention of the respondent, by its managing director, it was investigated and dealt with. That is to say, the respondent’s actions were not adverse to Mr Hosking but assisted him to deal with the issue about which he complained. Fourth, the allegations of rumour at the Christmas party are made against Mr Pavlovic only. It is not suggested that Mr McDonald or Mr Nolan engaged in the rumourmongering. Nor is there any suggestion that Mr Nolan was acting on behalf of the respondent when the rumours were spread. Whilst I have accepted that there may have been some rumours, the evidence does not permit of a finding about who started them or who spread them. Fifth, no argument was presented to me to demonstrate how what was said about Mr Hosking at the Christmas party injured him in his employment or altered his position to his prejudice. There is no suggestion that he was discriminated against as that term is used in the Fair Work Act. The evidence does not permit of a finding that the respondent injured Mr Hosking in his employment or altered his position to his prejudice. As a respondent points out, this aspect of Mr Hosking’s claim is analogous to an aspect of the decision in Kubat v Northern Health [2015] FCCA 3050. In that case Judge Riley dealt with a similar scenario as follows:44. Belittling a person is adverse action in normal parlance. However, the Act provides an exhaustive definition of adverse action. It is only the actions specified in s.342 of the Act that are prohibited adverse actions and that give rise to a remedy.45. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant’s position was altered to her prejudice by:a) Ms Vye telling her she was no longer an asset to the respondent because the applicant was lowered in the esteem of the respondent; andb) Ms Hart challenging her medical certificate because the applicant ceased to be a trusted employee.46. The applicant relied upon Hodkinson v Commonwealth (2011) 248 FLR 409, (2011) 207 IR 129, [2011] FMCA 171 at [175] where Cameron FM (as his Honour then was) said:In order to determine whether the respondent altered the applicant’s position to her detriment, it is necessary to identify and compare her “position” before and after the decision to not extend the [Work Improvement Plan] and then to determine whether it was altered to her detriment as a result of that decision. On 7 December 2009, when Ms Blyth and the applicant discussed the possibility of an extension of the latter’s WIP, the WIP had concluded and the applicant’s position was that of a probationary employee who was entitled to be considered for an extension of a WIP. After Ms Blyth’s decision to not extend the WIP, the applciant was a probationary employee who had been denied an extension of her WIP and who was subject to the alternative recommendation that her employment be terminated. Ms Blyth’s making of that decision did amount to an alteration of the applciant’s position to her prejudice because it resulted in her position after the decision being less advantageous than her position had been before it.47. The applicant argued that her case was analogous to Hodkinson. I do not accept that submission. In the case of Hodkinson, the decision not to extend the applicant’s work improvement plan had a tangible impact on her position. The comments complained of in the present case did not actually alter the applicant’s position at all, even assuming that the comments were made.48. To say that an employee is no longer an asset to her employer is simply an observation. It implies that there was another action taken previously by someone, probably the employee, that has resulted in the employee ceasing to be an asset. Making the observation does not in itself alter the employee’s position to her prejudice and is not adverse action as defined.49. Similarly, the words spoken in challenging the validity of a medical certificate do not cause a person to cease to be a trusted employee or otherwise alter the person’s position to her prejudice. Issues of trust would be based on the previous actions or inactions of the people involved. The applicant did not identify any actions or inactions on the part of the respondent that could have constituted adverse action connected with the challenge to the applicant’s medical certificate.