Horsman v Carpo Holdings Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   HORSMAN -v- CARPO HOLDINGS PTY LTD [2014] WADC 151

CORAM:   BOWDEN DCJ

HEARD:   31 OCTOBER 2014

DELIVERED          :   5 NOVEMBER 2014

FILE NO/S:   APP 69 of 2014

BETWEEN:   BARRY STANLEY HORSMAN

Appellant

AND

CARPO HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE SMITH

File No  :GE DOUG 119 of 2013

Catchwords:

Refusal of application for adjournment - Bias

Legislation:

Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1970
District Court Rules 2005
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Mr D L Armstrong

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Not applicable

Respondent:     D L Armstrong

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bennett v Councillor [2001] WASCA 342

Chong -v- The City of Mandurah [2013] WASC 470

Lewis v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2008] WASCA 155

Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597

Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19

R v Greer (1992) 62 A Crim R 442

Sekyere-Boakye -v- Whitney [2013] WASC 147

Touma v Saparas [2000] NSWCA 11

  1. BOWDEN DCJ:  This appeal is from a magistrate's decision to refuse to adjourn the hearing of an application under the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1970.

The history of the matter

  1. The history of this matter is somewhat protracted.

  2. Carpo Holdings Pty Ltd (Carpo) is a registered proprietor of land at 89 Anderson Street, Geraldton.  Boss Logistics WA Pty Ltd (Boss) is a company that at one stage was in possession of part of the land.  Mr Horsman was a director of Boss and is the person who gave possession of the disputed goods to Carpo.

  3. By a notice dated 21 November 2012 Carpo notified its intention to make an application under the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1970.

  4. On 28 February 2013 Carpo made an application to the court for an order to dispose of goods in their possession pursuant to the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act.  That application named Mr Horsman as the respondent and was duly served on him.

  5. On the 18 March 2013 Mr Horsman filed an application to strike out Carpo's application.  Carpo's response was filed on 8 April 2013.  The strike out application was mentioned in the Magistrates Court on 16 April 2013 and adjourned to 8 July 2013.

  6. Mr Horsman then made an application to dismiss Carpo's action which was filed on 25 June 2013.

  7. On 8 July 2013 Mr Horsman's strike out and dismissal application were both dismissed.  Carpo's application was adjourned to a date to be fixed and subsequently listed for mention on 28 January 2014.

  8. At the mention on the 28 January 2014 Carpo's application was adjourned to 11 February 2014 for a trial listings hearing.

  9. On 11 February 2014 at the trial listings, the matter was adjourned to 25 March 2014 for trial.

  10. On 25 March…

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Details
Case
[2014] WADC 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Horsman was the plaintiff and Carpo Holdings Pty Ltd was the defendant in a legal dispute. The case involved the refusal of an application for an adjournment and allegations of bias. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the refusal of the adjournment application constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The court had to consider if the refusal resulted in the denial of a reasonable opportunity for the plaintiff to present his case, as established in cases such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj and Touma v Saparas.

The court considered that it was fundamental to the administration of justice that parties have the opportunity to present their case. However, in this instance, the plaintiff had ample time to organise legal representation and had terminated his existing lawyers' services well in advance of the scheduled hearing date. The court found that the plaintiff's failure to secure alternate legal representation did not warrant an adjournment. The court held that granting an adjournment would not have necessarily resulted in the plaintiff being represented, and therefore, the refusal of the adjournment application did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness. The court also emphasised the importance of the efficient use of court resources and the interest of the community in the speedy resolution of issues.

The court concluded that it was fair to proceed with the trial in the circumstances. The refusal of the adjournment did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate how the absence of specific documents would have affected the outcome. The appeal was dismissed, and no orders were made in favour of the plaintiff.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is fundamental to the administration of justice that persons are given the full opportunity to present their case. The refusal of an adjournment may amount to a denial of procedural fairness if it is likely to deny a party a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597 [40] and Touma v Saparas [2000] NSWCA 11 [27]. See also Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165. It cannot be said Mr Horsman was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case or to obtain legal representation. He knew from 8 April 2014 that the hearing was to take place on 16 June 2014. He had a period of approximately 10 weeks to prepare his case. He terminated the services of his lawyers on 16 June 2014 and he had the opportunity on that date to put his case before the court, but he chose to walk out. Mr Horsman did not provide any reasonable explanation as to why alternate lawyers had not been engaged. He previously applied to the court to adjourn the trial on 25 March and knew at least since that date that he would need new lawyers. Mr Horsman cannot simply attend on the date fixed for trial, ask for an adjournment on the basis that he has terminated his lawyer's services and say that the trial should not go ahead because he is unrepresented. He had ample time to organise lawyers. If he could not organise his affairs in such a manner that the lawyers were able to represent him on either the first or second trial date then further adjourning the trial would achieve nothing. There was a real possibility that the court would be in the same position on a third trial date, namely that Mr Horsman would be unrepresented. Mr Horsman says that by not granting the adjournment it meant he had to proceed without having the documents necessary to support his claim. He argued this before the magistrate and said he had sent the documents to the lawyers and had not kept copies of them. At the hearing of the appeal Mr Horsman was unable to produce any documents claiming they were with his new lawyers. The documents have still not been produced and there is no basis upon which the court can conclude that the absence of those documents contributed to some form of miscarriage of justice. It was fair in the circumstances of this case for the trial to proceed. The parties were entitled to have the matter determined by the court at the earliest practical date. The community has an interest in the courts speedily resolving issues and using their resources efficiently and economically. The continual remand of matters from one hearing date to another is counter‑productive to that end. To not grant an adjournment would have resulted in an injustice to the respondent, the injustice being the failure to resolve an issue, as soon as practical, they had asked the court to determine. Mr Horsman argues essentially that there was a miscarriage of justice because he had arguable issues to raise in opposition to the respondent's application and those issues were raised by him on 8 July 2013 when his strike out application and application to dismiss the respondent's claim was heard before Magistrate Lawrence.