Horsell Nominees Pty Ltd v NAJB Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HORSELL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ORS v NAJB PTY LTD

[2010] SASC 321

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

24 November 2010

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - PENALTIES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

Defendant failed to settle on contract for sale of shares in a company and units in a trust - assets of the trust subsequently sold to third party - plaintiffs sought loss of bargain damages and other costs.

Held:  claim for damages upheld.

Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 75 ALJR 312; Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409; W & R Pty Ltd v Birdseye (2008) 102 SASR 477; Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17; Taylor v Raglan Developments Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 117; Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co (1998) 1 WLR 574, applied.
Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 276, discussed.
Commercial & General Acceptance Corporation Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491; AHR Constructions Pty Ltd v Maloney [1994] 1 Qd R 460, considered.

HORSELL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ORS v NAJB PTY LTD
[2010] SASC 321

Civil

  1. VANSTONE J:     The plaintiffs agreed in writing to sell to the defendant, for $3.5m, the legal and beneficial interest in shares in two companies and units in a trust which formed the ownership structure of the Walnut Grove Retirement Village.  The defendant failed to settle.  The plaintiffs terminated the contract and found a new purchaser.  The subject matter of the new contract, although the same in substance, was described in terms of the land and chattels owned by the unit trust.  The vendor was now the trustee of the unit trust, rather than the plaintiffs.  The purchase price under the second contract was $3.275m, being $0.225m less than the original price.  The plaintiffs sued for loss of bargain damages and consequential damages and interest.

  2. Two principal issues are raised at trial.  They are:

    1.did the default clause in the contract exclude common law remedies for breach of contract which would otherwise have been available to the plaintiffs, and

    2.if the plaintiffs can otherwise recover, have they proved that they had mitigated their damages.

    Background

  3. The matters I shall now set out are not in dispute and I find these facts proved.  The second plaintiff, Terence Amyat Horsell, and the third plaintiff, Maxwell John Horsell, each owned half of the shares in Walnut Grove Nominees Pty ltd and Walnut Grove Estate Pty ltd (Walnut Grove).  Walnut Grove was the trustee for the Walnut Grove Unit Trust (the Unit Trust), the units in which were owned equally by the first plaintiff, Horsell Nominees Pty Limited and the second plaintiff both as trustees.  The only substantial assets of the Unit Trust were the land on which the retirement village stood…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 321
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved a dispute between Horsell Nominees Pty Ltd and NAJB Pty Ltd, which arose from the defendant's failure to settle on a contract for the sale of shares in a company and units in a trust. The plaintiffs sought loss of bargain damages and other costs, as the assets of the trust were subsequently sold to a third party. The court was tasked with deciding whether the default clause in the contract precluded the plaintiffs from seeking common law remedies for breach of contract and whether the plaintiffs had taken reasonable steps to mitigate their damages. The case was heard and determined by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether the default clause in the contract excluded common law remedies for breach of contract, which would otherwise have been available to the plaintiffs, and whether the plaintiffs had mitigated their damages if they could otherwise recover. The court had to examine the terms of the contract, the circumstances leading up to the breach, and the steps taken by the plaintiffs to mitigate their losses.

The court held that the default clause in the contract did not exclude common law remedies for breach of contract. The clause merely provided a mechanism for the plaintiffs to resell the assets if the defendant failed to settle on the contract. The court further found that the plaintiffs had not unreasonably delayed in reselling the assets and had taken reasonable steps to mitigate their losses. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to loss of bargain damages in the amount of $322,940, plus costs.

In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and awarded them loss of bargain damages in the amount of $322,940, along with costs. The court found that the default clause in the contract did not exclude common law remedies for breach of contract, and the plaintiffs had taken reasonable steps to mitigate their losses.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Two principal issues are raised at trial. They are:1.did the default clause in the contract exclude common law remedies for breach of contract which would otherwise have been available to the plaintiffs, and2.if the plaintiffs can otherwise recover, have they proved that they had mitigated their damages.Background The matters I shall now set out are not in dispute and I find these facts proved. The second plaintiff, Terence Amyat Horsell, and the third plaintiff, Maxwell John Horsell, each owned half of the shares in Walnut Grove Nominees Pty ltd and Walnut Grove Estate Pty ltd (Walnut Grove). Walnut Grove was the trustee for the Walnut Grove Unit Trust (the Unit Trust), the units in which were owned equally by the first plaintiff, Horsell Nominees Pty Limited and the second plaintiff both as trustees. The only substantial assets of the Unit Trust were the land on which the retirement village stood and its rights to fees under licence agreements with the residents of the village. In the latter part of 2007, the third plaintiff was put under some pressure by his bankers to reduce debt. In order to placate his bankers the third plaintiff obtained a valuation of the Walnut Grove Retirement Village prepared by Egan National Valuers (the Egan valuation). It was the opinion of the author that on 9 November 2007 the Retirement Village was valued at $3m exclusive of GST. Notwithstanding receipt of the valuation, the bankers encouraged the third plaintiff to place the retirement village on the market. He contacted Mr Sutton, a chartered accountant of the firm PKF, to help with the sale. Through Mr Sutton several interested parties presented themselves as potential purchasers. One was a Queensland entity. Another was the defendant, NAJB Pty Limited, represented by Mr Michalakas. Another, which came via the third plaintiff’s son, was Masonic Homes Incorporated (Masonic). Masonic became the purchaser of the retirement village under the second contract. Mr Sutton conducted the negotiations on behalf of the plaintiffs. In late December 2007 a verbal agreement was reached, subject to conducting due diligence, that the defendant would buy the retirement village for $3.5m. The defendant paid a non-refundable deposit of $50,000. The third plaintiff said in evidence that this payment amounted to the price for “exclusivity”, in the sense that the defendant would be provided with information so that it could conduct due diligence and had the right to purchase at the price mentioned. A written contract was executed on 19 February 2008. The settlement date was to be 15 April 2008. Several days before the settlement date the defendant advised that there would be a delay and postponed the settlement date to 23 April 2008. On 22 April a further delay was foreshadowed. As a result the third plaintiff wrote, on behalf of all plaintiffs, to the defendant, in these terms:Dear Sir,We have just been advised that settlement of the Village will not take place tomorrow as confirmed in David Spurritt’s letter of 11 April 2008 which was written on your behalf.We are very disappointed with this further delay and therefore advise that we reserve all rights bestowed on us by clause 9 DEFAULT of the sale agreement and we are giving you seven (7) days notice as required under clause 9.2.2 that we will now exercise our rights to resell in accordance with that clause.This letter is signed on behalf of the Sellers as detailed in Schedule 1 of the sale agreement.This letter is important because the defendant claims that, by its terms, the plaintiffs irrevocably elected to proceed by means of the default clause in the sale agreement and not to utilise any common law remedy otherwise available.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I might say that I do not accept that the later agreement was anything but one struck at arms length. There is no evidence which suggests otherwise. It is noteworthy that the price paid by Masonic was within a few per cent of the price which the defendant had agreed to pay. In my mind there is no significance in terms of market value in the fact that what was sold to Masonic was not the shares and units in the ownership structure, but was the real assets and associated rights. I do not consider it to be of consequence that, when Mr Horsell took steps to resell the retirement village, he did not seek the services of an agent specialising in the sale of that sort of asset and did not advertise the sale. What he did was exactly what he had done in late 2007 and in both instances those steps achieved contracts at prices above valuation.Conclusion The plaintiffs have proved their case. There will be judgment in the amount of $322,940 with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.