| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
PRACTICE COURT
SCI 2014 01201
| STIRLING LINDLEY HORNE (as Trustee for the bankrupt estate of David Frederick Snelling) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| FRED SNELLING | First Defendant |
| LEONIE SNELLING | Second Defendant |
| VICTORIAN REGISTRAR OF TITLES | Third Defendant |
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JUDGE: | GINNANE J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 11 April 2014 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 8 May 2014 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Horne v Snelling | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2014] VSC 173 | |
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REAL PROPERTY – Caveat – Application to remove – Whether agreement to secure parents’ loans to son created caveatable interest – Later bankruptcy of son – Whether consideration – Whether consideration past – Whether forbearance to sue – Whether agreement a deed – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 120; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 90(3), Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 73, 73A.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Ms K. Poulakis | Harris Carlson |
| For the First and Second Defendants | Mr A Schlicht | Vadarlis & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
The plaintiff, Mr Stirling Horne, as trustee for the bankrupt estate of David Snelling, applies under s 90(3) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) to remove a caveat lodged over the interest of David Snelling in land in Certificate of Title Volume 08983 Folio 146 at Surf Beach, Victoria.
David Snelling lodged a debtor’s petition under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) on 4 July 2009. He was discharged from bankruptcy in July 2012.
The first and second defendants are the parents of David Snelling. The third defendant, the Registrar of Titles, did not participate in the proceeding.
The onus lies on the caveators to establish that there is a serious question to be tried that they have the estate or interest which they claim in the Surf Beach land and, having done so, to establish that the balance of convenience favours the maintenance of the caveat until trial.[1]
[1]Piroshenko v Grojsman (2010) 27 VR 489 [7] (Warren CJ).
The caveators, being the first two defendants Fred and Leonie Snelling, allege that the caveat was lodged pursuant to an agreement of 20 October 2008 with their son, David Snelling. That agreement related to moneys that they advanced to him pursuant to the agreement between December 2007 and September 2008, and totals $100,590.24.
The caveat was lodged over the Surf Beach property on 27 October 2008 and claimed an estate in fee simple in the land to the extent of the interest of David Frederick Snelling. The grounds of claim for the caveat were:
Pursuant to an Agreement in writing dated 20 October 2008 between the Caveators and David Frederick Snelling.
The Agreement, which is entitled a Deed of Agreement, contained recitals that:
(a)FSLA (Fred Snelling and Leonie Snelling) have advanced funds to DFS (David Snelling)(“the advances”) at the request of David Snelling.
(b)Fred Snelling and Leonie Snelling seek security for the advances from David Snelling.
(c)The parties wish to record in writing what was agreed…
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- Case
- [2014] VSC 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the agreement between the applicants and their son to secure loans constituted a caveatable interest. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the consideration for the agreement was valid, particularly in light of the son's subsequent bankruptcy. The court also had to consider whether the agreement could be considered a deed under the relevant legislation and whether the doctrine of forbearance to sue could apply.
The court held that the agreement between the applicants and their son did indeed create a caveatable interest. The consideration for the agreement was deemed valid, as it involved the son's promise to repay the loans, which constituted a future benefit to the applicants. The court further found that the agreement could be considered a deed under the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), and thus enforceable. The doctrine of forbearance to sue was not applicable in this case as the applicants had not waived their right to enforce the agreement. As a result, the application to remove the caveat was dismissed.
The court's final order was that the application to remove the caveat was dismissed, and the caveat remained in place. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the application.
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