Horleck and Horleck & Ors

[2012] FamCA 120

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HORLECK & HORLECK AND ORS [2012] FamCA 120

FAMILY LAW – COURT AND JUDGES – Disqualification – Where the Applicant Wife seeks the trial Judge recuse himself from the matter – Interlocutory proceedings – Bias – Fair-minded lay observer – Whether trial Judge was actually biased or created a reasonable apprehension of bias – Reasonable apprehension of bias – Trial Judge disqualified from any further conduct in this matter.

FAMILY LAW – SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS – Where all parties to proceedings have been self-represented for the duration of current proceedings – “sophisticated litigant”. 

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Batey-Elton & Elton (2010) 43 Fam LR 62
Dunwell & Dunwell [2011] FamCAFC 2
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; Cleane Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 205 CLR 337
Green & Knowles [2010] FamCAFC 248
Johnson & Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764
Johnson v Johnson (No 3) (2000) FLC 93-041
Nabers & Nabers [2001] FamCAFC 145
R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) 93-072
Strahan & Strahan (Disqualification) (2009) FLC 93-414

APPLICANT: Ms Horleck

FIRST RESPONDENT: Mr Horleck

SECOND RESPONDENT: Ms Lyman-Horleck (in her capacity as director of X Pty Ltd)

THIRD RESPONDENT: X Pty Ltd as trustee for the H Trust (ACN …)

FOURTH RESPONDENT: Ms Lyman-Horleck

FIFTH RESPONDENT: Ms Cooper

FILE NUMBER: BRF 8480 of 1994

DATE DELIVERED: 15 March 2012

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Bell J

HEARING DATE: 29 February 2012

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT APPEARING IN PERSON

THE FIRST RESPONDENT APPEARING IN PERSON

THE SECOND RESPONDENT APPEARING IN PERSON

THE THIRD RESPONDENT APPEARING IN PERSON

THE FOURTH RESPONDENT APPEARING IN PERSON

THE FIFTH RESPONDENT APPEARING IN PERSON

Orders

1. I hereby disqualify myself from the further hearing of any proceedings in relation to this matter, other than any directions that are required.

2. These proceedings be listed for trial for five (5) days commencing 10.00 am on 3 September 2012 at the Brisbane Registry of the Family Court.

3. The Wife having filed her affidavit of evidence-in-chief on the 27 January 2012, the Respondents to reply to such within a period of thirty (30) days of today’s date.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Horleck &

Horleck and Ors is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRF8480/1994

Ms Horleck

Applicant

And

Mr Horleck

First Respondent

Ms Lyman-Horleck (as director of X Pty Ltd)

Second Respondent

X Pty Ltd as trustee for the H Trust

Third Respondent

Ms Lyman-Horleck

Fourth Respondent

Ms Cooper

Fifth Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is a matter both complex and protracted, casting a lingering shadow over its litigants for nigh on 18 years. 

2. In brief, if I may use that word in connexion with a matter which has been on foot, in one way or another, since 1994, the Applicant Wife’s substantive application seeks to set aside Final Orders made by the Honourable Justice Butler in 1995. 

3. The Wife’s (Amended) Initiating Application came before Carmody J in January 2008 and his Honour made Orders dismissing same on 7 July 2008.  The Wife appealed the decision of Carmody J and on 20 January 2010 the Full Court upheld her appeal and remitted the matter for rehearing. 

4. Since that decision in early 2010, and following a Directions Hearings by Registrar Coutts on 11 March and 20 May 2010, this matter has remained in my docket.  This period of approximately two years of interlocutory and compliance hearings includes, I might add, some 15 days allocated to two separate attempts to progress this matter to trial.  Mostly recently, a five day trial set down for 16 to 20 January 2012 was vacated, as none of the parties were ready to proceed.

5. Following this sad concession by all parties on 16 January 2012 that the matter simply could not go on, and I note here that an earlier trial set down for 10 days commencing 4 July 2011 was vacated for a similar reason, the Fourth Respondent was given leave to bring an application for summary dismissal. 

6. The hearing for summary dismissal proceeded on what should have been the fifth and final day of trial, 20 January 2012, and it appears much of the Wife’s complaint as to bias arises from this subsequent hearing.

7. I note also that the hearing for summary dismissal was not finalised that day of 20 January 2012.  Instead, following the Fourth Respondent’s submissions, the Wife sought an extension of time to file and serve her affidavit in response, despite her assurances to the Court on 16 January 2012 that she was being provided with sufficient time to respond.  Nonetheless, the Wife was granted an extension to the following Friday 27 January 2012 to file and serve such affidavit, and I note my remarks that it was “the last time you’re going to get extensions from me.”

8. It was eventually determined that I would read a portion of her affidavit of evidence-in-chief, insofar as it responded to the Fourth Respondent’s application for summary dismissal.   

9. This, however, is the Wife’s Application in a Case filed 3 February 2012 seeking that I “recuse” myself from the matter.  The Wife asserts, by way of her supporting Affidavit filed that day, that I have a strong objection to s79A applications such as hers; that I have been “sympathetic” to the respondents’ arguments; that I have refused to read the Wife’s case material; that I have “derided and ridiculed” the Wife in respect of her disability; and that I have demonstrated “outright bias” against the Wife. 

10. The Wife went in oral submissions to a number of authorities in support of these assertions and also submitted that she had been denied natural justice and procedural fairness. 

11. Such application was opposed by the five respondents, all of whom appeared by telephone.  Ms Lyman-Horleck, who represents the Second, Fourth and Fifth Respondents, apologised for her failure to make any formal response to the application, but also referred to the fact that the Wife’s Application in a Case had only been received on the Friday prior, that being 24 February 2012.  I note in passing that effecting service in this matter has consistently proven to be quite an ordeal.   

12. In an effort to fully address the issues raised by the Wife, I have endeavoured to particularise all the grounds raised by the Wife under which she seeks to assert my bias and demand my subsequent recusal. 

Self represented Litigants

1. The Wife has, as have all parties to the matter, been self represented for at least the duration of the proceedings before me.   

2. Throughout her oral submissions the Wife has asserted she, as a self represented litigant, has been denied procedural fairness and a fair trial.  The Wife pointed to her lack of representation in distinguishing the present case from the Full Court authority of Green & Knowles [2010] FamCAFC 248 whereby Bryant CJ, Boland and Thackray JJ made the following remarks:

   38. While there can be no doubt his Honour’s comments were robustly expressed, those expressions must be seen in the context of a hearing where, at all relevant times, the father was represented by senior counsel experienced in the jurisdiction.  In such circumstances, we are satisfied his Honour was doing no more than that which the authorities on modern trial process recognise as appropriate conduct having regard to the level of sophistication of the particular litigant.    

3. I am cognisant of the well-known guidelines which should be employed in matters involving self represented litigants: Johnson & Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764; Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072.

4. The Wife has also referred throughout her material to her disability.  Namely, she states that my behaviour in relation to her disability violates her right to a fair trial and rehearing of the matter.

5. Difficulties arise from the fact that any such evidence of the Wife’s disability has not been readily put before the Court and I note the Fourth Respondent raised this issue in her submissions on 29 February 2012. 

6. I must confess I was further perplexed as to the submissions made by the Wife in relation to an apparent insult from the Fourth Respondent, whereby Ms Lyman-Horleck said during the 20 January 2012 hearing that “it is not in dispute that the applicant is mentally ill.”  The Wife points to the fact that I did not “castigate her [the Fourth Respondent] for being insulting or discourteous.”  I do not know how this statement can be attributed to me or my mindset in relation to the Applicant.

7. My impression of Ms Lyman-Horleck’s comments that day was that this phrase was a concession for the Wife’s benefit. 

8. The Full Court has referred to the prevalence of mental illness amongst litigants in this jurisdiction and provided that judicial officers must give proper consideration to such factors where they are present: Nabers & Nabers [2001] FAMCAFC 145.

9. Proper recognition of those considerations in respect of both the self represented litigant and the mentally ill litigant are essential to ensuring there is a “level playing field” between the represented and the self represented litigant (Johnson), but no evidence has been put before me of the Applicant’s mental illness.  On the contrary there is some evidence that she has been interviewed by the Mental Health Department and they have not found her to be mentally ill. 

10. Insofar as any suggestion that the Wife was not afforded this “level playing field”, if anything, the Wife could be held to be at some advantage when one considers her concession that she has been studying law for at least one year. The Wife also told me she had had the benefit of legal assistance from time to time, when she could afford it.    

11. Where the parties have been embroiled in Family Court proceedings for nigh on 18 years, I am afraid that any submission the Wife is an unsophisticated litigant will fall upon deaf ears.  I perhaps would not go so far as to say these are sophisticated litigants, but certainly all parties to the matters have some understanding of the basic court processes necessary to the expediency of hearing. 

12. The Wife’s submissions go to several demonstrations of sympathy toward the respondents on my behalf, subsequently indicative of my bias toward her. 

13. Without seeking to answer every accusation levelled against me, the Wife submits that I have at no time made any “suggestion” to her of any action she might like to take against the respondents.  I note the Wife did qualify this statement in that I had given her some advice in relation to the lodging of a further caveat, my advice upon which was apparently incorrect. 

14. That the Wife could accuse me of bias for a failure to advise her, when I have, ostensibly on her submission, been advising the other side, is simply ludicrous.  I again note the aforementioned guidelines in relation to self represented litigants whereby the Full Court quite clearly provides that while self represented litigants may be obliged to procedural guidance, trial judges should not give litigants legal advice: Johnson & Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764. I note also the intention of the Full Court in creating these guidelines to “assist parties and the judiciary in meeting the needs of litigants in person without compromising the impartiality of the court.”

15. The Wife also specifically points to a comment I made on 20 January 2012 in relation to the filing of the Fourth Respondent’s application for summary dismissal, whereby I said myself, “there was no suggestion…up until I made the suggestion that an application should be made this Friday…”

    [my emphasis] 

16. Perhaps the Wife seeks to assert that I prompted the First and Fourth Respondents to make such an application, yet I remind the Wife that the First and Fourth Respondents already had applications before me on 16 January 2012 seeking the matter be permanently stayed.  The matter had been stayed previously in conjunction with my Order of 9 June 2011, which provided for the matter to be stayed in the event the Wife did not comply with Orders in relation to the filing of certain valuations (see paragraph 2 of the Order of 16 July 2010).  The Wife did not comply and the 10 day trial referred to above was abandoned at an inordinate cost to the Court and the taxpayers. 

17. I note further their Honours’ statements in Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072 whereby this prohibition on judges proffering legal advice was somewhat qualified by the following statement:

    224.We do not disagree with the formulating of the Full Court in Johnson as to the reasons why it is usually undesirable for the judge to give legal advice, particularly when it is of a strategic nature.  We do, however, think that there can be circumstances where the requirement to conduct a fair trial requires a Judge to give assistance of a legal nature to a litigant in person even though such assistance may risk compromising the appearance of impartiality and neutrality from the perspective of the other side.

    [their emphasis]

18. Relevant to the assertions of the Wife in the present case, the Full Court in Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines, after determining that the giving of such assistance was a matter of discretion for the trial Judge, provided the following observations:

    235. Fourthly, the judge may take the view that he or she should assist in the reformulation of applications which may be made by the litigant in person, including but not confined to matters such as procedural steps.  Subject to the other party sustaining no injustice, we see no objection to a judge reframing the material to properly reflect what the applicant intended.  The alternative may be a costly adjournment followed by yet another application. 

    236.Similarly, it may be the judge considers it necessary to clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person, or the bases for such orders.    

    237.We see the giving of this sort of assistance as fundamentally different from, for example, proffering advice as to a litigant in person’s chances of success in a particular case or advising as to the type of witness that would best advance a party’s case.  Matters such as these appear to us to be too dependent upon an intimate knowledge of the party’s case which goes beyond the material on the record and is thus a function of advocacy rather than assistance or information.

Opinions Expressed in Relation to s 79A

1. The Wife submits that I have demonstrated actual bias by my comments in relation to a long held opinion of mine that s 79A applications ought be subject to a time limitation. 

2. Whilst I have conceded making such statements, for the sake of completeness I will set out those comments as they appear in the transcripts.  Firstly, on 16 January 2012, where I stated I would “move heaven and earth” about the fact there was no limitation upon s 79A applications. 

3. Again on 20 January 2012, in response to the submissions of Ms Lyman-Horleck:

   [MS LYMAN-HORLECK]: Now, in saying that, I know there is no limitation period for 79A - - -

   HIS HONOUR: I will be moving heaven and earth.

   [MS LYMAN-HORLECK]: Yes

   HIS HONOUR: There will be nobody taking notice, but this type of thing cannot happen again.

4. The Wife submitted during the course of her oral submissions that this “outburst” was a clear indication of my having prejudged the facts and merits of the case.  She also went on to submit that I was incapable of putting aside my “personal feelings regarding the lack of time limitations on section 79A applications”.

5. The Wife submits that my inability to put aside these “personal feelings” prejudices her rights to due process and a fair trial.  I am entitled to make comment about what I consider to be a deficiency in a litigant’s case under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). It does not and cannot be said that I have determined the Application in a Case because I comment upon what I consider to be a defect in the Act.

Refusal to Read Material

1. The Wife deposes to further bias at paragraphs 85 to 118 of her affidavit filed

   
   

   3 February 2012, by way of my “outright” refusal to read her case material.  At 88:

   88.On a number of occassions [sic] the Honourable Justice Bell has refused outright to read my material and has complained about various aspects of it.

2. The Wife goes on to depose to how she has made it easier for the Court to wade through the masses of material, which she has deposed in this same affidavit to be “necessary”, by a series of tabbing, highlighting, coversheets and whatnot.  Whilst the Court acknowledges the Wife’s efforts, I might note that many of the “steps” she took in an attempt to make the material easier to read are simply those protocols and procedures as required by the Rules.  (I note in particular the advice from Registrar Coutts in relation to the Wife’s failure to comply with Rule 15.12 which is concerned with annexures to affidavits)

3. The Wife further deposes that:

   97. Without His Honour reading my Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief there is no way he can make a fully informed decision regarding our matter.

4. I agree wholeheartedly with the Wife that a trial Judge’s outright refusal to read a party’s case material before making a decision would be unjust: per Kirby J in Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172. However, I must reject any such submission of the Wife in relation to this case, and my conduct on the basis that the Wife’s summation of events simply is not an accurate representation of what occurred.

5. The Wife referred in her oral submissions to my comments on 27 January 2012, and submitted that I “slammed (her) affidavit down on the table and vehemently said words to the effect of “I will not read this.  I refuse.”

6. I may have refused to read whole of the affidavit of evidence-in-chief on an interlocutory application, but did read those pages to which I referred.  I note this affidavit had not been filed at that time.

7. I must also contextualise this exchange against a background of these litigants’ consistent and protracted failure to comply with procedural orders, and I do say this has occurred on both sides; however history indicates that such failures have been largely on the part of the Wife.  

8. Following the above exchange the Wife and I eventually agreed that paragraph 533 was where the response to Ms Lyman-Horleck’s material began, where after I stated:

   HIS HONOUR: I’m not going to read the rest.  I will only read the document – part of the documents put before me…

   ….

   HIS HONOUR: All right, well that’s all I’m reading.  I’m not going to read it today.  This is an absolute farce.

   [MS HORLECK]: Why?

   HIS HONOUR: This is about the fourth time we’ve had affidavits of this size.

   [MS HORLECK]: It’s the same affidavit, your Honour.  It’s simply – I’ve tried to condense it.  There’s an - - -

   HIS HONOUR: Condense it? It now weighs four kilograms.

9. See pages 4 to 6 of transcript of proceedings of 27 January 2012 and in particular line 34 at page 8 of the transcript of that same day.

10. Accordingly, it was agreed between both the parties and the Court that pages 66 to 80 inclusive were the relevant passages insofar as the Wife’s response to the Fourth Respondent’s Application for summary dismissal. 

11. I concede that much has been said by myself in relation to the excessive amounts of material filed in this matter, much of which I must confess has originated from the Wife.  The physical file itself numbers some nine boxes and contains over 500 Court documents.  Furthermore, despite the apparent wealth of material already provided to the Court, many of the delays caused in this matter can be attributed – directly or otherwise – to both a consistent failure to comply with trial directions and the apparent desire of the Wife to file further and further amended updated affidavits of evidence-in-chief.

1. However, I nonetheless resent any submission from the Wife that if and when this matter proceeded to trial I would not have regard to the totality of evidence put before me, be it affidavit evidence or otherwise.  This statement is of course qualified by an appreciation for the procedural rules which govern this Court, and the filing of material in accordance with those Rules.   

2. It may be that the Wife attributes other earlier comments to also contributing to this head of bias, but if that was the case, I regret that she did not take me to that in her oral submissions nor her supporting affidavit. 

3. Accordingly, I reject any submission of the Wife in relation to my refusal to read her material on the basis that any such refusal never occurred. 

The Law

1. The Wife seeks I disqualify myself from her case on the basis that there has been actual bias on my behalf, or alternatively that my behaviour would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 

2. The law in relation to disqualification is well known.  The Wife went to many of the authorities in her oral submissions and I note the recent Full Court decisions of Strahan & Strahan (Disqualification) (2009) FLC 93-414 at paragraphs 5 and 6 and Batey-Elton & Elton (2010) 43 Fam LR 62 at paragraphs 61 to 64.

3. The principles insofar as disqualification are prescribed in two decisions of the High Court: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; Cleane Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 205 CLR 337; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488.

4. A two step process was prescribed in Ebner: the first step is the identification of the matters said to give rise to the apprehended bias.  The second step requires consideration of the “logical connection” between the matters identified and the possibility, real not remote, of a deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits (as recited in Strahan). 

5. The test to be applied is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the Judge is required to decide.

6. During the course of her oral submissions, the Wife asserted that my preliminary views demonstrated that I am “actually biased or that (my) conduct could lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias”

7. The Wife again referred to Green & Knowles [2010] FamCAFC 248, however as I noted in Court that day, that authority is distinguishable in its application to interlocutory proceedings as compared with a trial . The Wife stated that the “issues remain the same”, but I disagreed with her in Court and I disagree with her again now.

8. I refer to the High Court decision of R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, recently referred to by the Full Court Dunwell & Dunwell [2001] FamCAFC 2. In R v Watson,  Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ distinguished the nature of remarks made during preliminary proceedings to those made during a final hearing:

   264. The remarks on which the wife’s submission was founded were made during argument in an interlocutory proceeding.  One must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of remarks of that kind.  During the course of argument a judge will often follow the common, and sometimes necessary, course of formulating propositions for the purpose of enabling their correctness to be tested, and as a general rule anything that a judge says in the course of argument will be merely tentative and exploration.   

9. The isolated comments and uncontextualised statements reiterated from the Wife’s submissions in these Reasons go some way toward indicating the minutiae of detail that appears to fascinate the Wife.  That a Judge should preside over matters, and complex matters such as these, completely devoid of expressing any comment which could be construed as less than neutral is ludicrous.  

10. I here refer to the High Court’s comments in Johnson & Johnson (No 3) (2000) FLC 93-041, where Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ provided

    13. Whilst the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice… At the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Spinx.  [footnotes omitted]

11. I refer also to the comments of Kirby J in Antoun v R (2006) 224 ALR 51

    So far as the first point is concerned, it is certainly true that the trial judge’s remarks were strong and forthright.  In some circumstances, that will be a permissible expression to adopt, especially where the trial judge is conducting a trial as the sole judge of fact and law and the parties are legally represented by counsel able to respond with clarity and forthrightness.  Judicial indignation at a particular course of action, or proposed action, may on occasion be understandable.  Couched appropriately, at the proper time and in due sequence, it may give rise to no reasonable apprehension of bias.  For centuries in courts of our tradition, judges have been telling parties and their lawyers, sometimes in quite robust terms, that they consider that a particular submission or course of action is hopeless, a waste of the court’s time or doomed to fail.  I would not want to say anything that needlessly mollycoddled candid judicial speech addressed to trained advocates.    

12. I note here that Kirby J’s statement may not have gone so far or been so generous with such comments directed to self represented litigants and I also acknowledge the propensity for prudence “in a case of real doubt”: Batey-Elton & Elton (2010) 43 Fam LR 62

13. However to quote from May J’s judgment in the Full Court decision of Dunwell & Dunwell [2011] FamCAFC 2,

    112.While not wishing to fail to recognise the wife’s important position as a party to the proceedings, her subjective option about what the judge said, did and may have felt is irrelevant unless that coincides with the well known principles in relation to judicial bias, focussed on the impressions gained by an independent and detached lay observer.

14. That the Wife seeks the trial judge disqualify himself, a Judge whom, I might add, has been presiding over her self-professedly “complex” matter for over two years, on the basis that I refer to her by her title and her opponent by her first name, should go some way toward indicating that the Wife is not an objective bystander.

15. I would have thought in a matter with five parties, one of whom is joined both personally, as the director of a trustee company and as the trustee company itself, that it was excusable to refer to a litigant by her first name rather than either her double barrel last name, which happens to be the same or similar to two other litigants, or as the “Second, Third and Fourth Respondent”.  

16. Regrettably, I have considered the submissions made by the Wife as well as those on behalf of the Respondents.  Whilst I reject many of the allegations made by Ms Horleck, the Applicant Wife to which I have referred to in these my reasons for judgment, I am mindful that it is necessary for me to not consider my own feelings and my own view as to whether I am biased or not.  But, I have to consider the person who is sitting in the back of the Court as was referred to by the Wife.  The test to be applied as I have said in paragraph 55 hereof, is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the Judge is required to decide.  I must say that I have no hesitation in saying that I would not be biased against the Wife however, it may be, and I do feel as though that that is more than sufficient, it is not remote and that it is real and that may be that a fair-minded lay observer in the back of the Court may come to the conclusion that there is apprehended bias and consequently I regrettably disqualify myself in the further conduct of this case other than in relation to some direction matters.

17. The Wife has assured me, as usual, that she is ready to proceed.  I believe I have given her leave to file her affidavit to which I refer in these my reasons.  If not, I do so now.  I will order that the Respondents do reply to such affidavit within a period of thirty (30) days of today’s date and that the matter be set down for trial (since the Wife has assured me she is ready to go) for five days commencing on 3 September 2012.  I will make no further orders.

18. One further comment is that this matter must be disposed of.  I emphasise that I am of the view that it is appalling that there is not a limitation period applicable to applications under s 79A.  This Court has been put to a vast deal of inconvenience and wasted time which could have been used in hearing other cases.  At least 15 to 20 days has been non-productive.  I deplore the fact that there is no statutory time limit for applications pursuant to the provisions of

    
    

    s 79A.     

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bell delivered on 15 March 2012. 

Associate: 

Date:  15 March 2012