Hoppitt v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

[1999] QLC 70

[1999] QLC 70

 

 

LAND COURT

BRISBANE

9 JULY 1999

Re:     An Appeal against an Unimproved Valuation –

Valuation of Land Act 1944 –
  Local Government:    Warwick Shire Council
  AV98-768

Frederick C and Gloria M Hoppitt

v.

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

(Hearing at Warwick)

D E C I S I O N

Mr and Mrs Hoppitt own land described as Lots 43 and 44 on Registered Plan 21743, Parish of Gilbert, County of Merivale, containing 141.2 ha.  It is located about 9 km north-east of Yangan and 28 km east of Warwick. 
As at 1 October 1997, the chief executive's unimproved valuation of the land was in the amount of $50,000. The valuation was made pursuant to s.17(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act), in so far as any enhancement in value because the land is surveyed into two lots, has been disregarded. The land was valued as a large rural site exclusively used for purposes of a single dwelling house. A business of grazing is conducted on the land, by the owners. However, the chief executive contends that the land was not used at the relevant date for purposes of "farming" pursuant to the meaning of farming in s.17(2) of the Act. Had the land been used for purposes of farming as defined it would have received a lower valuation.
           The grounds of the appeal are as follows:

"Valuation of this property is disproportionate and has risen at a higher rate than other properties with far better access, facilities and other services it is also discriminatory in its nature and application."

If the land was to be valued as a rural homesite, then the appellants' estimate of value was $41,000.
           Mr Hoppitt appeared at the hearing to conduct the appellants' case and gave evidence in support of a written submission.  The reference to the "discriminatory nature and application of the valuation" in the grounds of the appeal, received the explanation that Mr Hoppitt has "been required to meet certain vague and unexplainable criteria before I can become eligible for Primary Production status." 
           This is not the first time that the valuation of the subject land has required determination by the Court on appeal.  Mr and Mrs Hoppitt appealed to the Land Court against unimproved valuations of $42,500 and $49,000 as at 30 June 1993 and 1 January 1995, respectively.  Those appeals were heard together and were unsuccessful both as to the argument that the land was being used for the purposes of farming or, alternatively, that the concessional valuations on the basis of use for purposes of a single dwelling, were too high.  Subsequently, an appeal was lodged against the chief executive's rural homesite unimproved valuation of $54,000 as at 1 October, 1996.  Although the grazing business had by that time grown, in terms of the size of the herd, the learned Member who determined that appeal found, inter alia, "that the appellants have not demonstrated that the business of farming upon the land yet meets the requirements of the Act".  That appeal was, however, successful to the degree that the unimproved value of the rural homesite was reduced to $50,000.  It appears that the evidence submitted by Mr Hoppitt (as to a sale of a rural homesite in Dollar Bill Drive), influenced the Member in that determination.
           Neither the appellants nor the chief executive appealed to the Land Appeal Court from that decision.
           The valuation as at the date relevant to this matter, was rewritten at the Court's determination as at 1 October 1996.  The one difference was that Mr DP Coe who had taken responsibility for the chief executive's earlier valuation, acted as advocate for the respondent in this matter, while Mr AB Cowley registered valuer, was the officer responsible for the unaltered valuation now appealed against. 
           The implications of the definition of "farming" in s.17(2) of the Act, as are relevant to the appellants' particular business of grazing, have been fully discussed in the previous decisions.  The appellants' business has been found in the past not to meet the test of having a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character.  Mr Hoppitt produced no fresh material to assist his argument that the land was used at the relevant date for the purposes of farming as defined.  Indeed, his verbal evidence as to the level of income generated by the business, supports the conclusion that the appeal lands are not, by definition, used for purposes of farming.
           It is Mr Hoppitt's submission that discrimination exists because other lands, the use of which he believes would not meet the "farming" tests as have been applied to the appellants' business, continue to enjoy the concessional "farming" basis of valuation.  Nevertheless, he would see it as a form of discrimination if the respondent, through Mr Hoppitt's identification of those lands, set about removing those concessions.  He simply wants the subject land also valued at the lower "farming" level.  He identified a source of what he sees as further discrimination through the respondent's practice of rounding valuations to the nearest $500.
           It is clear that, if lands receive a valuation concession to which they are not entitled, then the local government rating burden will be unfairly distributed.  The initial task of correctly identifying lands which are, or are not, entitled to concessional valuations, rests squarely with the chief executive – difficult as that task may be when associated with bulk annual valuations.  However, it is not the task of the Court to inquire into the veracity of the basis of valuations which are not subject of the appeal procedure.
           In this particular matter, it seems that Mr Hoppitt had intended to treat it as a re-hearing of at least the previous appeal.  The chief executive had chosen not to disturb the previous decision of the Court for the reason that there had been seen to be no change, since the date of the previous valuation, in the level of value for rural homesites in this locality.  In fact, the sales evidence which was used to support the chief executive's previous valuation was again adopted by Mr Cowley as being relevant in this matter.  Mr Cowley had investigated the sale of the land in Dollar Bill Drive, introduced as evidence by Mr Hoppitt in the previous hearing, but found it to show a much higher level of unimproved value than had actually been applied.  The  valuation applied to the sale land, upon which the Land Court relied, had not been based on an analysis of that sale.  Mr Cowley gave evidence that a subsequent analysis of the actual sale price indicated a level of value which was unreliably high. 
Mr Hoppitt remained unconvinced by previous Land Court decisions that no assistance was to be gained from revisiting the valuation history of the subject land and the disturbance to relativity of valuations of the subject and other lands which had existed as far back as 1983, and effective from 1988. That relativity had first been altered in the valuation as at 31 March 1988, effective from 1989, before the appellants had acquired the property. The valuation again rose, out of relativity, effective from 1992 (after the appellants' acquisition, as I understand it). A reduction effective from 1994 occurred when the chief executive valued the land, as it was entitled to be, as a rural homesite used exclusively for the purposes of a single dwelling, pursuant to s.17(1) of the Act. Mr Hoppitt produced various graphs showing the alterations to relativity which had occurred. His estimate of value was based on his perception of correct relativity with the valuation of one particular property ("Adams") which land had been submitted by the chief executive at some time in the past as being comparable to the subject land.
           Mr Hoppitt submitted that there should have been strict relativity between the valuations in the periods of effect from 1988 through to 1993.  It was not until the 1993 date of effect that the subject land received the concessional valuation as a single site.  Although arguing that the land should always have been entitled to at least that concession, Mr Hoppitt calculated that application of the factorised increases (to the Adams' valuation) subsequent to the 1993 date of effect, would have resulted in a concessional subject valuation of $41,000 as at 1 October, 1996 and at the relevant date. 
           In his calculations, Mr Hoppitt chose to ignore the fact that the concessional rural homesite valuations as at 30 June 1993 and 1 January 1995 had been contested unsuccessfully, despite his perception at that time, of incorrect relativity.  Had he chosen to use those dates as his graph foundation and adopted strict compliance to factorised increases in the Adams' valuation, the $54,000 valuation effective from 1997, should not have been altered to $50,000 and, no doubt, would have remained at $54,000 at the date relevant to this appeal.  Mr Hoppitt's evidence and his cross-examination of Mr Cowley, indicated a lack of understanding of the principles and practice of land valuation.  He is apparently happy to accept statistical alterations to relativity but only when it suits his theoretical, mathematically based submissions. 
           His approach to this hearing was based on a mixture of the perception of continuing discrimination and criticisms of the evidence introduced by Mr Coe at the previous hearing.  Most of his criticisms, even those which were technically correct, were irrelevant to the question of value.  For example, he had found the name of the purchaser in one sale was spelt incorrectly and in the second sale an incorrect street address was used.  He was critical of the fact that the description of "moderately sloping ridges" for the subject property, had altered from an original inspection sketch which showed "moderate to steep ridges".  Mr Hoppitt insists that the access road to the land departs, through privately owned land, from the surveyed road access and enters the property on the southern boundary.  Mr Cowley and Mr Coe before him, were aware that the access road diverts off the surveyed road but thought it entered the property on the western boundary.  Even if Mr Hoppitt is correct, as is probable, what is relevant is that the surveyed road is impassable along its full route and the present access is dependent on the use of the neighbour's land.  The chief executive, through Mr Cowley, recognised that the access disability should be and has been considered in the valuation process.  The poor television reception has continually been raised and has been accepted by the chief executive as being a detriment.  The carrying capacity potential of the land is a continual source of disagreement but is irrelevant to the worth of the land as a rural homesite, particularly as the chief executive's estimate is lower than that of Mr Hoppitt.
           Since the previous hearing, Mr Hoppitt has inquired of the local electricity authority as to the cost of extending electricity to the boundary of the subject land.  Not for this hearing, but for the previous hearing, an inquiry by an officer of the Department had resulted in a significantly lower estimate (excluding clearing of the line) having been given.  No formal advice from the electricity authority was obtained by Mr Hoppitt although documentary evidence, rather than the hearsay evidence,  may have assisted his case.  He was unable to obtain cost estimates for extension of electricity to the sale properties because of the private nature of that information.  However he had been informed that an estimate supplied by the electricity authority and adopted first by Mr Coe and then by Mr Cowley relative to one of the sales would have been applicable only if other potential users had not been prepared to share the construction cost.  Mr Hoppitt complained, unreasonably in my opinion, of a perceived misuse of the chief executive's powers in obtaining information regarding the cost of electricity extensions to private landowners.  Mr Hoppitt had some complaints also about a perception of lack of departmental assistance available to him when researching the Department's records.

Summary of Considerations

I do not propose to discuss the sales evidence provided by the respondent.  It was fully discussed by the Member in the previous decision.  Mr Hoppitt has  opinions differing from Mr Cowley regarding matters such as the relevance between the use of the winding access to one of the sales by timber jinkers and the use by heavy vehicles of part of the access to the subject land to a nearby quarry.  However, I prefer the evidence of Mr Cowley as to the overall comparison of the sales with the subject property for the purposes of carrying out an unimproved market valuation.  Some doubt has been created by the evidence given by Mr Hoppitt as to his inquiries relative to the cost of extending electricity to the subject land.  Nevertheless, the chief executive has attempted in the past and in this matter, to compare like with like, inasmuch as both the sale properties required extension of electricity lines to their boundaries before connection could be provided. 
           Having now read the decision of the Land Court Member in the previous appeal, and having heard the evidence from Mr Cowley relative to the Dollar Bill Drive sale, it is my opinion that the chief executive might reasonably have reinstated the earlier $54,000 valuation as at the date relevant to this matter.  Such action would have, no doubt, brought accusations of further discrimination.  However, the question of a comparison of the subject land with the "sale" land in Dollar Bill Drive, has, in fact, nothing to do with sales evidence, but instead relativity of valuations.  I find Mr Hoppitt's efforts to make valuation comparisons between rural homesites, as opposed to land used for purposes of farming, as lacking in cogency.
           Section 66 of the Act provides the Court with the discretion to affirm the valuation appealed against, or to "reduce or increase the amount of that valuation to the extent necessary in its opinion to determine the same correctly under, subject to, and in accordance with this Act", and subject to s.70 to make such order as it deems fit with respect to the payment of costs.
           I have decided in this matter not to increase the valuation to $54,000 for the purpose of maintaining the relativity of valuations of rural homesites which more than likely would have remained undisturbed as at 1 October 1996 had it not been for the weight given by the Land Court in the previous appeal, to what was then seen to be reliable evidence relative to the Dollar Bill Drive sale.  The benefit of doubt is provided to the appellants bearing in mind the uncertain effect on the market which would result from unconfirmed differing estimates of cost to extend electricity to the boundary of the subject property.
           It is clear that Mr Hoppitt refuses to accept reasons for previous Land Court decisions.  He has chosen in the past not to exercise the right of the appellants to appeal from decisions of the Land Court to the Land Appeal Court.  Instead, in this matter, he wished to conduct his fresh appeal as if it was a  re-hearing of all that has gone before, including evidence as to matters which previous decisions have found to be irrelevant.  Because of his continuing grievances, Mr Hoppitt would be well advised, in my opinion, to seek private professional advice as to the fair unimproved market value of the land and to the effect of previous Land Court decisions.  Proving the grounds of a reasonable appeal would also be assisted significantly by professional assistance in the efficient conduct of appeal proceedings.

Findings.

(1)The valuation history of the subject land is not found to have relevance to the amount of the valuation appealed against. There is no market evidence to suggest that the valuation of the subject land, exclusively used for the purposes of a single dwelling house, pursuant to Section 17(1) of the Act, is excessive.

(2)On the lack of substantive evidence to the contrary, the land is not used for the purposes of "farming" as defined, and should not be so valued.

(3)The appeal is dismissed and the unimproved valuation of the chief executive in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) as at 1 October 1997, is affirmed.

RE WENCK

MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT