CITATION: Hooper v Rowley & 1 Or [2004] NSWCA 398 HEARING DATE(S): 02/11/04 JUDGMENT DATE:
11 November 2004JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA at 1; Ipp JA at 2; Bryson JA at 28 DECISION: Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs. CATCHWORDS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Whether leave to appeal required - Measure of value of the appellant's right for the purposes of s 101(2)(r)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) - Where appeal would not settle any legal principle - Where litigation already consumed excessive proportion of estate - WILLS - Application under Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) - Two stage process under Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 - Whether appellant left without adequate provision for proper maintenance and advancement - Competing claim of second respondent - Where second respondent had lived in the property the subject of the claim all her life - Where whole of property had been left to the second respondent under the terms of the Will. D LEGISLATION CITED: Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 101(2)(r)CASES CITED: Amos v Fraser (1906) 4 CLR 78
Attorney-General (Q); Ex rel Duncan v Andrews (1979) 145 CLR 573
Ballas v Theophilos [No 1] (1957) 97 CLR 186
Bladwell v Davis [2004] NSWCA 170
Oertel v Crocker (1947) 75 CLR 261
Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201PARTIES :
Barbara Hooper (Appellant)
Mavis Rowley (First Respondent)
Patricia Museth (Second Respondent)FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40456/03 COUNSEL: In Person (Appellant)
M Gorrick (First & Second Respondents)SOLICITORS: In Person (Appellant)
L Rundle & Co (First & Second Respondents)
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): ED 2643/01 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :McLaughlin M
CA 40456/03
ED 2643/01Thursday 11 November 2004SHELLER JA
IPP JA
BRYSON JA
1 SHELLER JA: I agree with Ipp JA.
2 IPP JA: The appellant brought proceedings under the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) claiming an order for provision for her maintenance, advancement and education out of the estate of her late mother, Ethel Elizabeth Museth (“the deceased”).
3 The deceased died on 21 November 2000, aged 89. She had six surviving children who include the appellant and the second respondent, Patricia Ann Elizabeth Museth. By her will the deceased gave the entirety of her estate to the second respondent.
4 By judgment dated 2 May 2003 Master McLaughlin dismissed the appellant’s claim.
5 The only significant asset in the deceased’s estate was a house known as “Old Toongabbie”. At the outset of the hearing the parties agreed that the value of the Old Toongabbie residence was $360,000.
6 The Master noted that, in upholding the terms of the will of the deceased, the respondents would be entitled to an order that their costs be paid out of the estate and, the appellant, should she be successful in the proceedings, would also be entitled to an order for her costs to…
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- AGLC
- Hooper v Rowley [2004] NSWCA 398
- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 398
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Appeal included determining the measure of the value of the appellant's right for the purposes of section 101(2)(r)(ii) of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW), which governs when leave to appeal is required. This involved considering whether the proposed appeal would settle any significant legal principle and whether the litigation had already consumed an excessive proportion of the estate. Additionally, the court had to consider the underlying application under the *Family Provision Act 1982* (NSW), which involved the two-stage process outlined in *Singer v Berghouse* (1994) 181 CLR 201. This required assessing whether the appellant had been left without adequate provision for their proper maintenance and advancement, particularly in light of the competing claim of the second respondent, who had resided in the property in question her entire life and to whom the entire property had been bequeathed under the deceased's will.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the appeal would not settle any important question of law or public interest, nor would it advance any principle of law. Furthermore, the court considered that the litigation had already consumed a disproportionate amount of the estate, and that granting leave to appeal would likely exacerbate this issue. Applying the principles for granting leave to appeal, the court concluded that the threshold for granting leave had not been met.
Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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