Homewood and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services

Case

[2006] AATA 6

6 January 2006

No judgment structure available for this case.

Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 6

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No W2005/59

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  DIVISION )
Re WALTER HOMEWOOD

Applicant

And

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Linda Savage Davis, Member

Date6 January 2006

PlacePerth

Decision

  The Tribunal decides that the decision under review be set aside and in substitution decides that so much of the compensation payment received by the applicant be treated as not having been made such that the preclusion period ends on 1 July 2006 instead of 18 October 2022.

....[sgd L Savage Davis]..................

Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECURITY  – disability support pension – lump sum payment of compensation – preclusion period – discretion to treat whole or part of compensation payment as not having been made – whether special circumstances exist.

Social Security Act 1991 – section 1184(K) (1)

Martin and Secretary to Department of Social Security, Re (1990) AATA 6482

Secretary, Department of Social Security and Winterbotham (AAT 6499, 11 December 1990)

Secretary, Department of Social Security v Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580 at 586

Kulakov and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 63 SSR 879

Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 AAR 362

SDSS v Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580

REASONS FOR DECISION

6 January 2006 Linda Savage Davis, Member

1.      This is an application by Mr Walter Homewood (the applicant) for a review of a decision that was made by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal on 17 December 2004, to reject Mr Homewood’s claim for disability support pension.

2.      At the hearing the applicant was represented by Mr Ross Harrison of Dwyer Durack Lawyers.  The respondent was represented by Mr Aaron Holt, an officer in the Legal Service Branch of Centrelink.

3. At the hearing the Tribunal had in evidence the documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T-Documents) (T1 – T43, 1 – 495) and Exhibits A1 to A24.

4.       It was agreed by the parties that the date of the accident (3 February 1993), the amount of the compensation payment ($1,250,000) and the calculation of the preclusion period (3 February 1993 to 18 October 2022) were not in dispute.  The issue in contention was whether special circumstances existed that would make it appropriate to treat the compensation payment either in whole or part as not having been made.

Mr Homewood’s Evidence

5.      Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibits A1 and A2 which he confirmed he was familiar with and had prepared.  In regard to Exhibit A2 Mr Homewood confirmed that he had no income or superannuation and that the expenses listed were correct.  He told the Tribunal that the reference to $500 per month for house repairs was the cost associated with making the property, where he lives, wheelchair accessible.  He said that he spent less than $40 per week on food and that the high electricity and fuel costs were accounted for largely by the cost of driving to see his lawyer and specialist appointments, mainly at Shenton Park.  Mr Homewood said that the bank account containing $3,695.20 noted at Question 6 now contained about $3.00.  He had had a number of expenses since he had completed these financial particulars on the 15 November 2005 including over $300.00 repairs to the gopher which he uses to get about. 

6.      Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A3 - Westpac One Statement for the period 16 September 2005 to 17October 2005.  Mr Homewood explained the transactions as follows;  19 September 2005 - a withdrawal of $24.50 to pay for spray paint on a car that he had at that time;  20 September 2005 - a deposit of  $3,000 into the account being proceeds of sale of the Calais car;  20 September 2005 - withdrawal of $2,500 to transfer to his Maxi Saver account where he obtained more interest; 21 September 2005 - withdrawal of $38.32 to pay for groceries at Spud Shed; 29 September 2005 - deposit of $10 which his brother was paying him once per fortnight to repay loan applicant had made to him; 6 October 2005 - $1,000 that had been transferred from the Maxi Saver account back into his Westpac One account; 12 October 2005 - a further $500 transferred from Maxi Saver account to his Westpac One account; 14 October 2005 - a further $536.13 transferred from his Maxi Saver account to Westpac One.  In addition there were withdrawals on 26 September 2005 of $179.95 for a suit to wear to his niece’s wedding and $162.23 to Super Cheap Auto for the purchase of parts for another motor vehicle he had.  Mr Homewood said that the balance on the 17 October 2005 was $90.02 as listed.  Mr Homewood said he believed he would have about $400 in the account today.

7.      Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A4 – A Westpac One Statement for the period 17 May 2005 to 17 June 2005.  The deposit of $79,806.56 made on 13 June 2005 was the amount left after the sale of the property at Vance Street, Dudley Park (Vance Street property).   This property was sold for $269,000 representing a loss (Exhibit A9).  There was a withdrawal on the 16 June 2004 of $22,390.39 to pay off his visa card and a further $20,000 was transferred to a savings account.  Mr Homewood could not recall what the withdrawal of $2,273.35 was for.

8.      Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A5, a Max 1 Westpac Direct Account for the period 22 July 2005 to 30 September 2005.  Mr Homewood told the Tribunal that he currently has $2,500 in that account.  Money has been debited primarily from that account to his everyday account.

9.      Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A6, a Westpac One statement for the period 17 June 2005 to 15 July 2005.  He explained that a withdrawal on 20 June 2005 of $10,000 comprised of $5,000 to his sister to pay rent for six months and $5,000 to his parents so that they could pay off a credit card which had made payments to assist him.  He said that a withdrawal on the 21 June 2005 for $4,997.50 was to purchase a VL Wagon.  A number of other transactions for the period 15 July 2005 – 17 August 2005 were, Mr Homewood believed, transfers from his Maxi saver account (Exhibit A7).

10.     Mr Homewood confirmed that due to injuries to his bladder he must catheterise 6 to 8 times per day and purchases catheters in bulk at a cost of $157.50 for 150 (Exhibit A8).  Since his accident in 1993 Mr Homewood said he had had recurrent urinary tract infections and depression.  His depression had improved and he had become very mobile but an accident in 2001 resulted in his condition deteriorating and meant that he was now in a wheelchair.  It was as a result of this later accident that he had to sell the Harts Road property of 24 acres that he had bought following his 1993 accident and compensation payout.  Mr Homewood confirmed that medication listed in the letter from Dr Nguyen to his specialist Dr Kerr were for diabetes, depression, back pain, spasms, leakage and for his heart condition. (Exhibit A10)

11.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A11.  He told the Tribunal that he was disputing this Telstra bill because he believed he should not have to pay the $50 re-connection fee on top of the $59.90 per month he pays for internet access.

12.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A12 and confirmed that he pays $92.55 per month to Hospital Benefit Fund (HBF).

13.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A13, a Decision Review Form of the Department of Housing and Works dated 15 August 2005.  Mr Homewood said that he had sought emergency housing because living in his sister’s home is not suitable because he is in a wheelchair and also because it is very crowded.  He was unable to qualify for emergency housing because as the letter said he did not have any income.  As a result he is no longer on the emergency housing list.  The letter also indicated that although he was put on another waiting list he would be removed from it if in the event he was offered suitable accommodation he did not have a source of income.

14.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A14.  This was a policy schedule from American Home Assurance Company (AIG) addressed to Mr Homewood and dated 7 November 2005.  Mr Homewood said that he had applied for payment under this disablement policy but had been told that he had to provide medical evidence that the accident of 2001 had resulted in a new injury and was not only an exacerbation of the previous accident.  He had also made a similar claim against the HBF policy and was subsequently waiting for Dr Kerr to review his medical condition and provide an opinion although he understood Dr Kerr believed the 2001 accident exacerbated his earlier injury.

15.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A15.  He confirmed that under this policy he was entitled to one pair of free glasses per year which was necessary because his eye sight is failing due to diabetes.

16.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A16, a letter from the Department of Housing and Works dated 16 August 2005 which indicated that he had been declined his request for priority assistance due to lack of income.  Mr Homewood said he believed the situation would change if he was paid the disability support pension.

17.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A17, a letter from Lorraine Remmerswaal, a Social Work student at the South Metropolitan Health Service.  He said that this recorded that his current housing was not appropriate for him although he agreed he now had wheelchair access.

18.     Mr Homewood was referred to Exhibit A18, an invoice from the Sydney 2000 Olympic Coin Club Programme (Coin Club).  Mr Homewood joined this in 1998 and was also a member of the Perth Mint.  He had joined the Coin Club to get discounts for their various products and also to try to win some tickets to the Olympics.  These and other purchases from Perth Mint and Gold Corp (Exhibit A20) and other collectable items he owned had recently been valued by Fremantle Auctioneers for an amount totalling $12,790 (Exhibit A22).  Mr Homewood said that a number of collectables he had were not on the list.  He confirmed that he had prepared the list of Olympic memorabilia (Exhibit A21).  He said he purchased the items at K Mart for a 15% discount and thought that they might be worth something in the future.

19.     Mr Homewood confirmed that the undated handwritten letter was written by his mother but he was aware of its contents as well as the contents of the letter of the 7 July 2005 from South Metropolitan Health Service, Peel and Rockingham – Kwinana Community Health, written on his behalf by Lorraine Remmerswaal and Paddy Creevy, Senior Social Worker, Mandurah Community Health (Exhibit A23).  He said they supported his application.

20.     In cross-examination Mr Homewood was referred to T6/35 – a letter from the Compensation Management Section of the Department of Social Security dated 6 January 1994 which Mr Homewood recalled receiving.  Mr Homewood was also referred to the letters at  T8/37 and T10/40.  Mr Homewood said that he probably did receive or see both letters but did not take much notice.

21.     Mr Homewood confirmed that in 1997 he settled his claim for a lump sum compensation of $1,250,000, of which he subsequently received $995,000 after costs.  He said that he spent $55,000 of it on a Senator motor vehicle; paid for a 24 acre property at Harts Road costing $310,000;  spent $13,000 on a Pajero car for his parents; $30,000 of a Jeep for the farm and $17,000 for a Land Cruiser for his brother Shane.  The Land Cruiser was put in his brother’s name and his brother subsequently left and disposed of the vehicle.  He also purchased two large demountable site huts for storage and office space totalling $23,000;  did property improvements including putting in a road costing approximately $30,000; bought a further four vehicles which he intended to repair for about $2,500; purchased another utility vehicle for $15,000 and then spent $10,000 on the vehicle totalling $35,000.  Mr Homewood said that he subsequently sold the Ute for $13,000, therefore losing $22,000 and the Jeep for $17,000 therefore losing $23,000.

22.     Mr Homewood said that he purchased the lease of a video store for 7 months in July 1999.  This cost $20,000 plus he spent an additional $10,000 on stock.  Mr Homewood said that he thought that he would be able to run the business with the assistance of his sister, who had previously been in a business with her ex-husband.  It quickly became apparent that outgoings were greater than cash coming in and so he sold what remained of the lease at a loss of $2,000 to himself.  He sold some of the videos for about $5,000.  Mr Homewood said he sold the Harts Road property in 2001 for $295,000, which represented a loss.

23.     In October 1997 he set up a $300,000 portfolio with Westpac which paid $1,500 per month to him.  He started debiting increasing amounts each month and by the end of 2000 he had only $30,000 left.  This was completely gone by late 2002.

24.     Mr Homewood was asked whether it would have been possible to sub-divide the Harts Road property.  Mr Homewood said he couldn’t remember if he would have been allowed to sub-divide, but he understood he would need to get a building permit to build another house.

25.     Mr Homewood said he lent $45,000 to his sister which she has now repaid.  He lent $35,000 to his brother which he agreed to pay back at $250 per fortnight but after six months ceased to do so.  Mr Homewood said he believes his brother still owes him $28,000 although his brother says it only $24,000.  He is currently repaying this at $10 per fortnight.  Mr Homewood said another brother Shane, still owes him $500.

26.     Mr Homewood said that he currently owns one station wagon which he paid $5,000 for plus extra on improvements.  He thinks they would be worth $3,000.  He has $3,000 in furniture including a bed, computer, projector and stereo equipment worth $3,000.  He has recently spent over $5,000 on a car for one of his brothers who is helping him out.

27.     Mr Homewood was referred to T25/133, the letter from the Authorised Review Officer affirming the decision not to vary the preclusion period dated 19 October 2004.  Mr Homewood agreed that it was an accurate reflection of his financial circumstances at that time.

28.     Mr Homewood was referred to a Westpac Visa Statement dated for the period 25 August 2000 to 25 September 2000 (T29/285).  He confirmed that he had deposited approximately $4,000 with Home Bookie which enabled him to bet by SMS.  He said he realised this was unwise and managed to recover the entire sum less some $500.

29.     Mr Homewood was referred to T26/137 and the Bar Mirrors listed as purchased for $936.45.  He said that one had got smashed and one was waiting to be auctioned.  He said the Die Cast cars bought for $4,592.91 may be listed under Motor Memorabilia in Exhibit A22 with a valuation from Fremantle Auctioneers of $1,000.

30.     Mr Homewood was concerned that the replica 1960 Robot for which he paid $16,000 had been valued by Fremantle Auctioneers at $2,000.  He agrees the Spindrift Model which had been bought for $4,000 (T26/137) was not listed on the Fremantle Auctioneer’s list.  He said the Titanic Plate which cost $400 was listed on the Fremantle Auctioneer’s List as the White Star Plate and valued at $200.  He said that DVDs he had were worth approximately $4,000.

31.     Mr Homewood agreed that he currently had assets with Fremantle Auctioneers valued at approximately $12,000, $4,000 in DVDs, $28,000 owed by one brother and a further $500 owed by his brother Shane.  He said that he believed that the books/magazines/coins and medallions he had in storage would be worth approximately $4,000.

32.     Mr Homewood said that he would get a decision in early 2006 whether he would get additional compensation for the second injury that occurred in 2001.

33.     Mr Homewood was referred to his Witness Statement (Exhibit A1).  He agreed that he had approximately $45,000 in June 2005, following the sale of the Vance Street property, but now had only approximately $3,000 left.

34.     Mr Homewood said he believed he was entitled to receive disability support pension because he has been unable to work since his 2001 accident.  He is now in his wheelchair full time.  He spends most of his time on the computer, sees the occasional film, goes shopping and spends some time fixing up cars.  He is unable to drive and his nephew or father drive him.  He said he currently 20 boxes of memorabilia and collectables in storage which costs $400 to $500 per month.

35.     Mr Homewood said that he had received advice that he should attempt to enter into an agreement with his brother, John about the $28,000 he is owed.  He said a social worker had suggested that he ask John for half the money, and if he could pay it immediately say he would forget the other half.  He has been advised that it would cost too much money to go after his brother and the prospect of recovery of the money was slight.  He said his brother refuses to tell him about his current financial situation.  He understands that he has no assets and is the father of four children.

Mr Homewood Senior’s Evidence     

36.     Mr Homewood Senior’s Witness Statement was tendered in evidence (Exhibit A24).

Submissions

Applicant’s submissions

37.     Mr Harrison referred the Tribunal to the cases in the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision of 17 December 2004 and made the following submissions which can be briefly summarised as follows:

·     that special circumstances can be divided into two kinds, that is, financial hardship, and illness and disability resulting from the 2001 accident;

·     that the Tribunal can consider the issue of reasonableness of expenditure, but that this should not be the only or deciding factor;

·     that even if the compensation payment had been disposed of unreasonably, this should not alone decide the matter and it was submitted that the case of Martin and Secretary to Department of Social Security (1990) AAT 6482 supported this position;

·     that on 17 December 2004, the date of the SSAT decision the applicant still had equity in a property.  This was now gone.

·     that the assets the applicant had were collectables which, at the very best, could be sold for $16,500 and that the loan to the applicant’s brother John of some $28,000 was unlikely to be recovered; that the applicant had only $3,300 in cash and a motor vehicle worth $5,000 although it was unlikely it could be sold, and personal furniture and household items;   

·     that the applicant currently had no income, was no longer being extravagant,  had been unable to drive or work since 2001, had increased medical costs and would likely be destitute within six months.

·     that whilst the applicant had had the benefit of the compensation money, and could be said to have used it unwisely, this was not enough to prevent a finding of special circumstances.

·     that Mr Homewood’s original injury had been exacerbated by his more recent one, and that the 2001 accident was a special circumstance in itself particularly as it was likely to be non-compensable, a factor that could not have been taken into account in the compensation payment for the 1993 accident.

38.     The Tribunal was referred to the case of Secretary, Department of Social Security and Winterbotham (AAT 6499, 11 December 1990) on the basis that the applicant had now disposed of his home; the case of Secretary, Department of Social Security v Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580 at 586 was referred in support of the proposition that the applicant’s urinary infections and depression should be taken into account, and the case of Kulakov and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 63 SSR 879 on the grounds that the applicant faced not only ill health but also financial hardship.  

Respondent’s submissions

39.     On behalf of the respondent the Tribunal was referred to the Statement of Facts and Contentions and in addition the following submissions were made which can be briefly summarised as follows:

·     that the applicant no longer has any equity in his home.  He has collectables valued at at least $12,000.  He has loans of $28,500 owing to him from his brothers.  He has DVDs worth approximately $4,000 and 20 other boxes of collectables that it was submitted were worth at least $4,000;

·     that Mr Homewood has admitted that he badly managed his money, but notwithstanding that, had enjoyed the benefit of the money, and that this does not constitute special circumstances that would warrant disregarding any part of the compensation payment;

·     that the Tribunal should not find special circumstances and should affirm the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal of 17 December 2004;

·     that there was no evidence that Mr Homewood’s accident in 2001 was either unusual or had created additional medical problems.

Consideration of the Issues

40. The issue before the Tribunal in this application for review is whether “special circumstances” exist as provided for in section 1184 (1) of the Social Security Act 1991 which would enable the whole or part of the compensation payment to be treated as if it had not been made.

41. Section 1184K (1) of the Social Security Act 1991 (‘the Act”) provides as follows:

“For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:

(a)Not having been made; or

(b)Not liable to be made;

If the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.”

42.     The meaning and application of the expression “special circumstances” has been considered on many occasions.  The decision of the Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 has become the often quoted benchmark as to the interpretation of the term “special circumstances”. In that case the Tribunal said:

“An expression such “special circumstances” is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhausted definition.  The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional, where the circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur.  For the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases.  This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.”

43.     The Tribunal understands that the correct approach to adopt is to consider the applicant’s circumstances as a whole in assessing whether special circumstances can be said to exist.  On behalf of the applicant it has been submitted that his financial hardship and ill health amount to special circumstances.  The respondent has submitted that the applicant has disposed of his compensation payment in an unreasonable manner and still has assets including collectables, DVDs, outstanding loans that could be worth in the vicinity of $40,000 to $50,000.

Financial Hardship

44.     To qualify as “special circumstances”, financial hardship must be truly exceptional.  The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence that he has little left of value despite receiving a compensation payment totalling $1.25 million in 1997.  His remaining disposable assets are coin collections and other collectables which have been valued by Fremantle Auctioneers (Exhibit A22) as being worth approximately $12,000; a further 20 boxes of items which the applicant has said would be worth about $4,000, a figure, not disputed by the respondent;  DVDs worth some $4,000; a motor vehicle worth less than $5,000 and loans of $28,500 to two brothers of which the $28,000 appears unlikely to be recovered, and is currently being repaid at $10 per fortnight. This is significantly different from the applicant’s circumstances at the time when the SSAT made its decision.  At that time the applicant still had substantial equity in his Vance Street property.

45.     As noted in the SSAT decision at paragraph 40 (T2/10), there have been a number of decisions of the Tribunal indicating that the reasonableness of the person’s expenditure of the lump sum will be considered in determining whether there are special circumstances.

46.     Mr Homewood’s current financial circumstances have arisen primarily, the Tribunal concludes, due to his inability to handle money because of his lack of skills, his naivety and at times reckless purchasing.  The evidence before the Tribunal is that he has on a number of occasions purchased assets such as the Harts Road property which he subsequently improved and then sold for a loss; the purchase of a video store lease which he subsequently sold for a loss; the Vance Street property subsequently sold at a loss; the purchase of a large number of motor vehicles for himself and other family members, a number of which he spent additional money on improving and then sold for a loss; and unsecured loans to family members, in particular his brother, John.

47.     This being said, Mr Homewood did invest some $300,000 in an investment portfolio which indicated that he understood the need for funds to be available for the long term.  However, very quickly this money was drained to compensate for poor decision making in other areas.  The purchase of collectables appears with hindsight to have been an extravagance. This however would not have been the case if the purchase of the Harts Road property and the $300,000 investment portfolio were still intact.  Rather than reaching a conclusion that Mr Homewood has been unreasonable in the expenditure of the lump sum, his history of spending money suggests his lack of ability and poor management skills with money that, in the Tribunal’s opinion, is consistent with a background that has not prepared him for dealing with large sums of money.  I think this conclusion can be drawn in part from the evidence in the witness statement of his father who has himself not worked for over 20 years and has throughout that time been supported on the pension.  (Exhibit A24).  Common sense suggests that the placing of large sums of money in the hands of those who have had no previous experience in managing money and must plan for some 30 years ahead is not unlikely to result in an outcome such as that in Mr Homewood’s case.

48.     In the case SDSS and Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580 Einfeld J referred to the broad ambit of the discretion under section 1184 (1);

“The width of the discretion under the section clearly extends to all the circumstances of the case, including circumstances not specifically related to a particular portion of the compensation payment.  It is not therefore outside the section for the Tribunal to consider the general factors such as the mental health and social conditioning of the individual in concluding that the preclusion period should be shortened”. (at 53 FCR 586).

49.      Regardless of the reasons that have led to this situation Mr Homewood is facing the real prospect of having no income and little to sell to support himself in the near future.

Ill Health

50. On behalf of the applicant it has been submitted that his circumstances have declined significantly following an accident in 2001.  Although there is no medical evidence medical directly on this matter, the Tribunal accepts Mr Homewood’s evidence to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (T2) recorded at paragraph 15, in particular that he is now confined to a wheelchair.  This is supported by correspondence from Lorraine Rennerswaal from South Metropolitan Health Service (Exhibit A17).  This decline in Mr Homewood’s health is relevant to the findings of special circumstances.

51. There is evidence that his current medical condition requires him to purchase bladder catheters which cost $157.50 for 150 approximately every 3-4 weeks (Exhibit A8).

52. There is also evidence there Mr Homewood is on a range of medications for conditions including diabetes and depression.  The letter from Dr Nguyan to Dr Kerr, Mr Homewood’s treating specialist confirms that he is in a wheel chair (Exhibit A10).

53. Mr Homewood’s need to use a wheelchair is not disputed by the respondent.   As a result his current housing situation is not adequate.  This is supported by the letter from Lorraine Remmerswaal from the South Metropolitan Health Service who has visited Mr Homewood’s residence and has concluded that this housing was not appropriate for him to be living in.  (Exhibit A17)  In addition, he has “no income source in Western Australia and as such is not eligible for rental housing assistance”. (Exhibit A13).  Mr Homewood has now been placed on a waiting list; however, even if an appropriate house becomes available he would not qualify for it if he at that time has no income.  Being confined to a wheelchair creates particular needs in terms of housing and the evidence before the Tribunal is that Mr Homewood is currently unable to seek housing that would more adequately address his physical needs.

54. Since the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision of 17 December 2004, Mr Homewood has disposed of his one remaining significant asset, that is, the house in Vance Street.  The balance from that transaction of $79,806.56 which was deposited into his Westpac One Account on 13 June 2005 is now reduced to approximately $3,000.  Mr Homewood has approximately $40 – 50,000 in loans owing to him and money that could be raised from the sale of his collection of coins and other collectables.  He also has one motor vehicle worth less than $5,000 and personal effects and furniture.  He is unable to access appropriate housing even if it became available because he has no income.  Little is to be gained now by pointing to the folly of how he has managed his compensation or the wisdom of such a large amount being paid as a lump sum and resulting in a preclusion period of nearly thirty years. 

55. On behalf of the applicant it has been submitted that within six months he will be destitute. The Tribunal accepts this as an accurate projection based on the evidence before it.  The Tribunal concludes that based on Mr Homewood’s current financial situation, which can be described as straitened, as well as his health needs and in particular that he is wheelchair bound and unable to even go on a waiting list to access appropriate housing, “special circumstances” do exist. 

56. The Tribunal therefore sets aside the decision under review and in substitution decides that so much of the compensation payment received by the applicant be treated as not having been made such that the preclusion period ends on 1 July 2006 instead of 18 October 2022.

I certify that the 56 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of LINDA SAVAGE-DAVIS, MEMBER

Signed:         ......[sgd D Brodie]
  Associate

Date/s of Hearing  23 November 2005
Date of Decision  20 December 2005
Counsel for the Applicant          
Solicitor for the Applicant          R Harrison
Counsel for the Respondent      
Representing the Respondent    A Holt

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0