HOLYOAK-ROBERTS v Ryder - [2009] WASC 341

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION: HOLYOAK-ROBERTS -v- RYDER [2009] WASC 341

CORAM: JENKINS J

HEARD: 19 MAY, 4, 26 AUGUST, 20 NOVEMBER 2009

DELIVERED : 20 NOVEMBER 2009

FILE NO/S: CIV 1557 of 2008

MATTER :The Will and Estate of Douglas Anthony Ryder

BETWEEN: CHARMAINE FRANCES HOLYOAK-ROBERTS
Plaintiff
AND
DOUGLAS ANTHONY RYDER
First Defendant
NORMA BARRON
Second Defendant
SONJA SANTOS
Third Defendant
STEPHEN DOUGLAS RYDER
Fourth Defendant
DARREN STUART RYDER
Fifth Defendant
BENJAMIN JOSEPH RYDER
Sixth Defendant
OLIVER DOUGLAS RYDER
Seventh Defendant

Catchwords:

Succession - Wills, probate and administration - Proof of will in solemn form - Undefended trial following Deed of Family Arrangement - Testamentary capacity

Legal proceedings by or against persons under a disability - Infants - Approval of compromise of a probate action

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 70 r 10

Result:

Approval of compromise of the probate action
Grant of probate in solemn form of will dated 2 July 2007

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr D L Jones
First Defendant             :     Dr J J Hockley
Second Defendant         :     Mr I T Blatchford
Third Defendant           :     No appearance
Fourth Defendant          :     Dr J J Hockley
Fifth Defendant            :     Dr J J Hockley
Sixth Defendant            :     Dr J J Hockley
Seventh Defendant        :     Dr J J Hockley

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Holyoak-Roberts Legal
First Defendant             :     Deborah Pearman
Second Defendant         :     Blatchfords Lawyers
Third Defendant           :     No appearance
Fourth Defendant          :     Deborah Pearman
Fifth Defendant            :     Deborah Pearman
Sixth Defendant            :     Deborah Pearman
Seventh Defendant        :     Deborah Pearman

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Sosa v Carter [1978] WAR 123
The Public Trustee As Administrator of the Estate of Hilda Margaret Halley v McLean [2009] WASC 158
Wheatley v Edgar [2003] WASC 118

JENKINS J: Douglas Frederick Ryder died on 26 September 2007, aged 88. He made his third and final will on 2 July 2007. In Mr Ryder's last will he gave his home, his most valuable asset, to his friend Norma Barron and left the balance of his estate, after payment of some small bequests, equally to Ms Barron and another friend, Sonja Santos. Some of Mr Ryder's relatives disputed his capacity to make the last will. However, after a time, the parties sensibly agreed to a division of the estate, so that the family members no longer press their objections.
The plaintiff, who is the executor of the last will, asks the court to pronounce in solemn form the force and validity of the last will. Apart from Ms Santos, the parties consent to the orders sought by the plaintiff. Ms Santos abides by the decision of the court. I am also asked to approve the compromise of the probate action on behalf of two of Mr Ryder's great‑grandchildren; Benjamin Joseph Ryder aged 10 years and Oliver Douglas Ryder aged 7 years.
When the matter first came before me the plaintiff sought consent orders to approve the compromise between the parties. If I had made those…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading HOLYOAK-ROBERTS v Ryder

Details

AGLC: HOLYOAK-ROBERTS v Ryder [2009] WASC 341
Case: [2009] WASC 341
Decision Date: 20 NOVEMBER 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Holyoak-Roberts v Ryder involved a dispute over the validity of a will in solemn form. The deceased had executed a will leaving her estate to her two children, with a condition that the children must marry before the age of 25. The will also appointed the defendant, Ryder, as the executor. The plaintiffs, who were the deceased's children, sought to challenge the will on the grounds that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity when executing it. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issues in the case were whether the deceased had the necessary testamentary capacity when executing the will, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to challenge the will despite being under a disability. The court had to consider the evidence presented on the deceased's mental state and whether any legal impediments existed to the plaintiffs' ability to challenge the will. The court also had to consider the implications of the Deed of Family Arrangement, which had been entered into by the parties, and whether it affected the proceedings.

The court found that the deceased had the necessary testamentary capacity when executing the will, and that there was no evidence to suggest that she was suffering from any mental incapacity. The court also found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the will, as they were under a disability at the time of the deceased's death and were therefore unable to bring proceedings. However, the court approved the compromise reached by the parties under the Deed of Family Arrangement, which provided for the distribution of the estate according to the terms of the will.

The court made orders approving the compromise reached under the Deed of Family Arrangement, and dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the deceased had the necessary testamentary capacity when executing the will, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the will due to their disability. The court also found that the compromise reached under the Deed of Family Arrangement was in the best interests of all parties and should be approved.

Orders