Holmes and Churchill (Child support)

[2019] AATA 5120

Holmes and Churchill (Child support) [2019] AATA 5120 (26 September 2019)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division

REVIEW NUMBER:  2019/SC016114

APPLICANT:  Mr Holmes

OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar

Miss Churchill

TRIBUNAL:Member K Dordevic

DECISION DATE:  26 September 2019

DECISION:

The tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $21,000 per annum for the period 13 July 2018 to 16 September 2018;

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $10,735 per annum for the period 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019; and

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $21,000 per annum from 7 March 2019 until a terminating event occurs in relation to [Child 1].

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – income, property and financial resources of the liable parent – a ground for departure exists – decision to depart - decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

1. Mr Holmes and Ms Churchill are the parents of [Child 1] (born 2003). Ms Churchill is recorded as having 86% and Mr Holmes 14% care of [Child 1] until 5 August 2018; thereafter Ms Churchill is recorded as having sole care. The case was registered with the Department of Human Services – Child Support (the Department) on 9 November 2005 and has been collectable since 17 August 2009.

2. The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) provides for an administrative assessment of the child support payable. It uses a formula which contains variables such as the parents’ adjusted taxable incomes and their percentages of care of the children. The Act also provides for a departure from the administrative assessment in certain circumstances.

3. On 27 March 2014, a senior case officer determined that from 1 July 2016 to 1 October 2017 Mr Holmes is liable to pay an annual rate of child support of $16,550.

4. On 25 October 2017, a senior case officer determined that for the period 2 October 2017 until 19 May 2021 Mr Holmes’ adjusted taxable income is varied to $144,500.

5. On 13 July 2018, Mr Holmes lodged a departure application with the Department. On 5 October 2018 a senior case officer refused his application.

6. Mr Holmes lodged an objection to that decision on 17 October 2018. On 16 February 2019 his objection was partly allowed. The objection officer determined that for the period:

   ·1 July 2017 to 4 July 2018 Mr Holmes’ adjusted taxable income is varied to $100,000 per annum; and

   ·5 July 2018 to 6 March 2019 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Holmes is reduced to the minimum annual rate. 

7. On 18 March 2019, Mr Holmes sought further review with the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal).

8. A telephone directions hearing was held on 23 July 2019. Both parties attended by conference telephone. The tribunal issued directions requiring compliance by 4 September 2019.

9. The tribunal heard the matter on 26 September 2019. The parties appeared by conference telephone. The Child Support Registrar was not represented at the hearing. In reaching its decision the tribunal has considered the sworn evidence of Mr Holmes and Ms Churchill. The tribunal also considered the documentation provided by the Department (folios 1-844), Mr Holmes (folios A1-A177) and Ms Churchill (folios B1-B32). The tribunal notes that Ms Churchill advised that she did not receive all of the documentation provided by the Department (folios 740-840) but nevertheless elected to proceed with the hearing.

ISSUES

1. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are outlined in section 98C of the Act, which states that a decision to depart from the administrative assessment may be made if the following three requirements are met:

   (i)that one, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in subsection 117(2) exists; and

   (ii)that it would be:

   (A)just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support; and

   (B)otherwise proper;

   to make a particular determination under this Part …

2. Therefore, the issues which arise in this case are:

   ·     Does a ground exist for departure from the administrative assessment of child support? And, if so

   ·     Would it be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination?

CONSIDERATION

A ground for departure

1. Subparagraphs 117(2)(c)(ia)and (ib) of the Act provides grounds for departure if the administrative assessment would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent because of either party’s income, property and financial resources or their earning capacity. The central issue in this matter is whether the administrative assessment accurately reflects Mr Holmes’ income, financial resources and earning capacity.

2. At the time Mr Holmes lodged his change of assessment application he was assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $16,581 based on the 25 October 2017 senior case officer decision, which varied Mr Holmes’ adjusted taxable income to $144,500 and Ms Churchill’s 2017 adjusted taxable income of $15,718. From 6 August 2018 his annual rate increased to $21,817, as he ceased all care of [Child 1].

3. When lodging his departure application Mr Holmes sought a departure from 10 January 2017 on the basis that his income was not accurately reflected in the assessment and that he was now in receipt of income support payments as he was suffering from depression.

4. It is not in dispute that Mr Holmes has worked [in Occupation 1] on a full-time basis since about 2013. The tribunal finds that Mr Holmes was in receipt of newstart allowance from 19 July 2018 to 14 March 2019. Mr Holmes submits that he was unemployed as he had lost his driver’s licence for three months. Mr Holmes could not be specific regarding the dates of his loss of licence and the tribunal notes that there is no documentary evidence before it substantiating his claims. At hearing Mr Holmes stated that the loss of points related to minor incidents such as speeding, not obeying traffic signals and other infringements. He submits the loss of his licence at regular intervals is inevitable given the nature of his work; in fact he is likely to lose his licence in about four weeks for the same reasons. The tribunal does not accept that failing to follow road rules is an occupational hazard; even in recognising the nature of his work Mr Holmes is under no compulsion to disobey road rules.

5. The tribunal next considered Mr Holmes’ earning capacity from the date that he lost his licence. In order for a person to be assessed in accordance with their earning capacity rather than their actual income, the three tests set out in subsection 117(7B) of the Act must be satisfied:

   In having regard to the earning capacity of a parent of the child, the court may determine that the parent's earning capacity is greater than is reflected in his or her income for the purposes of this Act only if the court is satisfied that:

   (a)   one or more of the following applies:

   (i)the parent does not work despite ample opportunity to do so;

   (ii)the parent has reduced the number of hours per week of his or her employment or other work below the normal number of hours per week that constitutes full‑time work for the occupation or industry in which the parent is employed or otherwise engaged;

   (iii)the parent has changed his or her occupation, industry or working pattern; and

   (b)   the parent's decision not to work, to reduce the number of hours, or to change his or her occupation, industry or working pattern, is not justified on the basis of:

   (i)the parent's caring responsibilities; or

   (ii)the parent's state of health; and

   (c)   the parent has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support in relation to the child.

6. It is not in dispute that Mr Holmes changed his working pattern during the period 19 July 2018 to 6 March 2019. The tribunal accepts his evidence is that he did not work at all during this period. Therefore subparagraph 117(7B)(a)(iii) of the Act is satisfied.

7. Mr Holmes asserts that his state of health prevented him from working on a full-time basis during the period 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019. He provided two medical certificates, the first from [Dr A], general practitioner, who first treated Mr Holmes on 17 September 2018. [Dr A] stated Mr Holmes’ diagnosis is [Medical Condition 1] and that his symptoms include [symptoms deleted]. She determined that he was unfit to study from 17 September to 17 December 2018. [Another person], general practitioner, referred Mr Holmes to a registered psychologist for the management of his [medical conditions]. A second medical certificate in evidence was completed by [Dr B], general practitioner, who first treated Mr Holmes on 7 January 2019. [Dr B] stated Mr Holmes’ diagnosis is [Medical Condition 1] and that his symptoms include [symptoms deleted]. He determined that Mr Holmes was unfit to study from 7 January to 6 March 2019. The Departmental record notes that on 19 October 2018 Mr Holmes’ partner advised that Mr Holmes was an in-patient at [a hospital] for the last two days and was not likely to be discharged for some weeks. There is no evidence before the tribunal regarding this admission. Mr Holmes also provided a report from [a person], psychologist, who reported that he had provided three telephone sessions to Mr Holmes over a three-year period and described Mr Holmes as featuring symptoms of [a medical condition].

8. The tribunal accepts that Mr Holmes suffered from [another medical condition], but does not accept that it prevented him from working. Taking the limited medical evidence into account, the tribunal is not satisfied on the basis of two initial consultations with general practitioners (with whom he had never consulted before) or on the basis of three annual telephone consultations with a registered psychologist that any of these practitioners could conclusively diagnose a mental health condition, nor be satisfied that this condition justified him not returning to work from 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019. The tribunal concludes that Mr Holmes’ decision to stop working was not justified because of his state of health. Paragraph 117(7B)(b) of the Act is not satisfied.

9. Mr Holmes denied that his decision to stop working was based on a desire to affect his child support liability. The tribunal is not so persuaded when considering the discrete period 19 July to 16 September 2018 and finds that Mr Holmes has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of the decision to affect his child support liability. That is not to say the effect on his child support liability was the only reason he did not work. Mr Holmes has demonstrated in his dealings with the Department and this tribunal a resistance to contribute to [Child 1’s] costs. Even if Mr Holmes had provided evidence that he lost his licence, he still has not demonstrated to the tribunal that it was not a major reason. The tribunal concludes that all of the requirements of subsection 117(7B) of the Act are satisfied during the period 19 July to 16 September 2018 and that it is appropriate that the administrative assessment reflects his earning capacity (as addressed at paragraph 28 onwards) during that time.

10. As for the period 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019, the tribunal is not persuaded that a major purpose of Mr Holmes’ decision to not work was to affect his child support liability. The tribunal reached this conclusion by placing significant weight on Ms Churchill’s submissions that she understood that Mr Holmes was unwell during the same period. Thus, the tribunal concludes that during this period Mr Holmes did not have an unexercised earning capacity. The evidence suggests that during the period he was in receipt of newstart allowance and cash income of $1,680.

11. Application of his newstart allowance and cash income to the administrative assessment would result in his child support liability being set at the minimum annual rate ($420); the administrative assessment dictated an annual child support liability of $12,700. As Mr Holmes’ income and financial resources are not properly reflected in the child support assessment, there are special circumstances such that the application of the administrative assessment would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of child support payable. The tribunal therefore concludes that the ground provided for in subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ib) of the Act is established.

Just and equitable

1. The requirement to consider whether a departure would be just and equitable directs attention to what is fair to the parents and their children. Regard must be had to a variety of factors such as the needs of the child, the parents’ commitments and any hardship that would be caused by departing or not departing from the formula.

2. Ms Churchill is unemployed. In her Statement of Financial Circumstances dated 3 April 2019 she declares nil income, savings of $506, no assets and that she and [Child 1] are fully supported by her partner. She reports household contents and other personal property amounting to $7,500 and superannuation of $8,612. She has no liabilities or personal expenses. She estimates weekly household expenses of $920.50, of which about $473 relate to [Child 1]. Ms Churchill reports that she has experienced poor health in 2019, which resulted in two surgeries and a period of recuperation. She also stressed that she is required to support [Child 1] in her schooling as she has engaged in high risk taking behaviours and truancy, which Mr Holmes did not contest. The tribunal is satisfied that Ms Churchill does not presently have an unused earning capacity given her caring responsibilities.

3. [Child 1] is in good health. There is no evidence that she has any out of the ordinary expenses.  She is completing her secondary schooling in a supported program 3.5 days per week. She works on a casual basis at [a business], earning about $45 per shift. The tribunal had regard to the Department’s policy regarding casual employment by children of the assessment and determined that it would not be just and equitable to depart from the assessment on this basis.

4. In his Statement of Financial Circumstances dated 30 August 2019 Mr Holmes declares an annual income of $11,557, $4 in savings, no assets, household contents and other personal property valued at $10,000, superannuation valued at $1,350 and outstanding liabilities of $350,000 to his parents, $82,000 to his partner, $3,400 in credit card expenses and a [debt] of $19,071. He declares weekly personal expenditure of $192 and weekly household expenses of $1,385 including $813 in expenses which appear to relate to his [Occupation 1], and $100 for entertainment and hobbies.  

5. Mr Holmes submits that his income should be varied to about $78,000 from at least January 2017 onwards. He states that this would reflect his actual income and losses made by [Company 1], of which he is the sole director and shareholder. Mr Holmes also submitted that it was proper that his income be varied from September 2017 as he had taken custody of [Child 1] for four days and he had a “breakdown” as a consequence, resulting in a hospital admission. He stated that he had a breakdown “whether there is medical evidence or not” and that he would release the medical evidence when he appealed this matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. During the hearing Mr Holmes’ sought to reach an agreement with Ms Churchill whereby he would contribute $5,200 per annum towards [Child 1’s] costs, but only on the basis that his outstanding child support arrears would be reduced to $15,000. 

6. The 2018 [Occupation 1] tax statement in evidence indicates that Mr Holmes’ gross income was $182,589.61, with a net income of $131,890 after deductions of $40,124 in [in Occupation 1] charges and other charges (including tolls, airports and government) of $10,566.

7. The tribunal next considered the 2018 financial year [Company 1] tax return in evidence, which has not yet been submitted to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). It indicates that the company was operated from Mr Holmes’ (then) home and the description of the main business activity as insurance, though at hearing Mr Holmes initially stated that he ceased operating the financial services aspect of the business in 2012 and from 2013 onwards company income was generated only from his [Occupation 1]. Later in the hearing he said that up until 2018 he was attempting to generate income from ventures other than [Occupation 1]. The return declares total company income of $130,000, with expenses including rent ($52,248), motor vehicles ($32,000), repairs and maintenance ($8,500) and other expenses ($23,000). Payments of $15,000 each were noted as a wage expense and payments to associated persons. Mr Holmes stated that the difference in reported company income and [Occupation 1] statement of $1,890 was probably a calculation error.

8. The tribunal first considered the rental expense. At hearing Mr Holmes confirmed that [Company 1] paid his rental income. The tribunal finds accordingly.  Apparently this was so as the tenancy agreement was in the name of [Company 1]. His evidence on this point is problematic. On 25 September 2018 Mr Holmes declared “I NEVER PAID THE FULL RENT” (at folio 298) of this property, and that his contribution was only $400 per week with his parents paid the balance. In support of this assertion he provided a statutory declaration from his father stating the same. At hearing Mr Holmes explained the discrepancy between the company tax return and his declarations by stating that his parents also resided at the property and that his parents met the rental expense by loaning [Company 1] about $330,000 sometime in 2016; this could apparently be substantiated by the company’s 2016 bank records. He could not be more specific, as he did not have the documentation in front of him. Later in the hearing he stated that his payment of his parents’ share of the rental expenses represented his repayment of this loan. When it was put to him that [Occupation 1] does not require an office, Mr Holmes stated that he was trying to get other financial ventures “up and running” in the 2018 financial year. When pressed for further information he “property deals, other ventures here and there”, stressing that the business had been registered for 50 years. It was put to Mr Holmes that this was in contradiction from his other statements to the Department that the company had not operated its financial services arm since about 2012. He was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of this discrepancy to the tribunal.

9. In the tribunal’s view his evidence regarding this expense was evasive, implausible and self-serving and deliberately so. In Humphries & Berry (SSAT Appeal) [2008] FMCAfam 209, Federal Magistrate Slack dealt with the issue of the disclosure of financial information in matters before the tribunal. His Honour stated that the principle of full and frank disclosure applicable to proceedings in the Family Court was also applicable to proceedings before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. This principle also applies to a review by this tribunal. He stated that a tribunal should not be “unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the other party” when proper disclosure has not been made. A failure to make proper disclosure about income and financial resources allows the tribunal to accept what evidence there may be with more confidence than would otherwise have been the case: Thomas & Harry(SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 310. Clearly Mr Holmes’ failure is unsatisfactory and leaves him open to adverse inferences being drawn as a consequence of his failure to provide a full and frank disclosure of his financial circumstances. The tribunal concludes that the rental expense of $52,248 is a financial resource available to Mr Holmes.

1. Mr Holmes was questioned about the salary expense and payments to associated persons. He confirmed that the salary expense was paid directly to him and that the payment to associated persons was the repayment of loan/s made to him by his current partner; apparently he borrowed about $82,000 from his partner to meet previous company losses. When asked for evidence of these loans, he advised that he could provide it if compelled to do so. The tribunal notes that at the telephone directions hearing Mr Holmes was advised to provide in his response to the directions all evidence that he intended to rely on at hearing. Thus, in the absence of such evidence, the tribunal finds that the payment of $15,000 to associated persons reflect a financial resource available to Mr Holmes.

2. The tribunal next considered the other expenses of motor vehicles, repairs and maintenance and other expenses noted in the 2018 company tax return. In his written submissions Mr Holmes states that these expenses do not accurately reflect his actual expenses. He apparently has receipts which indicate that he has under-declared his expenses. These receipts are in a plastic shopping bag and he would provide them to the tribunal if required. He states that his petrol receipts total $14,897.15, though he estimates about $1,000 to $2,000 in receipts are actually missing. He also estimates, apparently based on various emails he received from his car hire company, that his total excess kilometres expense is $6,773 and that his repair expenses were under-declared by $3,000. He also estimates that he paid about $1,300 to clean the hire cars, though acknowledged that he only had receipts totalling $183.50 or the same period. He also states that the [Occupation 1] account indicates that he incurred $2,413.62 in tolls, whereas his toll account indicates he incurred extra toll expenses of $1,068 in the 2018 financial year. Again, he did not provide his toll statements into evidence but was willing to do so. He also states that his hire car company charged him an additional $1,000 in tolls in the same period; he apparently has receipts of the same and will provide them to the tribunal upon request. He also submits that a GST deduction of about $6,750 should be deducted from the above expenses. As stated above, Mr Holmes has not provided documentary evidence of his submissions regarding his 2018 expenses and it is simply not satisfactory to state that he will do so at hearing, or on appeal. The tribunal formed the view that it would be imprudent to accept Mr Holmes’ submissions without supporting documentation. Thus, it placed considerable weight on the bank statements in evidence.

3. The tribunal had the benefit of Mr Holmes’ bank statements (including his credit card statements) for the period 9 May to 30 June 2018. This 53-day period indicates that he incurred $5,842 in expenses to generate his [Occupation 1] income of $18,269 in the same period, made up of $3,210 (petrol and tolls) + car rental expenses ($2,632). Annualised this would indicate expenses totalling $40,234 (or 32% of net income), not $63,500 (or 49% of net income) as indicated in the company tax return, which Mr Holmes contends underrepresents his actual expenses. The tribunal is not persuaded, on the basis of Mr Holmes’ unsubstantiated claims alone, that his expenses associated with generating his [Occupation 1] income exceed those as outlined in the 2018 company tax.

4. It is difficult to establish with any certainty Mr Holmes’ actual expenses in the 2018 financial year. On balance, it concludes that they fall somewhere between the tribunal’s calculations based on the bank statements in evidence and that outlined in the company tax return, that is, about 40% of his net income. Thus, the tribunal concludes that Mr Holmes’ 2018 income and financial resources are at least $140,400 (calculated by grossing up the rent expense, wages and payments to associated persons and net profit of $25,752 ($14,252 + additional net profit of $11,500 when reducing expenses to 40% of net income)).

5. It is worth noting that Mr Holmes did not challenge the senior case officer’s determination made on 25 October 2017. When lodging a new departure application on 13 July 2018 he sought an amendment to the assessment from January 2017.  In the tribunal’s view he chose to rest on his rights in not lodging an objection to that decision. In any event, the tribunal is not satisfied that, as Mr Holmes contends, the administrative assessment should be back dated to January 2017. Applying an adjusted taxable income of $140,400 to the administrative assessment would result in an annual child support liability of $16,358, a decrease of about $388 per annum. The tribunal is not persuaded that an increase of $1.06 per day renders the application of the administrative assessment unjust and inequitable. It therefore concludes that there is no basis on which that the assessment should be amended at any time prior to Mr Holmes’ application on 13 July 2018.

6. The tribunal has already determined that it is appropriate to assess Mr Holmes on his earning capacity during the period 19 July to 16 September 2018, which is in the vicinity of $140,400 per annum. Application of an adjusted taxable income of $140,400 to the administrative assessment results in an annual child support liability of $21,524. The tribunal has determined that it is appropriate to amend Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support to $21,000 per annum from 13 July to 16 September 2018.

7. The tribunal is not persuaded that it would be just and equitable that Mr Holmes’ child support liability during the period 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019 should reduce to the minimal annual rate. His bank accounts in evidence indicate that in addition to his newstart allowance payments, he received $1,680 in unexplained deposits and that his discretionary spending (including Lotto, alcohol, hotels, life and private insurance) amounted to $442 in September 2018, $1,222 in October 2018 (noting that he did not provide his credit card statement for this month), $831 in November 2018, $1,125 in December 2018 and $412 in January 2019 (noting that the bank statements are only available for the period 1 to 4 January 2019 in respect of his savings account and none were provided in respect of his credit card statements). Mr Holmes did not provide any bank statements for February 2019, despite being directed to do so.

8. The tribunal concludes on the basis of the bank statements that Mr Holmes was provided with sufficient financial resources to meet his necessary self-care costs and that his discretionary spending represents funds available to him to meet [Child 1’s] ongoing costs. In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal does not accept Mr Holmes’ submission that the Lotto expense represents purchases he made on his mother’s behalf. The tribunal was also not satisfied that Mr Holmes made a full disclosure of all his bank account statements, noting that there were two deposits into an account referred to as [Company 1]; Mr Holmes was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation at hearing as to these deposits and why he did not provide [Company 1] bank statements for the same period. Thus, the tribunal concludes that it would be just and equitable that Mr Holmes contributes a total of $5,000 in child support during this period, thus his annual rate of child support is varied to $10,735 during the same.

9. The tribunal is not satisfied given the history of the administrative assessment and on the financial evidence before it that Mr Holmes’ income and financial resources will be correctly reflected in the administrative assessment on an ongoing basis. Apart from meeting his necessary self-support expenses, Mr Holmes has no greater priority than to maintain [Child 1]. At hearing his evidence can be summarised as that he can provide only for [Child 1] when he is debt free or, in the alternative, by $100 per week only if Ms Churchill agrees to waive a substantial part of his outstanding child support arrears. As stated above, application of an adjusted taxable income of $140,400 to the administrative assessment results in an annual child support liability of $21,524. The tribunal has determined that it is appropriate to amend Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support to $21,000 per annum from 7 March 2019 until a terminating event occurs. Given the evidence of his income and financial resources, as well as his necessary expenses and significant discretionary spending, the tribunal is satisfied that this amount adequately represents his capacity to support [Child 1] and that these funds are necessary for Ms Churchill to adequately provide for [Child 1]. This period of departure will provide certainty to the parties and minimise the need for repeat proceedings. Given Mr Holmes’ income and financial resources, the tribunal is satisfied that the payment of child support arrears and his ongoing child support liability will not cause him undue hardship.

10. For completeness, the tribunal had regard to Mr Holmes’ evidence that he will again be unemployed in four weeks’ time. For the reasons outlined above, the tribunal is not persuaded that [Child 1] should not receive financial support from her father on the basis that he commits driving offences.

11. The tribunal is satisfied that the administrative assessment is unfair given Mr Holmes’ income and financial resources and this results in an unjust and inequitable level of child support given the circumstances of each parent. For all the reasons above, the tribunal finds it just and equitable to depart from the administrative assessment.

Otherwise proper

1. The requirement to consider whether a departure would be otherwise proper directs attention to what is fair to the community. It is necessary to consider the effect of any departure from the administrative assessment on entitlements to income-tested pensions, allowances and benefits. Parents rather than the community have the primary duty to maintain a child. Ms Churchill is not in receipt of income-tested benefits. Departing from the administrative assessment by increasing the child support payable by Mr Holmes will have no impact on the apportionment of financial responsibility between the parents and the community.

2. The determination is otherwise proper.

DECISION

The tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $21,000 per annum for the period 13 July 2018 to 16 September 2018;

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $10,735 per annum for the period 17 September 2018 to 6 March 2019; and

• Mr Holmes’ annual rate of child support is varied to $21,000 per annum from 7 March 2019 until a terminating event occurs in relation to [Child 1].