Hollindale v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
[1998] QLC 44
•17 April 1998
|
BRISBANE
17 April 1998
Re: Appeal against Annual Valuation -
Valuation of Land Act 1944 -
Valuation Roll No 20242 -
Local Government: Gold Coast City-Albert
(AV97-237)
Craig W, Susan D and Nola M Hollindale
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources
(Hearing at Coolangatta)
D E C I S I O N
Background:
This matter relates to a 52.75 hectare property located at Billiau Road, Guanaba, and described as Lot 12 on RP 850786, Parish of Cedar. The property is situated in the Gold Coast Hinterland approximately 12.5 kms directly north-west of the Nerang Post Office, and about 14 kms from the Pacific Highway at Oxenford. The land is zoned as "Rural" under the Town Planning Scheme of the Albert Shire Council of 24 February 1994, and effective at the date of valuation of 1 October 1996. The key issues are the use of the land for farming purposes, changes in the valuation, comparison of sales and relativity.
The Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources, issued a valuation at $245,000 on 10 March 1997. Following an objection, the Chief Executive confirmed that valuation on 21 July 1997. The appellants have appealed that figure claiming the valuation should more properly be $200,000. The land was the subject of a former appeal, also involving several other parcels (V95-278), which was handed down on 14 June 1996, unreported.
Mr CW Hollindale appeared and gave evidence for the appellants. Mr P Grennan appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Ms Rebecca Bayntun, the Departmental Registered Valuer, who now accepts responsibility for the valuation. Ms Bayntun was not the original valuer who undertook the valuation, but concurs in the current quantum of the valuation.
Evidence:
(1) Farming activities - Mr Hollindale argues that the major thrust of his appeal is that, since the previous matter in 1996, he has now diversified his farming activities such that he now believes he satisfies the requirements of Section 17 of the Valuation of Land Act. During the last year he has extended his farming interests to include not only the grazing of cattle, but also the growing of olive trees, and the production of earthworms to provide an increased cash flow. His major use of the land is now for the cultivation of 130 olive trees for both the production of table olives and for olive oil.
Mr Hollindale gave evidence that he planted 100 trees in February 1997, and a further 30 trees in June 1997. He and his wife are currently hand-watering and pruning the trees. All except two trees have flourished, and are growing well. Once the viability of the trees has been proven, it would be his proposal to establish a sprinkler at a cost of about $650 to maintain growth. He currently has established two varieties which, from his research, should acclimatise well to the warmer and moister climate of the Gold Coast. One was developed at the University of California (UC336A), and the other has been propagated from established olive trees from St Helena Island in Moreton Bay. The Californian variety is currently being grown commercially in orchards in California. A large number of olive trees are currently being grown in Texas, Stanthorpe and Kingaroy in Queensland. His development of the olive trees is not so much an experiment, rather as an application of a proven variety to the local climate and area.
In respect of how he intends to market the olives, once they begin to mature and bear fruit, he advises that he may either utilise an existing crushing plant at Kingaroy, or purchase his own plant at a cost of $30,000 to $35,000. Should he move into table olive production, his costs are minimal, involving the use of a brine solution in plastic drums. Harvesting will be undertaken either by using a modified bobcat as a "tree shaker", or by combing the fruit from the trees, a method employed for centuries in the Middle East. The trees grow to maturity in 3 to 4 years, and reach a height of 4 to 5 metres.
In the management of the trees he believes a family can manage 100 to 150 trees, and he has staged his tree variety such that he will pick 50% (65 trees) each about 3 months apart. Based upon an average 100 kgs per tree (varies from 80 kgs to 120 kgs), at an "off farm" price of about $6 per kilogram, he estimates a return of $600 per tree for table olives, and $400 per tree for olive oil. His research in Australia into varieties has focussed upon existing growers and the University of Sydney, which has a research unit into olives. The trees tend to be virtually pest resistant, particularly the varieties he has chosen for his area. His planned annual gross income from the olive trees will be approximately $65,000.
In respect of his market research Mr Hollindale notes that 90% to 95% of table olives and olive oil is sourced from outside Australia. He believes he has identified a niche market, following the change in eating patterns for Australians with the advent of a multi-cultural society.
He has based his estimates upon current prices for imported olive products. However, he may be relying upon a European Common Market structure which is heavily dependant upon large tariff protection. Should the European Community move to ease those protections, the price of olives may vary considerably. He advises that the olive fruit is 20% oil, and that figure has been adopted when determining the return of $400 per tree from crushing the tree. He has currently cultivated 2 hectares for the olive production. His costs so far have been the $1,300 for trees, and $100 for materials and fencing. Later irrigation costs will cost $5 per tree.
In the matter of the grazing upon the land, Mr Hollindale confirmed that he continued to maintain on average 40 head of cattle, selling off about 15 to 20 young cattle each year, returning about $1,500 to $2,000 per year. He agrees that he is now selling less cattle, and at an earlier age than at the date of the last appeal, but he has also reduced his costs of production, as he is not supplementing the feed, and is stocking at a lower rate. Both he and his wife currently spend each about 15 hours per week running the farming operations. However, because of the current state of the cattle market, he agrees that the grazing would not be described at this time as of a significant nature. However, he feels the cattle support the olive tree plantation.
As a further means of establishing a cash flow for the farming operations, he has introduced the breeding of earthworms as supplementary income. His earthworm facility involves 10 elevated beds each of 3.6 metres x 1 metre wide. The worms were purchased for $2,500, plus a further cost of $500 to provide a roofed shed over the beds for protection. The whole earthworm shed covers about 80 square metres, and the gross return from sale of worms, since September 1997, has been at the rate of $1,000 per month.
He has three varieties of earthworms, which have a prolific fertility cycle and, following an initial period of 3 to 4 months to establish an adequate host base, he can sustain to market 5 to 10 kilograms of worms each week. His cost of delivering on the Gold Coast are minimal. The worms are used in restaurants for waste disposal, on golf course for aeration of fairways, and by some local governments for sewerage and garbage tips. Because of the relatively recent establishment of that part of his operation, it would be premature to conclude the long-term viability of the earthworm enterprise.
In referring to the use of the land for "farming" purposes, Ms Bayntun believes that the further developments by Mr Hollindale still do not quality for concessions under section 17 of the Act. However, in the event of determining otherwise, she believes that the land would be valued for "farming" purposes at $78,000, or $1500 to $2000 per hectare, based upon general relativity with other lands in the area being afforded the section 17 classification. She was aware of the earthworm enterprise, but believes that does not qualify as a "farming" activity under the Act.
Comparison of Sales
Mr Hollindale sought comparison with the sale of the subject which he acquired for $305,000 in 1988. At that time the land acquired had an area of 38.8 hectares, part of which has subsequently been realigned to form something more than 40% of the current subject land. In analysing that sale, Mr Hollindale sought to deduce the value of improvements upon the land, including a two storey dwelling and a swimming pool. His estimate of the value of improvements at $110,000 was challenged by Ms Bayntun who believes the appellant was in fact referring to the "replacement value" rather than their added value. To compare his estimate of the unimproved value by that method, Mr Hollindale sought comfort from the unimproved value determined by the Court in 1996, at $200,000, which he now claims.
Ms Bayntun acknowledges that there is a paucity of sales of parcels of land of this size in the area which are to be treated as a single residence site under section 17 of the Act. Generally speaking parcels of that size are either accepted for "farming" purposes, or are the subject of having potential for future subdivision. As a consequence she sought comparison with smaller parcels.
In this matter she provided two sales of rural homesites:•Sale 1 - (Sun Valley Court, Guanaba - Lot 16 on RP 892739).
This has an area of 2.271 hectares and sold in September 1996 for $90,000. It is seen as inferior to the subject.
•Sale 2 - (Sherlock Court, Guanaba - Lot 2 on RP 805673)
This has an area of 1.412 hectares and sold in February 1996 for $100,000. It is seen as inferior to the subject.
It was agreed by both parties that these sales provide no fair comparison, and they are of little assistance to me in this matter.
Relativity
A key part of the respondent's argument involves maintaining the former relativity between the subject and other like parcels in the area. Because of a lack of many sales of that type, Ms Bayntun feels that there was insufficient evidence to support a change in relativity at this time. She advises that the current relativity had been established at a former time when there was a greater range of sales evidence upon which to base the relativity levels. For this reason she has applied a consistent 10% increase in the valuation of the sub-market area (SMA) as reflected by the sales of other types of land.
Mr Grennan agreed that there really was insufficient sales evidence to support either a valuation of $200,000 (by the appellant) or $245,000 (by the respondent). By maintaining the former relativity, the 10% increase on the valuation at 1 January 1996, of $222,500, provided the current valuation at $245,000. Mr Hollindale saw little fairness in such an approach, which he feels has little to support its conclusion. He feels that the lack of sales of similar properties as the subject, suggests that there is no market for them. However, that would appear to ignore the special concession already afforded the subject as a single residence site under section 17 of the Act.
Changes in the Valuation
Mr Hollindale claims that the market has not risen, and draws support from the current measure of inflation over the last 2 or 3 years. He also argues that the description of the nature of the land as "steep" in fact underestimates the level of steepness which he claims is very steep. Ms Bayntun does not disagree in that matter, noting that her use of the word "steep" should be accorded a similar understanding as the appellant. In the end there was no difference on this matter between the parties.
Decision:
I turn first to the comparison of sales and note that, in view of the requirement under section 17 to treat the land as a "single dwelling house", because of its size, there are no real comparison sales in the area to draw upon. I find the comparison with the two sales of much smaller areas are of little assistance. In seeking comparison with the sale of part of the subject in 1988, I find that also provides little guidance, as there is no direct relationship between the sale at that time (38.8 hectares), and the current subject (52.75 hectares). In this regard, I note that when valuing a parcel as a rural homesite it has been found that such land is best valued on a site basis and not on a per hectare basis. This was followed in H and E Grahn v. The Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 330:
"The appellants fail on this point because the appropriate basis for the valuation of a residential lot is not the application of a rate per square metre but an assessment of the unimproved value of each lot as land used for single unit residential purposes. "
Further, in seeking to understand the value of improvements to be deducted from Mr Hollindale's adopted improved value, I believe that he has not appropriately identified the added value of the improvements. In seeking to determine the unimproved value by what is often referred to as the "summation" method of valuation, he has really to identify the added value that the improvements bring to the land. It has been found previously that in matters of this nature, appellants often fail to recognise that movements in the market, reflect also changes in the added value of the improvements as well as in the value of the land itself.
This was identified in O'Brien Nominees Pty Ltd v. The Valuer-General (1979) 6 QLCR 280, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 284:"In such circumstances it is unrealistic to conclude that the land, the commodity basic to the enterprise, has a minus or nominal value. It is logical to assume that in times of adversity and depression, when purchasers pay less for properties as a going concern, that the lesser price attaches not only to the land component but also to the improvements. The question facing in analysing improved sales in these circumstances is what value is fairly to be attributed to the improvements.
It appears to us that the only tenable approach is to abandon the traditional method of replacement cost as at sale date less depreciation and to adopt an `added value' concept. "
For the above reasons I find that there is no useful comparison of sales to assist me in this matter, and I turn to the matter of relativity. I accept that relativity is a factor which should, in the overall purpose of the Valuation of Land Act, be maintained in order to preserve a consistent and fair approach to the purpose of taxation undertaken using valuations determined under the Act. I accept also that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, then it would be appropriate for the respondent to not upset existing relativities, which were determined following a comprehensive evaluation of a broader range of sales evidence.
The matter of maintaining relativity was also discussed in Gibson Investments Pty Ltd v. The Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 223, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 230:"It has been stressed on many occasions that reasonable property to property relativity within shires, is highly desirable to ensure an equitable distribution of the incidence of rating. ---- However, this is feasible only if the relevant dates of valuation are close in point of time and there have been no intervening circumstances affecting the marketplace. "
However, I note also that such a continuation of relativity may, in the special circumstances of this matter, lead to a conclusion which could be to the disadvantage of the appellants.
It is also noted that relativity between parcels in an unimproved sense may change from time to time. For example, in JD Lindenmayer v. The Valuer-General (1974) 1 QLCR 273, the President noted at page 276:"I am, of course, not bound by any past relativity whether it be established by the Land Court or otherwise. It is well recognised that relativity between blocks in an unimproved sense may change from assessment period to assessment period. "
That was also followed in R and MM Barnwell v. The Valuer-General (1990-91) 13 QLCR 13, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 17:
"It has been well recognised over the years that previously established relativity in unimproved values can and does change from valuation to valuation. If there was no justification for a change in relativity, the valuer's task would be very simple in that all that would be required to establish value would be accomplished by the use of an adjusting formula. This, of course, is undesirable. "
The problem that occurs when there are no real comparisons to draw upon because of the section 17 status of the land, were also discussed in Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources v. Radlett Enterprises Pty Ltd (AV94-206), 11 February 1998 (to be reported).
In that matter the Land Appeal Court noted the lack of any nearby comparable sales. Because of that lack of sales, the learned Member had rejected the approach of the Chief Executive to compare more remote and less comparable sales, on an "applied" value basis, noting that the Chief Executive had discarded certain sales which he considered "out of line". The Land Appeal Court noted the findings of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373 at p. 391:"It is quite true that in all valuations, judicial or other, there must be room for inferences and inclinations of opinion which being more or less conjectural, are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others. Everyone who has gone through the process is aware of this lack of demonstrative proof in his own mind, and knows that every expert witness called before him has had his own set of conjectures, of more or less weight according to his experience and personal sagacity. "
The Land Appeal Court went on to note that the evidence in the Radlett matter left "room for considerable doubt as to the fair and reasonable unimproved value of the subject land as it is found pursuant to section 17(1) of the Act" (page 7).
Finally I turn to the key issue which is whether the land now meets the requirements under section 17 for farming purposes. The intention and thrust of section 17 was fully explained in the previous hearing (V95-278) and I do not intend to repeat those findings. Suffice to say that on the evidence before him, the learned Member found at that time that the land did not qualify for "farming" purposes under the Act. He specifically determined that the nature of the farming business did not meet the test of being of a "significant and substantial purpose or character" as required under section 17(2)(c). In respect of the grazing activities, Mr Hollindale concedes that there has been no real change in his situation.
I note also that Mr Hollindale has since established an enterprise for the growing of earthworms upon the subject. In this matter both parties agreed that it is difficult to determine whether such an activity can be accepted as "farming". In the interests of clarifying that matter, it was left to the Court to determine whether it did in fact meet the broad thrust of "farming" under the Act.
In seeking to understand the purpose of earthworm farming, I note firstly that an earthworm is one that lives in the ground, and is involved in incorporating surface litter into the soil. This increases the organic material which forms a protective layer to stabilise soil temperatures and limits the loss of moisture by evaporation. The addition of this organic matter to the soil may improve its fertility by conversion into carbonic acid which reacts with the soil minerals to form nutrients. Partly decomposed organic matter also forms channels for the free downward movement of water (see The Queensland Agricultural and Pastoral Handbook - Fruit and Vegetables, Volume II, Second Edition, page 36.)
In seeking guidance from the Valuation of Land Act I note that section 17(2)(b) includes:"17(2)(b) Any other business or industry involving the cultivation of soils, the gathering in of crops or the rearing of livestock; "
In seeking to understand the word "cultivation", I note that it is used in conjunction with the word "agriculture" and has been taken to include "horticulture, and the use of the land for any purpose of husbandry, inclusive of the keeping or breeding of livestock, poultry or bees, and the growth of fruit, vegetables, and the like."
(Strouds Judicial Dictionary 4th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, page 101.)
In my opinion the cultivation of earthworms to break down organic material, and their subsequent use in the aeration and improvement of soils for golf course fairways, or other purposes, may be seen to be part of the process of cultivating soils under section 17(2)(b) of the Act. However, while such an interpretation would support the adoption of the "farming" concession, unless the earthworm business is of a significant size and nature, it would only be seen as part of another farming operation.
However, while subject to the conditions outlined, earthworm "farming" may be seen as meeting the meaning defined under section 17(2)(b), and may be seen as being undertaken for the purpose of profit on a continuous or repetitive basis under section 17(2)(d), two other tests need to be satisfied. Firstly the earthworm farming needs to represent the dominant use of the land, and it must also be of a "significant and substantial commercial purpose or character" (section 17(2)(c). The difficulty of meeting this latter test was fully documented by the learned Member (V95-278).
In the context of the olive tree cultivation, I do not see the earthworms as the dominant use of the land. I find this not for any reason that it only occupies 100 square metres of the land. Even on a small area of a farm, certain business activities can provide a significant and substantial purpose for the land. (See GR and M Maguire v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (AV96-79), 23 April 1997, unreported.
In that matter the learned Member found that, while only 2,000 square metres was used for the purposes of nursery operations, that was not critical as floriculture is a fairly concentrated and intense operation which does not require large areas for blooms to be cultivated. A similar conclusion could be made for the business of earthworm farming. However, the main reason why I do not see it as the dominant use is that the appellant, by his own evidence, saw it only as an interim supplementary income. Having then considered the nature of the earthworm activity, I note however the appellant did not acquire his earthworms until April 1997, after the date of issue of the valuation on 10 March 1997. Precedent in this Court has determined that matters relating to a valuation can be considered up to and until the date of issue of the valuation. This was found in KP and RD Weisenberger v. The Valuer-General 5 QLCR 125, where the learned Member found at page 127:"I agree with the submission of Mr Butler, Counsel for the Valuer-General, that my jurisdiction in so far as circumstances relating to the subject valuation are concerned does not extend in point of time to uses beyond 28 October 1976 the date of issue of the valuation. "
That was also followed in RG McMurray v. The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 35.
For these reasons I find I have no jurisdiction to consider the impact of the earthworm farming upon the classification of the land. There is scope of course for the Chief Executive to reconsider the matter under section 28, which says:
"28.(1) No alteration shall be made in the valuation of any parcel of land during the period during which any general valuation or annual valuation relating to the area in question is in force. ----
(h)unless the valuation is affected by error or omission which the chief executive considers it necessary to correct; "
Should the Chief Executive determine that the use of the subject under section 17(1) as a single dwelling has ceased and, because of the impact of the earthworm farming, application under section 17(2) is appropriate, then any exercise of that discretion would be entirely a matter for the Chief Executive during the current valuation.
And finally I look to the matter of the use of the land for the growing of olive trees. While the appellant provided no documented evidence of a business plan or projected income streams, he did demonstrate an informed understanding of the olive fruit industry. He had conducted genuine research into factors influencing success and undertaking their growth, marketing and production. Like many primary producers I find he has so far not committed his thoughts and plans to paper, and I would encourage him to do so. The preparation of a reasoned business plan is often the best investment towards success that any business person can undertake. It would certainly assist in his explaining his strategy to the Chief Executive.
I accept that his business of farming olives is at an early stage of development, and there is little so far to demonstrate that the business will be viable and significant or substantial. If the appellant meets his predictions of an annual gross income of $65,000, he will certainly satisfy section 17(2)(c) of the Act. From the evidence Mr Grennan accepts that 100 of the olive trees were planted prior to the issue of the valuation on 10 March 1997, and constitute a reason for consideration in the current valuation. In considering whether the olive plantation satisfies section 17(2) of the Act, I note that it could be defined as horticulture under section 17(2)(a) and, because of the current commitment of the appellants to the cultivation and pruning of the young trees, it could be accepted as the dominant use of the land. I accept also the current plans and commitment of the appellants, which demonstrate that the olive growing is undertaken on a continuous or repetitive basis for the purposes of profit. It was noted by the learned Member in (V95-278) that "There is no question that at the relevant date each parcel of land was used, to a greater or lesser extent, for or in connection with primary production" (page 17).
It was also found that the enterprise was used continuously and as a "business", and is more than a hobby. The new development of the olive orchard continues those activities and intent.
What then needs to be considered is whether the olive orchard is of an experimental research nature, or is merely a calculated application of proven research into the area and climate of the Gold Coast Hinterland. The appellant gave evidence that it has been done before, and it should be able to be implemented effectively. In the light of his understanding of the industry and its costs, I accept that the appellant appears to meet the criteria required of a new business person starting in an industry which requires certain features of ingenuity and enterprise. I believe it meets the definition of a "business" as explained by the learned Member in V95-278.
In considering then the remaining criteria required to be met under section 17(2)(c), that the business is of a significant and substantial purpose or character, the appellant has so far not been able to demonstrate any profitable return. The most definitive precedents in this matter are to be found in the decisions of the Land Appeal Court in Chief Executive, Department of Lands v. KW Whackett (1994-95) 15 QLCR 311; AR Thomason v. Chief Executive, Department of Lands (1994-95) 15 QLCR 286; and Chief Executive, Department of Lands v. JW & K Higbie (1994-95) 15 QLCR 277. However, all of those relate to the grazing of cattle under section 17(2) of the Act.
A decision also of some relevance to this matter is the findings of CH and MC Peck v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (AV95-94), (LAC), 1 August 1997, to be reported. In the Peck case the use of the land was for the cultivation of palms, macadamias and lychees. In the end the Land Appeal Court ruled that the appellants' business was not of a significant or substantial nature in that, while not used as a hobby, it nevertheless failed to meet the expectations of a viable business.
In considering the findings in the Whackett decision, I note also the minority decision of Ambrose J. which, in his opinion, demonstrated that there was to be a comparison drawn between the "real and bona fide business of farming" from a "token, nominal, illusory, or insubstantial commercial nature". While I am bound by the majority decision in the Whackett case, I note also the words of Ambrose J. who said at page 342:"It is most unlikely that the legislative intent to be found in s.17 is to value land of the size and carrying capacity of this land so that the owner who used it for many years to breed and sell cattle by working on it as he does at present for 5 days every fortnight and working the other 9 days as an employee elsewhere will be required to pay greater rates which no doubt will make his farming venture even more marginal than it is at present. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that persons in the position of the owners in this case are of the very class of farming rate-payers which s.17(1) is designed to protect and benefit. "
While those sentiments are also reflected in the current matter, the majority decision of Whackett places clear responsibility upon the appellants to prove their case. A similar matter in DG Lane v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (V96-216), 12 June 1997, unreported, was determined in the appellant's favour in view of the originality of the farming methods of the appellant, and the result being achieved. As each application for "farming" is to be treated on its merits, the intentions, practices and outcomes achieved by each business will determine its success or otherwise.
In the end I believe that the appellants almost satisfy the requirements of section 17(2)(c), but the onus to prove that lies with the appellants under section 45(4) of the Act which says in respect of a notice of appeal:"Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated and the burden of proving any and every such ground shall be upon the owner. "
As in the Whackett case I am of the opinion that an olive orchard which can show a gross annual return of $65,000 may be shown to have a significant or substantial commercial purpose or character. In this matter the appellant has still to demonstrate that his plans have substance.
Conclusion:
In concluding any comparison with similar lands, I believe the sales of the respondent and the appellant, provide no conclusive evidence of the current unimproved value of the subject. The only reliable evidence I have is the previous valuation determined by the Court on 14 June 1996, at $200,000. I note that relativities from a former valuation have been retained, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. However, I also note that by retaining that relativity the valuation has now increased to $245,000. Had the appellants been able to demonstrate evidence of their primary production, the valuation for that purpose would be $78,000.
While the onus of proof rests upon the appellant, there is also a burden of evidentiary proof required of the respondent, in respect of his application of a proven principle or process in determining the valuation. This was found in Brisbane City Council v. The Valuer-General (1977-78) H.C. 140 CLR 41, where Gibbs J. said at page 56:
"In my opinion once it is shown that in making the valuation the Valuer-General acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact, the presumption created by s.13(7) is rebutted. "
In the wording of the current Act, section 13(7) refers now to section 33.
In the current matter I find that the Chief Executive has been unable to support his valuation by other than relativity. While relativity is important to be maintained in the absence of supporting evidence, its level can vary over time. (See Lindenmayer and Barnwell (supra)).
Conclusion:
Having considered the whole of the evidence I find that the appellants have partly proved their case. The land does not satisfy the meaning of "farming" under the Act, but there is no evidence to demonstrate that the valuation had increased from its former value at $200,000. The appeal is therefore upheld, and the valuation of the Chief Executive is set aside. The valuation of Lot 12 on RP 850786 is determined at Two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000).
(NG Divett)
Member of the Land Court
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