Hogan v Department of Natural Resources and Mines

Case •

[2004] QLC 82

•

28 September 2004

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Hogan v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2004] QLC 0082 
PARTIES: Michael John Hogan (V2004/0114)
(applicant)
Janet Caroline and Ralph Gordon Hogan (V2004/0115)
(applicants)
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
(respondent)

FILES NO:

V2004/0114 and V2004/0115
DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland
PROCEEDING: Appeals against annual valuations under the Valuation of Land Act 1944
DELIVERED ON: 28 September 2004
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARD AT: Proserpine
MEMBER Dr NG Divett
ORDER: The appeals are upheld, the valuations of the Chief Executive are set aside, and the unimproved values of Lot 61 and Lot 62 on SP 15370 are determined respectively in the sums of Four Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($425,000) (Lot 61) and Five Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($555,000) (Lot 62). 
CATCHWORDS: Valuation – Statutory valuation – Valuation of Land Act 1944 – Unimproved value – Added value of improvement
Valuation – Sales – Comparison of sales – Like with like basis – Development works not allowed
APPEARANCES: Mr Conroy for the appellants
Mr Cradick for the respondent

Background:

  1. These matters relate to lands at Botanica Estate, Woodwark located about 2 kilometres radially north-west of Cannonvale, and about 10 kilometres by road from Cannonvale.  The subject lands have good access via an easement over a private road known as Botanica Drive, which is bitumen sealed with gravel shoulders and earth channels.  Electricity, telephone and reticulated town water was provided at the owner’s expense.  There is no Council water supply or sewerage available.  Access to Botanica Drive is via Paluma Road.  The subject lands are described as Lot 61 on SP 153780 (V2004/0114) and Lot 62 on SP 153780 (V2004/0115).  Lot 61 has an area of 1 hectare and Lot 62 has an area of 2 hectares.  Both parcels are zoned Low Density Residential, under the Whitsunday Shire Council Town Planning Scheme, effective at the date of valuation at 1 October 2002.  The key issues are the nature of the land and comparison of sales.

  2. On 12 August 2003 the Chief Executive issued a valuation of the subject lands at $450,000 (Lot 61) and $600,000 (Lot 62). The valuations were issued as interim valuations under s.28 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act), with effect from 16 July 2003.  Following objections the Chief Executive confirmed those figures on 18 May 2004.  The appellants have now appealed claiming the unimproved values should more properly be $250,000 (Lot 61) and $350,000 (Lot 62).  Following further evidence at the hearing on 25 August 2002, and based upon a reassessment of the application of the Pringle Road sale (Lot 115), Mr Conroy for the appellants would be prepared to revise his estimate of the valuations to $350,000 (Lot 61) and $450,000 (Lot 62). 

  3. Mr Bevan Conroy, an experienced registered valuer appeared and gave evidence for the appellants.  Mr A Cradick, legal officer for Department of Natural Resources and Mines, appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Ross Malcolm Bein, the experienced departmental senior registered valuer now accepting responsibility for the valuations.  The original valuations were undertaken by another valuer no longer available to defend the valuations.  At the request of the parties, the Court undertook a field inspection.

Nature of the Land –

  1. Lot 61 is a very rocky knoll on the foreshore, with a narrow esplanade between the subject lands and the ocean.  The land falls moderately from the road frontage on the west towards the ocean to the east.  The rocky nature of the land is likely to provide problems for building development.  There are extensive ocean views towards Cannonvale and Able Point Marina.  Mr Conroy advises that because of the difficult nature of Lot 61, the owners had needed to spend $45,000 on excavations to provide a building pad.

  2. Lot 62 is also a very rocky knoll on the foreshore, immediately adjacent to Lot 61 to the north.  There are similar ocean views to Lot 61, and there is also a narrow esplanade between Lot 62 and the ocean.  The subject land also falls moderately from west to east, and the road frontage to Lot 62 is restricted to the south western corner of Lot 62 fronting the easement access road.  The reticulated water to both Lot 61 and Lot 62 is from the town water supply, but is supplied and maintained at the owner’s cost.  Both lands are valued as single residence rural home sites.  Mr Conroy advises that because of the difficult nature of Lot 61, and access to that parcel, the owners had needed to spend $150,000 on excavations to provide a building site.

  3. Mr Conroy advises further that both Lot 61 and Lot 62 were developed as part of a 48 Lot development, including a future 24 Lot development of the 32.3 hectare Lot 47 immediately west of Lot 62.  Access to that future 24 Lot development is via the access Easement C across Lot 47.  That future development includes smaller parcels from 1,000 square metres to 4,000 square metres along Easement C, and the larger balance of Lot 47 will result in open space land immediately west of Lot 62.  That land is dedicated to the Whitsunday Shire Council (the Council) for open space purposes.

  4. Mr Conroy provides his advice on site development costs based upon information from the owners, who were the developers of the entire Botanica Drive Estate, including the adjacent Lot 47.  However Mr Conroy provides no idea of when those house pad excavations were provided, or whether they were provided as apportionments of the entire development cost.  Mr Conroy advises that his advice is that total road costs for that Estate was $1,250,000, plus further costs for the water services, with further unknown costs for the road construction through the adjoining private land to the south of the Estate.  The Hogans had been long term owners of the Estate area. 

  5. Mr Cradick rejects use of the onsite house pad construction costs, which he argues appear excessive, and as special requirements for the owners.  He notes that the style of house is a personal choice of the owners, and other designs such as pole houses would not have required such expensive earthworks.  Any such decision would therefore be a matter for consideration separate to the purchase of the lands.  Mr Conroy was unable to advise whether any ongoing costs were involved with the subject land in respect of the supply of town water.  Mr Bein rejects any development costs for water supply, but agrees that if any abnormal ongoing costs were involved, then he would have allowed some deduction in the unimproved values.  Mr Bein also confirms that while onsite development costs are allowable on sales information, they are generally not normally allowed for on subject lands, unless some abnormality of the subject lands were evident.  In respect of Lots 61 and 62, he argues that is not relevant.  However both valuers agree that the two subject lands are quite unique sites in that locality.

Comparison of Sales –

  1. While both valuers agree that the subject lands are unique in nature, they have sought comparisons only with sales of vacant or lightly improved lands.  There was therefore no recognised element of scarcity evident in the subject lands, and sales of improved parcels were not considered, thus rejecting the principles outlined in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue and Anor [2002] 212 CLR 111.

  2. To support his estimates of the unimproved values Mr Conroy provides the following sales of vacant lands:

    ·    Sale 1 – (Pringle Road, Cannonvale – Lot 115 on HR 974).  This is a 2.628 hectare esplanade fronting irregular shaped parcel, located about 1.2 kilometres north of the subject lands.  The sale is undulating to gently sloping fronting a shallow creek along its northern boundary.  There are some mangroves along the esplanade, but the sale has fair ocean views across Pioneer Bay to Abel Point Marina.  The sale is in an isolated locality, and has access via bitumen sealed Pringle Road, and then along a formed earthen roadway which is ungazetted across Unallocated State Land.  Electricity and telephone are available, but there are no Council services available including water or sewerage.

    Mr Conroy advises that a former conditional rezoning of the land for resort and residential development purposes has now lapsed, but the owners are currently seeking to reactivate a fresh approval.  The sale is seen as overall inferior to the subject land.  The sale sold in July 2001 for $350,000.

  3. ·    Sale 2 – (corner Beach Road and Coral Esplanade, Cannonvale – Lot 9 on RP 710000).  This is a 1,821 square metre corner parcel with frontage to an esplanade road.  The sale is gently sloping, with attractive ocean views and island views, looking across a public toilet block.  Access is good from bitumen sealed roads.  Subsequent to the sale, the land has been developed with twelve multiple units.  The sale is seen as superior to the subject land.  The sale sold in January 2002 for $621,000.

  4. ·    Sale 3 – (Mandalay Road, Mandalay Point – Lot 1 on SP 148648).  This sale is five kilometres east of Airlie Beach.  This is a 2,987 square metre waterfront parcel falling from the road to the esplanade, with extensive ocean and island views over Pioneer Bay to the west.  There is an easy building site with no major earthworks required.  Electricity, telephone and garbage services are available.  The sale is seen as marginally superior to the subject land.  The sale sold in November 2001 for $455,000.

  5. To support his valuation Mr Bein provides the following sales:

    ·    Sale 1 – (Mandalay Road, Mandalay Point – Lot 1 on SP 148648).  This is common with Mr Conroy’s Sale 3.  The sale is seen as inferior to both subject lands.  The sale sold in November 2001 for $455,00, was analysed at $440,000, and applied at $425,000. 

  6. ·    Sale 2 – (Pringle Road, Cannonvale – Lot 115 on HR 974).  This is a common sale with Mr Conroy’s Sale 1.  The sale is seen as inferior to both subject lands.  The sale sold in July 2001 for $350,000, was analysed at $300,000, and while currently applied at $225,000, Mr Bein sees its true application at $300,000.

  7. ·    Sale 3 – (Parkland Drive – Lot 16 on RP 804262).  This is a 2 hectare rural residential parcel located about 1.2 kilometres west of the subject lands.  The sale is heavily timbered steep land above road level, with a steep rise from the east off Parkland Drive.  There is also a rear access to Parkland Drive towards the west.  Access is difficult to the sale, but the sale has a town water supply and also has ocean views.  However the sale is not a beach front property and the views are therefore inferior to the subject land.  Overall the sale is inferior to the subject lands.  The sale sold in May 2002 for $220,000, was analysed at $215,000, and applied at $210,000.

  8. To further support his valuations Mr Bein also provides 12 later sales of the Botanica Community Title Estate, adjoining the two subject lands.  Those 12 sales reflect transactions occurring between November 2002 to November 2003, at prices varying from $575,000 (Lot 4) to $480,000 (Lot 6) for beach front lands, and from $382,500 (Lot 18) to $170,000 (Lot 19) for lands removed from the water.  While Mr Bein admits that those sales reflect a later period, generally well after the relevant date in a rapidly increasing market, he argues those sales indicate the general level of value in that locality.  Mr Bein also notes that while Sale 12 (Lot 19 - $170,000) is generally opposite the subject land (Lot 61), with similar ocean views, it is smaller in area and removed from the waterfront.  He argues that difference is reflected in the much lesser value, and reflects the impact of size and ocean frontage (Exhibit 3).  Mr Conroy rejects those later sales, which he argues provides no reasonable comparisons of value at 1 October 2002.

  9. With the common sale at Pringle Road, Cannonvale (Lot 115), Mr Conroy advises that he feels that is not a major issue as that ungazetted road across Unallocated State Land has been used by local residents for about 50 years.  However he agrees that the subject lands both have legal access.  Mr Conroy concedes that if the applied value of Lot 115 at $225,000 was found in fact to be more like $300,000, as argued by Mr Bein, then Mr Conroy would be prepared to amend his valuation of the subject lands at Lot 61 to $350,000, and Lot 62 to $450,000.  Mr Conroy argues that those reassessments of the subject lands reflect the uniqueness of those parcels, and the extra area of two hectares of Lot 62.  He notes that the estate already is close by to larger areas of open space to the west on Lot 47.

  10. In the matter of the level of earthworks involved on both subject lands, Mr Cradick questions the quantum of those works, as well as the need for allowance in the unimproved values as noted in paragraph [8]. Mr Conroy argues that it was essential to undertake those works in order to maximise on the advantage of ocean frontage. Mr Bein rejects that assumption. Mr Conroy was unable to provide an opinion about how much site development could be relevant to another prudent purchaser. It is also noted that similar earthworks for housing pads were not specifically allowed for on the comparative sales.

  11. In respect of Mr Conroy’s Sale 2 ( Coral Esplanade – Lot 9), he agrees that is really a different development potential to the subject land, but argues that it is one of the few esplanade sales in that area.  However he does not really rely on that sale as it has a different highest and best use.

  12. The key sale is really the common sale at Mandalay Point (Lot 1), as that is also direct waterfrontage land with similar ocean views towards the subject lands.  However Mr Bein notes that those western views suffer from afternoon glare and, in his opinion, are inferior to the similar eastern ocean views from the subject lands.  Mr Bein also notes that the Mandalay Point sale is much smaller in area than either subject land, and on that basis he argues that the sale must be inferior to the subject lands.  However Mr Conroy argues that the subject lands were more remote, and most of those lands are steeply sloping rocky areas.

  13. Mr Conroy also notes that the owner of the Mandalay Point sale has closer deep water anchorage for his personal vessel, than is available to the owners of the subject lands, due to the shallower waters near Lots 61 and 62.  Mr Conroy provides no evidence of water depths in either area, and that is merely an opinion by Mr Conroy.  However it is noted that Lot 1 is generally protected from the prevailing north-eastern and south-eastern winds, rather than the subject lands which are more exposed to those offshore breezes.  Mr Conroy further notes that the useable building areas are similar on the Mandalay Point sale than on either subject land.

  14. To support his application of the Pringle Road sale at $300,000, Mr Bein provides evidence of a later amalgamation of Lot 115 with the two adjoining parcels to the north (Lots 2 and 3 on RP 840155).  (Exhibit 4).  He notes that amalgamated parcel of a total area 6.21 hectares had an applied unimproved value of $425,000 at 1 October 2002 issued in September 2003.  On the same date a further amalgamation including Lot 152 on HR 1268 to the west, of total area 21.5881 hectares was applied at $450,000.  Mr Bein notes that total amalgamated parcel has a larger marine frontage than the subject lands, and is not as rocky as the subject lands.

  15. However Mr Bein notes that native title implications associated with the ungazetted roadway through Unallocated State Lands, would be a matter of concern in respect of costly procedures to seek official gazettal of that roadway.  Mr Conroy provides a without prejudice application to the Council in 1999 in respect of a former rezoning application for the amalgamated area of the Pringle Road sale at 6.21 hectares, but there was no indication of the outcome of that application, and it provides little assistance.  (Exhibit 5).  Mr Cradick argues that the amalgamated parcel of Lot 115, and Lots 2 and 3 (6.21 hectares at $425,000) has a less panoramic range of ocean views than the subject lands, due to the shape of the waterfront in those localities.

Decision:

  1. I turn first to the legislation and note that unimproved value of land is defined by s.3(1) of the Act, which relevantly states:

    "3.(1)  For the purposes of this Act –

    ‘unimproved value’ of land means –

    (a)in relation to unimproved land – the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require;  and

    (b)in relation to improved land – the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require, assuming that, at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, the improvements did not exist."

  2. I note that at the date of valuation both Lots 61 and 62 were vacant lands, although Lot 62 was subsequently being developed with a residence.  The question to be addressed initially is whether the unimproved value of either parcel would exclude the considerable development works for access and a house pad as sought by Mr Conroy.  I note Mr Bein’s evidence that had either of those parcels been analysed as evidence of sales, then he would have made some allowance for the development works, although he challenges the quantum of those works.  The question is whether those site works should be seen as “improvements” under the Act, or part of the actual subdivided land in its unimproved state.

  3. Now while I accepted that both Lots 61 and 62 are difficult rocky sloping parcels, so also is Mr Bein’s Sale 3 (Parkland Drive – Lot 16), which was analysed at a lower figure than its sale price to its unimproved state.  I note that onsite development works were allowed as improvements to be deducted from an improved value of a parcel of land in State Government Insurance Office v Valuer-General (1980-81) 7 QLCR 171, where the President said at 185:

    "The exercise is to ascertain the value of the land in its improved state based on its purchase price plus necessary on site improvements to permit the commencement of building."

  4. However that matter dealt with the Canelands Shopping Centre in Mackay, and is not a reasonable comparison with a single dwelling house site such as the subject land.  I note also in State Government Insurance Office v Valuer-General (supra) that the President noted at 187 that s.12(2)(b) as it then was, now s.5(2) of the Act directs that any such costs, if they are allowable, are to reflect the amount that should reasonably be involved in effecting, at the time as at which the value is required, improvements equivalent to the existing improvements.

  5. However if the development costs were to be allowed as improvements to the subject lands, then they should be deducted from any improved value of those parcels, for which there has been no evidence of a market value, other than Mr Bein’s schedule of sales of the adjoining smaller parcels in paragraph [16]. Now while s.6 of the Act defines the meaning of “improvements” in this matter, it does not specifically refer to any excavation or levelling of the subject lands. Section 6 refers only to “improvements thereon or appertaining thereto, whether visible, invisible or intangible, and made or required by the owner …”.

  6. Some further assistance can be obtained by reference to similar legislation in New South Wales which has comparable intentions.  That was noted by the Court of Appeal in New South Wales in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2001] LGERA 376, where Handley JA noted at 379, that land improvements under the Valuation of Land Act (Rating and Valuation) Amendment Act 1996 relevantly included:

    (d)the restoration or improvement of land surfaces by excavation, filling, grading or levelling, not being works of irrigation or conservation.

    (dl)without limiting paragraphs (d), any excavation, filling, grading or levelling of land for the purpose of the erection of a building, structural work, not being for the purpose of irrigation or conservation.

    (e)the reclamation of land by draining or filling together with any retaining walls or other works appurtenant to the reclamation. 

On that basis the site works were accessed and a building pad would be seen as "improvements" upon the land.

  1. I note also that courts have exercised some caution in accepting any costs of improvements, as noted by the Land and Environment Court in New South Wales in Mood & Anor v Cowra Shire Council (1999) 103 LGERA 260, where Talbot J noted at 263:

    "It is important to discern between the cost of improvements and their value at the date of acquisition:  (see Collins v Livingstone Shire Council (1972) 127 CLR 477 at 484 and 500; 56 LGRA 409 at 413-414 and 425, and Blue Mountains City Council v Mulcahy (1998) 45 NSWLR 577 at 587; 100 LGERA 193 at 201)."

    In the matter of Collins the High Court had to determine the matter of compensation for resumption by Livingstone Shire Council of land including a water storage dam that had been partly constructed on the resumed land, and partly on adjoining lands. In that matter Gibbs J noted at 500:

    "Some improvements increase the value of land to a greater extent than the cost, but in other circumstances the cost of an improvement may greatly exceed its value, eg, because its wasteful design renders it unnecessarily expensive to construct, or because it is redundant or out of place and cannot be put to profitable use having regard to its situation.”

  2. In the current matters the key as to whether the site development costs should be seen as part of the unimproved parcel, or more as part of the development of improvements upon the land, lies in the comparisons made with the comparable sales.  In all cases the comparable sales have been analysed to unimproved values with deductions made for any house pad development works.  To make a further allowance for cost now sought by Mr Conroy would, in my opinion, be double-dipping for such works.  On that basis I reject any further deductions for the development works from the comparative unimproved values determined from the analysed sales evidence.  I also agree with Mr Bein that the very large expenditure on the site development works reflects specific special values attached to those works by the owner/developers. 

Comparison of sales –

  1. If I look then at the comparisons of sales of vacant lands, I find that both valuers have followed a principle long held by the courts as the best method of determining unimproved values.  That was emphasised in PH Clough v Valuer-General (1981-82) 8 QLCR 70, at 76; NR and PG Tow v Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 378, at 381; R and MM Barnwell v Valuer-General (1990-91) 13 QLCR 13, at 17; and Hans and Else Grahn v Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, at 330.

  2. The comparisons by Mr Bein of his Sale 3 (Parkland Drive – Lot 16) demonstrates the value of ocean views, but that land does not have direct water access like the subject lands, and is clearly, when applied at $210,000, a far inferior parcel to either Lot 61 or Lot 62.  It merely therefore provides a lower benchmark to the comparisons.  Likewise the comparison with Mr Conroy’s Sale 2 at Beach Road (Lot 9) provides a much higher highest and best use, and is also merely a highest parameter, and not really a useful comparison.

  3. The most useful sales therefore are the two common sales. If I take first the Pringle Road sale (Lot 115), I find that both valuers agree that it is inferior to both subject lands. The difference between the valuers is the likely applied unimproved value of that parcel. The records reveal that the applied value at 1 October 2002 was $225,000. Mr Bein provides an alternative opinion that the applied value should more properly be $300,000, as noted in paragraph [22]. To support his higher figure for the sale, Mr Bein seeks to apportion part of the amalgamated valuation of $425,000 for 6.21 hectares. However I note that while the amalgamated parcel has a larger beach frontage than either subject land, the original sale of Lot 115 involved a relatively smaller beach frontage, and a more irregular part of the rear of the sale along the creek on its northern boundary (Exhibit 4 SmartMap).

  4. However the physical access track to Lot 115 lies more within that parcel than does the access track across to the adjoining Lots 2 and 3, passing more across Lot 152, which is only a permit to occupy.  On balance I believe that Lot 115 would have more direct control of the access track than to Lots 2 and 3, and Mr Bein’s analysed value of $300,000 would appear to be a reasonable apportionment of the $425,000 for the amalgamated parcel of 6.21 hectares.  On that basis Mr Conroy’s revised figure of $350,000 (Lot 61) and $450,000 (Lot 62) would be appropriate.

  5. In respect of Mr Conroy’s opinion that the long standing use of the rough track across Lot 27 (the Unallocated State Land), has little impact upon the sale price of Lot 115, I find that is not consistent with the current problems confronting further development of that parcel by the owners (Adams).  While the without prejudice application for rezoning of that land in 1999 was apparently not successful (Exhibit 5), clearly any approval of use of Lot 27 would require the approval of the Minister.  As that parcel adjoins the Dryander National Park (Lot 24 on NPW 559), and as Lot 27 is Unallocated State Land, its granting of tenure would depend upon clearance of any native title issues.  As Mr Bein argues, native title matters tend to be uncertain and protracted, and some uncertainty must reside in the sale of Lot 115.  I agree with Mr Bein that the actual legal access to the two subject lands makes them considerably superior to the Pringle Road sale (Lot 115).

  6. I turn then to the Mandalay Point (Lot 1) sale, and note that sale has similar water frontage to the two subject lands, and has a comparable available building area for development of a house.  It has similar ocean views as the subject lands, but looks westward rather than eastward from Lots 61 and 62.  However from the site inspection the ocean views from the subject lands would tend to be more impacted by tidal influences, than Mandalay Point sale which is much nearer to the deep water anchorage.  On balance I believe those tidal influences would balance the western aspect of that sale.  The subject lands are both much larger than the Mandalay Point sale, and would therefore have greater capacity for visual privacy from neighbours.  However the subject lands are further removed from the main development areas of Airlie Beach and Shute Harbour.  Mr Bein sees the sale as inferior and Mr Conroy sees it as marginally superior.  On balance I believe the sale is comparable to Lot 61, and but inferior to Lot 62 because the latter’s much larger size.

  7. On the above analysis, I see Lot 61 as being considerably superior to Pringle Road (Lot 115) at $300,000, and comparable to Mandalay Point (Lot 1) at $425,000, while Lot 62 is superior to both sales.  On that basis I believe that $425,000 is a reasonable figure for Lot 61.

  8. If I turn then to the matter of differences in area between Lot 61 and Lot 62, I note that the beachfront parcels at Botanica Community Title, while much later sales after the relevant date, reflected a rising market of about 28% per year (Lot 4), and non-beachfront parcels varied in the later sales from about 60% annual increase (Lot 19) to 130% annual increase (Lot 14).  Now there is no evidence of the details of those much later sales, but if those increases were applied back to 1 October 2001, then the unimproved value of Lot 61 at $425,000 would appear very conservative.  But those after date sales provide no conclusive evidence, and I reject their application in the current matters.

  9. Of more assistance is the relativities provided by the two valuers for Lots 61 and 62 as follows: 

    Subject land         Mr Bein         Relativity       Mr Conroy     Relativity

    Lot 61                   $450,000        1.0                  $350,000        1.0

    Lot 62                   $600,000        1.33                $450,000        1.29

    On balance I will accept a relativity of 1.3 or $552,500 for Lot 62, say $555,000. 

Summary:

  1. In summarising these matters, I am aware that s.33 of the Act directs that the unimproved values by the Chief Executive are deemed to be correct unless proved to the contrary, and that the onus is upon the appellants to prove their case under s.45(4).  However on the evidence I believe that the appellants have partially established that there is some room for uncertainty in the final analyses.  On that basis any room for inconsistency should be applied in the appellants’ favour.  (Commissioner of Succession Duties (South Australia) v Executor Trustee and Agency Company of South Australia Limited & Ors (1946-47) 74 CLR 358, at 373).

Conclusion:

  1. Having considered the whole of the evidence I am persuaded that the appellants have partly proved their cases.  The appeals are upheld, the valuations of the Chief Executive are set aside, and the unimproved values of Lot 61 and Lot 62 on SP 15370 are determined respectively in the sums of Four Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($425,000) (Lot 61) and Five Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($555,000) (Lot 62). 

NG DIVETT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT

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