Sally Rowena Hodgson (First Appellant) Commonwealth of Australia (Second Appellant) Matthew Broderick Crane (Respondent)
JUDGMENT OF:
Sheller JA at 1; Heydon JA at 2; Davies AJA at 46
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION :
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) :
DC 228/00
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER :
O'Reilly DCJ
COUNSEL:
Mr C R R Hoeben SC/Mr D J Brogan (Appellants) Mr B M J Toomey QC/Mr A J Black (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
Australian Government Solicitor (Appellants) Walsh & Blair (Respondent)
CATCHWORDS:
Motor accidents - Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 ss 131, 131, 133, 134 - - Statutes - construction - reading in of words - conditions for - whether necessary - D
The appeal is dismissed; the appellants are to pay the respondent's costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40003/02 DC 228/00
SHELLER JA HEYDON JA DAVIES AJA
22 August 2002
HODGSON v CRANE
Motor accidents – Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 ss 131, 131, 133, 134 – Statutes – construction – reading in of words – conditions for – whether necessary
The plaintiff sustained injuries when a motor vehicle owned by the second defendant and driven by the first defendant reversed into his motor cycle. Under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) the primary judge entered a verdict and assessed damages at $557,254 with costs. The defendant appealed as to quantum of damages for non-economic loss on the ground that the primary judge had incorrectly construed the Act.
Held (Heydon JA, Sheller JA and Davies AJA agreeing), dismissing the appeal:
1. On the true construction of ss 131-134, once the threshold of 10% permanent impairment is passed, the court is to assess damages for non-economic loss without any statutory restraint, save that no more than $284,000 may be awarded, provided the court has regard to information published by the Motor Accidents Authority as required by s 135: [39].
2. It was not possible to construe the language of ss 131-134 as importing any idea of proportionality where there are no express words conveying it, where the express words which conveyed it in the 1988 Act had been removed, and where the most relevant object of the 1999 Act appeared to indicate a purpose of preserving principles of full compensation, without reference to proportionality, once the s 131 threshold had been satisfied. The novelty of the “new scheme” which the Act created lay in the abandonment of the former threshold, the introduction of the much stricter s 131 threshold, and the abandonment of proportionality: [34].
3. Given the lack of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Hodgson v Crane [2002] NSWCA 276
Case
[2002] NSWCA 276
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal in *Hodgson v Crane* concerned a dispute arising from a motor accident. The appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the original proceedings, sought to recover damages for injuries sustained in the accident. The respondent was the defendant. The matter came before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was the proper construction of sections 131, 133, and 134 of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW). Specifically, the court had to determine whether it was necessary to "read in" words to these statutory provisions to give them a sensible operation, and if so, under what conditions such an interpretative exercise would be permissible.
The Court of Appeal considered the principles of statutory interpretation, particularly in circumstances where a literal reading of the legislation might lead to an absurd or unintended outcome. The court analysed the purpose and context of the relevant sections of the Act. Ultimately, the court concluded that it was not necessary to read in words to the provisions in question, finding that the existing wording, when properly understood, provided a coherent framework for the matters before it.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is dismissed; the appellants are to pay the respondent's costs.