Hodak & Hodak (No. 3)
[2021] FamCA 341
•26 May 2021
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hodak & Hodak (No. 3) [2021] FamCA 341
File number(s): MLC14738/2018 Judgment of: JOHNS J Date of judgment: 26 May 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – COSTS. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 19.18
Cases cited: I and I (1995) FLC 92-625
Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340
Prantage & Prantage [2013] FamCAFC 105
Colgate-Palmolive v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
Number of paragraphs: 76 Date of last submission/s: 8 December 2020 Date of hearing: Written Submissions in Chambers Place: Melbourne ORDERS
MLC 14738 of 2018 BETWEEN: MS HODAK
Applicant
AND: MR HODAK
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JOHNS J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MAY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.That within 30 days the husband pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings, fixed in the sum of $8,000.00.
2.That all extant applications be otherwise dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hodak & Hodak has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
On 12 October 2020 this matter came before me in the Judicial Duty List. The reserved judgment was subsequently delivered and orders made on 24 November 2020 (“the Judgment”). Those orders made provision for the parties’ to make application for costs upon the filing of written submissions.
The wife filed written submissions on 8 December 2020 seeking that the husband pay her costs of and incidental to the hearing before me on 12 October 2020. At paragraph 4 of the wife’s submissions she seeks that the husband pay her costs as follows:-
(a)In the sum of $12,705.80 (incl GST), calculated on an indemnity basis in accordance with the Costs Agreement executed between the Wife and Lander & Rogers Lawyers.
(b)In the alternative to (a), fixed in an amount of $8,000.00.
(c)In the alternative to (a) and (b), such other costs order this Court deems just and equitable.
The husband has not filed any reply to the wife’s submissions in support of her application for costs. These are my Reasons for Judgment with respect to the wife’s application for costs.
BACKGROUND
The applicant wife, Ms Hodak, is aged 37 years. The wife is engaged in home duties caring for the parties’ daughter, aged almost four years at the date of hearing.
The respondent husband, Mr Hodak, is aged 39 years. He is a professional and operates his own business known as F Pty Ltd.
The parties married in 2007, with final separation occurring on 10 February 2018 when the husband vacated the former matrimonial home. The parties have one child of the relationship, X, aged four years.
The procedural history of this matter is set out in greater detail in the Judgment. As a result, I do not propose to repeat myself and will only refer to the history which is relevant to the issue of costs.
On 11 June 2020 the wife filed an Application in a Case seeking the enforcement of final property orders made by consent on 15 January 2020 (“ the Final Orders”) and the parties’ Financial Agreement and Binding Child Support Agreement, both dated 13 January 2020.
The husband filed a Response to an Application in a Case on 1 September 2020 in which he conceded some parts of the wife’s application but otherwise raised a raft of new issues separate to those agitated by the wife.
On 1 September 2020 the matter came before Hartnett J in the Judicial Duty List. Her Honour made orders largely in the terms sought by the wife in her amended Application in a Case filed 27 August 2020. Further orders were made listing the husband’s Response to Application in a Case to the Judicial Duty List before me on 12 October 2020.
On 30 September 2020 Hartnett J made an order that the husband pay the wife’s costs of her Amended Application in a Case filed 27 August 2020 fixed in the sum of $9,500.
On 12 October 2020 the husband’s amended Response to an Application in a Case filed 9 September 2020 came before me in the Judicial Duty List. That day I reserved my judgment.
On 24 November 2020 I delivered reasons for judgment and made the following orders:-
BY CONSENT
(1)The husband have leave to withdraw his Response to an Application in a Case filed 1 September 2020.
(2)That the wife sign all such documents as may be required to effect her removal as a signatory to the bank accounts in the name of the Husband’s Entities (as defined at recital M to the orders dated 15 January 2020) within 7 days of production of such documents by the husband.
BY THE COURT
(3)That the husband’s Response to an Application in a Case filed 9 September 2020 be otherwise dismissed.
(4)That any party seeking costs must file written submissions within 14 days of these Orders being pronounced.
(5)That in the event an application for costs is made pursuant to order 4 herein, any written submissions in response be filed within 28 days from the date of these Orders.
In accordance with my orders on 8 December 2020 the wife filed written submissions seeking orders that the husband pay her costs of and incidental to the hearing before me on 12 October 2020.
Pursuant to the orders made 24 November 2020, the husband had 28 days from the date of the orders to file any submissions in reply to the wife’s application for costs. The husband has failed to file any submissions in reply to that application.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The wife relies upon the following documents in support of her submissions as to costs:-
·Orders made by Deputy Registrar Mestrovic on 15 January 2020;
·Application in a Case of the wife filed 11 June 2020;
·Affidavit of the wife filed 11 June 2020;
·Affidavit of the wife filed 27 August 2020;
·Reply to Response to an Application in a Case of the wife dated 7 October 2020;
·Affidavit of the Wife filed 8 October 2020;
·Orders made by Justice Hartnett on 1 September 2020;
·Transcript of the hearing before Justice Hartnett dated 1 September 2020;
·Reasons for Judgment of Justice Hartnett delivered 30 September 2020;
·Orders made by Justice Johns on 24 November 2020; and
·Reasons for Judgment of Justice Johns delivered 24 November 2020.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The question of costs is governed by s 117(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) which provides:-
Subject to subsection (2), subsections 45A(6) and 70NFB(1) and sections 117AA and 117AC, each party to proceedings under this Act shall bear his or her own costs.
That is, the general rule in proceedings under the Act is that subject to the provisions of s 117(2), the parties to the proceedings shall bear their own costs of the proceedings.
Section 117(2) of the Act provides that if the Court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it doing so, the Court may, subject to sub-sections (2A), (4), (4A), (5) and (6) and the applicable Rules of Court, make such order as to costs and security for costs as the Court considers just.
Section 117(2A) of the Act provides that in determining what order (if any) should be made under sub-section (2), the Court must have regard to the following:-
(a)the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;
(b)whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;
(c)the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d)whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e)whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f)whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and
(g)such other matters as the court considers relevant.
Costs are not awarded as punishment of the unsuccessful party, but rather are compensatory in the sense that they are awarded to ameliorate the expense of the successful party as a result of having been required to participate in the legal proceedings.
The discretion in s 117 of the Act is broad and the relevant factors in s 117(2A) are not to be read in a restrictive way; any one of those factors may found an order for costs but all factors must be taken into account and balanced (I and I (1995) FLC 92-625).
The method of calculation of costs is referred to in r 19.18(1) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”). It provides:-
(1)The court may order that a party is entitled to costs:
(a)of a specific amount;
(b)as assessed on a particular basis (eg; lawyer and client, party/party or indemnity);
(c)to be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order; or
(d)for part of the case, or part of an amount, assessed in accordance with Schedule 3.
Rule 19.18 sets out the method of calculation of costs, providing that:-
(3)In making an order under subrule (1), the court may consider:
(a)the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b)the reasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;
(c)the rates ordinarily payable to lawyers in comparable cases;
(d)whether a lawyer’s conduct has been improper or unreasonable;
(e)the time properly spent on the case, or in complying with pre-action procedures; and
(f)expenses properly paid or payable.
Having regard to the above matters, I consider that I have a wide discretion in respect of matters relating to any costs orders.
The wife principally relies upon the considerations identified at s 117(2A)(c), (e) and (f) of the Act, that is, she contends that the relevant considerations are:-
·The conduct of the parties in relation to these proceedings;
·Whether the husband was wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings; and
·Whether the wife made an offer in writing to the husband to settle.
Section 117(2A)(a) The financial circumstances of the parties
The wife is a homemaker and is not currently employed.
The husband is a professional and operates his own business.
Pursuant to the Final Orders made in January 2020 the husband was to retain the following:-
(h)The K Property, subject to the K Mortgage (or the Balance if paragraphs 10 to 12 apply);
(i)The Husband’s Entities (being the Husband’s Companies and the Husband’s Trusts);
(j)The bank accounts held in his sole name;
(k)The bank accounts held in the joint names of the parties (including the CBA Accounts #...00, #...99 and #...80);
(l)The Motor Vehicle 3 (Registration No.: …);
(m)His superannuation entitlements held with Super Fund 1; and
(n)His watches, personal items and effects, furniture and chattels inclusive of the contents of the K Property and his current residence.
At paragraph 21 of her costs submissions, the wife submits that:-
At the time the Final Orders were made, the Husband retained assets totalling between $3,648,471 and $6,010,000 (noting that there was a significant dispute as to the value of the parties' interests in F Pty Ltd and J Pty Ltd).
Further, in the costs judgment of Hartnett J dated 30 September 2020, her Honour at paragraph 23 found the following in relation to parties’ financial circumstances:-
…There is no issue before the Court as to the husband’s capacity to pay. The husband conceded the majority of the wife’s claim.
The wife submits that there has been no significant change to the parties’ financial circumstances since Hartnett J made the above findings.
As the husband has not filed any submissions in response to the wife’s costs application, his current financial position is not known.
In circumstances where there is little evidence before me as to the husband’s current financial circumstances and the submissions of the wife are unchallenged, I am satisfied that the financial circumstances of the husband are not an impediment to an order for costs.
In determining the question of costs, I have taken into account the parties’ financial circumstances generally.
Section 117(2A)(b) Whether either party is in receipt of Legal Aid
Neither the wife nor the husband is in receipt of Legal Aid.
Section 117(2A)(c) The conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings
The wife submits at paragraph 26 of her submissions that the husband made numerous baseless and unsubstantiated allegations at the hearing before me on 12 October 2020, which included the following:-
(a)that the Wife refused to sign documents to remove her access to the company bank accounts;
(b)that the Wife demanded that the Husband pay to her $1,000 as "ransom";
(c)that the Wife had undertaken "dodgy and secretly done actions" to keep $60,000 from PAYG instalments;
(d)that the Wife acted in a way that publicly disparaged the husband’s companies and that he is entitled to damages as a result of the harm suffered by his companies;
(e)that the Wife failed to provide her driver's licence details to the husband in a timely manner.
(Citations omitted)
The wife submits that at the hearing before Hartnett J on 1 September 2020,[1] her Honour informed the husband that if he elected to proceed with his Response on 12 October 2020 and was unsuccessful, the wife may make a further application for costs in relation to the second hearing and the costs would be considerably higher. Hence, the husband was on notice as to the potential for a costs application being made against him in the event that he proceeded with his Response.
[1] Transcript of the hearing dated 1 September 2020, pp 31-32.
In addition, at paragraph 29 of her submissions the wife submits that “the way the Husband conducted his case was at best imprudent, and at worst a deliberate attempt for the Wife to incur additional costs in defending his allegations.”
There is much force in the submission of the wife that the husband’s pursuit of his application before me was imprudent. As observed by me in the Judgment, I found parts of the husband’s application to be ill-conceived and the pursuit of other issues to be petty. For example, as to the husband’s application seeking a $1000 payment from the wife on the basis that the wife had obtained a “ransom” from him, I found at paragraph 37 of the Judgment that that part of his application was “ill-conceived and that the relief he sought was beyond the power of this Court”.
Further, as to his application that the wife reimburse him the sum of $395 in respect of fees levied by the parties’ mortgagee in relation to the finance package it provided, I found the husband’s pursuit of that issue to be “petty and short-sighted”.[2] I also found that the husband’s application seeking damages was beyond the powers of this Court. As a consequence of those findings the husband’s applications with respect to those matters was dismissed.
[2] Paragraph 47 of the Judgment
However, whilst I am satisfied that the husband’s pursuit of his application was ill-considered, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the husband’s conduct in pursuing those matters was a deliberate attempt by him to have the wife incur additional costs. There is no evidence before the Court to support that contention.
Section 117(2A)(d) Whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the Court
The wife submits that the hearing before me was a direct result of her Application in a Case which she claims was necessitated by the husband’s failure to comply with the Final Orders. The wife further submits that the nexus between the husband’s failure to comply with the Final Orders and the hearing before me is not broken by the fact that there has been a costs order granted by Hartnett J in relation to the wife’s Application in a Case.
It is true that the husband’s Response was filed by him following the application of the wife for enforcement of the Final Orders and agreements entered into by the parties. However, I am not persuaded that the proceedings before me were necessitated by the failure of the husband to comply with Court orders. The orders sought by the husband in his Response raised separate and discrete issues to those agitated by the wife.
Section 117(2A)(e) Whether a party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful
The wife contends that the husband was wholly unsuccessful at the hearing on 12 October 2020.
Pursuant to the husband’s amended Response to an Application in a Case filed 9 September 2020, the husband sought the following orders:-
·Wife to remove herself from the companies accounts;
·Wife to refund $1,000 demanded as ransom;
·Wife to refund $60,000 taken from PAYG installments (sic);
·Wife to refund $395 falsely claimed as bank interest while in fact wealth package;
·Wife to bear cost of application;
·Wife to pay husband $58,000 in companies damage and $2,400 in property damages;
·Wife to be removed as a Director in J Pty Ltd.
(As per the original)
None of the orders as sought above by the husband were granted.
During the hearing the wife offered to sign documents necessary to facilitate her removal as a signatory to the company accounts; the Final Orders did not make provision for that matter. The wife deposed in her affidavit filed 8 October 2020 that she would sign documents necessary to close the accounts. It was only during the hearing before me that the husband accepted the wife’s proposal. Further, during the course of the hearing before me the wife also offered to repay to the husband $541.15, an amount which he had overpaid her when he transferred money to her to meet other expenses. Again the Final Orders did not make provision in relation to those matters. The husband also accepted that proposal during the hearing. Accordingly, orders were made by consent in relation to those matters.
Otherwise, the husband’s Response was dismissed in its entirety.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the husband was wholly unsuccessful in relation to his Response to an Application in a Case before me on 12 October 2020.
Section 117(2A)(f) Whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings and the terms of that offer
The wife submits that in response to the husband’s application, she had offered to close the company bank accounts and reimburse him $541.15 prior to the hearing. The wife confirmed her position with respect to those matters in her affidavit filed 8 October 2020.
The wife submits that those proposals constitute offers to settle the matter. The husband did not respond to those proposals, electing to proceed with his Response to an Application in a Case at the hearing on 12 October 2020.
Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that the offers made by the wife to resolve the issues and avoid the need for a hearing are a relevant consideration with respect to the issue of costs.
Section 117(2A)(g) Any other matters the court considers relevant
There are no other relevant considerations.
ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR COSTS?
I am satisfied that an order for costs against the husband is warranted in the circumstances of this matter, having regard to the considerations addressed above.
I am satisfied that the husband’s conduct throughout the proceedings coupled with the fact that his application was wholly unsuccessful and he refused to resolve the matter in the face of the wife’s reasonable proposals (which were ultimately accepted by him during the hearing), are matters that justify an order for costs.
Should costs be paid on an indemnity, solicitor-client or party/party basis?
Rule 19.18(1) of the Rules provides that the Court may make an order for costs:-
(a)Of a specific amount;
(b)As assessed on a particular basis (eg lawyer and client, party/party or indemnity);
(c)To be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order; or
(d)For part of the case, or part of an amount, assessed in accordance with schedule 3.
The wife seeks an order that the costs payable by the husband be assessed on an indemnity basis. She seeks the sum of $12,705.80. In the alternative she seeks costs fixed in the sum of $8,000. In the further alternative, she seeks that the husband pay her costs as the Court deems just and equitable.
The Rules provide that the Court may make an order for costs on a number of different bases. The applicant seeks that the order for costs be determined on an indemnity basis. Rule 19.08(3) provides:-
A party applying for an order for costs on an indemnity basis must inform the court if the party is bound by a costs agreement in relation to those costs and, if so, the terms of the costs agreement.
In support of her application for indemnity costs, the wife relies upon a costs agreement between Lander and Rogers and the wife dated 21 August 2018.[3] Having regard to that document, I am satisfied that the wife has met the requirements of r 19.08(3).
[3] The Wife’s Submissions filed 8 December 2020, Annexure A.
The law with respect to indemnity costs is well settled; the Full Court observed in Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340 that the Court should not depart lightly from the ordinary rules with respect to costs. In the decision of Prantage & Prantage [2013] FamCAFC 105, the Full Court confirmed that indemnity costs should only be awarded if the case has some special or unusual feature.
In Colgate-Palmolive v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, Sheppard J identified circumstances that might constitute special or unusual features so as to justify an award of indemnity costs. Usefully, Holden CJ in Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784 at 84,660 drew from the decision of Sheppard J the following examples:-
(a)Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts.
(b)Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud.
(c)Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties.
(d)The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions.
(e)An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise.
(Citations omitted)
The category of circumstances which enliven the discretion to award indemnity costs is not closed; the circumstances do not need to come precisely within the examples provided by Sheppard J.
It is submitted on behalf of the wife that each of the examples identified by Holden CJ at sub-paragraphs (a) and (e) are relevant to the determination of the wife’s application for indemnity costs.
As to sub-paragraph (a), it is submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband continued to seek a number of orders which the Court had no power to grant and where a party properly advised should have known there was no prospect of success.
In Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 Woodward J considered such circumstances and at page 401 stated:-
…I believe that it is appropriate to consider awarding “solicitor and client” or “indemnity” costs, whenever it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive, or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law. Such cases are, fortunately, rare. But when they occur, the court will need to consider how it should exercise its unfettered discretion.
The husband sought an order providing for the “Wife to pay husband $58,000 in companies damages and $2,400 in property damages”. In respect of these matters the Judgment states that:-
57.Even were the husband’s contentions accepted, he does not identify the source of power that would enable this Court to order damages as sought by him. In my view, having regard to the Final Orders, this Court has no power to provide the relief as sought by the husband. Accordingly, his application for damages must fail.
58.The husband also complains that he has incurred costs as a result of damage caused to the gate at his property by the process server engaged by the wife’s lawyers to serve the wife’s court documents. The husband seeks that the wife reimburse him in relation to costs of repair of the gate. If as the husband alleges, there has been damage caused to his property by the process server, his claim with respect to those matters does not lie with the wife. Accordingly, I reject the husband’s claim.
In light of those findings the wife submits that properly advised, the husband should have known that he had no chance of success with respect to the orders sought.
In addition, the husband sought orders providing for the “Wife to remove herself from the companies accounts” and that the “Wife to be removed as a Director in J Pty Ltd”. Both of these orders sought are within the purview of the Final Orders and thus could not be made by me. These matters were addressed in the Judgment as follows:-
29.Pursuant to the Final Orders, there is no specific order relating to the control of Company Accounts. Paragraph 6 of the Final Orders provides that the wife is to resign as a director and/or secretary from the husband’s entities and transfer to him her shareholdings in those entities contemporaneously with the husband discharging the mortgage over the former matrimonial home; that has not yet occurred. Accordingly, the wife continues as a director and shareholder of the husband’s entities.
30.In order to resolve the impasse as to the operation of the Company’s accounts, counsel for the wife confirmed that the wife was willing to sign documents necessary to close the account.
31.After discussion, the husband conceded that the wife’s proposal that she sign documentation removing herself as a signatory to those accounts was a sensible resolution of the issue. Accordingly I will make orders as proposed by the wife’s counsel that the wife sign documents consenting to her removal as a signatory to the accounts within 7 days of production of them by the husband.
…
60.As I have set out above, paragraph 6 of the Final Orders dictates when the wife is to resign her offices in the husband’s companies. As a result, this part of the husband’s application must fail.
Again, the wife submits that properly advised, the husband would have been aware of his obligations with respect to the Final Orders and that orders sought in those terms by him would have no prospect of success.
As to subparagraph (e), the wife relies upon her proposals made which are referred to earlier in this judgment. As indicated above, the wife submits that in response to the husband’s application, she had offered to close the company bank accounts and to reimburse him $541.15 prior to the hearing. The wife submits that the husband refused to entertain that offer and that:-
….the Husband’s concessions during the hearing to proposals already available to the Husband reflect a failure to accept offers to compromise that can be only described as imprudent.[4]
[4] Costs Submissions of the Wife filed 8 December 2020, para 43.
I am not persuaded that the matters referred to above fall within the exceptional kind of circumstances as contemplated by the Full Court in Kohan. As was noted by Murphy J in Prantage at [152]:-
Section 117(1) is important in that respect. Indemnity costs are confined to “an exceedingly rare situation” (Callinan J quoted by Thackray and Ryan JJ at [42]) in jurisdictions where “the usual rule” is that a successful party receives an order for costs (i.e. “costs follow the event”). They might, then, be seen to be more so in this jurisdiction where the “usual rule” is that “each party … shall bear his or her own costs” (s 117(1)). The comments by this Court in Kohan that indemnity costs are “a very great departure” from the “normal standard” should be seen in that context. That, it should be observed, is not a fetter on this Court’s discretion to award costs or indemnity costs if justice so requires it (see Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, at 134 (particularly subpar [3]), per Kirby J). Rather it recognises that an order for indemnity costs, has a particular context in this jurisdiction.
There is no doubt that many aspects of the husband’s application were ill-conceived and imprudent. The husband did himself no service by electing to represent himself in the proceedings and it is likely that had he had the advantage of legal advice, the hearing before me may have been avoided. There is no evidence before me that indicates the husband’s conduct was motivated by some ulterior purpose, such as would give rise to an order for indemnity costs.
However, were the husband to bring further applications of this nature, in light of the findings made by me in the Judgment and in relation to this application, it may well be that another court may take a different view with respect to those matters.
However having regard to the circumstances of this matter, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to make an award for party-party costs. The wife seeks that the amount of costs be fixed in the sum of $8,000. That sum takes into account the costs of counsel to appear at the hearing, and the necessary costs associated with the preparation of a reply, an affidavit in reply and the briefing of counsel to appear. I am satisfied, having regard to the work undertaken and the scale of costs set out at Schedule 3 of the Family Law Rules that an order in those terms is appropriate.
THE ORDERS
The orders I shall make are as follows:-
That within 30 days the husband pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings, fixed in the sum of $8,000.00.
That all extant applications be otherwise dismissed.
I certify that the preceding 76 (seventy-six) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Johns. Associate:
Dated: 26 May 2021
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