Hobeich, A.J. v The Queen

[1990] FCA 276

276 I / +

JUDGMENT NO. ........ ..... ....,.,

CATCHWORDS

APPEAL - Application for extension of time in which to flle

and serve notlce of appeal against conviction and sentence for offences against the Poisons and Narcotic Druqs Ordinance 1978 (A.C.T.) - Whether special reasons shown - Conslderatlon of substance and merits of proposed grounds of appeal.

Federal Court Rules, Order 52, sub-rule 15(2)

ANDREW JOSPEH HOBEICH v. THE OUEEN

No. ACT G 4 of 1990

Neaves J.
22 June 1990

Canberra

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	) )
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY	)
) No. ACT G 4 of 1990
DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN: ANDREW JOSEPH HOBEICH

Applicant

AND:  THE OUEEN

Respondent

MINUTE OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER	: Neaves J.
DATE OF ORDER	: 22 June 1990
WHERE MADE	: Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the application for an extension of time In which to file and serve a notice of appeal from the conviction and sentence of the applicant in the Supreme Court	of the Australian Capital Territory on 24 November 1989 on	charges under s.4 of the Polsons and Narcotics Druqs Ordinance
1978 ( A . C . T . ) be dismissed.
Note:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36
of the Federal Court Rules.
LN THE FEIIERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA  )

)

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY	)
) No. ACT G 4 of 1990
DISTRICT REGISTRY	)
GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN:  ANDREW JOSEPH HOBEICH

Applicant

AND:  THE OUEEN

Respondent

CORAM: Neaves J.

m: 22 June 1990

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This 15 an application by Andrew Joseph Hobeich ("the applicant") pursuant to Order 52, sub-rule 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notlce of appeal agalnst hls conviction and sentence in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory on four charges against s.4 of what was, at the date of the commission

of the offences, the Polsons and Narcotic Druqs Ordinance 1978

(A.C.T.). One of the charges alleged that, on 26 January 1988, the applicant had a controlled substance, namely heroin, in hls

possession for the purposes of supplying that substance to

another person or to other persons. Each of the other three charges alleged that, on a date between l July 1987 and 26 January 1988, the applicant supplied a controlled substance, namely heroin, to another person, namely Miguel Anguel Rodriguez.

The applicant was arraigned on the four charges on 23 October 1989. He entered pleas of not gullty. On 24 October 1989 a jury returned a verdlct of guilty on each charge. On 24 November 1989 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for elght years dating from 24 October 1989 in relatlon to the flrst of the charges referred to above, a perlod of five years from 24 October 1989 being fixed as the perlod within which the applicant was not to be ellgible for parole. The Court deemed it inexpedient to inflict any penalty in relation to the other

charges.

The time prescribed by Order 52, sub-rule 15(1) as the
time within which a notice of appeal from the conviction and
sentence might be filed and served expired on 15 December 1989.

The present application was filed in this Court on 17 January 1990. In support of the application there was filed an affidavit of Michael James O'Keefe, Solicitor, sworn 17 January 1990. The hearing of the matter was adjourned on more than one occaslon to allow those appearing for the applicant to

result, four further affidavits of Mr O'Keefe sworn	supplement the material on which the applicant relied. In the
respectively 23 February 1990, 16 March 1990, 4 Aprll 1990 and 11 Aprll 1990 and an affidavit of the applicant sworn 21 April 1990 were filed in support of the application.
It appears from the material before the Court that on or about 11 December 1989 Mr O'Keefe recelved a telephone call from one Michelle Kaleth, said to be a relative of the applicant, informing him that she had been told by the applicant that he wished to appeal against hls conviction. Mr O'Keefe said that he informed the caller that, although he had no instructions direct from the applicant, he would be prepared to lodge a notice of appeal on his behalf on the basis of the caller's instructions. Mr O'Keefe had not acted for the applicant either at his committal or hls trial and informed the caller that it would be necessary for her to obtaln necessary information from the solicitors who acted for the applicant in relation to his trial and forward the information to him. Mr O'Keefe says that on or about 13 December 1989 he was informed
by the caller that the applicant's former solicitors had
refused to provide any information relating to the appeal as their costs remained unpaid.
Mr O'Keefe further says that, from the information he was able to obtain from Michelle Kaleth, he prepared a notice of appeal. He says that on 18 December 1989 he attended at the Registry of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for the purpose of lodging the notice of appeal. Part of the document, the backsheet, is in evidence. It is intltuled "In the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital
Territory at Canberra ... On appeal from the Supreme Court". The parties are shown as Andrew Joseph Hobeich as appellant and Police as respondent. Mr O'Keefe says that, although the document was received at the Registry counter and stamped by a
court offlcer as having been lodged on 18 December 1989, he was shortly thereafter informed by the court officer that the time wlthln which an appeal could be lodged had expired and that an application for an extension of time could not be made until January 1990.
Mr O'Keefe also says that his office was closed from 20 December 1989 to 8 January 1990 and that upon hls return to the office he recelved instructions from one Joan Baptie, described as a solicltor employed by Paul K. Bell & Co. of Penrith, N.S.W., and as solicltor for the applicant, to make application to this Court for an extension of the time withln which to file and serve a notlce of appeal.
It further appears that on 15 February 1990 Mr O'Keefe telephoned MS Baptie who Informed hlm that Paul K. Bell & Co. had no instructions in the matter pending the outcome being known of an application for legal aid made by the appllcant to the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales.
On 16 February 1990, Mr O'Keefe telephoned the Legal Aid Commission and was informed that the application for legal aid was still under consideration. On 20 February 1990 he
again telephoned the Legal Aid Commlsslon and was informed that "Mr Hobeich's application had not been finally determined, but
that his appllcation for ald would be refused".
On 22 February 1990, Mr O'Keefe wrote to the appllcant suggesting to him that he "make an urgent appllcation to the Legal Aid Offlce of the Australian Capital Territory In Canberra to see whether that Office will grant aid in respect of a possible appeal to the Federal Court". An application form was enclosed with the letter
In his affidavit sworn 16 March 1990, Mr O'Keefe deposed that he was instructed by the applicant to continue with the applicatlon for an extension of time in whlch to file and serve a notlce of appeal agalnst hls conviction and sentence. He also deposed as follows:

"The applicant has instructed me that leave should be given because the circumstances of his failure to lodge within 21 days after conviction were such as to warrant the exercise of the discretion of the Court. The applicant has instructed me that his contract of retainer with his former sollcitors had been terminated following conviction and sentence, and that he was unable t o obtaln private legal representation due to his f lnancial circumstances. I am further lnstructed that partly because of the appellant's Csic3 confinement in Goulburn Training Centre and the

termination of his retainer with his former

solicitors, his relatives in Sydney were unable to obtain sufficient details from the appellant's Csicl former sollcitors relating to the case to enable an appeal to be lodged. This matter was compounded by an error on my own part In relying on the lncomplete directions of the relatives wlthout instructions from the applicant in Goulburn, notwithstanding that the

applicant had not expressed any wlsh to give me instructions in thls matter. I am further	Instructed that the applicant, acting on
incorrect advlce given to him by offlcers of Goulburn Tralning Centre, had misdirected his applicatlon for legal ald in respect of an appeal during the perlod immediately following his conviction, to the NSW Legal Ald Commission, and that that Commission was unaware that an appeal was requlred to be lodged in the Federal Court in Canberra, because of lncomplete and incorrect lnforrnatlon included in the applicant's application for a grant of legal
aid. "

A draft notice of appeal was annexed to the affldavlt.

The applicant, in hls affidavit sworn 21 April 1990, has deposed that, following his conviction and sentence on 24 November 1989, he termmated his relationship with his then legal advlsers and that he was unable to obtain other legal representatlon due to his poor financial circumstances. Paragraphs 6 - 10 of his affidavit are as follows:

"6. Following my sentence, I was taken immediately to Goulburn Training Centre. After I arrlved in Goulburn Training Centre, I made enquiries about lodging an appeal agalnst my conviction and sentence. I was given incorrect appeal forms by a female wing officer of Goulburn Training Centre, and in about late December or early January my application for legal ald in respect of an appeal was sent to the NSW Legal Aid Commission. On or about 14 February 1990, I recelved a letter from the NSW Legal Aid Commission saying that my application was under consideration. On or about 2 March 1990, I recelved a letter from the NSW Legal Aid Commission saying that my application had been rejected because my appeal was not in a New South Wales Court. Annexed hereto and marked with the letters "A" and "B" are copies of the letters recelved from

the Legal Ald Commission of NSW.

7.  I am informed and verily believe that my former solicitor in Sydney has

persistently refused to give members of
my famlly any information relating to my trlal and conviction until some

outstanding fees were paid.

8.  I am Informed and verily believe that my family instructed Joan Baptie, Solicitor, of Penrith in New South Wales, to represent me, but she could not continue to act for me.

9.  I have found communication extremely difficult since being imprisoned from 24 November 1989. It has always been my intention to appeal from the conviction and sentence of that date as I say that

I am not guilty of the four offences

with whlch I was charged and found
guilty.

10.  I was granted Legal Aid from the Legal

Aid Office (ACT) and in late February 1990, I asked Michael O'Keefe of Gilpin

& Associates in Canberra to represent

me. "

The letter dated 14 February 1990 addressed to the

applicant by the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and
referred to in par.6 of the affidavit reads as follows:

"I acknowledge receipt of your application for
legal aid.

Before legal aid is granted it is necessary for me to be satisfied that your application has legal merit. When my investigations have been completed I will inform you whether or not legal aid has been granted for the appeal.

If, as a result of this investigation, legal aid

for an appeal is granted in compliance wlth the Legal Aid Commission's policy this offlce would have the carriage of the matter and brief counsel. If you are dissatisfied with this determination an appeal can be made to the Legal Aid Review Committee. If legal aid is refused an appeal also may be lodged with this Commission. From such a decision an appeal lies to the Legal Aid Review Committee.

A Publlc Defender will be briefed to furnish an	opinion in your matter. I have this date
ordered a copy of the transcript of proceedings of your conviction and sentence as perusal of the transcript is of vital importance before the merits of an appeal can be fully considered. There is a long delay of many months before the transcript is prepared and forwarded to my office.
In the meantime, I will be the solicitor who has
the carrlage of your matter. I hope to have a conference to dlscuss your matter in the near future. If you are re-located please advise my office on [phone].
If you have enquiries regarding your appeal please do not hesitate to contact me either in writing or via a welfare offlcer at the gaol.
I specifically draw to your attention the
requirements of s.38A of the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979. In accordance with such provlslon you must immediately inform the Commission in writinq if there is any change in your means, clrcumstances or any other matter relating to the grant of legal aid. Such changes being of the nature that you ought reasonably expect the Commission may terminate or alter the nature and extent of your current grant of aid."

The letter dated 2 March 1990 to the appl~cant from the

Commission reads:

"I refer to your application for legal aid and

advlse that thls matter is outside the

jurisdiction of this office.

You should make application for legal aid to the
ACT Legal Ald Office."

Order 52, sub-rule 15(1) of the Federal Court Rules prescribes an appeal period of 21 days and for the extension of that period upon application made by motion upon notice filed within that period. Order 52, sub-rule 15(2) provides:

sub-rule, the Court or a Judge for special	"Notwithstanding anything in the preceding
reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal."
In Jess v.	(1986) 12 F.C.R. 187, a Full Court of

this Court reaffirmed (at p.188) "that leave to appeal out of tlme is to be determined by the court's view of the demands of lustice in accordance with a broad judicial discretion, and not simply upon the application of any verbal formula". Later, at p.195 of the report, the Court said:

"What is needed to justify an extension of time 1s indicated in r 15(2) by the words 'for speclal reasons'. It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression 'special reasons' is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justlfy departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression 'for special reasons' implies something narrower than this.

It should not be overlooked that r 15(2) enables leave to be given 'at any time'; the 'special reasons' relevant to such a power cannot but describe an elastic test, suitable for application across a range of situations, from an oversight of a day to a neglect persisted in during a prolonged period. It would require something very persuasive indeed to justify a grant of leave after, for example, a year; equally, it may be said, something much less significant might justify leave where a party is a few days late. 'Special reasons' must be understood in a sense capable of accommodating

both types of situation. It is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but	one requiring a case to be made upon grounds
sufficient to justify a departure, in the
particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served."

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the material before the Court established sufficient grounds to justify an appropriate extension of time being granted. He accepted, however, that it was permissible for the Court, in considering whether the wide discretion conferred by sub-rule 15(2) should be exercised in favour of the applicant, to have regard to the

substance or merits of the appeal which would be Instituted if an extension of time were granted. Support for the view that the merits of an appeal may be taken into account upon an application such as this is to be found in v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parter Mehta C19753 1 W.L.R.

1087 at p.1091 and Palata Investments Ltd v. Burt & Sinfield
C19853 1 W.L.R. 942 at p.947. Counsel tendered, without
objection, the transcript of the evidence adduced at the trial
and of the trial ludge's summing up to the jury. He
foreshadowed the grounds of appeal on whlch the applicant would
rely if leave to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time

were granted and submitted that the grounds of appeal had

merit.

The application was opposed by counsel for the respondent. It was disputed that the material before the Court established any "special reason" why the time for appeal should be extended. He also submitted that the grounds of appeal

foreshadowed had little or no prospects of success.

It must be acknowledged at once that the material before the Court relating to the failure of the applicant to flle and serve a notice of appeal within the prescribed time is lacking in detail. For example, the applicant has said in his affidavit that following his conviction he terminated his legal relationship wlth his then legal advisers. The circumstances in which that occurred are not stated. Nor does it appear whether those legal advisers, before their relationship with the applicant was terminated, tendered any advice to the applicant concerning the prospects of success of an appeal or whether any such advlce was sought. Again, the applicant has said that he was given incorrect appeal forms by an officer of the Goulburn Training Centre but it does not appear what information or forms he was given. Nor does the material

before the Court show what information was provlded by or on behalf of the applicant to the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales or when it was supplied. The circumstances which led to Michelle Kaleth telephoning Mr O'Keefe on or about 11 December 1989 are not deposed to and there is no information as to her relationship to the applicant or whether what she dld was done on hls authority.

Notwithstanding the lack of detail, however, one is left with a feeling of some disquiet concerning the nature of the advice and assistance which was available to the applicant at the Goulburn Training Centre. I can put the matter no higher, if only because the authorities at the Goulburn Training Centre have had no opportunity to comment. However,

this is not an isolated instance in which it has been suggested

that the wrong forms have been supplied to a person whose

convlctlon has been recorded in, or his sentence has been imposed by, a court in the Australian Capital Territory. I

would strongly commend to the relevant authorities both in the Australian Government and in the Government of the Australian Capital Territory the need to take steps to ensure, as far as possible, that officers at the Goulburn Training Centre are in a position to give tlmely, adequate and accurate advice to such persons of the procedures to be followed in the case of appeals from the Supreme Court and the Magistrates Court of the Territory. The information available should include a reference to the fact that no fees are payable in thls Court upon the filing of a notice of appeal in a criminal matter (see reg.2(2)(f) of the Federal Court of Australia Regulations). The provisions of Order 52, rule 21 of the Federal Court Rules might also be brought to notice, that rule providing in effect, that a notice of appeal drafted in the absence of all necessary information may, within the time permitted, be amended by

fil~ng a supplementary notice.

It must also be said that the letters dated 14 February and 2 March 1990 addressed to the applicant by the Legal Ald Commission of New South Wales, taken at their face value, engender concern. Again, I can put the matter no higher as I am not aware of what materlal the officers of the Commission had before them and they have not had an opportunity to comment. But, to inform the applicant that the author of the letter had ordered a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the applicant's trial and that "Ctlhere is a long delay of many months before the transcript is prepared and

forwarded to my office" could not have reflected the true position. The officer can hardly have ordered the transcript wlthout being aware that the trial had been before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory wlth the consequence, as the subsequent letter indicated, that the matter was not one for consideration by him. What is more, the transcript of the evldence adduced at the trial, as appears from internal evidence in the transcript itself, was available before the conclusion of the trial and there is nothing to suggest that the transcript of the summlng up was not promptly available.

One cannot doubt the necessity for the Commission to satisfy itself that an appeal has merit before committing public funds to its prosecution but it seems to be implicit in the letter dated 14 Feburary 1990 that the applicant would not be likely to be informed whether funds would be available to

permit even a protective notice of appeal to be prepared and filed until some considerable tlme after the tlme within which to lodge a notice of appeal had expired. Procedures which necessitate that situation arlsing would appear to require review, regard being had in thls connection to the remarks of Fitzgerald J., albeit in another context, in Lucic v. Nolan and Others (1982) 45 A.L.R. 411 at pp.417-8. Further, the circumstance that the letter dated 2 March 1990 followed so soon after the letter dated 14 February 1990 clearly suggests that the matter was not given proper consideration prior to the earlier letter being written.

The comment may also be made that good administration should dictate that, where an application for legal aid is made by a prisoner and it becomes apparent to the Commission that the application has been directed to it in error, the application be forwarded directly to the proper authority with a request that it be glven consideration rather than, as was done here, the applicant being told that the Commission cannot deal with the matter and that he should initiate a fresh application to the proper authority.

I turn now to the substance or merits of the proposed The case made by the Crown at the trial was that the applicant arrived in Canberra from Sydney in November 1987 and that shortly thereafter, through a mutual friend, he met the principal Crown witness, Miguel Anguel (also known as Michael) Rodriguez. The evidence given by Rodriguez, who was an experienced heroin user, was that the association between himself and the applicant continued for some time and that the applicant supplled hlm with heroin on the three occasions the subject of the charges, the last of the transactions taking place on 26 January 1988. He also gave evidence that on that date he took a quantity of heroin from premises occupied by the applicant. He said that the applicant had not only supplled him with heroin but had, on 26 January 1988, endeavoured to solicit him to act as a dlstributor for the applicant of heroin in the Australian Capital Territory. He further said that he

appeal.

had declined to act as a distributor and that his refusal to do

so, combined with a refusal of a demand by the applicant for

the immediate payment of outstanding moneys representing the purchase price of a quantity of heroin, led to a violent fight in which the applicant suffered severe knife and other wounds. In relation to the infliction of those wounds Rodriguez had been charged and was awaitlng trial.

The applicant did not qlve evidence on oath but made an unsworn statement in which he denied that be had supplied heroin to Rodriguez, the truth being, he said, that Rodriquez had, indeed, been the supplier of the drug to him. The essential issue for the jury was, therefore, whether they believed the evidence of Rodriguez.

The principal ground of appeal foreshadowed by counsel for the applicant concerned the failure of the Crown to call as a witness Jacqueline Mary Rodriguez, the wife of Mlquel Anguel Rodriquez. Mrs Rodrlquez had been called as a witness by the Crown in the committal proceedings against the applicant. In the course of cross-examination, Mrs Rodriguez was asked whether she had made a statement to a police officer to the effect that she had been informed by Rodriquez that he was supplying heroin to another person whom she presumed to be the applicant. She agreed that she had said that to the police offlcer but when asked whether the statement was correct, she said that she had phrased the statement badly, that Rodriquez "was not deallnq as such", that he had said to her that he was "just scoring an occasional deal for someone", that she thought

the statement she made to the police officer was true or not as that person was the applicant but that she did not know whether

she had no information about the situation at all. She added that she had told the police officer not that Rodriquez was selllnq heroln himself but that he was putting this person in contact wlth someone else that could sell it to him. In a further answer she said that the words she used to the pol~ce

officer were not true and that she realised this a couple of
hours after signing the statement.

It is clear from a perusal of the transcript of proceedings at the trlal that the question whether Mrs Rodriguez was to be called as a witness by the Crown was discussed before the trial judge in the absence of the jury. Counsel for the Crown informed his Honour that he did not intend to call Mrs Rodriguez as a wltness but that she would be made available to the defence if counsel for the applicant wished to call her as a witness.

Counsel who then appeared for the applicant had, inadvertently as his Honour accepted, omitted to ask Rodriguez In cross-examination questions directed to making admissible under 5.61 of the Evidence Act 1971 (A.C.T.) evidence of the

inconsistent statement alleged to have been made by him to his

wife. The trial judge permitted Rodriguez to be recalled so that questions directed to that matter might be asked of him and thls was done. Rodriguez denied making any statement to his wife that he had been supplying heroin to the applicant though it is a matter for debate whether the requirements of 5.61 of the Evidence Act were satisfied.

Counsel for the applicant then submitted to his Honour that Mrs Rodriguez should be called as a witness by the Crown so that he might cross-examine her. His Honour declined to give any direction to the Crown and ruled that it was sufficient that the Crown had brought the witness to the court and made her available to the defence.

,

Having regard to what was said by the High Court in Richardson v. The Oueen (1974) 131 C.L.R. 116 and The Oueen v. Apostilides (1984) 154 C.L.R. 563 and to the evidence given by Mrs Rodriguez in the committal proceedings, I am satisfied that the proposed qround of appeal has little, if any, chance of success.

A further proposed qround of appeal is that the trial judge erred in asking certain questions of Rodriquez the answers to which were said to be highly prejudicial to the applicant. It was also said that his Honour had reminded the jury of that evidence in the course of his summing up and had failed to warn the jury to disregard it as being prejudicial. The questions relied upon were asked at the conclusion of Rodriguez's cross-examination. The questions and the answers given by Rodriguez were as follows:

"Q. Just before you go, you say you first met the

accused at this friend's place at Red Hill?

A. That is correct.

Q	-	And how many times would you say you saw him after that?
A.	Probably about twenty, thirty tlmes.
Q .	Between late November and ---?
A.	26 January.
Q.	What did you say, 20 or 30 times?
A.	26, till January, from late November to ---
Q	-	How many times dld you see him?
A.	About 20.
Q	-	About 20 times. Did he ever tell you where he came from?

A. Yes.

Q.	What dld he tell you about that?
A.	He came from Sydney. Did you ever see him in Sydney? I did go with him one day, yes.
When was that? One night after work.
Where did you go? To the Cross.
And what did you do there? He picked up a package and we came back.

That night, back to Canberra?

Yes. "

The particular answers that were said to be highly prejudicial to the applicant were the answers that, on the occasion when Rodriguez and the applicant went to Sydney, the applicant picked up a package at Kings Cross. It was submitted that those answers were highly prejudicial because the reference to picking up a package could give rise to an inference by the jury that the package contained heroin and to a further Inference that the applicant proceeded to hand over some or part of the contents to Rodriguez. In the course of the summing up, the trial judge referred shortly to those answers. His Honour was not asked to direct the jury to disregard the evidence.

In my opinion there is no substance in this proposed

ground of appeal.

Other proposed grounds of appeal are that the trial
judge failed to warn the jury as to the danger of convicting
the applicant upon the uncorroborated evidence of an

V

\

accomplice, namely Rodrlguez, and failed to warn the Jury that they were not bound to act upon his Honour's view of the facts.

I am satisfied that, reading the summing up as a
whole, those proposed grounds of appeal also have no substance.

Looking at the matter overall, it may be accepted, notwithstanding the lack of detail in the material before the Court, that, if the proposed appeal had substance or merit, the circumstances in which the prescribed time was permitted to elapse without a notice of appeal being filed and served were sufficiently out of the ordlnary to constitute "special reasons" within the meaning of Order 52, sub-rule 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules and thus to justify the grant of an appropriate extension of time. However, the lack of substance or merlt In the proposed appeal leads me to conclude that the dictates of justice do not require that the discretion vested in the Court should be exercised in favour of the applicant.

The application is, therefore, dismissed.

I certlfy that this and

Reasons for Judgment

are a true copy of the the preceding 18 pages

herem of the Honourable
Mr Justice Neaves.

Dated: 22 June 1990

Counsel for the applicant	: Mr R. Mildren
Solicitors for the applicant	: Gllpin & Associaes
Counsel for the respondent	: Mr M. Edwards

Solicltor for the respondent : Director of Public

Prosecutions

Dates of hearing : 9, 23 February 1990,

16 March 1990,

11, 26 April 1990

Date of judgment : 22 June 1990

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