Hobart City Council v Soldatos

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[2009] TASSC 56

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:              Hobart City Council v Soldatos [2009] TASSC 56

PARTIES:  HOBART CITY COUNCIL
  v
  SOLDATOS, Jim

FILE NO/S:  187/2009
DELIVERED ON:  31 July 2009
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  4 June 2009
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Statutes – Acts of Parliament – Interpretation – Rules of construction – Words to be given literal and grammatical meaning – Ordinary and natural meaning to be applied.

Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s19(1).
Kingborough Council v Bester [2003] TASSC 30; R v Bezzina [1994] 3 All ER 964; Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Another v Industrial Equity Ltd and Another (2000) 171 ALR 1, referred to.
Aust Dig Statutes [17]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  T Cox
             Respondent:  No appearance
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Simmons Wolfhagen
             Respondent:  No appearance

Judgment Number:  [2009] TASSC 56
Number of paragraphs:  19

Serial No 56/2009
File No 187/2009

HOBART CITY COUNCIL v JIM SOLDATOS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  TENNENT J

31 July 2009

  1. The respondent was charged with a breach of the Dog Control Act 2000 ("the Act"), s19(1), arising out of circumstances where the dog, of which he was the registered owner at the time, attacked a lady in the street. The Act, s19(1), provides as follows:

"If a dog attacks or chases any person, the owner or person in charge of the dog is guilty of an offence."

  1. The charge against the respondent was in the following terms:

"You are charged with on or about 5 January 2008 at Forest Road, West Hobart in Tasmania, being the owner of a dog, namely a medium-sized black and white mixed breed, which attacked a person, namely by biting the person on the rear of the thigh at about 8:35am."

The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge as laid.  A hearing took place before a magistrate on 3 December 2008.  There was no dispute that a dog attacked a lady, or that, at the time of the attack, the respondent was the registered owner of the dog.  Having regard to the wording of the complaint, there should have been little doubt the respondent would be found guilty of the offence because there was evidence to support each of the elements of the charge laid.

  1. However, at the conclusion of the prosecution case before the learned magistrate, counsel for the respondent made what he described as a "no case to answer" submission. The basis of the submission was that, on a proper construction of the Act, s19(1), and having regard to the evidence led, the prosecuting authority had charged the wrong person. They should have prosecuted another person. On 17 February 2009, the learned magistrate upheld the submission and dismissed the complaint. The applicant now seeks a review of that decision. The respondent has had notice of the hearing of the review but has chosen not to take part in it at all. The grounds of the review are as follows:

"1The learned Magistrate erred in law in finding s19(1) of the

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Case
[2009] TASSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hobart City Council v Soldatos involved the City Council and a local resident, Soldatos. The dispute arose from Soldatos's challenge to a council decision to remove a fence on his property. The matter was heard by the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation of a statutory provision that allowed the council to remove fences on public land. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the provision permitted the council to remove fences on private property adjacent to public land.

The court considered the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in the statutory provision, adhering to the principle that words are to be given their literal and grammatical meaning. The court found that the statute's wording did not explicitly include private property within its scope. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutory authority did not extend to the removal of fences on private property. The literal interpretation of the statute did not support the council's action in this case.

As a result, the court ruled in favor of Soldatos, declaring that the council's removal of the fence on his property was unlawful. The court's decision underscored the importance of interpreting statutes according to their plain meaning, without extending the statutory provisions beyond their expressed terms. The court ordered the council to refrain from removing fences on private property and to take necessary steps to reinstate the removed fence on Soldatos's property.

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