HMFZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration)

HMFZ and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3861 (11 October 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2018/4159
Re:HMFZ
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal: Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:11 October 2018
Place:Sydney

The decision under review is affirmed.

..........................[sgd]..............................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – revocation of visa cancellation – Ministerial Direction No. 65 applied - primary considerations considered -protection of the Australian community - best interests of minor children - expectations of the Australian community – other considerations - whether Applicant owed non-refoulement obligations - strength, nature and duration of ties - impact on victims – extent of impediments if removed – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) – s 253C
Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Regulation 2014 - s 102
Migration Act 1958 – ss 48A , 499, 501, 501CA, 501E
CASES
Aciek and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 2755
Ahori v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 601
Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650
BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96
BFXK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 866
Bowdler and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 347
Contreras v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47
Dinkha and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3037
Do and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 390
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] 46 FLR 409 at 420.
G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1229
Mendoza and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 686
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo and Another [1997] 144 ALR 567
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray [1994] 33 ALD 13
Pizarro and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3517
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1506
QKJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 820
Rabino and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 999
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No.2) [1979] 2 ALD 634
Re ER Aston and Y Aston and Secretary to the Department of Primary Industry [1985] AATA 306
Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 608
Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594
The Trustees for the Fuzzy Events Unit Trust and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3273
VXKK and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3268
XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 2385
YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Ministerial Direction No. 65: Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 and Revocation of a Mandatory Cancellation of a Visa under s 501CA
Ministerial Direction No. 75: Refusal of Protection Visas Relying on section 36(1C) and section 36(2C)(b)
REASONS FOR DECISION
11 October 2018
HMFZ’s personal details

HMFZ was born in 1987 in The Philippines and arrived in Australia on 8 February 2003 aged 15.[1] He has thus spent half his life in The Philippines and half in Australia.
[1] Section 501 - G Documents at p 47.
He has been in a de facto relationship since November 2011.[2] There have been two daughters born to the couple, one who is now aged five, and one who tragically died as a result of Sudden Death Infant Syndrome (SIDS) in January 2016, being just a few weeks old.[3]
[2] Section 501 - G Documents at p 62.
[3] Idem.
His mother and two of his brothers (who are now Australian citizens), together with an extended family network are all present in Australia[4] and indeed they preceded him in arrival.[5] He also has a step-father in Australia.
[4] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 12 and 52.
[5] Section 501 - G Documents at p 66.
HMFZ was the holder of a Class BC subclass 100 Spouse (Migrant) visa which was cancelled on 11 August 2017, because of his “substantial criminal record”, as mandated by section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).[6]
[6] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 73-77.
HMFZ sought a review of this decision and on 19 July 2018 the Minister’s Delegate decided not to revoke the original decision to cancel, giving his/her reasons.[7] It is this decision which is now under appeal to the Tribunal.
[7] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 3-15.
In order to understand the processes by which these decisions came to be made it is necessary to outline the legislative scheme in question.
The Legislative Scheme – A brief outline
Section 501(3A) of the Act provides that the Minister must cancel a person’s visa in the following circumstances:
(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:
(i) paragraph (6)(a) (substantial criminal record), on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c); or
... and
(b) the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.
This visa cancellation process is mandatory.
Section 501(6)(a) of the Act then provides that a person does not pass the character test if they have a “substantial criminal record”. Relevantly for this application, s 501(7)(c) provides:
(7) For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:
…
(c) the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more;
It can thus be seen clearly in relation to HMFZ that the cancellation of his visa was an automatic process: he was serving a sentence of imprisonment and further, he cannot meet the required “character test” because that sentence of imprisonment (as distinct from any period of time actually served) was for a period of at least twelve months.
Once the original decision has been made the Minister must notify the person and give them an opportunity to respond to it. Section 501CA of the Act outlines the process:
(1) This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.
(2) For the purposes of this section, relevant information is information (other than non-disclosable information) that the Minister considers:
(a) would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for making the original decision; and
(b) is specifically about the person or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the person or other person is a member.
(3) As soon as practicable after making the original decision, the Minister must:
(a) give the person, in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances:
(i) a written notice that sets out the original decision; and
(ii) particulars of the relevant information; and
(b) invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the original decision.
It is up to the individual concerned to place before the Minister whatever information they think relevant for the Minister’s consideration. Upon receipt of such representations, the provisions of sections 501CA(4) and (5) come into effect as follows:
(4)The Minister may revoke the original decision if:
(a) the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and
(b) the Minister is satisfied:
(i) that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or
(ii) that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked.
(5) If the Minister revokes the original decision, the original decision is taken not to have been made.
A decision on such an application is, in most circumstances, made by a delegate of the Minister. In the Applicant’s case, this review decision, as noted above, resulted in a determination that the mandatory revocation should not be set aside. This is the reviewable decision now before the Tribunal.
In coming to their decision, the Delegate noted that since the Applicant had, by definition, failed the character test, (a point not disputed by HMFZ), it was required that the Delegate consider whether there was “another reason” for the revocation to be set aside.
In doing so, the Delegate followed the requirements set out in Direction 65, Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 and Revocation of a Mandatory Cancellation of a Visa under s 501CA (the Direction) (discussed below) in coming to their conclusion.
This is because under s 499(1) of the Act, the Minister may give written directions to a person or body having functions or powers under the Act if such directions concern the performance of those functions or the exercise of those powers. When such a direction has been given in accordance with that section, a person or body having those functions or powers under the Act must comply with such direction (s 499(2A) of the Act).
It will be necessary to return to the operation of Direction 65 in due course.
HMFZ’s Criminal Record
By his own admission, HMFZ’s criminal history “is not short”.[8] In the words of a sentencing Judge he has “an appalling record of offences”[9] and according to a sentencing Magistrate he is “a repeat offender”.[10]
[8] Applicant’s Statement (21 February 2018): Section 501 - G Documents at p 58.
[9] Section 501 - G Documents at p 32.
[10] Section 501 - G Documents at p 37.
His litany of offences date from February 2009 to August 2017[11] and encompass a range of matters:
[11] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 16-22.
·Motor vehicle and licencing: 9 counts
·Possession of stolen goods/goods in custody: 3 counts
·Dishonesty offences (obtain goods by deception): 2 counts
·Armed with intent to commit indictable offence: 1 count
·Assault occasioning actual bodily harm: 2 offences
·Possession of prohibited drug: 1 offence
·Shoplifting: 2 counts
·Common assault (domestic violence): 2 counts
·Breach of Apprehended Violence Order: 2 counts.
In many instances numerous charges have been dealt with together, but it appears that HMFZ has been convicted of no fewer than 53 offences over time.
Prior to his sentence on 27 June 2017, he had received numerous bonds, fines, community service orders, intensive correction orders, suspensions of his driving licence and several short-term sentences of imprisonment.
The Tribunal notes that HMFZ in his submissions has characterised these convictions as being “at the lower end of the scale of criminality.”[12] In this respect he fails to appreciate that (a) they nevertheless present a cumulative picture of his persistent disregard for the law and (b) he has been the consistent beneficiary of the leniency of the courts.
[12] Applicant’s Statement (21 February 2018): Section 501 - G Documents at p 58.
Being at the “lower end of the scale” is also not a fair characterisation of his first offence in January 2009 where he assaulted his then de facto girlfriend and his offence in March 2009 when he again assaulted the same young woman and, on this occasion attacked her new partner with a “metal clublock” causing him significant physical injury and using the same device to smash up parts of his car.[13]
[13] Police reports of these two incidents are at Tender Bundle pp 297-301 and 274-278 respectively.
The latter point, expressions of leniency, was emphasised in the sentencing remarks of the Judge who was considering, and rejecting, an appeal for a reduction in HMFZ’s sentence of 27 June 2017. Her Honour remarked, in relation to previous sentences:
“…. the sentences imposed by the Local Court involved a real leniency…”
“…. but the Local Court did exercise leniency…”
“…. the sentences you received have already got inbuilt leniency sir.”[14]
[14] Section 501 - G Documents at p 32.
The matters before the Local Court, the sentences for which provided the trigger for HMFZ’s visa cancellation (see below), involved the following:

·Goods in custody: for which a custodial sentence of three months was imposed.
·Larceny (≤ = $ 2000): for which a custodial sentence of nine months was imposed.
·Shoplifting: for which a custodial sentence of 12 months was imposed.
·Possession of prohibited drug: for which a custodial sentence of two months was imposed.[15]
[15] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 24-25.
In his appeal against these sentences, HMFZ (or his advisor) misunderstood the consequences of these separate sentences having been imposed. HMFZ put to the presiding Magistrate:
APPELLANT: Yes your Honour, the reason I’m appealing this is I could face deportation if I don’t get this sentence like dropped, at less than that 12 months that are currently imposed so that’s all I’m appealing your Honour.
HER HONOUR: You could face deportation if you don’t get the sentence dropped less than –
APPELLANT: Less than the twelve months that’s currently instated yes.[16]
[16] Section 501 - G Documents at p 30.
Her Honour nevertheless declined to vary the sentences imposed.
However, although these four separate sentences were to be served concurrently, commencing on 29 May 2017,[17] for the purposes of the Act this is not one twelve month sentence, but rather a cumulative sentence of 26 months.
[17] Leaving aside consideration of parole dates. Section 501 - G Documents at p 25.
Section 501(7A) of the Act reads:
(7A) For the purposes of the character test, if a person has been sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently (whether in whole or in part), the whole of each term is to be counted in working out the total of the terms.
Example: A person is sentenced to 2 terms of 3 months imprisonment for 2 offences, to be served concurrently. For the purposes of the character test, the total of those terms is 6 months.
The Tribunal notes several other points in relation to HMFZ’s record. The first is that, leaving aside the domestic violence matters (below), HMFZ’s offences as a young man (aged 21/22) involved acts of physical violence whereas most of his more recent offences have eschewed acts of violence and have been characterised more by crimes of theft and deception. In relation to this, HMFZ in his oral evidence indicated that most of these crimes were related either to stealing items for the benefit of his small daughter or stealing items in order to swap/pawn/sell them in order to raise money to support his drug habit. In evidence he named the person who supplied his drugs and who worked with him in selling the stolen items or otherwise exchanging them for drugs.
Although properly cautioned by the Respondent (as to his right to remain silent), HMFZ admitted that there were more offences of this nature for which he had not been apprehended and which were related to his drug-use and its financing.
The nature of HMFZ’s offending has changed over the years although the Tribunal does not accept the submission of the Respondent that this indicates an increasing “severity” rather than an increasing “frequency” of offending, and further notes that this recidivist behaviour, not unsurprisingly, has attracted an increasing level of sentence.
The Tribunal must also take account of the fact that HMFZ’s driving record is appalling and his continuing disregard of the law in this jurisdiction (together with one incident of risking his child’s safety by failing to have her properly restrained in a safety capsule)[18] bespeaks of a degree of willful disregard and contempt not only for the law but for the safety of others on the road.
[18] Tender Bundle at pp 329-331.
The Tribunal has previously made clear the extent to which it regards repeated traffic offences as being an example of the sort of behaviour which, rightly, inclines the Australian community to have expectations that this will count adversely against any claims made for its tolerance of misbehavior or the extending of any form of benefit.[19]
[19] Bowdler and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 347 at [52], QKJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 820 at [41].
The seriousness of the offences
The Tribunal is concerned that several of HMFZ’s offences involve domestic violence, accompanied by breaches of Apprehended Violence Orders (AVOs).
The National Police Certificate records that on 9 April 2009 (Parramatta Local Court) HMFZ was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 months on the charges of “assault occasioning actual bodily harm (domestic violence) and “Contravene/prohibition restriction in avo (domestic).” This conviction was, on appeal (Parramatta District Court, 12 May 2009), confirmed but the sentence reduced to the same period of time under supervision of the NSW parole authorities.[20] Unfortunately there is no documentation before the Tribunal which elucidates this matter further, nor were there before the Delegate when they were making their reviewable decision.[21]
[20] Section 501 - G Documents at p 21.
[21] Section 501 - G Documents at p 9.
However details of a second offence involving both domestic violence and breaches of an AVO are before the Tribunal in sentencing remarks by the Magistrate in the Blacktown Local Court on 30 January 2014.
The Court reviewed the evidence which informed it that HMFZ had argued with his de facto partner after she pulled blankets off a bed causing his 18 month child to fall off the bed. He had then assaulted her, pulling her hair and punching her to the head with a closed fist three times. When her 17 year old son (HMFZ’s step-son) sought to intervene to protect his mother he was also assaulted by being punched in the stomach.
The Magistrate said:
…. You have … been charged with two counts of assaults (sic), one on your wife (sic), one on her son aged 17 and those in contravention of an apprehended order. When that combination of offences occurs the Court is obliged to pass a sentence of imprisonment or explain why not. In the circumstances I see no reason why a sentence of imprisonment will not be imposed. Domestic violence offences which follow upon an earlier convictions (sic) for domestic violence offences, similar combinations, for which sentence of imprisonment previously has been passed, so you are a repeat offender.[22]
[22] Section 501 - G Documents at p 37.
His Honour imposed a term of imprisonment for 8 months, this sentence being confirmed on appeal in the Parramatta Local Court on 14 March 2014.[23]
[23] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 18-19.
This Tribunal has made it clear that it regards matters of domestic violence as particularly serious.
In Mendoza this Tribunal made its position clear when it stated that:
The Australian community, rightly, professes zero tolerance for violence against women. There is zero tolerance for domestic violence perpetrated against any woman, man or child. Such forms of violence are unacceptable at any time – in any place – in any circumstances – and whether manifest physically, emotionally or psychologically.[24]
[24] Mendoza and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 686 at [48].
The approach taken by this Tribunal in relation to matters of domestic violence follows the clear guidance given by Deputy President Kendall when he stated that:
The Tribunal would add that, in a society that adheres to fundamental sex equality principles, violence that is gendered and directed at women (and which seeks to degrade and dehumanise women on the basis of sex) is both individually and systemically intolerable. Its harms are threefold. First, it results in direct physical and psychological harm for those women against whom the violence is directed. Second, it psychologically harms the children of these women – children who, as in this instance, witness their mothers being abused, degraded and dehumanised - and sends a message to these children (male and female) that behaviour of this sort is to be tolerated. Third, it normalises those socially enforced gender imbalances that allow sex based inequalities and violence to arise in the first place. The impact this has, socially, on systemic equality between the sexes cannot be underestimated.[25]
[25] XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 2385 at [45].

In Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Deputy President Constance made it clear, in relation to citizenship matters, but equally applicable in this instance, that:
The Australian Citizenship Instructions provide that crimes of violence are to be regarded as serious offences. This is particularly so in the case of domestic violence. Such conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the standards of behaviour expected by the Australian community and usually weighs heavily against an individual being of good character.[26]
[26] Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2015] AATA 608 at [37].
He repeated this in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
Domestic violence, in any form and in any circumstances, is fundamentally inconsistent with the standard of behaviour expected by the Australian community.[27]
[27] Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1506 at [32].
In Ahori the Tribunal noted:
Domestic violence is a very serious matter. In no way can violence in a domestic situation by one partner against another partner be trivialised or downplayed. The implication of such violence on the children, broader family and friends of the parties involved can be serious and long lasting.[28]
[28] Ahori v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 601 at [53].
The Tribunal is mindful of the fact that while HMFZ has made several references to his shame, regret and apology for his breaches of the law, he has nowhere addressed the issue of assaults upon his wife and other members of his family.
Having established the basis upon which HMFZ’s visa has been cancelled it is now necessary to outline the steps that must be undertaken to establish if there is “another reason” why the Delegate’s decision should be set aside. This requires an understanding of the operation of Ministerial Direction 65 referred to above.
Ministerial Direction 65
Under section 499 of the Act, the Minister is authorised to issue Directions to decision-makers to guide them, by statement of government policy, as to how they should evaluate various matters which are outlined in the Act and which must be considered by decision-makers.
Ministerial Direction 65 was made on 22 December 2014. The Tribunal is required to take it into account and give it full and proper regard when making its own independent decision on a request for revocation of a visa cancellation.
As far back as 1979 the Full Federal Court held that:
If the original decision maker has properly paid regard to some general government policy in reaching his decision, the existence of that policy will plainly be a relevant factor for the tribunal to take into account in reviewing the decision. On the other hand, the tribunal is not, in the absence of specific statutory provision, entitled to abdicate its function of determining whether the decision was, on the material before the tribunal, the correct and preferable one in favour of a function of merely determining whether the decision made conformed with whatever the relevant general government policy might be.[29]
In a further review of the same case, the then President of this Tribunal made it clear in relation to Ministerial discretion (as expressed in policy directions) as applied to members of this Tribunal that “His discretion cannot be so truncated by a policy as to preclude consideration of the merits of a specified class of cases.”[30]
[29] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] 46 FLR 409 at 420.
[30] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No.2)[1979] 2 ALD 634 at 640.
In 1985 the Tribunal noted:
Policy is not law. A statement of policy is not a prescription of binding criteria. By conferring a discretion upon the decision-maker, the law requires that all matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion shall be taken into account.[31]
[31] Re ER Aston and Y Aston and Secretary to the Department of Primary Industry [1985] AATA 306 at [21].
In 1994 the Full Federal Court opined:
it is right to say that the tribunal which operates as part of a continuum of administrative decision-making, is not bound by government policy although it may take such policy into account in the exercise of the statutory power or discretion which is under review.[32]
[32] Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray [1994] 33 ALD 13 at 28.
Most recently, Mortimer J, after a comprehensive review of the authorities on this matter concluded:
…policy is not to become a rule of law. The statute is the expression of the rule of law. Executive policy cannot, in form or more importantly in substance, be perceived by decision-makers as, or operate as, a rule.[33]
[33] G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1229 at [210].
This Tribunal draws heavily upon the recent decision by Senior Member PW Taylor SC in Aciek,[34] where the relationship between Ministerial Direction 65 and the statutory responsibilities of the Tribunal is stated with utmost clarity:
7. Direction no. 65 does not derogate from the Tribunal’s duty to reach the preferable decision in the particular case before it. The guidance it provides is intended to assist in reaching such a decision:- Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 348 at [50] per Robertson J. As the Minister submitted in that case
[35]... the Direction does not determine the law or alter the content of the law. Rather, it provides guidance and direction to decision-makers. Decision-makers are required to comply with the Direction but the Direction does not itself create, vary or remove rights, privileges or obligations. In particular, the Direction does not impose any limit on the matters that may be taken into account; properly construed, it does not stipulate the weight to be given to those matters in each and every case; and does not make relevant (in a mandatory sense) any consideration that is not already relevant by reason of the text and context of s 501 of the Migration Act.
8. The “another reason” criterion for the exercise of the revocation discretion requires an evaluative assessment of all the relevant matters. The purpose of the required evaluation is to achieve a result that is “fair and rational in all of the circumstances”:- Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Lesianawai [2014] FCAFC 141 at [80]- [83]; [2014] FCAFC 141; 227 FCR 562. The decision must be legally “reasonable” – in the sense of having a rational foundation and a result that is not plainly unjust:- Ogbonna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 620 at [13]- [20]. Where the discretion falls to be exercised in the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is to be exercised for the purpose of achieving the “correct or preferable” result, having regard to the terms and purpose of the relevant statutory provisions, and the available relevant information:- Drake v Minister For Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 589. It necessarily follows that the required consideration must address the matters that favour revocation and those that do not:- Marzano v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 66 at [30]- [32]; Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166 at [38]. The process of addressing those matters must involve “an active intellectual engagement” and genuine, proper realistic consideration of the relevant information:- Lafu v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 140; (2009) 112 ALD 1 at [48]–[49]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164 at [26]; Maioha v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1016 at [24]- [26].
[34] Aciek and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 2755.
Having addressed that question, the Tribunal returns to the provisions of Ministerial Direction 65. It establishes various matters for consideration, describing some as “primary considerations” and others as “other considerations”.
Three “primary considerations” related to revocation requests are set out as:
a)Protection of the Australian community and future risks of harm
b)Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision; and
c)Expectations of the Australian community.[35]
[35] Part 13, Ministerial Direction No. 65.
Consideration of the protection of the Australian community focuses principally on the twin issues of the nature or seriousness of the offences in question and the risk to the community that they will be repeated were the applicant to remain in Australia. As already noted, HMFZ’s offences are certainly numerous; they involve repeated acts of violence; repeated acts involving theft and dishonesty (misuse of credit cards)[36], several shoplifting offences and several breaches of AVOs.
[36] Respondent Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions at [24] relying on Local Court summonsed material fact sheets (7 September 2012) find at Tender Bundle pp 319-324.
In terms of number, variety and period of time over which they were committed, cumulatively they cannot be regarded as anything but serious, in particular in relation to acts of personal and domestic violence (including the use of a weapon) and breaches of AVOs.
It is an important element in any Tribunal consideration of whether to exercise discretion in favour of an applicant with a serious criminal record to examine the steps taken by that applicant to access programmes or interventions which would reduce the chances of recidivism.
Unfortunately for HMFZ his record in this regard is not encouraging. On 2 February 2009 a report was prepared for the Court by the Community Offender Services Probation and Parole Service. It assessed HMFZ as suitable for a low to medium level of intervention by that Service and as suitable for a Community Service Order which was subsequently made.[37] On 1 April 2009 the same Service issued a report in which it stated that:
Case notes indicate that HMFZ has failed to attend his counselling appointments, has not responded to written directions to attend an induction session and has been un-contactable on the telephone numbers provided. When challenged about his poor performance by his Supervising officer, HMFZ said that he had been too busy with other things, including arranging new accommodation.[38]
[37] Tender Bundle at pp 295-296.
[38] Tender Bundle at p 279.
As a result of this assessment and his own behaviour HMFZ was then assessed as being no longer suitable for a Community Service Order.[39]
[39] Ibid at p 280.
A further assessment on 6 April 2009 confirmed that HMFZ was “considered to be not suitable (for a community service order) due to his response to previous orders and assessed lack of commitment.”[40]
[40] Ibid at p 283.
These interventions were offered very early in HMFZ’s offending career and his failure to take the opportunities they offered, although perhaps due to his immaturity and sense of bravado at the time, may very well have been the tipping point for a recidivist career, which was otherwise, by no means inevitable.
It is unclear if any such programmes were offered to HMFZ while he was in various forms of detention, but it does not appear that they were.
It must count strongly against HMFZ that, while he was in prison he arranged for his established de facto partner to attempt to smuggle contraband into the prison. On 26 August 2017 she, her brother and her brother’s partner were intercepted at Bathurst Correctional Centre in an attempt to smuggle 14 buprenorphine strips and 0.6 grams of methamphetamine (“ice”) into the Centre. The material, together with a drop-map were located on their persons and in their vehicle. The Correctional Centre report states:
During the interview (the de facto partner) stated that her partner wrote the instructions for the drop and passed it to here (sic) some weeks ago during a visit as she was supposed to place tobacco at this location on Tuesday. The instructions were written in Filipino (sic) however (she) confirmed what GOOGLE translate has shown us and that map and instructions were for tobacco drops.[41]
[41] Tender Bundle at p 219.
In other words, as late as August 2017, HMFZ was involved in an attempt to break the law, even from within the confines of his prison. He provided his partner with a map and instructions for her to make a drop off of tobacco – a substance prohibited in NSW prisons since August 2015 – knowing this to be illegal. The Tribunal accepts his oral evidence that he did not specifically ask for either buprenorphine or “ice” to be smuggled, but of course is aware that the former is a valued currency inside NSW jails (as is tobacco) and that she would have been well aware of HMFZ’s personal use of “ice”.
Despite HMFZ’s protestations that he has matured, grown more self-aware and committed himself to a crime-free life, this incident cannot but be seen as evidence to the contrary. HMFZ consciously undertook to engage in an illegal activity without even the fact that he was in custody being sufficient to discourage him. Further he engaged his partner in this activity which is an offence carrying a potential custodial sentence.[42]
[42] Under the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) section 253C(4) this offence carries a penalty of up to 2 years imprisonment.
To date it has apparently only resulted in her being prohibited from making any future prison visits.[43] HMFZ was also suspended from contact visits, a matter impacting on his daughter’s ability to have any contact with him.[44]
[43] Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Regulation 2014 s.102.
[44] Tender Bundle at p 218.
HMFZ seemed oblivious to the fact that, were his partner to be detected attempting to smuggle drugs and contraband into a prison she faced a possible jail sentence herself which would have left their daughter entirely deprived of parental support and possibly being placed in the care of the State. Such behaviour is entirely irresponsible and reprehensible and effectively vitiates any claims of personal rehabilitation or acceptance of responsibility for the care of members of his family.
If reliance is placed on past practice, it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than HMFZ poses a risk of reoffending.
In Guo, the High Court opined:
The course of the future is not predictable, but a degree of probability that an event will occur is often, perhaps usually, assessable. Past events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability – high or low – of their recurrence. ….. Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many, if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require finding as to what occurred in the past because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide to what will happen in the future.[45]
[45] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo and Another [1997] 144 ALR 567 at 578-579.
The level of that risk is hard to assess. In relation to the domestic violence offences, I accept that it might be at a lower level than has been in the past, but the Tribunal has no effective way of gauging this.
However in relation to matters such as theft, shoplifting and misuse of credit cards, given that HMFZ has not been in employment since 2012, it is probably safer for the Tribunal to adopt the view expressed by NSW Corrective Services in their Assessment Report, under an Intensive Corrections Order, tendered to the Blacktown Local Court for hearing on 10 April 2017 that HMFZ’s risk of re-offending is “medium”.[46] Furthermore, the attempted prison smuggling venture demonstrates that HMFZ’s continues to have a disregard for the law which continues to manifest itself in even the most recent months and without regard to previous warnings about continued criminal behaviour.
[46] Summonsed material: Intensive Correction Order Assessment Report, 6 April 2017, Corrective Services NSW, filed by Applicant on 20 September 2018.
Such a conclusion, taken with all the evidence of prior offending, must lead to this consideration weighing against HMFZ.
The best interests of the minor children relate primarily to HMFZ’s one surviving daughter, now aged five years. It is difficult to know much about the nature of this relationship and how much time HMFZ has spent with her given his frequent periods of incarceration.
A number of statements of support were put before the Tribunal from members of HMFZ’s family. His brother stresses that “his family needs him” and this is supported by his mother.[47] His partner writes that he does not want to be separated from his family and that his daughter needs him. In a letter of 20 September 2018 she tells the Tribunal that “(his daughter) is very close to (him) and they sleep together”. She describes the daughter as “a daddy’s girl” with deep attachments to him and an increasing level of dependency as she starts kindergarten. She pleads for HMFZ’s release from detention primarily “for the sake of my daughter …. I don’t want (her) to grow up without a father. She really loves her father.”[48]
[47] Section 501 – Section 501 - G Documents at pp 64-65 and 66-67 respectively.
[48] Statement by Applicant’s partner dated 20 September 2018.
A subsequent letter from HMFZ’s mother goes somewhat further. She writes that:
I believe his daughter … needs her father growing up. I don’t believe (her mother) is coping in raising her on her own. Every time I talk to (the child) she always tells me that she stays at her maternal grandmother’s house and when I ask her about mum she said she is not with them. Every time my other two grandchildren visit us, they always tell me most of the time (she) is late or doesn’t show up at school.[49]
[49] Statement by Applicant’s stepfather, undated, filed 20 September 2018.
HMFZ’s step father provided both a written statement and appeared as a witness. The Tribunal found him to be a very direct, forthright and impressive witness. He has a long career as a serving Correctional Officer in NSW and has been a Justice of the Peace for a quarter of a century or more. In his written statement he attested:
As for the impact upon his daughter’s life I believe (she) really needs the assistance of her father in her life, as her mother suffers from severe headaches and depression due to injuries sustained in an accident years ago, and the situation she finds herself in because of (his) actions. During these periods she has trouble coping with (the daughter’s) needs and (she) is left at her maternal grandmother’s house for days, she is often late for school or has days off, visits for family are arranged for play dates or family gatherings but then they don’t show up, with no explanation. I believe that (the daughter) is more likely to be deprived of her education and family support ties if she loses her father’s support because of this situation.
In oral evidence the step-father made reference to one occasion of an unplanned visit to the house only to find it in some sort of disarray with the child’s mother apparently unable to cope in a manner which left the daughter, in his impression, ill-clothed and ill-fed. When pressed by the Respondent’s representative on this matter and asked whether he had considered reporting the matter to the Department of Children’s Services, he replied to the effect that it was not his position to initiate such drastic action.
The Tribunal cannot but observe that the references initially supplied by members of HMFZ’s family early in the Tribunal’s proceedings make no mention of any concerns on their part about the competency of HMFZ’s partner to supply adequate parental care, whereas those submitted just a few weeks later immediately before the Tribunal hearing make this a central point of their concern. Members of the family attended the Tribunal hearing but the Applicant’s partner did not. It is evident that there are some family issues in play here, but none that the Tribunal is in a position to understand fully or further comment upon.

The Tribunal has noted the attitude taken by HMFZ in seeking to involve his partner in the prison smuggling episode and must take into account the potentially devastating effect which this could have had on the daughter had her mother been prosecuted to the full extent of the law for undertaking an activity master-minded by HMFZ.
There is also an offence, committed in November 2013, which came before the Blacktown Local Court in January 2014 where HMFZ was fined $800 for the offence of having a child unrestrained (established in oral evidence to be his daughter) in his car.[50] This does not speak well of his approach to the safety of even members of his own family or his responsibility as a parent.
[50] Section 501 - G Documents at p 19; Summonsed material: Traffic Report, filed by Applicant on 20 September 2018.
Dealing with the expectations of the Australian community is always a difficult task for the Tribunal. Community expectations change over time and they vary according to the circumstances of each case. The Tribunal expects that they would be more favourable to people who have experienced particularly challenging circumstances in their lives, or to people who have learned from previous experiences of offending and have made serious attempts to get their lives back together and to take active steps for their own rehabilitation. On the other hand, they would be less inclined to view favourably those who have committed particular types of offences, persisted in offending behaviour and failed to take control of their own lives and act responsibly.
In cases such as YNQY and BFXK, the Federal Court and this Tribunal have noted that this criterion starts off from a position of being, ipso facto and indeed, by intention, unfavourable to the applicant.[51] However as was stated in BFXK, the degree of this unfavourability is to be assessed in relation to the individual circumstances of each applicant and each case.
[51] YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466 at [76]; BFXK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 866 at [126].
The determinant in HMFZ’s case must be the extent to which he has sought to desist from offending behaviour and has taken advantage of the opportunities offered him by the imposition of good behaviour bonds, community service orders, intensive corrections orders and relatively short prison sentences to correct his behaviour and desist from further offending.
He manifestly has not stopped offending, nor taken the opportunities presented by previously “lenient” approaches taken by the Courts as remarked upon by the sentencing Judge, above.
Repeated offences, repeated breaches of Court orders[52] and consistent disregard of matters such as holding a driver’s licence cannot but cause this criterion to be weighed against the interests of the Applicant.
[52] Note Summary of Bail Decision (6 February 2017) in Summonsed Material, filed by Applicant on 20 September 2018.
Ministerial Direction 65 goes on to list a series of “other” considerations which must be taken into account by the Tribunal. These are:

a)International non-refoulement obligations;
b)Strength, nature and duration of ties;
c)Impact on Australian business interests;
d)Impact on victims;
e)Extent of impediments if removed.
In Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Colvin J made it clear that while these considerations are characterised as “other” they are not to be taken as secondary, they must be given “appropriate weight” in line with that given to the “primary” considerations.[53]
[53] Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594 at [23] and [28].
For reasons which will appear in the discussion, the Tribunal thinks it appropriate to deal with considerations (a) and (e) together and notes that there appear to be no matters for analysis under consideration (c).
(a) and (e) Non-Refoulement and Impediments if Removed
In his submission to the Tribunal[54] (dated 30 August 2018) HMFZ expresses concerns that, as a result of his having experienced problems with drugs in Australia and having had a drug-related offence recorded against him, he might well find himself in danger from the notorious Philippines “war on drugs” which has been promoted and encouraged by President Duterte. The nature of this programme and the extensive (state sanctioned) extra-judicial killings are outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report on The Philippines.[55]
[54] Applicant exhibit A1.
[55] Dated 9 August 2017, filed by the Applicant on 20 September 2018.
As required under the court’s guidance in BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[56] the Tribunal must at least give proper consideration to such a claim. Such claims also fall prospectively within the regime established by Ministerial Direction 75[57] which was made in response to the Court’s ruling cited above.
[56] [2017] FCAFC 96.
[57] Ministerial Direction No 75: Refusal of Protection Visas Relying on section 36(1C) and section 36(2C)(b) made on 5 September 2017.
The Tribunal understands these concerns, but given that the information in question is not likely to be readily known to Filipino authorities[58] and given that HMFZ has made no representations to the Tribunal about any current and on-going drug problems, there does not seem to be anything but a very limited basis for the Tribunal accepting that this issue constitutes a serious threat to his physical security and safety and hence a significant impediment were HMFZ to be repatriated.
[58] Granted that such authorities will know that HMFZ is being deported back to his home country the Tribunal assumes they would also know that this is for breaches of Australia’s criminal laws but there is no basis to believe that they would be privy to the exact nature of those offences. In any event HMFZ’s criminal record discloses only one minor possession offence.
If this submission is intended to enliven a claim for protection under Australia’s non-refoulement obligations,[59] HMFZ is free to make a formal application for a Protection Visa based upon these concerns. Sections 48A or 501E of the Act do not operate to prevent such an application being made.
[59] See section 36 of the Migration Act especially section 36(2).
That application would be heard initially in jurisdictions other than this Tribunal and it is not for this Tribunal to comment further, or form an opinion, upon it. This point is made clearly in Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[60] where the Federal Court held:
[28] At the end of the day, the decision sought to be reviewed in the present proceeding is the decision made on 25 October 2017 to not exercise the power conferred by s 501CA(4) to revoke the original decision. That decision‐making process relevantly required a state of satisfaction to be formed — not as to whether a person satisfied the criteria prescribed by s 36(2) — but a state of satisfaction as to whether “there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked” for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii).
[60] [2018] FCA 650 at [28] per Flick J.
HMFZ, as already noted, spent his formative years in The Philippines and arrived in Australia aged 15. There is thus no reason to believe that he is unfamiliar with the language, culture, mores, social conditions or values of that country. In this cultural-related sense it is unlikely he would suffer any significant impediment.
He is still a young man and does not appear to suffer from any health or medical problems (other than some degree of depression) and there is no reason to believe that he would suffer impediment in this respect.
He has not worked in Australia since July 2012 and has been drawing Centrelink payments. While these would cease he would be eligible for any other forms of social security support which avail to a Filipino citizen. He has found difficulty gaining employment in Australia, but given that he has an employment history between 2006 and 2012[61] there is no reason to believe that he would necessarily be unable to find work in his native country.
[61] Section 501 - G Documents at p 54.
On the other hand he has no established family network there, all his close family being Australian residents. However, this is not a case as extreme as those of applicants such as Nystrom[62] or more recently Pizarro[63] where the individuals concerned had left their homeland as mere babies and had no knowledge of language, culture or mores or were totally devoid of family connections. In HMFZ’s case he has lived half his life in each of The Philippines and Australia. He is a total stranger to neither.
[62] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50 upholding a visa cancellation leading to deportation.
[63] Pizarro and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3517 revoking a visa cancellation.
Taken together, the Tribunal concludes that this consideration weighs marginally in favour of HMFZ.
Strength, nature and duration of ties
HMFZ has lived half his life in Australia and all his relevant emotional and support networks are here. There are none comparable in The Philippines.
Apart from information about family ties, there is no material before the Tribunal related to any others forms of association which HMFZ has in the Australian community or in his local environment.
The Tribunal takes careful note of the Statutory Declarations from HMFZ’s de facto partner; his brother and mother, all of which make eloquent cases for him to remain in Australia. Together they attest to him being prepared to “change to a better person” (his de facto); “a good man (deserving of) another chance (his brother) but having somehow “gone off the rails” (in his mother’s words).[64]
[64] Section 501 - G Documents at pp 62-63 Statement by Applicant’s partner, pp 64-65 Statement by Applicant’s brother, and pp 66-67 Statement by Applicant’s mother.
The Tribunal is prepared to give credence and credit to these testimonials and agrees with the Minister that this consideration weighs in favour of revocation.
Impact on victims
HMFZ has been convicted of common assaults against his former partner as well as domestic violence assaults against this same former partner and her husband. However there is no evidence that since the occurrence of those events in 2009, there has been any ongoing contact between the parties or that they would have any ongoing interest in and knowledge of HMFZ’s affairs. Hence, it is safe for the Tribunal to conclude that their interests are irrelevant in these proceedings.
In relation to the offences involving domestic violence, the victims were his de factor partner and her teenage son. There is no indication as to the views or the feelings of the latter about HMFZ being allowed to remain in Australia, and hence no conclusions can be drawn on that matter. By contrast, his partner writes in favour of HMFZ being allowed to remain here. Her letter does not specifically address the question of HMFZ’s violent behaviour towards her or her son. It is the Tribunal’s experience that (predominantly female) victims of domestic violence often make submissions in favour of previous aggressors and unless there is an opportunity to test those submissions in direct examination, it is often very difficult to know what weight to assign to them.
The best that can be said in the present case is that this consideration weighs neither for nor against HMFZ.
Taken together, and making the “calculus” (to borrow a term from the Federal Court in Contreras[65]) weighing all the considerations for and against which are outlined in the Ministerial Direction leaves matters somewhat in the balance.
[65] Contreras v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 47 at [52].
None of either the negative factors (from HMFZ’s point of view) such as protection of the Australian community or its expectations, nor those which are favourable to him (best interests of minor children, impediments if removed and nature and duration of ties) tend overwhelmingly in that one direction.
Requests for a Second Chance
In his submission of 23 August 2017 made to the National Character Assessment Centre of the Department, HMFZ writes:
… I stand here like a man and take full responsibility for my actions and ask forgiveness because I believe everyone deserves a 2^nd chance.[66]
[66] Section 501 - G Documents at p 45.
HMFZ’s brother in his Statutory Declaration writes:
Please give him another chance, please let my brother to stay and lived in Australia.[67]
[67] Section 501 - G Documents at p 65.
His mother similarly, in her Statutory Declaration pleads
I am asking you to please give my son one final chance to prove that he can turn his life around and become a good Australian like his two brothers and myself.[68]
[68] Section 501 - G Documents at p 67.
Neither the Australian community nor this Tribunal is unsympathetic to the idea of giving people a second chance.
At the end of the day, Australia is after all, a nation built upon the principle of a second chance. The Tribunal cannot think of a principle so uniquely Australian. Indeed, it is fundamental to what can properly be described as our national character: the idea that, except in the most extreme of circumstances, everyone is entitled to a second chance. Such a principle was the very raison d’etre for the despatch of the First Fleet on 13 May 1787 and those which followed them.
In a context only marginally different from the case now before it, this Tribunal stated:
Neither the Australian community, nor this Tribunal, is averse to giving people a second chance. However, those second chances are not automatically available; they have to be earned.[69]
[69] Dinkha and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3037 at [113].
The Tribunal notes Deputy President Forgie’s supportive comments in Rabino and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection that “the Principles are directed to whether the Australian community is prepared to give the person another opportunity to remain in Australia”.[70] Although this is a reference to the tests imposed in citizenship matters, it remains apposite when considering the way in which the Ministerial Directions in migration cases should be considered.
[70] [2016] AATA 999 at p 68.
Deputy President McCabe in Do and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[71] reflected on the question of second chances when he said that:
A decision-maker is, to some extent, required to guess at the community’s expectations… As I begin my deliberations, I assume the Australian community would be fair-minded and mature… The community would certainly not be vengeful… after all: we are a nation built on second chances.
[71] [2016] AATA 390 at [23].
Two other recent cases are relevant for noting. In Fuzzy Events Unit Trust, Deputy President Justice Stevenson held that it was appropriate to give a “second chance” to an applicant, in large part, “in recognition (of) … his life changes”[72] since he had been first convicted. The Deputy President noted that the efforts of the Applicant to change his behaviour and to seek to make a positive contribution to the community following his conviction was something which helped earn him the right to a second chance.
[72] The Trustees for the Fuzzy Events Unit Trust and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3273 at [65].
Perhaps going somewhat beyond a mere “second” chance, the Tribunal in VXKK considered an applicant who, like HMFZ had struggled with issues of drug use. After assessing the suite of “other” considerations outlined in Ministerial Direction 65, Member Burke wrote:
Many in the community would believe VXKK’s visa should remain cancelled. Others appraised of his difficult life story would afford him the opportunity to stay in Australia to turn his life around – this final chance.
She concluded: “He should be given a final chance to get his life in order.”[73]
[73] VXKK and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2018] AATA 3268.
HMFZ has been given several, indeed numerous second chances. He has been given at least three bonds, two intensive corrections orders, one community service order and he has been disqualified from driving on four occasions. In terms of his second chances, he has progressed throughout his offending career from bonds to community service orders to intensive correctional orders to short periods of incarceration to longer prison sentences.
There is no evidence that he has learned from any of these lesser steps along the path to significant punishment, nor that the experiences of incarceration have caused him to pause, reflect and desist. Indeed he has attempted further illegal activity from within the prison walls themselves.
There is nothing to suggest that he has earned a (more than) second chance or that the Australian community would think that he deserves one. The Tribunal certainly cannot conclude that he does.
Consideration
Applications to the Tribunal of this character arise because it is common ground that the applicant fails the character test set out under the Act because they have a substantial criminal record.
The question then becomes whether or not the Tribunal should seek to exercise the discretion which the Act gives it to revoke the delegate or Minister’s decision because there is “another reason” to do so.
That other reason must somehow be found within the ambit of Ministerial Direction 65 and the guidelines which it establishes for decision-makers who must have regard to, but are not absolutely bound, by them.
Such a process must, of necessity, be a balancing act, a calculus of some sort whereby competing elements of public policy are weighed against each other to come to a final determination.
In this instance the calculus lies between what might be in the interests of a minor child and the interests of the protection of the Australian community.
There is no doubt that HMFZ is devoted to his little daughter and this relationship is perhaps more poignant given the loss of her sibling in tragic circumstances at a very young age. There is little doubt that the daughter is close to and misses her father. He has been separated from her for a large part of her life due to his criminal behaviour for which he alone is responsible.
On the other hand HMFZ’s criminal behaviour is unacceptable at all levels including those of repeated acts of domestic violence, breaches of AVOs and consistent disregard for traffic laws. The Tribunal is satisfied that HMFZ poses a risk of reoffending. It is also satisfied that HMFZ has gone beyond the limits of tolerance which the Australian community would be prepared to concede.
Had the recent events of August 2017 not taken place the Tribunal would have been marginally inclined to find in favour of HMFZ. That event however has tipped the scales against him.
It is not just that, given all his previous encounters with the law HMFZ seems impervious to the lessons he should have learned. Literally within days before he is preparing to front the Parramatta District Court and pled for leniency because he fears a sentence of twelve months may lead to his deportation, he is organising to smuggle contraband into a Correctional Centre and making his partner his catspaw in the process. In doing so he showed callous disregard for her and the risk he was asking her to take. Even more so, he was putting at perhaps even greater risk the long-term welfare of the daughter, upon which he now seeks to rely, with the potential of depriving her of both her parents for a considerable period of time.
This is not the behaviour of a loving father with the long term interests of his child at the center of his thinking. It is an utterly self-centered action in which all other interests are potentially scarified to his.
The Tribunal does not believe that this behaviour is entitled to be regarded as acceptable, nor consonant with either the genuine best interests of the minor child or the expectations of the Australian community.
Decision

The decision under review is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding 136 (one hundred and thirty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member.

.............................[sgd]...........................................
Associate
Dated: 11 October 2018

Date of hearing: 27 September 2018

Applicant: In person

Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr A Keevers and Mr S Agnello,
Sparke Helmore Lawyers

[2018] AATA 3861

11 October 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Natural Justice

Remedies

Date of hearing:	27 September 2018
Applicant:	In person
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Mr A Keevers and Mr S Agnello, Sparke Helmore Lawyers