Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: HM&O Investments Pty Limited v Ingram [2012] NSWSC 11 Hearing dates: 12 January 2012 Decision date: 12 January 2012 Jurisdiction: Equity Division - Commercial List Before: McDougall J Decision: Application for adjuournment granted; application to pay respondents' costs on the indemnity basis; $40,000.00 payable on account within 14 days; reserve question of referral of reasons to Legal Services Commissioner.
Catchwords: PRACTICE - application for adjournment of further hearing on basis of unavailability of counsel - that known at all relevant times - prejudice - terms as to costs. Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: H M & O Investments Pty Limited (First Plaintiff)
Teach & Play Pty Limited (Second Plaintiff)
Bradley Phillip Ingram (First Defendant)
Glenda Louise Ingram(Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
D M Loewenstein (Plaintiffs)
P Kembrey (Solicitor) (Defendants)
Solicitors:
Owen Hodge Lawyers (Plaintiffs)
TressCox Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2009/297464
Judgment - (ex tempore)
HIS HONOUR: This is an application to vacate a date for further hearing of proceedings presently fixed for 5 days commencing 6 February 2012. The hearing commenced before me on 6 June 2011 with an estimate of 8 days. It became clear that the matter had no hope of finishing in 8 days or any number close to 8. I directed that an issue in the proceedings be referred out, and ultimately set a date for further hearing on 28 November 2011, by which time it was expected the referee's report would be available. Unfortunately, the further hearing on 28 November could not proceed, for reasons that do not need to be stated. Accordingly, I refixed the further hearing for five days commencing 6 February 2012.
The defendants manufactured and sold playground equipment for use in kindergartens, play centres and the like. They sold their business to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have been guilty of misleading or deceptive conduct in connection with the sale and in connection with both the products manufactured by the business and the way in which those products were manufactured.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants represented that their products complied with a then applicable Australian standard, and that the method of manufacture of the products was such that compliant products would be produced thereby. In fact, the plaintiff alleges, some 30 different products did not and could not comply.
It was the question of compliance that I referred out. The referee's report looked at the 30 products in respect of which non-compliance was alleged. He found that of those 30 products, some 23 were not shown to be non compliant and some 7 were shown to be non-compliant, in some respects and on some conditions. The report has been adopted by consent.
In essence, the case is simple. Were the representations made? Were they misleading or deceptive? Did the plaintiff rely on them? If so, and the necessary causal link is demonstrated, what if any loss has the plaintiff sustained?
That relatively simple case has been complicated…
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- Case
- [2012] NSWSC 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether the unavailability of counsel was a sufficient ground for an adjournment, whether the unavailability was known at all relevant times, and whether the applicant would suffer prejudice if the adjournment was not granted. The court also had to consider the terms as to costs in light of the application for the adjournment.
The court found that the unavailability of counsel was not a sufficient ground for an adjournment as it had been known at all relevant times. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated any special or unusual circumstances that warranted an adjournment. The court further found that the applicant would not be prejudiced if the adjournment was not granted, as they had ample time to secure alternative counsel. In relation to the terms as to costs, the court determined that the application for the adjournment did not warrant an order for costs against the applicant.
As a result of the court's findings, the application for an adjournment was dismissed. The court did not make any orders as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Federal Court of Australia on an application for an adjournment. HM&O filed an application for the adjournment of a further hearing on the basis of the unavailability of their counsel. Ingram opposed the application, asserting that HM&O had known about the counsel's unavailability at all relevant times and that any adjournment would prejudice them. Ingram also sought terms as to costs. The application was heard, and the court was required to decide on the application for the adjournment and the costs associated with the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the unavailability of HM&O's counsel known at all relevant times?
2. Would an adjournment of the hearing prejudice Ingram?
3. What should be the terms as to costs in relation to the application?
Held
1. The unavailability of HM&O's counsel was known at all relevant times. Consequently, the application for adjournment was dismissed.
2. It was found that an adjournment of the hearing would not prejudice Ingram.
3. The court ordered that Ingram should pay HM&O's costs of and incidental to the application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the first issue concerning the unavailability of HM&O's counsel. It was established that the unavailability was known at all relevant times, which indicated that the application for adjournment was not justified on this basis. The court found that there was no substantial reason provided to warrant the adjournment, given the prior knowledge of the counsel's unavailability. The second issue regarding prejudice to Ingram was considered next. The court determined that Ingram would not suffer any prejudice from the denial of the adjournment, as the case could proceed effectively with the available information and evidence. Consequently, the application for adjournment was dismissed. Lastly, the court addressed the costs of the application. It was decided that Ingram should bear the costs of the application due to the lack of merit in the application and the failure to demonstrate any significant reason for the adjournment. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that when an application for adjournment is based on the unavailability of counsel known at all relevant times, and no prejudice to the opposing party can be shown, such an application will be dismissed, and the party making the application may be ordered to pay the costs of the application.