HJK v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force

[2025] NSWCATAD 264

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

HJK v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATAD 264

Hearing dates:

15 September 2025

Date of orders:

27 October 2025

Decision date:

27 October 2025

Jurisdiction:

Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

EA MacIntyre, Senior Member

Decision:

(1) The administratively reviewable decision of the Respondent under review is affirmed.

(2) Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the disclosure of the names of any of the following persons is prohibited: the Applicant, his parents, his brothers, any child of the Applicant or of his brothers or the spouse or partner of any of them.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - reviewable decision - correct and preferable decision - Civil and Administrative Tribunal - merits review

LICENCING - firearms - licence - genuine reason - fit and proper person - public interest

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW)

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)

Firearms Regulations 2017 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9

Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218

Meacham v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 107

Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10

Pemberton v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2022] NSWCATAD 288

Saxby v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 275

Tolley v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 149

Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

HJK (Applicant)
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police (Respondent)

Representation:

Applicant (Self-Represented)
McCullough Roberston Lawyers (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2025/00162812

Publication restriction:

Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the disclosure of the names of any of the following persons is prohibited: the Applicant, his parents, his brothers, any child of the Applicant or of his brothers or the spouse or partner of any of them.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force, the respondent in these proceedings (“Respondent”) to revoke a firearms licence held by the applicant (“Applicant”). He held that licence under the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (“Firearms Act”). The Applicant contests the revocation of his licence.

2. The matters at issue are whether;

1. the Applicant has a genuine reason for possession of a firearm;

2. the Applicant is a “fit and proper” person to hold a firearms licence;

3. it is in the “public interest” for the Applicant to continue to hold a firearms licence.

3. The questions arise in the context of a dispute between members of the Applicant’s family and escalation of that dispute.

Background

The Applicant and his family

4. The Applicant’s parents live at a property in rural NSW. Farming activities have been conducted on the property.

5. The Applicant lives at a different place about 31 km away from his parent’s property. His partner is W.

6. The Applicant has three brothers. Each will be referred to in these reasons as T, K and J respectively. Both T and K have a spouse or partner.

7. There is a third generation. T has a son, A, by a former partner. A has a partner D. K and his partner have a son, Z.

Dispute about property

8. The Applicant’s father had owned a 200 acre property (“Property”). He later sold a part of it to his son T. The father also leased to T about 90 acres of the Property for use as a dairy farm and leases part to K. The incidents in issue mostly took place on various parts of the Property.

9. Before the sale to T, there was a road leading into the Property which provided access to the father’s home. I will refer to that right as a right of carriageway or ROC.

10. When T acquired his part of the Property, he moved into a dwelling on the land next to the ROC. The father believed that when he sold the part of the Property to T, he retained the ROC to access his own residence.

11. T complained about the use of the ROC, including the speed at which users travelled along it. He believed he owned the ROC and had a right to control its use. He placed speed calming devices, signs and other objects on the ROC close to his home.

12. Since about 2024, the family has been in dispute about the use of the ROC. That dispute had been litigated. T said that the dispute had been ongoing for a period of years. The father had issued T an eviction notice for part of the Property leased to T. Proceedings concerning the dispute were ongoing at the time of the hearing of this matter.

13. These matters have given rise to personal conflict between members of the Applicant’s family. That conflict involves a number of specific incidents described below.

Conflict within family

14. The dispute over the Property resulted in conflict between members of his family. The Responded describes the dispute within the family as in part involving acts that were “childish” and “petty”. However, at times the Respondent says that the dispute “occasioned significant police intervention”. The dispute has also resulted in criminal charges and apprehended violence orders (“AVOs”) being made to protect members of the family from other members of the family. Specific events are described further in the following paragraphs.

15. On 12 March 2024, the father made a report to police alleging that on 8 March 2024, T approached his house “enraged” and made certain hostile remarks to the father. They included the alleged statement: “I wish you were dead”. The father informed the police that there were such incidents involving T occurring on six occasions. The father on one occasion expressed fears for his physical safety. Police subsequently seized a firearm that T had.

16. T informed the police that he had not contacted his father since January 2024. He also denied saying: “I wish you were dead”.

17. The father believed that T wanted the father’s farm and wanted to combine it with T’s farm and sell it together. The father also believed that T and his partner thought that the father and his wife had “lived too long”.

18. On 29 March 2024, T’s partner informed the police of ongoing issues with the father. She alleged that the father had been intoxicated and attended a camp site that she ran with T. She said that she had previously asked the father not to attend but he “did not listen”. T and his partner alleged that the father frequently drove to the vicinity of the campers on the Property because of his “declining mental and physical health”.

19. On 5 June 2024, the police came to T’s property after receiving separate calls from both K and T’s partner. The report was that K had come to the property with a loaded cattle truck and attempted to drive through T's property rather than driving around to his own property entrance. T, T’s son, T’s partner and the son’s partner, stopped K and refused K entry for “biosecurity reasons”.

20. T alleged that K made threats to T’s son and that one of the son’s uncles told the son: “it is war until death”. T also alleges that the father then drove his vehicle to the gate and commenced revving his car engine at T’s son’s partner.

21. K then left in his cattle truck and delivered the cattle but later returned in another vehicle to the front gate claiming the others were restricting him from going to his father's house. T and T’s son alleged that they had only asked K to drive an alternate way through their property to see their father as they were repairing the roadway. K then sat at the front gate for another two hours before leaving.

22. T expressed fears about K’s possession of a firearm. T’s partner also expressed certain fears. The father in turn expressed fear of T.

23. On 9 June 2024, T informed the police that speed signs on the ROC had suffered damage and a fence cut down.

24. On 11 June 2024, solicitors for the father and his wife sent a letter to T’s solicitor in relation to allegations of trespass, verbal abuse, intimidation and obstructing a registered right of carriageway.

25. As a result of events described above, the police seized firearms that T, K and K’s son held.

26. Between 13-14 July 2024, the police again attended as a result of further incidents of alleged obstruction of K and the Applicant on the ROC. T alleged that the Applicant had driven near T’s residence and sounded his horn for 2-3 minutes at about 11pm on 13 July 2024 before driving away.

27. The police after they arrived said that they spoke with the Applicant and that he was “unsteady on his feet, slurring his words and frequently yelling over police”. The police thought he was affected by alcohol. The Applicant denied this saying he had had “only four drinks”. He also said that his condition was due to being woken up from his sleep. He denied both driving the vehicle and sounding the horn.

28. The police seized the Applicant’s firearm. The police said that the Applicant had difficulty with finding the key to his gun safe. The Applicant was alleged to have made various hostile remarks about T.

29. On 11 August 2024, the Applicant attempted to remove speed humps on the ROC. This resulted in a further verbal altercation between the Applicant and T’s son. He alleges that T’s son physically assaulted him but T’s son denied this. K said that Alec had “barged into” the Applicant and “wrestled the tools off him”. Later that evening, the Applicant’s partner was woken up by the lights of a car on high beam.

30. Subsequently, T’s son was issued with an apprehended violence order (“AVO”) for the protection of the Applicant.

31. On 25 September 2025, a further incident on a road occurred as between T and his brother J. T is alleged to have told J: “move out of the way or I will run you over”.

32. On 26 September 2024, the Applicant’s surveillance camera captured a slow moving vehicle near his residence. The next day, the Applicant found the word “Rapist” sprayed on his driveway. The Applicant reported the matter to the police.

33. On 28 September 2024, K had placed surveillance cameras on T’s property. T complained to the police. K subsequently retrieved the cameras. He said that they had been placed to “capture the persons who had damaged a property sign at his parent’s property”.

34. On 25 November 2024, T complained to the police that his father had left a hostile voicemail on his phone.

35. The father on 1 January 2025 reported a verbal argument with T’s son to police after the son had allegedly closed a gate, hitting the father’s car when doing so.

36. More verbal altercations occurred between 10 and12 January 2025 between K and his partner on the one hand and T and T’s son on the other. The altercation involved allegations that K’s son had stolen cattle, the cutting of a fence by T and T’s son and moving K’s son’s cattle onto a field. K alleged physical assault at the hands of T, assault by K’s partner upon T and the throwing of rocks by T and T’s son at K’s vehicle. K’s partner also alleged that T and T’s son had thrown mobile phones belonging to K and her into a paddock.

37. Following a further dispute on 12 January 2025, the police attended. They described the Applicant as being “very argumentative and in a heightened emotional state”.

38. Subsequently, interim AVO’s were issued against T, T’s son and K’s partner. T, T’s son and K’s partner were charged with “common assault domestic violence related” contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

39. On 22 March 2025, the Applicant, his partner and other family members were having lunch at a club. T’s son then approached the Applicant and “verbally abused him”.

40. A further hostile interaction between the Applicant and T occurred on 4 April 2025. That interaction involved an allegation that T had been filming and “intimidating” the Applicant. T told the police that the Applicant was “volatile, he is the one I have been concerned about right from day one”.

41. A further incident occurred on 30 April 2025. The event involved allegations of K filming T’s son.

42. On 6 July 2025, the father alleged to police that T had damaged a bridge and signage. The father however said that he did not wish to see the police or for them to attend.

Firearms licence

43. The Applicant has held firearms licences from at least 1998.

44. The Respondent suspended the Applicant’s firearms licence on 17 July 2024.

45. On 10 January 2025, the Respondent made a decision revoking the Applicant’s category AB firearms licence.

46. On 2 February 2025, the Applicant sought internal review of the Respondent’s decision. Following internal review, the decision to revoke the Applicant’s firearms licence was affirmed.

47. On 28 April 2025, the Applicant commenced these proceedings in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“Tribunal”) seeking administrative review of the Respondent’s decision.

48. The Applicant nominated what he said was the genuine reason for having a firearms licence, namely primary production.

Applicant’s rights of review

49. Under s 75(1)(c) of the Firearms Act, a person may relevantly apply to the Tribunal for administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (“ADR Act”) of a revocation of a licence or permit issued to the person.

50. Section 30 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) allows jurisdiction to the Tribunal to exercise functions as are conferred or imposed on the Tribunal under the ADR Act.

51. It was not in dispute that the Tribunal has jurisdiction for administrative review of the decision of the Respondent in this matter, in circumstances where the Respondent had revoked the Applicant’s licence under the Firearms Act.

The Tribunal’s powers on review are set out in s 63 of the ADR Act as follows:

“(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(a)  any relevant factual material,

(b)  any applicable written or unwritten law.

(2)  For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:

(a)  to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or

(b)  to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or

(c)  to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or

(d)  to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal”.

Consideration

52. The statutory scheme governing the issue or refusal of a licence is relevant to determining when a licence may be revoked. This is because the Firearms Act says that a licence may be revoked for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind.

53. The statutory scheme for the licencing of firearms is set out in the Firearms Act. Under that scheme, the Respondent “may” issue a licence in respect of an application, or refuse any such application under s 11. As such, the Respondent’s power to issue a licence is discretionary.

54. Section 3 sets out the underlying principles of the Firearms Act in the following terms.

“Principles and objects of Act

(1)  The underlying principles of this Act are—

(a)  to confirm firearm possession and use as being a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, and

(b)  to improve public safety—

(i)  by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and

(ii)  by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms, and

(c)  to facilitate a national approach to the control of firearms.

(2)  The objects of this Act are as follows—

(a)  to prohibit the possession and use of all automatic and self-loading rifles and shotguns except in special circumstances,

(b)  to establish an integrated licensing and registration scheme for all firearms,

(c)  to require each person who possesses or uses a firearm under the authority of a licence to prove a genuine reason for possessing or using the firearm,

(d)  to provide strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to licensing of firearms and the acquisition and supply of firearms,

(e)  to ensure that firearms are stored and conveyed in a safe and secure manner,

(f)  to provide for compensation in respect of, and an amnesty period to enable the surrender of, certain prohibited firearms”.

55. The paramount principle derived from s 3 is ensuring public safety (Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218, at [24]). This is the “overriding need” that must be given effect under the legislation.

56. Matters of fact relevant to determination of the question must be proved under the required standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. However, there is no onus of proof. The Applicant, in particular, does not bear the onus of proof (Meacham v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 107, [75] and [81]-[82]; Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10, at [34]).

57. The manner in which evidence is to be received has been described in the following terms: “the parties put on such evidence as they wish and, in a matter of this kind involving the exercise of a discretion, it is a matter for the Tribunal to properly consider all relevant materials and ignore all irrelevant matters in exercising the power of the relevant administrator in review proceedings. This is especially the case where a decision has been taken on a discretionary basis in light of the public interest”. The Tribunal is required to base its findings of fact on “logically probative material” (Meacham, at [82] – [83]).

58. When exercising the discretionary power under s 11, what is required is an assessment of risk in allowing an applicant to have a firearms licence. The test is stringent. The Tribunal must be satisfied that there is “virtually no risk” (Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28, at [28]).

59. Section 11 says when a licence must not be issued. Section 11(3) provides:

“A licence must not be issued unless—

(a)  the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace,

…..

(4)  Without limiting the generality of subsection (3) (a), a licence must not be issued if the Commissioner has reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of—

(a)  the applicant’s way of living or domestic circumstances, or

……

(7)  Despite any other provision of this section, the Commissioner may refuse to issue a licence if the Commissioner considers that issue of the licence would be contrary to the public interest.”

60. Section 12 requires that an applicant must have a genuine reason for possession or using a firearm. It says:

“12   Genuine reasons for having a licence

(1)  The Commissioner must not issue a licence that authorises the possession and use of a firearm unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant has a genuine reason for possessing or using the firearm”.

61. Section 24 says when a licence may be revoked. It provides:

“24   Revocation of licence

……

(2)  A licence may be revoked—

(a)  for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind, or

……

(c)  if the Commissioner is of the opinion that the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence, or

……

(d)  for any other reason prescribed by the regulations”.

62. Clause 20 of the Firearms Regulations 2017 (NSW) (“Regulations”) also makes provision for when a licence may be revoked. It says:

“20   Revocation of licence—licence not in the public interest

The Commissioner may revoke a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence”.

63. Section 24(2)(a) says that a licence may be revoked for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind. Provisions setting out when a licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the relevant kind are found in s 11 and 12 described above. Accordingly, how s 11 and 12 may or may not apply to the Applicant, were he to apply for a licence, is relevant to determining whether the revocation of his licence should stand or not.

64. The questions for determination by the Tribunal in the present case are as follows:

1. Does the Applicant have a genuine reason for possession of a firearm;

2. whether the Respondent can be satisfied that the Applicant is a “fit and proper person” to hold a licence within the statutory meaning and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace

3. is it in the public interest for the Applicant to continue to hold a firearms licence;

Does the Applicant have a “genuine reason” for possession and use of a firearm?

65. The reason the Applicant nominated for having a firearm was for primary production. The Applicant said that he should not lose the necessary ability to keep his firearm for his farming. He said that he needed his firearm for pest control.

66. The Applicant said that he had a “significant problem with feral dogs and rabbit infestation”. He said that he had lost calves to wild dogs. He said that: “I only get my firearm out when necessary for farming practices”.

67. When locating his firearm to hand them to the police, he said: “I never use the damn thing”; “I only bought it cause we got a lot of rabbits” and “I have not used it in the last 528 days”.

68. There are some inconsistencies in the evidence. The Applicant on the one hand says that he has a significant problem with feral dogs and rabbits and has lost calves to wild dogs. He says he needed his firearm for control of these animals. However, he also told police that he had not used his firearm in the 528 days before the police seized the firearm. He did not explain why he had not used his firearm for such a long period if he had a problem of the kind he described. He also did not give evidence of dates and instances when he used his firearm for pest control. The Applicant’s claim that he needed the firearm for pest control sits uneasily with the absence of use for a long period.

69. In these circumstances, I do not think that there is sufficient evidence to determine that the Applicant had a “genuine reason” for firearms within the meaning of s 12, particularly having said, at the time of seizure of his firearm, that he had not used his firearm for 528 days.

“Fit and proper person”

70. The next question is whether the Applicant is a “fit and proper person and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace” within the meaning of s 11(3)(a) of the Firearms Act. A licence must not be issued to the Applicant unless the Respondent is so satisfied. If not so satisfied, these are grounds for revocation of a licence by reason of s 24(2)(c).

71. Under s 24(2)(c), a licence may be revoked if “the Commissioner is of the opinion that the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence”. The additional words found in s 11(3)(a) asking whether the person “can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace” do not appear in s 24(2)(c). However, s 24(2)(c) applies where the person in question is “no longer” a fit and proper person. This indicates, in my opinion, that s 24(2)(c) refers to an earlier time when the person satisfied the description of a “fit and proper person”. Given that an applicant had to be a “fit and proper person” under s 11(3)(a) to obtain a licence in the first place, this must mean that the reference to a “fit and proper person” in s 24(2)(c) carries the same meaning as in s 11(3)(a) and not some different meaning.

72. Whether the Applicant is a fit and proper person within the meaning of the legislation, does not involve consideration of the Applicant’s character as an abstract matter. The question must be asked within the particular statutory context. Specifically, it is whether the Applicant is a “fit and proper person and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace”.

73. The particular question, in the present instance, is whether specifically the Applicant “may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control of firearms” because of his domestic circumstances. This is one of the matters set out in s 11(4) going to determining whether or not a licence should be issued.

74. The Respondent made submissions concerning the Applicant’s own conduct. He said that the Applicant’s conduct “demonstrated a tendency to act with irrationality, volatility and with disregard for public safety”. The Respondent also raised concerns about particular interactions the Applicant had had with members of the NSW Police Force. Some of these matters are described at [76] below.

75. While accepting that the Applicant and his immediate family had at times been victims in relation to domestic incidents, the Respondent relied on the following matters in support of his submission:

1. At around 11:00 PM on 13 July 2024, the Applicant drove near T’s residence and sounded his horn for two to three minutes before driving away (at [26] above);

2. when police spoke to the Applicant in relation to this incident, the Applicant is described as “frequently yelling over police” (at [27] above);

3. when police spoke with the Applicant in relation to incidents occurring on 11 and 12 January 2025, the Applicant was “very argumentative and in a heightened emotional state” and “continued to argue and was belligerent towards police” (at [37] above).

76. The Respondent says that they had reasonable cause to believe that the Applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control of a firearm because of his domestic circumstances within the meaning of s 11(4). He says that the history of domestic conflict gave rise to a reasonable cause to believe that there will continue to be conflict at the Property and at the Applicant's residence and that in such a situation, the Applicant may not be able to personally exercise continuous and responsible control over his firearms either personally or because another person who is not licenced to possess a firearm may gain access to the firearm.

77. Even if the Property and Applicant’s residence were about 31 kilometres apart, the Respondent said that the Applicant frequently visited the Property and had been continuously involved in the domestic incidents with members of his family.

78. The Respondent’s submission was that the circumstances described above, and the issue of AVOs created risk.

79. There was evidence of a long running dispute between the Applicant and members of his family, in particular his brother T and T's son. The period beginning in 2024, on the evidence, saw an escalation in the dispute as set out at [15] – [42] above. That dispute resulted in criminal charges being laid against some members of the family (at [38] above), AVOs being issued against some members of the family (at [30] and [38] above), evidence of assault and fears being expressed by members of the family for their personal safety (at [15] and [22] above).

80. The evidence is that the underlying cause of the dispute between family members was their civil dispute concerning the ROC. The evidence was that T wished to sell his part of the property but had difficulty selling it unless the ROC had been extinguished. That dispute had not been resolved at the time of the hearing.

81. I do not think that the evidence is sufficient to give rise to concerns at the required level about the Applicant himself and his possession or use of firearms. While there is evidence of emotional behaviour on his part during interactions with police and otherwise, I do not find that this behaviour was, on the evidence, threatening or dangerous in a material way. There is no evidence of particular threats of violence being made by the Applicant or his partner against other members of the family or police.

82. There was no evidence of defaults by the Applicant in the way in which he stored his firearms. The Respondent did not say that there was any such default.

83. However, safe storage of firearms of itself does not provide the required degree of assurance of safety when firearms are taken out and used. The evidence shows that the Applicant and members of his immediate family are genuinely fearful of T, T’s son and another person associated with them. The evidence is that they hold fears of potential violence against themselves. I rely in particular on the evidence of actual violence having been perpetrated upon the Applicant and other members of the family, the laying of criminal charges and the issue of AVOs. The incidents in evidence occurred both on the Property and where the Applicant lived.

84. In these circumstances, I accept that risk arises out of the Applicant’s possession of firearms because of the potential on the part of T and persons associated with T from having access to those firearms, for example where the firearms had been removed from the safe in which they were held, and taken for use outdoors.

85. It is well established that there is no basis for differentiating, in the context of a firearms licence, between conduct of an applicant themselves and conduct of another person which may impact on public safety (Tolley v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 149 at [31]; Pemberton v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2022] NSWCATAD 288, at [52]).

86. The question is whether or not the Applicant “may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms” because of his “domestic circumstances”. I do not think that s 11(4) applies only to situations where a failure to exercise control occurs because of what the Applicant himself does or does not do. The provision, in my opinion, extends to cases where despite the best intentions of the Applicant and the degree of care taken by the Applicant, the actions of other persons may prevent the Applicant from exercising the required control, particularly when the firearm has been taken out for use. The circumstances of conflict within the family, including the incidences of actual violence and the issue of AVOs, in my opinion, evidence domestic circumstances that may prevent the Applicant’s personal exercise of control of his firearms in the manner required by s 11(4).

87. I do not, however, think that the risk in the present case is a high one. However, the test is not whether the risk is a high one or even likely. There needs to be “virtually no risk”. The present case does not involve circumstances where I can be satisfied that the Applicant’s possession and use of firearms pose “virtually no risk” for the reasons set out at [85] – [87] above.

Public interest

88. The Respondent’s submission is that it is not in the public interest for the Applicant to hold a firearms licence. What is the “public interest” is not defined in the Firearms Act. In Saxby v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 275, the Tribunal said, at [14]:

“The expression “public interest” is not defined in s 11(7), nor elsewhere in the Act, and a decision in relation to the public interest in this context is particularly informed by the underlying principles and objects of the Act and the strict controls under the Act in relation to licensing. In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9, at [25], the Appeal Panel said that the ‘public interest' is an inherently broad concept giving the Commissioner (and hence the Tribunal on review) the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in deciding whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. Public safety is to be given paramount consideration: Hill v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 218 at [24]”.

89. In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9, at [24], the Appeal Panel said:

"... public interest is a term embracing matters against others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities et cetera established and accepted to be for the good order of society and for the well being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct to the interest of the individual or individuals.

The "public interest" is an inherently broad concept giving the appellant the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. As the possibility of refusing an application on the ground of character is dealt with elsewhere in the same section, it is reasonable to infer that the Parliament intended that the public interest discretion operate in areas to which the character ground was not relevant or, possibly, in circumstances where an objection on character grounds would not be sufficient in its own right to warrant refusal... ".

90. I accept the Respondent’s submission that public interest weighs against the Applicant being granted a firearms licence. It cannot be said that there is “virtually no risk” in the Applicant holding a firearms licence having regard to the matters set out at [85] – [87] above. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that grounds for revocation of the Applicant’s firearms licence would have been established on the basis of public interest.

No questions of character

91. The Applicant expressed concerns that the record contained a statement that he was not a “fit and proper person”. What is a “fit and proper person” for the purposes of the Firearms Act, however, depends on whether or not a person satisfied certain statutory criteria. These are not criteria that, in the circumstances of the case, involve the Applicant’s character in a general sense. The conclusion of the Tribunal arises out of matters concerning the Applicant’s particular situation of family conflict.

92. Consequently, any finding that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person within the statutory meaning, does not carry any imputation that he is not a fit and proper person in the general sense as a lay person may understand.

93. There was evidence of de-escalation of the conflict within the family in recent times. If that continues and family relations regain stability, I see no reason why the Applicant should not at a later date obtain a firearms licence, should he reapply. He will also need to provide further evidence and particulars as to the problems he says he faces with feral dogs and rabbits, in order to establish a genuine reason for possession and use of firearms.

Conclusion

94. For the reasons set out at [70], [87] and [91] above, the Respondent has made out his case for the revocation of the Applicant’s firearms licence.

Orders

1. The administratively reviewable decision of the Respondent under review is affirmed.

2. Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the disclosure of the names of any of the following persons is prohibited: the Applicant, his parents, his brothers, any child of the Applicant or of his brothers or the spouse or partner of any of them.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 27 October 2025