His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2)

[2007] NSWCA 287

New South Wales

Court of Appeal

CITATION:	His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand & Anor v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 287 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
HEARING DATE(S):	On written submissions
JUDGMENT DATE:	23 October 2007
JUDGMENT OF:	Giles JA at 1; Hodgson JA at 17; Ipp JA at 18
DECISION:	(1) The Association is required to pay the costs of Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev in relation to the appeal. (2) The Association is entitled to be reimbursed out of the Schedule A property for the balance of its costs incurred in conducting the appeal (being those it is required to pay Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev and those it incurred itself) after taking into account any monies that may be paid to it under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW). (3) The Association is entitled to a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise qualified. (4) Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev are required to pay the Association's costs of the application for leave to appeal against the orders made on 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005. (5) The matter is remitted to the trial judge to determine the costs of the trial and any other related costs that might be affected by this Court's judgment in [2007] NSWCA 150.
CATCHWORDS:	COSTS – appeal – costs of appeal of appellants – whether the unsuccessful trustee (the Association) is entitled to be indemnified out of trust assets or must pay the successful appellants’ costs of the appeal personally – costs of appeal of Association – whether the Association is entitled to be indemnified out of trust assets in respect of its own costs of the appeal – question as to whether ss 93(2) and (3) of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) apply to the question of a trustee’s indemnification for costs out of trust assets or whether that issue is governed by s 59(4) of the Trustee Act and Pt 42 r 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) – s 59(4) is a provision of general application, does not concern the costs to be awarded in litigation involving trustees and is usually relied upon in declaratory proceedings – ss 93(2) and (3) of the Trustee Act concern costs to be awarded in litigation involving trustees and govern the Court’s power to order costs of the kind now in issue – whether ss 93(2) and (3) are limited by Pt 42 r 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules – whether, assuming Pt 42 r 25 applies, the Association acted unreasonably in seeking judicial advice, or acted for its own benefit rather than for the benefit of the trust - COSTS – costs of trial – issues remitted to the trial judge for determination. D
LEGISLATION CITED:	Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 98(1)(a) Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) Trustee Act 1925 (NSW), ss 59(4), 63, 93(2), (3), 104(1) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), Pt 42 r 25
CASES CITED:	Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201 Gatsios Holdings Pty Limited v Kritharas Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) ATPR 41-864; [2002] NSWCA 29 Harrison v Mills [1976] 1 NSWLR 42 His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand & Anor v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc [2007] NSWCA 150 Hypec Electronics Pty Limited (in liq) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169; [2004] NSWSC 731 In re Beddoe; Downes v Cottam [1893] 1 Ch 547 In re Evans (deceased) [1986] 1 WLR 101 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand (2006) 66 NSWLR 112 Marley v Mutual Security Merchant Bank and Trust Co Limited [1991] 3 All ER 198 Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 National Trustees Executors and Agency Company of Australasia Limited v Barnes (1941) 64 CLR 268 Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574
PARTIES:	His Eminence, Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand (First Appellant) Very Reverend Father Mitko Mitrev (Second Appellant) The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (Respondent)
FILE NUMBER(S):	CA 40159/07
COUNSEL:	T G R Parker SC/R E Steele (Appellants) G O Blake SC (Respondent) R P L Lancaster appearing for Attorney General
SOLICITORS:	Sachs Gerace Lawyers (Appellants) McConnell Jaffray Lawyers (Respondent) I V Knight Crown Solicitor (for Attorney General)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:	Supreme Court - Equity Division
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):	ED 2451/04
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:	Palmer J
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:	20 March 2007
LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	Application of Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated (No 4) [2007] NSWSC 254

CA 40159/07
SC 2451/04

GILES JA
HODGSON JA
IPP JA

Tuesday 23 October 2007

His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand & Anor v The Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2)

Judgment – On Costs

1 GILES JA: These reasons are concerned with costs orders following the Court’s decision of 22 June 2007 [2007] NSWCA 150. I have the misfortune to differ from Ipp JA, whose reasons I have had the benefit of reading, as to the orders to be made. Hodgson JA agrees with his Honour. Since mine is a minority opinion, I will be brief in expressing it.

Costs of the appeal

2 For the present I leave aside any question of costs out of trust property.

3 The Association conceded that Metropolitan Petar and Father Mitrev (hereafter the appellants) should have the costs of the appeal, other than of their application for revocation of the orders of 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005. The Association is entitled to the costs of the applications. They were minor. Its entitlement can be accommodated by reducing the order in favour of the appellants to 95 per cent of the costs of the appeal.

4 The Association submitted that, because in other proceedings an order for costs had been made in its favour (Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Metropolitan Petar, the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Church of Australia and New Zealand and Anor (2006) 66 NSWLR 112 at [62]), the order should be limited to any balance in favour of the appellants after set-off. I do not agree. Orders for costs are made. Whether they are set off one against the other or others is a different matter. There are many costs orders between the parties, and the Court should not tailor its orders to a running balance.

5 Subject to any question of costs out of trust property, it should be ordered that the Association pay 95 per cent of the appellants’ costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Costs of the appeal out of the Schedule A property

6 The appellants did not ask for an order that the costs to which they were entitled be paid out of the Schedule A property; indeed, they opposed recourse to that property. The Association sought an order that any costs payable to the appellants and its own costs be paid out of the Schedule A property.

7 The Court is presently concerned with making orders as to costs, not with whether apart from its orders the Association is entitled to reimbursement out of trust property. Sections 93(2) and (3) of the Trustee Act 1925 and Pt 42 r 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules are relevant. The discretions under s 93(2) and (3) are to be exercised according to what seems to the Court to be just or what the Court thinks fit. The prima facie entitlement under Pt 42 r 25 can be displaced by an exercise of discretion if the trustee has acted unreasonably or in substance for the trustee’s own benefit rather than for the benefit of the fund.

8 I fully appreciate the matters which have led Ipp JA to conclude that the Association did not act unreasonably within Pt 42 r 25, and should have a favourable exercise of discretion under s 93(2) or (3). I respectfully see it otherwise.

9 The principal basis of the Court’s decision was that the application for judicial advice was used adversarially, to protect the Association from the claims of breach of trust made by the appellants. Thus Ipp JA said at [82] that the Association did not ask for the advice as a neutral party, disinterested in the outcome, but urged an order “that would protect its interests against the interests of [the appellants]”, and at [94] -

“The main reason for the Association being interested in the terms of the trust is to prove that it has not breached the trust. Knowledge of the true terms of the trust would, undoubtedly, be of benefit to the Association as trustee. But there can be no doubt that the principal motivation for the Association’s desire to have the terms of the trust determined is to prove that it has not breached the terms of the trust and should not be removed as trustee. As I have pointed out, the Association is not a disinterested observer seeking advice as to whether it should follow one course of conduct or another. It strongly propounds its views and asks that the court endorse them.”

10 Although only on appeal was this seen as fatal to giving judicial advice, it was always thus, and I do not think applying for judicial advice as an adversarial step in this long-running litigation should be regarded as reasonable in the context of recourse to trust property. Reasonableness calls for regard to the interests of the trust, not the interests of the trustee in contesting claims of breach of trust. Further, although the Main Proceedings are yet to be resolved it is necessary to focus on the conduct of the Association in applying for judicial advice. I consider that it should be concluded that in applying for judicial advice the Association was in substance acting for its own benefit rather than for the benefit of the trust fund: cf Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574 at 581-2.

11 In Harrison v Mills (1996) 1 NSWLR 42 a trustee’s application for judicial advice was refused essentially because it was directed to resolving matters of basic controversy between trustees. The plaintiff trustee asked for his costs out of the trust property, but did not obtain them; no order was made for his costs. In In re Evans (1986) 1 WLR 101 costs of a trustee’s failed application for judicial advice were paid out of the estate, and similarly in Marley v Mutual Security Merchant Bank v Trust Co Ltd (1991) 3 All ER 198, but expressly in the latter case (at 210) without any suggestion to the contrary. The discretion must be exercised on the facts of each case, and in neither of these cases was there the controversy found in the Main Proceedings and the circumstances of the application found in the present case. They are distinguishable.

12 Accordingly, I would not make an order under s 93(2) or (3) whereby costs payable by the Association to the appellants and the Association’s own costs are paid out of the Schedule A property; and I would order under Pt 42 r 25 that the Association’s costs not be paid out of that property. Whether that order trumps s 59(4) of the Trustee Act could arise, but need not presently be explored.

Costs of the trial

13 Orders as to costs are complicated by the interim advices on 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005, in relation to the revocation of which leave to appeal has been refused. While in part the giving of the interim advices has been undermined by this Court’s reasons, if the advices stand then the costs orders made should stand. In principle, the costs of the Association and (if they want them) of the appellants to 10 June 2005 should be paid out of the Schedule A property. The costs thereafter, however, should be as for the costs of the appeal – in short, the Association to pay the appellants’ costs and an order under Pt 42 r 25. There should not be a reduction in the costs ordered through set-off.

14 I express this in principle, as it is not clear what costs orders were made in the course of the trial; and as well, as Ipp JA observes, this Court does not have sufficient knowledge reliably to rule on the costs of the trial. I agree that this should be remitted to the trial judge. In order to clear the slate, all costs orders made in the proceedings below should be set aside, and the discretion will fall to be exercised afresh.

15 The Association should have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 if otherwise qualified.

16 I propose orders -

1. The Association pay 95 per cent of the appellants’ costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

2. The Association’s costs not be paid out of the Schedule A property.

3. All costs orders made in the proceedings at first instance set aside.

4. Remit to the trial judge the disposal of costs of the proceedings at first instance.

5. The Association to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 if otherwise qualified.

17 HODGSON JA: I agree with Ipp JA.

18 IPP JA: These reasons relate to the costs issues that, by the judgment of this Court in [2007] NSWCA 150, were left open for later decision. In these reasons I shall, as in [2007] NSWCA 150, refer to the appellants as Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev and to the respondent as “the Association”.

19 When the judgment in [2007] NSWCA 150 was delivered, this Court ordered the parties to file written submissions in regard to the costs issues that had arisen. Those submissions have been filed.

20 Before dealing with the parties’ respective contentions, it is convenient to reiterate the following matters and findings set out in [2007] NSWCA 150 as they form part of the background circumstances relevant to costs:

(a) The breach of trust alleged in the Main Proceedings involved the question whether the Association was administering the trust in accordance with the true doctrines and tenets of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (as the trust requires).

(b) On the strength of the Association’s argument that judicial advice was required to enable it to protect the trust from takeover by Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev who, on its case, were not true followers of the Church, this Court did not decide that the giving of judicial advice by the trial judge was beyond power.

(c) Judicial advice is generally an inappropriate mechanism for determining substantive rights in contested proceedings and the issues on which judicial advice was sought were, essentially, adversarial.

(d) While knowledge of the true terms of the trust would undoubtedly be of benefit to the Association as trustee, the principal motivation for the Association’s desire to have the terms of the trust determined in the Main Proceedings was to prove that it had not breached the terms of the trust and should not be removed as trustee.

(e) In general terms it may be accepted that it is in the interests of the trust that the Association be financially supported by the trust so that the true purposes of the trust can be fulfilled; but the question as to which of the parties is applying true doctrine is in contest in the Main Proceedings and that fact was of fundamental importance in deciding whether judicial advice should be given.

(f) There were three matters that affected the discretion the trial judge had exercised in deciding to give judicial advice. These were:

(i) the omission to address, expressly, the adversarial nature of the judicial advice sought;
(ii) the omission to balance the potential benefits to the trust (in authorising the Association to defend the Main Proceedings and to obtain the necessary resources from the trust property, and in affording the trust protection under s 63 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW)) against the potential disadvantages (namely, should the Association be unsuccessful in the Main Proceedings, costs would be lost and Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev would seek to recover their costs from the trust); and
(iii) the judge’s erroneous finding that he was empowered to make revocable orders in respect of the judicial advice he gave.


(g) This Court held that as his Honour had erred in principle in exercising his discretion to give judicial advice, this Court was required to exercise the discretion afresh. It determined that judicial advice should not be given.

(h) The appeal of Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev was upheld but their application for leave to appeal against the orders made on 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005 was refused.

21 I turn now to the costs of the appeal, that being the first of the costs issues requiring determination. As the appeal was upheld, Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev are entitled to those costs. Questions arise as to whether the Association must pay those costs personally, or whether the Association is entitled to be indemnified out of the assets of the trust (and, if so, which assets), and whether the Association is entitled to be indemnified out of those assets in respect of its own costs.

22 The starting point is a consideration of those sections of the Trustee Act that are relevant to the costs orders sought. These are sections 59(4), 93(2) and 93(3). Section 59(4) provides:

“A trustee may reimburse himself or herself, or pay or discharge out of the trust property all expenses incurred in or about execution of the trustee’s trusts or powers.”

Section 93(2) provides:

“The Court may order the costs, charges and expenses of and incident to any application or any order under this Act to be paid or to be raised by sale or mortgage out of the property in respect whereof the same is made or out of the income thereof, or to be borne and paid in such manner and by such persons as to the Court may seen just.”

Section 93(3) provides:

“In any proceedings with respect to the management or administration of any property subject to a trust or forming part of the estate of a testator or intestate, or with respect to the interpretation of the trust instrument, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order any costs to be paid out of such part of the property as in the opinion of the Court is the real subject matter of the proceedings.”

23 Mr Blake SC for the Association submitted:

“The Court should find that the power to order costs under ss 93(2) and (3) of the Trustee Act does not apply to the question of a trustee’s indemnification for costs out of trust assets which is governed by s 59(4) of the Trustee Act and Pt 42 r 25 of the UCPR.”

24 In Gatsios Holdings Pty Limited v Kritharas Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) ATPR 41-864; [2002] NSWCA 29, Spigelman CJ (at [9]) emphasised that the inquiry under s 59(4) was “whether or not expenses incurred do in fact answer the description of having been so incurred ‘in or about execution of the trustee’s trusts or powers’”.

25 If Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev are successful in the Main Proceedings, it would follow that the Association’s conduct in defending the Main Proceedings was not in furtherance of the purposes of the trust. This issue, however, is incapable of determination at this stage.

26 It may not necessarily follow that it is not now possible to determine whether the costs in question were incurred “in or about execution of the trustee’s trusts or powers”. But, in my opinion, s 59(4) is not a factor of significance in determining what costs order should be made in regard to the unsuccessful appeal.

27 Section 59(4) is an empowering provision of general application. Unlike ss 93(2) and 93(3), it is not expressed to concern the costs to be awarded in litigation involving a trustee. Section 59(4) is usually relied on in declaratory proceedings. A trustee may seek a declaration that it is entitled to be indemnified from trust assets in accordance with s 59(4): National Trustees Executors and Agency Company of AustralasiaLimited v Barnes (1941) 64 CLR 268; Gatsios. But no such declaration is presently sought. This Court is now concerned only with what costs order should be made in the ordinary course of legal proceedings, Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev having succeeded in their appeal.

28 In my view, the principal relevance of s 59(4) to the costs question is that it underpins a trustee’s right to recover the costs of litigation from the trust estate. The section is in accordance with the general law entitling trustees to an indemnity from the trust estate for all costs, charges and expenses properly incurred: National Trustees Executors and Agency Company of AustralasiaLimited v Barnes (at 274 per Starke J and 277 per Williams J). See also Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718 (at 721, [11]), [2005] NSWCA 133. The question as to what costs order should be made in legal proceedings to which a trustee is a party calls other considerations into play. Sections 93(2) and (3) govern the Court’s power to order costs of the kind now in issue.

29 Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev contended that Pt 42 r 25 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) was of application, while the Association disputed this. Part 42 r 25 provides:

“(1) Subject to sub-rule (2), a person who is or has been a party to any proceedings in the capacity of trustee or mortgagee is entitled to be paid his or her costs in the proceedings, in so far as they are not paid by any other person, out of the fund held by the trustee or out of the mortgaged property, as the case may be.
(2) The Court may order that the person’s costs not be so paid if:
(a) the trustee or mortgagee has acted unreasonably, or
(b) in the case of a trustee, the trustee has in substance acted for his or her own benefit rather than for the benefit of the fund.”

30 There are difficulties attendant upon the application of Pt 42 r 25. On its face, it limits the power conferred by ss 93(2) and (3). Neither party addressed the question how the subordinate legislation constituted by Pt 42 r 25 could vary these sections. Complicating this question is the fact that, while s 104(1) of the Trustee Act provides that rules of court may be made under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) “for better carrying the provisions and objects of this Act into effect”, Pt 42 r 25 was made under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and not the Supreme Court Act. I would add that s 98(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that costs are in the discretion of the Court, subject to “this or any other Act”. Prima facie, it seems that Pt 42 r 25 cannot detract from ss 93(2) and (3). As this issue was not properly ventilated in the parties’ written submissions, I would prefer not to express any final opinion in regard to it.

31 I shall, however, assume (without deciding) that Pt 42 r 25 is of application.

32 At the outset, I would repeat that the question whether the Association has in substance acted for its own benefit rather than for the benefit of the trust can be decided only after the Main Proceedings are determined. Therefore, at this stage, Pt 42 r 25(2)(b) cannot be established. Thus, the Court’s power under Pt 42 r 25 to order the Association’s costs to be paid out of the trust property is dependent upon whether it acted unreasonably. I turn now to that issue.

33 In In re Beddoe; Downes v Cottam [1893] 1 Ch 547, Bowen LJ (at 562) accepted that:

“[T]rustees ought not to be visited with personal loss on account of mere errors in judgment which fall short of negligence or unreasonableness.”

On the other hand, his Lordship said:

“[I]t is no answer in the mouth of a trustee who has embarked in idle litigation to say that he honestly believed what his solicitor told him, if his solicitor has been wrongheaded and perverse.”

34 In Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201, the Full Federal Court (Northrop, Wilcox and Cooper JJ), after referring to Bowen LJ’s remarks in Beddoe, said (at 211 to 212):

“The critical question, in our view, is whether or not the conduct which gave rise to the burden of costs – whether costs ordered to be paid or costs incurred by the trustee in prosecution of the litigation – was proper in the sense explained in Beddoe ; that is, whether the expenditure was reasonably, as well as honestly, incurred. … [W]e issue the caution that the language in some authorities, many of which relate to gratuitous trustees, may mislead. Sometimes that language appears to require a degree of personal misconduct or wilful recklessness, as opposed to mere negligence, mistake or breach of the trustee’s duty as set out above. We do not think that such a limitation can stand with cases such as Beddoe , which in our opinion correctly express the law. If the expense is one prudently and reasonably incurred in the discharge of the trustee’s proper duties, there is a right under the general law to be indemnified out of the trust estate. If the expense is not so incurred or is unreasonable or unnecessary, there is no right under the general law to indemnity because the expenses is not ‘properly incurred’ … Where the line is drawn, between an expense properly incurred and one not properly incurred, is to be determined on the facts of the particular case and in the exercise of judgment.”

35 The passages quoted from Beddoe and Adsett were cited by Campbell J in Hypec Electronics Pty Limited (in liq) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169; [2004] NSWSC 731 and repeated by this Court (Sheller, Ipp and Tobias JJA) in Mead v Watson (at 720 to 721, [11] to [13]) on appeal from the judgment of Campbell J. The Court said (at 721 to 722, [14]):

“A degree of personal misconduct or wilful recklessness on the part of the liquidator was not required: mere negligence or mistake or the incurring of costs unreasonably or unnecessarily was sufficient to constitute the relevant degree of impropriety to justify an order that the costs be paid by the liquidator personally.”

36 Applying these authorities, the question of unreasonableness on the part of the Association is finely balanced. I have, however, concluded that the Association did not act unreasonably in seeking judicial advice. There are a number of factors that lead me to this view.

37 Firstly, the trial judge was persuaded that the Association was entitled to judicial advice; the Association’s case was reasonably arguable.

38 Secondly, the three grounds on which this Court found that his Honour had erred in exercising his discretion were only articulated with clarity during the course of the hearing on appeal and after intervention from the Bench. It does not seem to me that the case was put before the trial judge in the way it eventually was put on appeal.

39 Thirdly, there is no suggestion that the Association, in seeking judicial advice, was acting otherwise than in good faith; this was regarded as relevant in Harrison v Mills [1976] 1 NSWLR 42 (at 46 per Needham J) and Marleyv Mutual Security Merchant Bank and Trust Co Limited [1991] 3 All ER 198 (at 210 per Lord Oliver).

40 Fourthly, in other cases of this kind, courts have ordered that the costs of unsuccessful applicants for judicial advice be paid out of the trust property: see Harrison v Mills; In re Evans (deceased) [1986] 1 WLR 101 and Marley.

41 Thus, even on the assumption that Pt 42 r 25 is of application, in my opinion the conditions in Pt 42 r 25(2)(a) and (b) have not been fulfilled.

42 The matters to which I have referred in [37] to [40] are relevant to the exercise of the discretion that has to be exercised under ss 92(2) and (3). On the basis of those matters, I have concluded that the Association’s conduct in applying for judicial advice was not unreasonable. Accordingly, I am of the view that the Association is entitled to be indemnified out of the Schedule A property in respect of its own costs (that exceed any costs that it might recover under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW)) and the costs it is required to pay Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev. As I understand both parties’ submissions, both accept that the Schedule A property is the appropriate trust property that should be used should such an order be made.

43 I should add that I was not persuaded to the contrary view by the fact that, prior to commencing proceedings for judicial advice, independent counsel had advised the Association “that permission to use trust funds to defend the proceedings was ‘an unlikely exercise of discretion’ and that any application should be ‘a last resort’”. I have expressed the opinion that the Association’s case in this regard was reasonably arguable.

44 Other costs orders in relation to certain other proceedings have been made in favour of the Association in the past, but I see no reason to make an order in relation to any set-off (as the Association requested).

45 Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev should pay the Association’s costs in respect of their applications for leave to appeal in respect of the orders of 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005.

46 I turn, finally, to the costs of the trial.

47 The arguments raised on behalf of the Association in regard to these costs are complex. They are difficult to follow without a detailed knowledge of what in fact occurred at the trial and the interlocutory proceedings that preceded it. In my view, this Court is not in a position to rule reliably on all the matters the Association has raised in regard to the trial costs and any other costs that might be affected by the judgment in [2007] NSWCA 150.

48 Accordingly, in my view, it would be appropriate to remit the issues concerning the costs referred to in the preceding paragraph to the trial judge for decision by him.

49 I propose the following orders:

(a) The Association is required to pay the costs of Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev in relation to the appeal.
(b) The Association is entitled to be reimbursed out of the Schedule A property for the balance of its costs incurred in conducting the appeal (being those it is required to pay Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev and those it incurred itself) after taking into account any monies that may be paid to it under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW).
(c) The Association is entitled to a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise qualified.
(d) Bishop Petar and Father Mitrev are required to pay the Association’s costs of the application for leave to appeal against the orders made on 7 May 2004 and 10 June 2005.
(e) The matter is remitted to the trial judge to determine the costs of the trial and any other related costs that might be affected by this Court’s judgment in [2007] NSWCA 150.
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23/10/2007 - Cover Sheet - correction to Solicitors representing Appellants & Respondents. - Paragraph(s) Not applicable