Hirst and Hirst and Anor

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HIRST & HIRST AND ANOR [2015] FamCA 866
FAMILY LAW – SUMMARY DISMISSAL – Application by third party Second Respondent for summary dismissal of orders and declaration sought by the Applicant wife insofar as that order and declaration affect the interests of the third party Second Respondent
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 78
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125;
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87;
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62;
Beck and Beck (2004) FLC 93-181;
Pelerman v Pelerman (2000) FLC 93-037;
Custodio & Pinto & Ors (2006) FLC 92-279;
Lindon v The Commonwealth (No 2) (1996) 70 ALJR 541;
Muschinski & Dodds  (1985) 160 CLR 583
Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137;
Giumelli  v Giumelli (1996) 196 CLR 101.
APPLICANT: Mr Hirst
FIRST RESPONDENT: Ms Hirst
SECOND RESPONDENT: Ms B Hirst
FILE NUMBER: BRC 8139 of 2014
DATE DELIVERED: 14 October 2015
PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane
PLACE HEARD: Brisbane
JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J
HEARING DATE: 21 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Galloway
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: VC Catanzaro Solicitor
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Dr Sayers
SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: Best Wilson Buckley Family Law

COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND 

RESPONDENT:

Mr Galloway
SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: VC Catanzaro Solicitor

Orders

  1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Amended Response filed 31 March 2015 are struck out.

  2. Ms B Hirst is removed as party to the proceedings and, so far as it is necessary, Clause (5) of the Order made 16 April 2015 (amended 14 May 2015) is discharged.

  3. In the event the Second Respondent seeks an order that the First Respondent pay her costs of and incidental to the Amended Response filed 31 March 2015 and/or the Application in a Case filed 30 June 2015:

    (a)the Second Respondent shall file and serve brief written submissions in support of such application for costs within fourteen (14) days of today; and

    (b)the First Respondent shall file and serve any brief written submissions in answer to the submissions filed and served by the Second Respondent seeking costs within a further fourteen (14) days thereafter; and

    (c)the Second Respondent shall file and serve any brief further written submissions, strictly in reply to the submissions served by the First Respondent, within seven (7) days of its service,

    and any such application for costs shall be considered in Chambers. 

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hirst & Hirst and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 8139 of 2014

Mr Hirst

Applicant

And

Ms Hirst

First Respondent

And

Ms B Hirst
Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The Second Respondent is the husband’s mother. On 16 April 2015, Judge Howard joined her[1] to the property settlement proceedings[2]…

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Details
Case
[2015] FamCA 866
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Hirst and Hirst and Anor*, Hogan J considered an application to strike out parts of an amended response and to remove a party from proceedings. The dispute involved allegations by the wife concerning the accuracy of farming enterprise records, the husband's hours worked and remuneration, and various expenses paid by a company, J Pty Ltd, on behalf of the parties. The wife also contended that the second respondent had an intention to transfer her property to the husband, which formed the basis of certain claims.

The court was required to determine whether paragraphs 1 and 2 of the amended response should be struck out, and whether the second respondent should be removed as a party to the proceedings. Central to these determinations was the interpretation of an Option Agreement and the nature of the intentions attributed to the second respondent regarding the transfer of her property. The court also considered the timing and conditions under which any such transfer was contemplated.

Hogan J reasoned that the equitable remedy of a constructive trust, while remedial, is not intended for subjective notions of fairness. The court found that the claims as pleaded in the statement of claim were misleading. Specifically, the assertion of the second respondent's intention to transfer property was flawed because it failed to acknowledge that any such transfer was conditional upon the husband purchasing the property. The court noted that the pleaded intentions did not accurately reflect the terms of the Option Agreement, which required payment for the property. Furthermore, representations allegedly made by the second respondent could not support the husband's asserted failure to exercise his rights under the Option Agreement, as these representations likely occurred after the agreement had lapsed.

Consequently, Hogan J ordered that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the amended response be struck out. The second respondent was removed as a party to the proceedings, and a related clause in a previous order was discharged. The court also made provision for the consideration of costs in chambers, requiring written submissions from the second respondent and the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Amended Response filed 31 March 2015 are struck out.

2.

Ms B Hirst is removed as party to the proceedings and, so far as it is necessary, Clause (5) of the Order made 16 April 2015 (amended 14 May 2015) is discharged.

3.

In the event the Second Respondent seeks an order that the First Respondent pay her costs of and incidental to the Amended Response filed 31 March 2015 and/or the Application in a Case filed 30 June 2015:

(a) the Second Respondent shall file and serve brief written submissions in support of such application for costs within fourteen (14) days of today; and

(b) the First Respondent shall file and serve any brief written submissions in answer to the submissions filed and served by the Second Respondent seeking costs within a further fourteen (14) days thereafter; and

(c) the Second Respondent shall file and serve any brief further written submissions, strictly in reply to the submissions served by the First Respondent, within seven (7) days of its service,

and any such application for costs shall be considered in Chambers.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The wife suggests that the farming enterprise records are inaccurate, that the husband worked more hours than those for which he was paid and/or which were shown on the payslips and that he told her he did not get holiday pay. She also says that, in addition to paying a weekly cash wage to the husband, J Pty Ltd paid expenses like home and contents insurance, car expenses, rates, electricity, telephone, internet, private health insurance, firewood, water (when necessary), veterinary bills, dog registration and food expenses. Additionally, the parties were given a credit card (which had a limit of $5,000.00) for their use and the costs of the wife’s attendance at University were also paid. J Pty Ltd also paid for house renovations and extensions and the installation of a bore; a ride-on mower was purchased; lease repayments for a car were paid; motorbikes were provided and a contribution made towards the parties’ purchase of a caravan.Discussion and conclusions The fact that the equitable remedy of constructive trust is predominantly remedial does not mean it is a medium for the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice.[16][16] Muschinski & Dodds (supra) per Deane J at 614-615. As pleaded, Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Statement of Claim assert simply that the Second Respondent had an intention to transfer or cause the transfer of her property to the husband. Neither contains any reference to the fact that one of the terms of the Option Agreement – relied on as providing the basis for the asserted intention pleaded – was that the husband would purchase her property from her. It is, I think, misleading to assert that the Second Respondent held a particular intention at a particular undefined time on the basis that she was then putting into effect the agreement between her and her ex-husband (which led to the creation of the Options Agreement in May 1996) without reference to the fact that any transfer of property from the Second Respondent to the husband was to be conditional upon him purchasing her property from her. Any intention shared with the husband was that the Second Respondent receive payment from him for her property. Whilst Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim asserts that at an unknown time of the restructuring of the farming enterprise, the Second Respondent had an intention to transfer or cause a transfer of her property to the husband, any intention imputed to her, at this unknown time, appears to be reliant upon the implicit assertion (for reasons not particularised) that her intention remained then (whenever “then” was) as it had been when the Option Agreement was executed in May 1996. As is the case with Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim, the intention asserted in Paragraph 8(3) fails to recognise the significant issue that the transfer then contemplated by the Second Respondent was conditional on the payment of a price by the husband. The representations pleaded by the wife in Clause 13 of the Statement of Claim as having been made by the Second Respondent to the husband ‘on dates presently unknown’ to her can only, from the way in which Clause 13(4)(c) of the Statement of Claim is constructed, have occurred after the husband and wife moved to L Town and he started working for remuneration (and the benefits the wife deposes to) in the farming enterprise – that is, after about December 2002 and after the Option Agreement had lapsed and, consequently, after the Second Respondent would have been obliged to transfer her interests in the farm land and farming enterprise to him if he exercised his option. Given this, they cannot provide a basis for his asserted failure to exercise his rights under the Option Agreement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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