Hinds and Charlton (No.2)

[2017] FCCA 2958

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HINDS & CHARLTON (No.2) [2017] FCCA 2958

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – res judicata – Rice & Asplund – Secondary school enrolment – financial contribution towards educational expenses.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CA, 60CC

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989

Cases cited:

Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Volume 12 at p.359

Kemeny v Kemeny (1998) FLC 92-806
Stein v Black (2000) FLC 93-005
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
SPS & PLS (2008) FLC 93-363
Searson & Searson [2017] Fam CAFC 119

Applicant: MR HINDS

Respondent: MS CHARLTON

File Number: ADC 2933 of 2012

Judgment of: Judge Kelly

Hearing date: 26 November 2017

Date of Last Submission: 26 November 2017

Delivered at: Adelaide

Delivered on: 29 November 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms P Kari

Solicitors for the Applicant: Clelands Lawyers Adelaide

The Respondent: In Person

UPON NOTING:

1. The Court orders pronounced 15 August 2015 (“the 2015 Orders”) were determined on the basis that father offered to pay all of the children’s tuition fees and compulsory school levies imposed by the relevant private school, (now (omitted) School) and the Court anticipates the father will meet those outgoings as previously ordered;

2. The 2015 Orders directed the parents contribute to the children’s additional educational expenses as may be agreed between them, such expenses to include (but are not limited to) school uniforms, sports uniforms and equipment, school books, laptops, school excursions, interstate or overseas school trips and extracurricular activities and the Court considers this remains an appropriate outcome;

3. These matters are more properly considered within the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989.

ORDERS

1. That the parties do all things necessary to confirm the child X’s enrolment at (omitted) School commencing first term 2018.

2. The parties do all things necessary to confirm the child Y’s enrolment at (omitted) School commencing first term 2020.

3. The parties do all things necessary to confirm the child Z’s enrolment at (omitted) School commencing first term 2022.

4. The parties do all things necessary to cancel X’s enrolment at (omitted) School. 

5. The parties each pay one half any cancellation fee imposed by (omitted) School.

6. All proceedings are dismissed as finalised.

7. Liberty to the parties to speak to the Minutes in relation to any Departure Application pursuant to the Child Support (Assessment) Act1989, upon written request made by either party to Judge Kelly’s chambers within 28 days.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Hinds & Charlton (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADC 2933 of 2012

MR HINDS

Applicant

And

MS CHARLTON

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. Before the Court are the parties’ competing applications in relation to their children’s high school enrolment.  This issue has been dealt with by the Court previously and orders were made on 14 August 2015 as follows:

   “1.The parties do all things necessary to enrol the children X born (omitted) 2006, Y born on (omitted) 2007 and Z born (omitted) 2009 for their secondary education at either (omitted) School or (omitted) School or such other co-educational high school as the parties may agree.

   2.The parties contribute to the costs of the children’s education as agreed between them on the basis that the father will meet the costs of the ongoing tuition fees and any compulsory school levies imposed by the children’s school and other educational costs and expenses will be shared on such basis as may be agreed between the parties.

   3.In the event the parties are unable to reach agreement in relation to sharing the further educational expenses by January 2018, then the children X, Y and Z shall be enrolled at either (omitted) High School or (omitted) High School.”

2. Those orders were made following a short hearing and reflected the Court’s assessment of the children’s best interests at that point in time, as indicated in the Reasons for Judgment.[1]  The Court hoped that the parties would be able to negotiate within the framework provided by the orders but unfortunately, that proves not to be the case.

   [1] Charlton & Hinds [2015] FCCA 3351

3. For the reasons that follow, the parties’ oldest child X (born (omitted) 2006) will commence his secondary education at (omitted) School (“(omitted) School”) for the year 7 “middle school” intake and his siblings Y (born (omitted) 2007) and Z (born (omitted) 2009) will follow their older brother to (omitted) School.

Background

1. The formal applications before the Court are the father’s Application in a Case filed 7 September 2017 and the mother’s Response filed 17 October 2017.   It is deeply disappointing to see Mr Hinds and Ms Charlton have been unable to resolve the issue of their children’s high school enrolment, even when the choice of schools was limited to two private co-educational schools and two public co‑educational schools.

2. Following the Court orders pronounced 14 August 2015 (“the 2015 Orders”) the parties completed an enrolment form for X to attend at (omitted) School and in early 2016 he was offered a position in the Year 7 intake at the school commencing in 2018.  The father acknowledges that he paid the enrolment fee at (omitted) School at that time, but points out that he also made it clear that he was reserving his rights to consider (omitted) School (“(omitted) School”) as an alternative.

3. In early 2017 X was offered a place at (omitted) School, commencing in 2018.  At this point it became clear that the father preferred the children attend at (omitted) School whereas the mother wanted to proceed with X’s enrolment at (omitted) School.

4. The parties entered into further negotiations and attended mediation in an effort to resolve this matter, but were unable to reach agreement.  Hence the father filed his Application in which he seeks the following orders:

   a)The parties cancel X’s enrolment at (omitted) School;

   b)The parties do all things necessary for X to be enrolled at (omitted) School in year 7 commencing in 2018, for Y to commence at (omitted) School in year 7 commencing in 2020 and for Z to commence (omitted) School in year 7 commencing in 2022;

   c)The Applicant pay all educational costs and expenses for the children’s enrolment at (omitted) School.

5. The mother filed her Response in which seeks orders as follows:

   a)The parties cancel X’s enrolment at (omitted) School;

   b)X commence at (omitted) School in 2019 commencing in Year 8;

   c)Y and Z also commence at (omitted) School in 2019;

   d)The father pay all other educational costs associated with the children’s attendance at (omitted) School.

6. The father argues that the issue in relation to the children’s schooling has already been determined in 2015 and that it is improper for the Court to now reconsider its earlier decision.  Counsel for the father, Ms Kari, relied upon the doctrine of res judicata in support of her client’s position.

Does the principle of res judicata apply?

1. Res judicata or cause of action estoppel arises as a defence to ongoing litigation.  It is defined in Halsbury’s Laws of Australia as follows:

   “In general terms, estoppel by judgment prevents a party to litigation in which a final judgment was given from raising, in any subsequent litigation between parties to prior litigation, any issue or cause of action determined by the judgment and any issue of cause of actions which could or should have been raised in the prior litigation.”[2]

   [2] Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Volume 12 at p.359, O21

2. The principle of res judicata has been considered by the Full Court.  In Kemeny v Kemeny (1998) FLC 92-806 the Full Court endorsed comments made by the trial Judge as follows:

   “The constituent elements of res judicata are set out in ‘The Doctrine of Res Judicata’ (citation omitted) as follows:

   1.  The decision was judicial.

   2.  The decision was in fact pronounced.

   3.  The Tribunal had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.

   4.  The decision was final and on the merits.

   5.  The decision to terminate the same questions as that raised in later litigation.

   6.  The parties to the later litigation were parties to the earlier litigation.”[3]

   Ms Kari argues that all of these elements exist in this dispute and therefore the Court should not – indeed, cannot – revise or reconsider its earlier decision.

   [3] Kemeny & Kemeny, (1998) FLC 92-806, para.

3. The relevant principles were discussed by O’Ryan J in Stein v Black (2000) FLC93-005.  His Honour considered the relevant authorities and concluded at para.92:

   “The essential characteristic of a final judgment is that it determines finally a dispute between the parties.  An order that may be reversed on appeal is nonetheless final, but it cannot be capable of variation by the Court which made it.”[4]

   [4] Stein v Black (2000) FLC 93-005 at para.92

4. Clearly the 2015 Orders meets the criteria identified in Kemeny. The Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 1975 to deal with parenting issues, including disputes relating to children’s school enrolment. The Orders were a final judicial decision and were made on the merits, after a defended hearing.  Equally clearly, the 2015 Orders relate to the same issue that is now before the Court and this litigation involves the same parties that were involved in the earlier proceedings.

5. The doctrine of res judicata is an expression of the principle of “finality of litigation”, which is an essential aspect of our judicial system. Ms Kari argues that the 2015 Orders dealt finally and comprehensively with the issue of the children’s school enrolment.  I agree.  The Court intended that the 2015 Orders would provide a final, binding framework for the parents to decide upon their children’s high school enrolment. 

6. However it is also well understood that this principle applies differently in relation to parenting disputes. In any parenting dispute before the Court, the overarching consideration guiding the Court’s decision is that the best interests of the children are paramount.[5]  It would be an improper use of judicial authority for a Judge to dismiss a parenting Application on the grounds of res judicata, if the existing Orders were not, or potentially not, in the best interests of the children.  This is precisely why the line of authority described as the “Rice & Asplund principle”[6] has developed, to apply some constraints upon ongoing litigation given the limited application of the res judicata principle.

   [5] Section 60CA

   [6] Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

7. In the present matter, while the factual background of the dispute clearly meets the identifying factors identified in Kemeny, the 2015 Orders included an ongoing obligation of negotiation.  The parties have been unable to meet that expectation, despite both parties making genuine efforts.  The proposed default outcome does not appear to be supported by either party. To now argue that the Court is precluded from further determining the issue cannot be in the best interests of X, Y & Z.

Do the Rice & Asplund  principles apply in this case?

1. Ms Kari argues that in addition to the principle of res judicata, the “Rice & Asplund principle” also applies in this matter.  The “Rice & Asplund principle” is a line of authority that has developed in the Courts as an acknowledgment that ongoing litigation between parents has a detrimental impact upon the children’s emotional welfare.  In Rice & Asplund and later decisions such as SPS & PLS (2008) FLC 93-363 and Searson & Searson [2017] Fam CAFC 119 it is noted that :

   “The rule is not the application of some esoteric principle but rather, the practical application of a principle designed to avoid endless litigation to the detriment of the relevant children in circumstances where otherwise the principles of res judicata do not apply.[7]

   [7] Searson & Searson [2017] Fam CAFC 119 at para 11

2. The Full Court in Searson & Searson succinctly summarised the authorities relevant authorities and said:

   “15.The ‘evil’ referred to [by Warnick J in SPS & PLS] is the undoubted harm to children of ‘a perennial football match between parents’ and the canvassing “again and again” of issues relating to their best interests.  That situation can in my view be distinguished from circumstances in which the parties express their agreement about parenting arrangements in a consent order but are now no longer in agreement and where it is said that the now absence of agreement is due to circumstances that have changed since the making of consent orders.”[8]

   [8] Ibid at para.15

3. Obviously this is not a situation where the previous orders were made by consent.  On the contrary, the Court determined the matter after a short hearing during which both parties gave evidence and were cross examined.  Nonetheless, the Full Court’s comments resonate in this present situation. The Court finalised the parenting litigation between the parties, however the very terms of the Orders required the parents to reach agreement, within the limited range of schooling options identified within the Orders.

4. The 2015 Orders set out a framework. First, the parties could enrol the children at either (omitted) School or (omitted) School (or another co-educational high school if agreed).  Second, the Orders clarify that the father will meet the cost of all ongoing tuition fees and any compulsory school levies imposed by the relevant school. The parties will then contribute to the children’s additional educational costs and expenses as agreed between them. 

5. The third step deals with the situation where the parties cannot agree about payment of those additional educational expenses.  If the parents are unable to agree about their respective contribution to the children’s additional educational expenses then the children are to be enrolled at a public high school. The final ‘fall back’ option, where the children would be enrolled at (omitted) High School or (omitted) High School, was only enlivened if the parents were unable to reach an agreement. 

6. To my mind, the analysis discussed above in relation to the principle of res judicata is equally relevant to the application of the Rice & Asplund principle.  The parents are unable to reach agreement about which school X should attend, nor can they agree when he should move from (omitted) Primary.  Both parties have filed an Application in a Case/Response seeking that the children attend at their preferred private school.  Neither party sought an order in terms of paragraph 3 of the 2015 Orders, albeit the father, through Counsel, now proffers that outcome.

7. In my view, if the father was truly content for X, Y and Z to attend at (omitted) High or (omitted) High then he would not have filed his present Application.  It would have been left to the mother to bring an Application seeking to vary or ‘interpret’ the 2015 Orders to ensure the children are enrolled at (omitted) School, rather than the father initiating these proceedings.

8. There is no prima facie evidence to suggest any substantial change in the children’s circumstances, but the Court’s reasonable expectation that these two intelligent, caring, committed parents would be able to negotiate (within the confined options left available to them by the 2015 Orders) was sadly misplaced.

9. In those circumstances it cannot be in the children’s best interests to leave this issue unresolved.  Ms Kari’s submissions in relation to res judicata and Rice & Asplund are both a correct statement of the law and prima facie, are applicable to the present case.  However if the Court were to accept her submissions, the parties would be left in a position where they will need to negotiate and choose between either public school on offer.  None of the evidence before me suggests that the parents are able to do so.

10. I conclude that either party is entitled to bring their Application before the Court and seek the Court’s assistance to resolve this impasse.  And it is an impasse.  Ms Kari points out that the parties have faltered at both the first and second steps.  They are unable to decide between (omitted) School and (omitted) School.  They are in dispute regarding their contributions towards the children’s additional educational expenses, in the event the children are enrolled at (omitted) School.  Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 2015 Orders the children should now be enrolled at either (omitted) High School or (omitted) High School.  Yet neither parent has sought that outcome in their Application in a Case or Response.

11. Ms Kari made it clear that her client was prepared to accept that outcome but with respect, the father cannot “run with the fox and hunt with the hound”.  He cannot invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to seek an order for X to attend (omitted) School in 2018 and then rely upon res judicata to prevent the mother making a similar application in relation to (omitted) School.

12. The Court exercised its proper jurisdiction to make final parenting orders in August 2015, by setting out a framework that empowered the parties to exercise their shared parental responsibility.  In pronouncing the Orders, the Court attempted to hand back their parental responsibility to the parents, by offering them a limited range of options.  It was then up to the parties to negotiate and reach agreement between the various options left open to them.   They were unable to do so.

13. It is difficult for the father to argue that the Rice & Asplund principles now apply to the present litigation when:

    (a) he is the party who commenced the present proceedings;  and

    (b) his Application is seeking a private school outcome in accordance with the previous orders (the children’s enrolment at (omitted) School);

    (c) his Application does not seek in the alternative that the default outcome specified in the 2015 Orders should apply.

14. The parents’ inability to reach agreement, even within the limited framework set out in the 2015 Orders, leaves the Court with no choice but to make the decision on their behalf, to ensure certainty and stability for the children.

What school should X attend and what year should his enrolment commence?

1. The father is prepared to meet all of the children’s educational expenses if they attend at (omitted) School, but not if they are enrolled at (omitted) School.  That engages the second step envisaged by the 2015 Orders, but the parties cannot agree about their respective contribution towards the children’s other educational costs and expenses.  The father also proposes that X commence at (omitted) School in 2018, in the Year 7 middle school intake, in accordance with the 2015 Orders. The younger children Y and Z would follow X and also move schools at the start of year 7 in 2020 and 2022 respectively.

2. Both Ms Kari and the mother referred to the previous hearing in 2015.  Ms Kari pointed out that on the day of the hearing, the mother promoted both (omitted) School and (omitted) School as suitable schools for the children, even though her formal application at that time was limited to public school options.  Ms Kari argues that it is illogical and inconsistent for the mother to now say that (omitted) School is a less desirable option than (omitted) School.  

3. The father will be meeting the children’s school fees at either school, but he is not offering to meet all of the children’s educational expenses if they are enrolled at (omitted) School.  Ms Kari reminded the Court of the comments made by me in my earlier judgment as follows:

   “the father is well within his rights to focus his financial support upon [that school] that he considers would be most advantageous for the boys and for Z.  He should not be criticised in that regard”[9]

   She submits that the same principle holds true today.  She further argues that the mother has offered to contribute only $400 per child per year towards their associated educational expenses, such as sports uniforms, school uniforms, shoes, laptops, books, extracurricular activities, an offer made in March 2017.  

   [9] Charlton & Hinds (supra) at para.16

1. It is hardly surprising the parents remained in dispute, if that was the extent of the mother’s proposed financial contribution.  The father argues this fact alone is sufficient for the Court to determine that the children should attend (omitted) School, to ensure all of the children’s educational and extracurricular expenses are covered, without further conflict between the parents.

2. The Court’s focus must always be on the best interests of the children.  In 2015 the Court was confronted with a dispute between the father’s preferred option of (omitted) School and (omitted) School (both single sex schools) and the mother’s first preference for a co‑educational State school, so that the children could eventually attend at high school together.  In a finally balanced matter, the emotional benefits for the children in attending the same school was the factor that weighed most heavily in my assessment of the children’s best interests.

3. The landscape confronting the Court today is different.  The Court is now faced with a decision between competing co-educational schools, in accordance with my earlier ruling.  Factors such as the convenience of the school location and the transport issues involved for each parent, but more importantly for the children, acquire higher significance.

4. The parties provided a great deal of evidence regarding the practical implications of the children’s enrolment at either (omitted) School or (omitted) School.  These practicalities are a particular issue for the mother and form the crux of her case before the Court. 

5. The mother lives in (omitted), which is a significant distance from both (omitted) School and (omitted) School (and indeed, from (omitted) Primary).  This is not new; the mother was living in (omitted) in 2015 and was aware of the travel involved when she promoted both schools as possible high schools for the children. 

6. The practical reality is that the children must travel a substantially longer distance to attend school when in their mother’s care.  This is not a criticism of the mother; many people decide that life in the (omitted) brings other benefits and advantages that offset the longer drive to school or work.

7. Within this context, there is no avoiding the reality that the children’s travel between (omitted) and (omitted) School will be far more onerous than their travel to between (omitted) and (omitted) School.  The father concedes that X would be spending an extra half hour on public transport each day, but points out that this only occurs when the children are in the mother’s care every second week.

8. He argued that the mother is overstating the travel difficulties, as the mother will continue to drive Y and Z to (omitted) Primary for the next few years and can drop X at (omitted) School as well, as it is nearby.  The mother agrees that she will be driving all the children to school in the morning wherever possible, certainly while Y and Z are attending primary school. 

9. As discussed in my earlier judgment, the travel to and from school was a relevant factor at that time, but did not weigh heavily in my decision making in 2015.[10]  I accept that the mother will endeavour to drive the children to school where possible and will continue to collect the younger children from out of hours school care at (omitted) School on most days.

   [10] Charlton & Hinds (supra) at para.19

10. I also accept her submission there may be occasional days when X may need to travel to school by public transport.  While the (omitted) School day starts earlier (8.15 or 8.20am) than (omitted) School (8.40am)[11], it is possible for X to catch the 6.50am bus leaving (omitted) which arrives at (omitted) School at 8.14am, just in time for the school day to commence at 8.20am.  Likewise, the return journey is achievable for X (and the other children in later years).  This journey involves one bus transfer in the city, not two transfers, as argued by the mother.

    [11] The parents were in dispute regarding (omitted) School’s start time.  Neither party presented any evidence on the topic.

11. X and his siblings may need to leave home very early if they are travelling to high school by public transport but I accept that this will only occur occasionally.  However, it is likely that the children will be travelling home from high school by public transport.  The journey from (omitted) School to (omitted) involves an extra half hour on public transport, compared to (omitted) School.  This is a significant factor in my view.

12. By contrast, the father lives in the (omitted) suburbs and works in the city.  He may find it more convenient for the children to attend (omitted) School, but it will not be greatly inconvenient if the children attend at (omitted) School, given that the father works in the city.  The public transport options from either school are far less onerous than from the mother’s home in (omitted).

13. Once again, this is a finely balanced matter. The s.60CC criteria that the Court must apply when assessing the children’s best interests are of limited assistance. I repeat my earlier findings that X, Y and Z are blessed to have two loving, competent parents. There is no criticism to make of either parent in terms of their parental capacity or their attitude to parental responsibility.

14. Accordingly, the Court returns to first principles and to my assessment of the children’s best interests.  Both parents are putting forward sensible proposals regarding the children’s future schooling, even though they have been unable to come to a meeting of minds on the topic. They agree that each school will provide a suitable educational environment for the children.  The father raised some concerns with the mother explaining his preference for (omitted) School, relating it to the school’s preferable subject choices, smaller class size and better “pastoral care”.  These matters are not set out to any extent in his Affidavit and they do not weigh in my determination today.   

15. My determination today is based upon my assessment of the impact of the Court’s decision upon the children and their day to day routines.  In a finely balanced matter, the impact of the additional travel required for the children to attend at (omitted) School is significant.  One half hour each day equates to two and one half hours each alternate week, which is an additional burden for the children.  This factor weighs strongly in favour of the children being enrolled at (omitted) School rather than (omitted) School.

16. I conclude that it will be in the children’s best interests that they be enrolled at (omitted) School.

When should the children commence school?

1. The mother proposes that all three children commence at (omitted) School in first term 2019.  She seeks to delay X’s progress to (omitted) School by one year, arguing that he is relatively immature and has experienced some behavioural difficulties in recent years.  She argues that it will be in his best interests to finish his primary school at (omitted) Primary where he has a good friendship network and will be in a leadership role in Grade Seven.

2. The father disagrees.  He argues that the parties’ previous plan – that the children all commence at High School in the Grade Seven middle school intake – is more appropriate.  This will allow X to commence at (omitted) School, as will most of his classmates.  While there may still be a significant intake in the year 8 level, X will have the advantage of being already settled in the school environment.  He will have established friendships and social groups and will have a settled “place” in the school community.

3. Both parties are putting forward sensible, child-focussed proposals.  On balance, I conclude that X should commence at (omitted) School in 2018, as was originally anticipated.  I am confident both parents will maintain contact with the school to ensure that X’s particular needs are attended to and supported by the school community.  I conclude that it will be more beneficial for X to move at this stage of his schooling, for the reasons the father has promoted.

4. In relation to the two younger children, I conclude they should also commence at (omitted) School in the relevant Grade Seven intake.  I appreciate it is more complicated for the mother to deliver the children to two different schools, but that was the reality she was always going to face, whilst Z was at primary school. 

5. It is unrealistic for the mother to expect the father to pay the additional school fees for three or four years, simply for the mother’s convenience. 

School fees and associated educational expenses

1. The final issue relates to the children’s school fees and associated expenses.  It is apparent that any final orders in this regard should properly be dealt with pursuant to a departure application under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989.  The following comments indicate the Court’s preliminary views on this topic.

2. The father previously offered to meet the costs of the children’s ongoing tuition fees and any compulsory school levies imposed by the children’s school, together with all other educational expenses, dependent upon the school that was chosen.  That offer was reflected in the 2015 Orders and should continue.

3. The issue now arises in relation to the associated educational expenses given that the children will be attending a school not of the father’s choosing.  The Court had hoped the parties may resolve this by negotiation, but that has not occurred.

4. The father enjoys a very comfortable income which enables him to pay the tuition fees and required school expenses. He has offered to meet all of the additional expenses as well, dependent on the choice of school.  Accordingly I am satisfied that he has the financial capacity to meet all of the children’s school related expenses.  I appreciate the mother’s financial circumstances are limited but her proposed contribution of $400 per child per year would barely be sufficient to meet the children’s high school expenses at a State school.   

5. In determining this matter, hope springs eternal in the Court’s mind.  Absent any other information, I consider it would be appropriate that the father meet the tuition fees and other expenses required by (omitted) School, as previously ordered.  Otherwise, it would be appropriate that both parents contribute towards the children’s additional educational expenses such as school uniforms, sports uniforms and equipment, school excursions, lap tops, and extracurricular activities. 

6. The parties should contribute to the children’s additional school related expenses as agreed between them.  Clearly the father has the financial capacity to meet these expenses and it may be appropriate that he make a greater contribution, given his financial circumstances. However, the mother also has an obligation to contribute towards the children’s school related expenses.  Her income is more limited, but I am confident she would be able to adjust her expenditure to support the children’s education, just as many other parents do.

7. I consider it would be appropriate to order that the parties contribute to the children’s additional educational and related expenses as may be agreed between them, but if they are unable to reach agreement the mother contribute 50% of those additional expenses up to a capped contribution for each child each year.  Her proposal of $400 per child is insufficient; I consider a contribution in the region of $1,000 per child may be more appropriate.

8. I now make orders as published at the commencement of these Reasons.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Kelly

Date:  29 November 2017