Hill v St Anthony's Tennis Club

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hill v St Anthony’s Tennis Club [2021] FCCA 66

File number(s): SYG 2827 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
Date of judgment: 22 January 2021
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Applicant is director of company that provided services to respondent under contract – respondent terminated contract after applicant lodged applications with the Fair Work Commission alleging respondent bullied him and contravened general protection provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) – respondent terminated the contract – applicant applies for relief under FW Act alleging contract was terminated in contravention of s 340 of the FW Act – applicant applied for interlocutory relief for reinstatement of contract – whether the applicant has reasonably arguable case that he has standing to apply for relief in relation to termination of the contract – whether applicant otherwise has reasonably arguable case that respondent contravened s 340 of the FW Act – whether balance of convenience favours the granting of interlocutory relief – application for interlocutory injunction refused.
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 340, 341(1), 342(1), 360, 361(1), 361(2), 365, 370(a), 370(b), 372, 539(1), 539(2), 545, 789FC

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), s 7(1)

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46

Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education [2010] FCA 284

Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32

Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148

Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064

Fair Work Ombudsman v Northcoast Security Services Group Pty Ltd & Ors (No.3) [2020] FCCA 521

Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204

Number of paragraphs: 48
Date of hearing: 15 January 2021
Place: Sydney
The Applicant: Appeared in person, by telephone
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr S Alexander of Alexanders Lawyers, by telephone

ORDERS

SYG 2827 of 2020
BETWEEN:

ANDREW JAMES HILL

Applicant

AND:

ST ANTHONY'S TENNIS CLUB ABN 69 475 998 584

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JANUARY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for an interlocutory injunction is dismissed.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 15 December 2020 the applicant, Mr Hill, filed an application with this Court for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) against the respondent, St Anthony’s Tennis Club (SATC). The proceeding was listed for a first court date on 2 February 2021.

  2. On 22 December 2020 there came to my attention an email a Mr Grass had sent to the Court Registry on 18 December 2020 on behalf of Mr Hill. In his email Mr Grass, who is not a lawyer, said he had been advised by the Court Registry “to make urgent representations to expedite Mr Hills [sic] request for an interlocutory injunction in…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Hill v St Anthony's Tennis Club*, the applicant, Mr Hill, sought interlocutory relief from the Federal Court of Australia. Mr Hill, through his company AJH Leisure Pty Ltd, had a contract with the respondent, St Anthony's Tennis Club (SATC), to provide tennis court management services. SATC terminated this contract after Mr Hill lodged applications with the Fair Work Commission alleging bullying and contravention of general protection provisions under the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth). Mr Hill alleged that the termination of his contract was in contravention of section 340 of the *Fair Work Act*.

The court was required to determine whether Mr Hill had a reasonably arguable case that he possessed standing to seek relief concerning the contract's termination. Additionally, the court had to assess whether Mr Hill had a reasonably arguable case that SATC contravened section 340 of the *Fair Work Act*, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of interlocutory relief, specifically an injunction for the reinstatement of the contract.

Manousaridis J found that Mr Hill had a reasonably arguable case that SATC terminated the contract for reasons that included, as a substantial and operative factor, Mr Hill's lodging of applications with the Fair Work Commission. Consequently, his Honour was satisfied that Mr Hill had a reasonably arguable claim for relief under section 545(1) of the *Fair Work Act* based on a contravention of section 340. However, when considering the balance of convenience, the court determined that any prejudice Mr Hill might suffer if no injunction was granted, but he succeeded at a final hearing, would be adequately compensated by an order for compensation. The court also weighed the prejudice SATC would suffer if an injunction were granted, including the engagement of a new service provider, and noted the delay in commencing proceedings.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Mr Hill's application for an interlocutory injunction.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The applicant’s application for an interlocutory injunction is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

I begin with the relevant facts as revealed in documents and as alleged by Mr Hill. For ease of expression, I will state the facts without regularly noting that the facts I set out are those that are alleged by Mr Hill. No statement of fact, however, is to be taken as a finding of the fact stated other than for the purposes of this application.ALLEGED FACTS SATC is a club that operates a tennis court complex. It is managed by a committee. Mr Hill is a member of SATC. In about November 2007 Mr Hill commenced providing to SATC the services of a “Tennis Court Manager/Facilitator”. Mr Hill did so through his company, AJH Leisure Pty Ltd (AJH), pursuant to the terms of an agreement contained in a “Job Description Form” (Contract). That document begins with the following:St Anthonys Tennis Club Inc.Job Description Form: AJH LEISURE PTY. LIMITED (Andrew Hill, Principal)LOCATION: St Anthony’s Tennis Club Courts, MARSFIELD, NSW.JOB TITLE: Tennis Court AdministratorREPORTS TO:SATC CommitteeTYPE OF POSITION WEEKLY PAY RATE:. . . $424.00 per week . . . x Contractor Under the heading “GENERAL DESCRIPTION” the document describes the required work of a tennis court administrator. These included organising tennis court bookings, club maintenance, court maintenance, and keeping SATC committee members informed of a number of issues. In addition to the Contract, Mr Hill has a contract with SATC under which SATC permits AJH to provide coaching services at SATC’s courts. Pursuant to that contract AJH has been hiring tennis courts from time to time for the purpose of undertaking coaching activities. Mr Hill claims that beginning in late 2019 and early 2020 members of SATC’s committee increasingly interfered with Mr Hill’s tasks under the Contract. In March 2020 Mr Hill raised concerns with SATC “regarding their interference, takeover and instruction [sic] in various aspects of” Mr Hill’s “contracted duties”. The committee “commenced bullying and harassing” Mr Hill and undermined Mr Hill’s authority and responsibilities in relation to ensuring the tennis courts abided by the COVID-19 restrictions. Mr Hill annexes what appears to be an extract from the minutes of the SATC committee meeting of 26 April 2020. The minutes relate to a motion to reopen the tennis courts following the further relaxing of the COVID-19 restrictions. Mr Hill, in his capacity of COVID-19 marshal, moved the motion. The minutes record that Mr Hill offered to ensure that those using the tennis courts will be supervised, and that those using the tennis courts will comply with the social distancing and other requirements of Tennis NSW, and the Commonwealth and (New South Wales) State governments. The minutes further record Mr Hill’s agreeing there would be no additional costs for the additional effort. Mr Hill says that SATC’s interference with the Contract included the matters of which Mr Hill was notified by a memorandum dated 31 May 2020 from Mr Bennett Tesara. The memorandum sets out a number of “changes to the role that you are fulfilling for SATC”, noting that “all the arrangements including your current agreed payment per month holds”. The changes related to the introduction of an online court booking system. The memorandum stated that all casual bookings would be done online; Mr Hill should direct to a specified link all enquiries he receives on how casual hirers can hire the tennis courts; Mr Hill should direct all enquiries by persons who intend to make permanent bookings to a specified email address; member bookings will be done by members via the online system; and Mr Hill must ensure that only persons who have paid for their bookings should be using the tennis court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied that Mr Hill has a reasonably arguable case that SATC terminated the Contract for reasons that included as a substantial and operative factor Mr Hill’s having lodged his applications with the FWC. Conclusion on apparent merits of claim For these reasons I am satisfied Mr Hill has a reasonably arguable claim for relief under s 545(1) of the FW Act against SATC based on a contravention of s 340 of the FW Act.BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE Mr Hill submits that unless the Contract is reinstated he will suffer economic hardship because he will not be earning the income he was earning under the Contract. Mr Hill also submits that without the Contract his tennis coaching business has been and will continue to be adversely affected. Mr Hill has not adduced evidence of any specific hardship from AJH not receiving payments under the Contract. Mr Hill has not adduced evidence, for example, that he cannot meet his day to day expenses because he no longer has the benefit of the Contract. To the extent AJH’s coaching business has been affected by SATC’s termination of the Contract, that would not be a relevant prejudice because it is not reasonably arguable that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the Contract was entered into for a purpose other than that revealed by its terms, namely, for AJH to undertake the work described in the Contract. For these reasons, I am satisfied that any prejudice Mr Hill may suffer if no injunction is granted, but if he succeeds at the final hearing, will be adequately compensated by an order for compensation, together with interest. If, contrary to my conclusion, the prejudice Mr Hill will suffer cannot be adequately compensated by an order for compensation, there is the prejudice SATC will suffer if an injunction is granted, but it succeeds at the final hearing. The principal prejudice is that SATC has engaged another person to provide services that AJH would have provided had SATC not terminated the Contract. Although it is reasonable to assume that it is open to SATC to terminate that other service provider’s engagement on the giving of a short period of notice, nevertheless, there is a likelihood there will be a period in which SATC will be required to pay two service providers for the same service. That is a prejudice that would offset any prejudice Mr Hill may suffer if an injunction is not granted. There is one other matter that is relevant to the exercise of discretion; and that is delay. SATC notified Mr Hill on 30 August 2020 it intended to terminate the Contract with effect on 28 September 2020, but Mr Hill did not commence this proceeding until 15 December 2020. Mr Hill submits he could not have lodged any application with the FWC until after his notice period had expired. That period expired on 28 September 2020, and Mr Hill lodged his application with the FWC on 1 October 2020. I have no reason to doubt that Mr Hill believed he could not make any application to this Court until after he lodged an application with the FWC under s 365 of the FW Act. That is the effect of s 370(a) of the FW Act. That paragraph, however, is subject to s 370(b) of the FW Act, the effect of which is that a person who is entitled to apply to the FWC under s 365 of the FW Act to deal with a dispute may make a “general protections court application in relation to the dispute” if “the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established