Hill v Iluka Corporation Limited - [2002] TASSC 30

[2002] TASSC 30

CITATION: Hill v Iluka Corporation Limited & Anor [2002] TASSC 30

PARTIES:  HILL, Richard Grant Manners
  v
  ILUKA CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 000 048 464)
  and
  RENISON LIMITED (ACN 004 490 304)

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  868/2001
DELIVERED ON:  23 May 2002
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  28 February, 15 April and 1 and 3 May 2002
JUDGMENT OF:  Master Holt

CATCHWORDS:

Limitation of actions - Extension of time - Arguable case - Explanation for delay - Prejudice - Exercise of discretion.

Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s5(3).
Aust Dig Limitation of Actions [55]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  D A Shelley
             First Defendant:      C P Webster
             Second Defendant: F V Moore
Solicitors:
             Plaintiff:  Page Seager
             First Defendant:      Wallace Wilkinson and Webster
             Second Defendant: Archer Bushby
Judgment Number:             [2002] TASSC 30
Number of Paragraphs:     18

Serial No 30/2002
File No 868/2001

RICHARD GRANT MANNERS HILL v
ILUKA CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 000 048 464)
and RENISON LIMITED (ACN 004 490 304)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT MASTER HOLT

23 MAY 2002

The application

By writ filed 26 July 2001, the plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries suffered by him in the course of his work at the Renison tin mine near Zeehan in Tasmania on about 9 March 1998. As the plaintiff has not received workers compensation payments the relevant limitation of actions legislation is to be found in the Limitation Act 1974, and not in the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. Section 5(1) provides that actions for damages consisting of or including damages in respect personal injuries are not to be brought more than three years after the date on which the cause of action accrued. Section 5(3), however, authorises the Court to extend that period for up to six years from the accrual of the cause of action if, after hearing the persons likely to be affected "in all the circumstances of the case it is just and reasonable so to do". The plaintiff seeks an extension of time to the date of the issue of his writ, namely, for a period of about 4½ months after the expiry of the primary limitation period.

The plaintiff is a geologist currently aged 33 years. He obtained an Honours Degree in Science at the University of Western Australia at the end of 1997 and commenced employment with the first defendant ("Iluka") in February 1998. His employment commenced with a two week course dealing with team building and management issues in the Blue Mountains in New South Wales. Immediately upon completion of that course, he was sent by Iluka to Zeehan in Tasmania, to commence work with the second defendant ("Renison") at its Tasmanian tin mine under the supervision of geologist, Mr Tim Hunter. The plaintiff had some below ground safety training, but within about two weeks of commencing work at the mine he had the accident which is the subject of these proceedings. His clothing issue had not arrived and he was wearing apparel principally…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2002] TASSC 30
Decision Date: 23 May 2002

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Hill v Iluka Corporation Limited, the plaintiff, Richard Grant Manners Hill, sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a workplace accident at a Tasmanian tin mine. The defendants, Iluka Corporation Limited and Renison Limited, argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas). The plaintiff applied for an extension of the limitation period under section 5(3) of the Act. The primary legal issue was whether it was just and reasonable to extend the limitation period for the plaintiff to bring his action.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had established an arguable case and whether the delay in bringing the proceedings was satisfactorily explained. The plaintiff, a geologist, had fallen down a ladder at the mine, sustaining injuries that led to ongoing back pain. The court accepted that the plaintiff's account of the accident was credible, noting that he had filled out an Incident Investigation form shortly after the accident, attributing the fall to his lack of familiarity with the underground environment. The court also accepted that the plaintiff had not deliberately concealed the true circumstances of the accident, and his delay in detailing the specific conditions contributing to the fall was understandable given his newness to the job.

The court further examined the explanation for the delay in bringing the proceedings. The plaintiff, who had legal training, had not been aware of the three-year limitation period but had consulted a lawyer shortly before the limitation period expired. The lawyer had mistakenly believed that the limitation period was six years and had filed the writ against the wrong defendant. The court found that the plaintiff's delay up until deciding to take legal action was satisfactorily explained by his lack of knowledge of the limitation period, the non-disabling nature of his injury, and his ongoing work and career.

The court also assessed whether the defendants would suffer prejudice if the limitation period was extended. The defendants argued that the passage of time would hinder their ability to defend the claim, particularly regarding the condition of the ladder and the availability of witnesses. However, the court concluded that the defendants had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the delay would cause material prejudice. The court noted that the defendants had not made a reasonable effort to locate key witnesses or obtain relevant records.

In conclusion, the court found that the justice of the case lay in granting the extension. Despite the plaintiff's delay in consulting a lawyer, the court determined that the plaintiff had acted reasonably given his circumstances. The court ordered that the time limited for bringing the action be extended to the date of the issue of the writ, 26 July 2001.

Orders