Hill v Fraser

[2025] NSWPICMP 496

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL
CITATION:	Hill v Fraser [2025] NSWPICMP 496
APPELLANT:	Charlie Anne Leah Hill
RESPONDENT:	Mark Noel Fraser
APPEAL PANEL
MEMBER:	Marshal Douglas
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Michael Hong
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Nicholas Glozier
DATE OF DECISION:	10 July 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; review of Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC); whether Medical Assessor (MA) sufficiently explained his ratings of the appellant’s impairment in several of the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS) categories; whether MA erred with his ratings of the appellant’s impairment in several of the PIRS categories; Appeal Panel found that MA adequately explained his ratings and correctly rated appellant’s impairment in all challenged PIRS categories other than concentration, persistence and pace but when that rating was corrected there was no change in the outcome; Held – MAC confirmed.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL

1. On 15 April 2025 Charlie Anne Leah Hill, the appellant, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Wayne Mason, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 21 March 2025.

2. The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):

   ·        the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and

   ·        the MAC contains a demonstrable error.

3. The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.

4. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.

5. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4^th ed
   1 March 2021 (the Guidelines).

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. The appellant was employed as a farm hand by Mark Noel Fraser, the respondent. On 8 April 2018, while working for the respondent, she jump started a tractor. The tractor ran over her causing her to suffer significant physical injuries and also a psychological injury that was diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder.

2. The appellant claimed compensation from the respondent for permanent impairment arising from her psychological injury. She relied on a report of consultant clinical psychiatrist Dr Bernard Chivaurah dated 4 April 2024. He assessed the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from her injury is 22% whole person impairment (WPI). That assessment was based on his rating of the appellant’s impairment in the several categories of conduct and function comprising the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scale (PIRS), as detailed in Chapter 11 of the Guidelines. His rating of the appellant’s impairment in self-care and personal hygiene, in social and recreational activities, in social functioning, and in employability was Class 3, in travel it was Class 2, and in concentration, persistence and pace (CPP) it was Class 4.

3. The respondent’s insurer denied liability to pay compensation to the appellant for permanent impairment from her psychological injury. It relied on a report of psychiatrist Dr Yajuvendra Bisht dated 7 November 2024. Dr Bisht assessed the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment is 7% WPI, which is below the threshold of at least 15% imposed by s 65A(3) of the WorkersCompensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) for a worker to be entitled to compensation for permanent impairment under s 66(1) of that Act. Dr Bisht’s ratings of the appellant’s impairment in the several PIRS categories were Class 2 for self-care and personal hygiene, social functioning, travel, CPP, and employability, and Class 3 for social and recreational activities.

4. Hence, a medical dispute arose between the parties. This resulted in the appellant initiating proceedings in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission), seeking it determine her claim for compensation for permanent impairment. Before that could occur the medical dispute between the parties relating to the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from her injury needed to be resolved and to that end a delegate of the President of the Commission on 6 March 2025 referred the medical dispute to the Medical Assessor to assess.

5. The Medical Assessor examined the appellant on 18 March 2025 to conduct that assessment. As said, he issued the MAC on 21 March 2025 wherein he certified he assessed the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from her injury is 7% WPI. That assessment was based on his rating the appellant’s impairment in the several PIRS categories as Class 2 for self-care and personal hygiene, travel, social functioning, CPP and employability, and Class 3 for social and recreational activities.

6. The appellant in her appeal against the Medical Assessor’s assessment of the medical dispute has challenged the Medical Assessor’s ratings of her impairment in the categories of travel, social functioning, CPP, and employability.

7. The reasons the Medical Assessor provided within the PIRS rating form attached to the MAC for rating the appellant’s impairment in travel as Class 2 are:

   “Ms Hill is able to drive locally to collect her groceries. She was able to drive from Airlie Beach to Home Hill only 2 weeks earlier accompanied by a friend. She has been overseas on a number of occasions and has travelled to Western Australia by plane. She is able to use public transport. She is mildly impaired.”

8. Within the MAC the Medical Assessor also noted within the history he detailed that immediately after the appellant suffered her injury, she was fearful of driving was unable to drive at all at that time and became hyper-vigilant when in a car. The Medical Assessor recorded that following the appellant’s then boyfriend returning to his native Germany the appellant forced herself to drive. The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant is presently always watching her rear-view mirror because she is fearful of being rear ended. He noted that the trip the appellant undertook two weeks between Airlie Beach and Home Hill two weeks before his examination of her was a distance of 176 kilometres. The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant does not now travel to attend her physiotherapist because he moved to an industrial area and she does not feel save to drive there.

9. The Medical Assessor provided the following reasons in the PIRS rating form for rating the appellant’s impairment in social functioning as Class 2:

   “Ms Hill has been in a relationship with her partner for the last 3 years. Relationships with extended family members are intact. She said she has a close friend with whom she has regular contact. Her wider social network has been significantly reduced because of anxiety and depression. She is mildly impaired.”

10. Within the MAC the Medical Assessor also recorded in the history he set out that the appellant’s relationship with her partner at the time of her injury ceased after he returned to Germany a few years after her injury.

11. The Medical Assessor’s reasons within the PIRS rating form for rating the appellant’s impairment in CPP as Class 2 are:

    “Ms Hill said she was never a big reader and now has even less interest in reading. She said she has the television turned on for company but does not watch particular programs. She described a poor memory and said it is necessary for her to write lists every day. She manages her own money online. She said she would like to do an online course on animal welfare if she could afford it. There was no evidence of impaired concentration throughout the 95-minute interview. She is mildly impaired.”

12. The Medical Assessor recorded within the body of the MAC that the appellant displayed a full range of appropriate affective expression during his examination of her, was fully oriented in time, person and place, and displayed no evidence of organic or psychotic psycho-pathology.

13. The Medical Assessor’s reasons in the PIRS rating form for rating the appellant’s impairment in employability as Class 2 are:

    “Ms Hill is working 20 hours/week in a reception position at a restaurant. She said she loves her job but could not do more hours because of pain. From a psychiatric point of view she is mildly impaired.”

14. The Medical Assessor noted within the history he detailed in the body of the MAC that the appellant can experience anxiety after working a difficult shift. Hew noted the appellant can work if she is anxious as she can manage to overcome her anxiety. The Medical Assessor noted that after spending a day at work the appellant often spends the next day sleeping in order to recover.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

1. The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.

2. As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the appellant to undergo a further medical examination. This is because the Appeal Panel came to the view that the appellant had not established the grounds for appeal on which she relied, and consequently the Appeal Panel neither has power nor reason to examine the appellant.[1]

   [1] New South Wales Police Force v Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1792 at [33]; Finnegan v Komatsu Forklift Australia Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 38 at [125]-[130]; Saveski v Brunjev Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 157 at [66].

3. During its preliminary review of the medical assessment the Appeal Panel also considered whether it should receive into evidence a statement the appellant signed on 15 April 2025.

4. Section 328(3) of the 1998 Act provides that evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to a medical assessment appealed against may not be given on an appeal by a party unless the evidence was not available to the party before the medical assessment and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party before that medical assessment. However, even though fresh evidence may meet the terms of s 328(3), an Appeal Panel is not required to accept the evidence if it is irrelevant or if it does not have “substantial prima facieprobative value, in terms of its particularity, plausibility and/or independent support”.[2]

   [2]Lukacevic v Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 112 at [78] and [102].

5. In her statement the appellant described several matters that had occurred to her subsequent to her injury, but before the Medical Assessor’s examination of her.

6. These included that after she was discharged from hospital following her admission immediately after her injury, she returned to her home because she had nowhere else to go.

7. She also described in this statement that she has no direct dreams or nightmares of the event in which she suffered her injury because she was rendered unconscious by the incident.

8. She stated that she has one friend in Airlie Beach who is a work colleague and with whom she does not socialise outside of work.

9. She said that two years ago she flew to England, where she was born, because she was missing her family. She flew with her partner. She also said that she flew to Western Australia before the COVID pandemic. She said that she has difficulty flying and has only flown alone once when she had no other choice. She said she had not been on public transport for years.

10. She said that she lives at Airlie Beach because it is quiet without traffic. She described having difficulty driving since her injury. She described frequently calling her partner when she is driving telling him that she cannot drive anymore. She said that she does not drive to get the groceries. She said that when she drove home with a friend, she knew that her friend could take over driving if needed. She said that she moved house so she could be closer to her workplace and now does not have to cross a road.

11. She said that there is strain in her relationship with her current partner.

12. She said that the Medical Assessor suggested that she study animals online.

13. She said that she frustrates her colleagues and her partner because she cannot stay focused on a conversation.

14. She said her current employer is very accommodating and the work she does requires less skill than the employment she has had in the past.

15. She said that her anxiety symptoms are more debilitating than her depressive symptoms. She said that she was close to tears during the examination by the Medical Assessor. She said she has largely stopped taking medications because of the side effects.

    The appellant submitted that the Appeal Panel should receive the evidence in her further statement because the evidence is of a medical kind in that it relates to matters relevant to the ratings of her impairment in the PIRS categories. The appellant submitted that her evidence in her statement addresses errors made by the Medical Assessor and his conclusions regarding his ratings in the PIRS categories. The appellant did not however, in her submissions identify the actual errors that she contends the Medical Assessor made. 

16. The appellant submitted that her evidence in her further statement is plausible and has independent support because it is consistent with the evidence of Dr Chivaurah and the evidence that she provided in statements she made on 5 March 2024 and 21 January 2025.

17. The appellant submitted that if the Appeal Panel were not to receive her statement into evidence the system objectives stipulated within s 3 of the 1998 Act would not be met. Further, she submitted the Appeal Panel’s refusal would be inconsistent with s 42 of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 which provides that the guiding principle of that Act and the Commission’s rules in their application to proceedings in the Commission is to facilitate the just, quick and cost effective resolution of real issues in proceedings before the Commission. She submitted it would also be inconsistent with s 43(1) and (2) of that Act which provides for proceedings in the Commission to be conducted with as little formality and technicality as proper consideration in the matter permits and enables the Commission to inform itself on any matter in the manner in which the Commission thinks appropriate as a proper consideration in the matter permits.

18. In substance, the appellant in her further statement provides evidence, in the main, of her function and her symptoms as it was at or before the medical assessment. It does not therefore meet the terms of s 328(3) because that evidence was available to the appellant before the medical assessment and could reasonably have been obtained by her before the medical assessment. That is, the appellant prior to the medical assessment could have reasonably provided a statement detailing the examples of her function and her symptoms that she has detailed in her statement of 15 April 2025. The appellant in her statement does not describe any event that occurred after the medical assessment or details any new symptoms that arose after.

19. Further, the appellant did not in her further statement provide any detail or example of the strain she says she experiences in her current relationship. She did not detail or provide any example of how she is unfocused in conversation. That particular evidence consequently lacks particularity such that it provides insufficient probative value for the Appeal Panel to accept it into evidence.

20. In any event, given that the appellant’s further statement does not provide any further evidence of matters which she could have given evidence in the form of an earlier statement the Appeal Panel cannot receive it into evidence. The appellant provided a statement dated 24 January 2025 which contained similar material as to her view of her impairment in the PIRS classes which was in the evidence before the Medical Assessor. The Appeal Panel not receiving her statement into evidence does not defeat the system objective as defined in s3 of the 1998 Act nor the guiding principle stipulated in s 42 of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020, and this is because the Appeal Panel is unable by virtue of the terms of s 328(3) to receive the statement into evidence. The requirements too of s 43 of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 cannot allow an Appeal Panel to receive evidence that a specific provision, that is s 328(3) of the 1998 Act, specifically prevents the Appeal Panel receiving.

EVIDENCE

1. The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

SUBMISSIONS

1. Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.

2. In summary the appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor did not provide reasons for why his assessment differed from the assessment Dr Chivaurah made of her permanent impairment. The appellant highlighted that the Medical Assessor said that “I am unable to explain this difference” and submitted that this was a cursory remark that did not discharge the Medical Assessor’s obligation to explain why his assessment differed from the assessment of Dr Chivaurah. The appellant submitted there was “a tension in this matter” such that more than one conclusion was available regarding the Medical Assessor’s ratings, and that required the Medical Assessor to explain why his assessment differed from Dr Chivaurah’s assessment.

3. The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor “applied the PIRS on the basis of his discretion”. The appellant submitted that with respect to CPP he rated her as he did because he took into account a matter that was irrelevant, being that she was able to participate in the 95-minute assessment process. The appellant submitted that was not relevant to whether her impairment should be rated as Class 2 or 3. The appellant submitted there is no correlation between that matter and any of the descriptors for a Class 2 or Class 3 rating.

4. The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor “applied the PIRS on the basis of his discretion” by also rating her impairment in employability as Class 2. The appellant submitted that a Class 2 rating “pertains to a worker being able work [sic] in a fulltime basis and the duties require comparable skill and intellect as an [sic] appellant’s pre-injury job”. The appellant submitted that she now works in a different position and cannot work more than 20 hours.

5. The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor’s rating of her impairment as Class 2 in travel and in social functioning “were not in line with the medical and appellant [sic] evidence before him”. The appellant did not identify what evidence she contends is not in line with the Medical Assessor’s ratings.

6. In reply, the respondent submitted that the Medical Assessor was, in accordance with paragraph 1.6 of the Guidelines required to base his assessment of the appellant as she presented on the day of assessment, taking into account the relevant medical history and available medical information. The respondent submitted, relying on Jenkins v Ambulance Service of NSW,[3] that the descriptors provided in the various tables within Chapter 11 of the Guidelines are not prescriptive and are intended only to provide guidance to the Medical Assessor. The respondent submitted that what is important is the Medical Assessor’s evaluation of the material available and the exercise of his clinical expertise.

   [3] [2015] NSWSC 633.

1. The respondent submitted that for an error to be found an Appeal Panel must be satisfied that it was not open to the Medical Assessor, based on the material before him, to rate the appellant’s impairment as he did. The respondent relied on Ferguson v State of NSW[4] (Ferguson). The respondent submitted that having regard to the history disclosed in the material and the appellant’s report of symptoms to the Medical Assessor at the time of clinical examination it was open to the Medical Assessor to allocate a Class 2 rating in CPP, which was the same as Dr Bisht assessed the appellant’s impairment.

   [4] [2017] NSWSC 887.

2. The respondent submitted that the history the Medical Assessor recorded suggested that the restriction in the hours the appellant works is due to physical symptoms rather than the effects of a psychological injury. The respondent submitted it was open to the Medical Assessor to rate the appellant’s impairment in employability as Class 2 based on his clinical judgment. The respondent submitted that the appellant has not demonstrated how a higher rating was applicable based on the available evidence.

3. The respondent noted that the appellant did not detail how the Medical Assessor had fallen into error with respect to his rating of the appellant’s impairment in travel and social functioning. The respondent submitted that based on the history the Medical Assessor recorded it was open to him to rate the appellant’s impairment as Class 2 in both travel and social functioning. The respondent noted that Dr Chivaurah rated the appellant’s impairment in travel as Class 2.

4. The respondent submitted that the fact that the Medical Assessor had a different opinion than Dr Chivaurah with respect to the appellant’s permanent impairment from her injury does not constitute a demonstrable error.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

1. The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.

2. In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons.

3. Section 325(2)(c) and (d) of the 1998 Act requires a Medical Assessor to set out the reasons for his or her assessment and set out the facts on which the assessment is based. That obligation clearly requires a Medical Assessor to explain their opinion but it does not require a Medical Assessor to explain why their findings or their reasons upon which they make an assessment, differ from the findings or opinions of others. A Medical Assessor is required to consider the material that has been placed before the Medical Assessor, insofar as that is relevant to the assessment. That material will include the opinions of any specialist doctor on whose opinion a party has relied to support a claim or oppose a claim. It will also include the history the Medical Assessor has obtained during the assessment. So long as the Medical Assessor has considered that material, and has set out the facts upon which his or her opinion is based and has explained his or her opinion, then the Medical Assessor will not have erred by virtue only of having a differing opinion than that expressed by another doctor.[5] A Medical Assessor is not required to explain why he or she did reach an opinion he or she did not form; that is, the Medical Assessor is not required to explain why his or her assessment has differed from the assessment of another.[6] Essentially, and in any event, by abiding the obligation under s 325(2) it will be apparent why the Medical Assessor’s opinion differs.

   [5]Wingfoot Aust Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43 (Wingfoot) at [47]; Ferguson at [24].

   [6] Wingfoot at [56].

4. Hence, the Appeal Panel does not accept the appellant’s submission to the effect that there is a demonstrable error in the MAC as a consequence of the Medical Assessor not providing adequate reasons for why his assessment of her permanent impairment differed from the assessment of Dr Chivaurah made.

5. Turning to the Medical Assessor’s rating of the appellant’s impairment in travel, the descriptors provided in Table 11.3 of the Guidelines for a Class 2 impairment are, “mild impairment: can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour”. The descriptors provided for a Class 3 impairment are:

   “Moderate impairment: cannot travel away from own residence without support person. Problems may be due to excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment.”

6. These descriptors of activities are examples only. They are not prescriptive and are intended only to provide guidance to a Medical Assessor when determining the extent of the seriousness of a worker’s impairment within each of the PIRS categories.[7]

   [7] Jenkins v Ambulance Service of NSW [2015] NSWSC 633 at [65]; Rogers v Health Services Union NSW [2025] NSWSC 291 at [43]-[45].

7. As noted earlier the appellant did not identify the evidence with respect to which she contended the Medical Assessor’s rating of her impairment in travel is inconsistent. The history the Medical Assessor obtained included that the appellant is anxious when driving and is quite shaken when she drives her motor vehicle. The reasons the Medical Assessor provided for rating the appellant’s impairment in travel as Class 2 include that she has flown overseas and has flown to Western Australia. The Medical Assessor reasoned that the appellant is able to use public transport, and that is correct, given the appellant has travelled by plane to different destinations.

8. The Medical Assessor’s reasons for rating the appellant’s impairment as Class 2 also included that she drove between Airlie Beach to Home Hill accompanied by a friend. The Medical Assessor noted within the MAC that the distance she drove on that occasion was 176 kilometres. The Medical Assessor’s reasons for rating the appellant’s impairment in travel as Class 2 also included that she drives locally to collect her groceries.

9. The history the Medical Assessor obtained included that the appellant is able to drive a motor vehicle but is quite shaken after doing so. He was clearly aware the appellant was anxious with respect to travelling.

10. In the Appeal Panel’s view the Medical Assessor has taken into account relevant facts to rate the appellant’s impairment in travel. The fact that she may experience anxiety because of her driving, and indeed may prefer to have a companion with her when doing long trips, does not, in the Appeal Panel’s view, elevate her impairment to a Class 3 rating. Essentially, she has the capacity to travel locally without a support person and is able manage public transport, albeit with anxiety. This is the same rating as made by Dr Chivaurah and for the same reasons

11. The Appeal Panel considers that the Medical Assessor weighed the relevant facts to rate the appellant’s impairment in travel. He did not consider anything that was irrelevant. He was aware of all significant factual matters. In the Appeal Panel’s view, it was not apparent from the MAC that the Medical Assessor, in the exercise of his clinical judgment, was affected by any misunderstanding.

12. In the Appeal Panel’s view the Medical Assessor has not erred with respect to his evaluation of the appellant’s impairment in travel, and rating it Class 2.

13. The examples for a Class 2 and Class 3 impairment provided in Table 11.4 of the Guidelines for social functioning are:

Class 2	Mild impairment: existing relationships strained. Tension and arguments with partner or close family member, loss of some friendships.
Class 3	Moderate impairment: previously established relationships severely strained, evidenced by periods of separation or domestic violence. Spouse, relatives or community services looking after children.

1. Again, the appellant with respect to the Medical Assessor’s rating of her impairment in this category did not identify the evidence that she contends is inconsistent with the Medical Assessor’s rating of her impairment. The Medical Assessor’s reasons for rating appellant’s impairment as Class 2 includes that the appellant has intact relationships with her partner of three years and with her extended family and also has regular contact with a close friend. He took account of the fact that her wider social network has been reduced because of her anxiety and depression. He noted significant support from her mother for fertility treatment.

2. Dr Chivaurah also recorded that “there are no conflicts in the current relationship ‘he helps me a lot'”, which is inconsistent with a class three rating.

3. In the Appeal Panel’s view that squarely accords with a severity of impairment indicated by the descriptors for a Class 2 impairment. Again, it is not apparent from the MAC that the Medical Assessor has considered other than relevant facts to make his assessment and it is not apparent that his evaluation of the appellant’s impairment was affected by any misunderstanding. In the Appeal Panel’s view there is no error demonstrated from the MAC in the Medical Assessor rating the appellant’s impairment in social functioning as Class 2.

4. The descriptors provided in Table 11.5 for a Class 2 impairment for CPP are:

   “Mild impairment: can undertake a basic retraining course, or a standard course at a slower pace. Can focus on intellectually demanding tasks for periods of up to 30 minutes, then feels fatigued or develops headache.”

5. For a Class 3 impairment they are:

   “Moderate impairment: unable to read more than newspaper articles. Finds it difficult to follow complex instructions (eg operating manuals, building plans), make significant repairs to motor vehicle, type long documents, follow a pattern for making clothes, tapestry or knitting.”

1. The Appeal Panel considers that the Medical Assessor did make an error in rating the appellant’s impairment in CPP as Class 2. The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant watches television for company but does not watch any particular programmes, which is suggestive of her having poor concentration and problems with persistence. The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant must make lists because of her poor memory. The Medical Assessor noted that whilst the appellant was never a big reader, she now has even less interest in reading.

2. Whilst the Medical Assessor noted that the appellant did not demonstrate any impaired concentration during his interview of her, because the appellant has a poor memory, and must rely on lists, and is now a poor reader with insufficient concentration or persistence to focus on television programmes, the Appeal Panel considers that the Medical Assessor erred in his evaluation of the appellant’s impairment in CPP. There is no evidence, beyond the observation in the assessment itself, of prolonged focus, or capacity to undertake further training or courses Her impairment is of a severity that is greater than that described by the descriptors of Class 2 and consequently the Medical Assessor ought to have rated her impairment as Class 3.

3. The examples provided in Table 11.6 of the Guidelines for a Class 2 and Class 3 impairment in employability are:

Class 2	Mild impairment. Able to work full time but in a different environment from that of the pre-injury job. The duties require comparable skill and intellect as those of the pre-injury job. Can work in the same position, but no more than 20 hours per week (eg no longer happy to work with specific persons, or work in a specific location due to travel required).
Class 3	Moderate impairment: cannot work at all in same position. Can perform less than 20 hours per week in a different position, which requires less skill or is qualitatively different (eg less stressful).

1. The Medical Assessor detailed in the history that the appellant works as a receptionist at a restaurant for 20 hours a week over the course of three or four days. He noted that her work causes her anxiety but she is able to manage to overcome that. He was aware that she often has to sleep the day following a shift in order to recover.

2. The Medical Assessor in the reasons he provided for rating the appellant’s impairment as Class 2 noted that the appellant is unable to work more hours than she does because of pain from her physical injury. In her statements the appellant states she cannot work fulltime and at times calls in sick, but makes up hours later. Anxiety travelling to work is not conduct assessed in this category. She states that work is her highlight and that her employers accommodate her physical limitations. Noting that the appellant feels anxiety during her shift, although she can manage it, the Appeal Panel considers that the appellant’s limit of 20 hours a week work would also be due to her psychological injury which may contribute to fatigue after some shifts, limiting more shifts per week. It is not apparent that the Medical Assessor weighed that circumstance. However, that circumstance does not, in the Appeal Panel’s view, change the result. In other words, the consideration of that circumstance does not elevate the appellant’s rating above Class 2.

3. The appellant was employed as farm hand at the time of her injury. Her employment now is in a reception position at a restaurant. It can be inferred that the appellant in her current employment must deal with patrons of the restaurant, assist with allocating patrons to their seats, and manage reservations. Those tasks are of a different nature than what the appellant would have done in her employment as a farm hand, in that they do not require any physical effort on the part of the appellant, but in terms of the intellectual and interpersonal demands they would be at least the equivalent of those she was doing as a farm hand, and no less psychologically stressful.

4. In other words, the appellant is working 20 hours a week in a comparable position in terms of stress, intellectual demands and skills, and that accords with the severity of impairment indicated by the examples provided for a Class 2 impairment. The Medical Assessor consequently did not err by rating her impairment as such.

5. The Appeal Panel found the Medical Assessor erred by not rating the appellant’s impairment in CPP as Class 3, but correcting that error makes no difference to the outcome in that the median class score remains as 2 with the aggregate score increasing to 14, which in accordance with Table 11.7 of the Guidelines converts to 7% WPI.

6. For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 21 March 2025 should be confirmed.