[2008] HCATrans 345
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S202 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
GLENN ANDREW JOSEPH HICKSON
Applicant
and
GOODMAN FIELDER LIMITED
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 2008, AT 11.23 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.S. BELL, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.J. HOOKE, for the applicant. (instructed by Beilby Poulden Costello)
MR L. KING, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S. LAWRANCE, for the respondent. (instructed by Eakin McCaffery Cox)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Dr Bell.
MR BELL: Your Honours, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) manifests an unequivocal intention that where a worker receives common law damages by reference to his or her contributory negligence, his or her obligation to repay previously received workers compensation payments is reduced to the extent of any reduction in the common law verdict for contributory negligence. Your Honours see that in section 10(2) of the Act, which is conveniently reproduced in the application book at page 7. That provision, and section 9, is at the heart of the statutory construction questions raised by this appeal.
Now, section 10(2) reflects the clear legislative policy that to the extent that an injured worker cannot recover by reason of his or her own fault, payments received under the no fault workers compensation scheme are to be retained, no windfall either to a worker or an employer.
The important question in this appeal, and in practice it is an extremely important question which extends, as I will seek to demonstrate, not only in New South Wales but in the context of Victorian legislation as well – the important question in the present case is whether the same statute dictates, one, a different result and, two, a less favourable result for the worker in circumstances where he or she settles the common law claim in the context of allegations of contributory negligence as opposed to litigating it through to a verdict, having findings of contributory negligence and consequential reduction.
By majority the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Justices Giles and Hislop, so held that it did, or on its proper interpretation, the Act should produce or does produce that different result, and that was a decision reached over the dissent of Justice Hodgson and in the face of what, in our submission, is a very clear and a very strong decision of the primary judge, Judge Kearns.
As a result of the decision, on the facts of the present case – and I go to the facts just simply to illustrate the practical consequences – Mr Hickson, my client, who is a paraplegic, injured on his way home from work when his bicycle was struck by a car, will be obliged to repay the entirety of just over $600,000…
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- Case
- [2008] HCATrans 345
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the phrase "net profit" as used in the deed of settlement was to be interpreted according to accounting standards or in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words, taking into account the context of the deed. The court was required to determine the correct method for calculating the profit figure upon which Hickson's entitlement was based.
The High Court held that the phrase "net profit" in the deed should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, informed by the context of the agreement, rather than by reference to specific accounting standards. The court reasoned that the parties had not expressly incorporated accounting standards into the deed, and therefore, the plain language of the clause, understood in its commercial context, was paramount. The court found that the calculation method adopted by Goodman Fielder did not accurately reflect the ordinary meaning of "net profit" as contemplated by the deed. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court for redetermination of the amount payable to Hickson.
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