Hicks v Western Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hicks v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 1490

NATIVE TITLE – future acts – right to negotiate – arbitral hearing – whether State negotiated in good faith – preliminary issue – condition on power to conduct arbitral hearing – Tribunal finding that State negotiated in good faith – appeal against Tribunal decision by native title party – motion for stay of arbitral hearing – relevant considerations – prejudice – fragmentation of proceedings – order refused.

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 36, s 169, s 170

WILFRED HICKS AND OTHERS ON BEHALF OF THE WONG-GOO-TT-OO GROUP v THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
W6005 OF 2002

FRENCH J
22 NOVEMBER 2002
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W6005 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

WILFRED HICKS AND OTHERS ON BEHALF OF THE WONG-GOO-TT-OO GROUP
APPLICANTS

AND:

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The time limited for hearing the motion be abridged to enable it to be heard today.

2.The motion is adjourned to 3 February 2003 at 9.30am.

3.The appeal is set down for directions on 3 February 2003 at 9.30am.

4.The appeal is provisionally set down for hearing on 4 March 2003 at 10.15am.

5.There is liberty to apply at short notice.

6.Costs today reserved.

7.The other native title parties before the Tribunal be named as respondents to the appeal and copies of the notice of appeal, these orders and these reasons for decision be served upon them.

8.The additional respondents joined as second and third respondents respectively pursuant to the preceding order are:

(i)David Daniel, Daisy Moses, Roger Barker, Jill Churnside, Trevor Solomon and Les Hicks on behalf of the Ngarluma People and Bruce Monadee, Woodley King, Kenny Jerrold, Mary Walker, Bruce Woodley, Michelle Adams, Jimmy Horace, Linda Ryder and Judy Albert on behalf of the Yindjibarndi people which was accepted for registration on 14 July 1999 (‘the Ngarluma/Yingjibarndi native title party’); 

(ii)Valerie Holborow, Kevin Kelvin Cosmos and Robert Boona on behalf of the Yaburara and Mardudhunera Native Title claim group which was accepted for registration on 1 August 1996 (‘the Yaburara/Mardudhunera native title party’).

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W6005 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

WILFRED HICKS AND OTHERS ON BEHALF OF THE WONG-GOO-TT-OO GROUP
APPLICANTS

AND:

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE:

22 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ON MOTION TO STAY ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
OF NATIONAL NATIVE TITLE TRIBUNAL

  1. On 9 February 2000, the State of Western Australia gave notice under s 29 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), of its intention to compulsorily acquire native title rights and interests in land in the Shire of Roebourne. The land is in the vicinity of Dampier and Karratha. It includes land in the Burrup Peninsular, Intercourse…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1490
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hicks v Western Australia concerned the applicants seeking an appeal from a decision of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Council (the Tribunal) regarding the proposed acquisition of land in Western Australia. The applicants, representing various native title groups, argued that the Tribunal did not have the authority to conduct a substantive inquiry into the acquisition. They sought a stay of the Tribunal’s decision pending the outcome of their appeal to the Federal Court.

The primary legal issue was whether the applicants had the right to appeal the Tribunal’s decision and, if so, whether a stay should be granted to prevent the implementation of the decision. The court had to consider the statutory framework, particularly section 170 of the Native Title Act, which provides the court with the power to make orders affecting the operation or implementation of a decision appealed against, if such an order is appropriate for securing the effectiveness of the appeal. The court also had to examine whether the applicants’ appeal was properly framed under the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court.

The court concluded that the applicants' appeal was within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court as conferred by section 169(5) of the Native Title Act. While the applicants cited the wrong rule (O 52 r 17) for their stay application, the court recognised that the correct statutory basis for a stay was section 170 of the Native Title Act. The court found that a stay was necessary to secure the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal because, without a stay, the substantive hearing would proceed, potentially rendering the appeal nugatory.

In light of the court’s findings, it made several orders. It abridged the time for hearing the motion, adjourned the motion, set down the appeal for directions, and provisionally set the appeal for hearing. It also directed that the additional native title parties be named as respondents to the appeal and served with relevant documents. The court reserved costs and granted liberty to apply at short notice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time limited for hearing the motion be abridged to enable it to be heard today.

2. The motion is adjourned to 3 February 2003 at 9.30am.

3. The appeal is set down for directions on 3 February 2003 at 9.30am.

4. The appeal is provisionally set down for hearing on 4 March 2003 at 10.15am.

5. There is liberty to apply at short notice.

6. Costs today reserved.

7. The other native title parties before the Tribunal be named as respondents to the appeal and copies of the notice of appeal, these orders and these reasons for decision be served upon them.

8. The additional respondents joined as second and third respondents respectively pursuant to the preceding order are:

(i) David Daniel, Daisy Moses, Roger Barker, Jill Churnside, Trevor Solomon and Les Hicks on behalf of the Ngarluma People and Bruce Monadee, Woodley King, Kenny Jerrold, Mary Walker, Bruce Woodley, Michelle Adams, Jimmy Horace, Linda Ryder and Judy Albert on behalf of the Yindjibarndi people which was accepted for registration on 14 July 1999 (‘the Ngarluma/Yingjibarndi native title party’);

(ii) Valerie Holborow, Kevin Kelvin Cosmos and Robert Boona on behalf of the Yaburara and Mardudhunera Native Title claim group which was accepted for registration on 1 August 1996 (‘the Yaburara/Mardudhunera native title party’).

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
Section 170 which is relevant to the present application provides: “170(1) Subject to this section, the institution of an appeal to the Federal Court from a decision or determination of the Tribunal does not affect the operation of the decision or determination or prevent the taking of action to implement the decision or determination.(2) If an appeal is instituted in the Court from a decision or determination of the Tribunal, the Court or a Judge of the Court may make such order staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of either or both of the following: (a)the decision or determination of the Tribunal or a part of that decision or determination; and (b)the decision or determination to which the proceeding before the Tribunal related or a part of that decision or determination; as that Court or Judge considers appropriate for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal.(3) The Court or a Judge of the Court may vary or revoke an order at any time. (4) An order: (a)is subject to such conditions as are specified in the order; and (b)has effect until: (i)if a period for the operation of the order is specified in the order – the end of that period or, if a decision is given on the appeal before the end of that period, the giving of the decision or determination; or(ii)if no period is so specified – the giving of a decision on the appeal.”Contentions and Conclusions The applicants’ submissions invoked O 52 r 17 in aid of the stay orders sought. But that rule relates to appeals proper in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal Court by s 169(5) of the Native Title Act is original jurisdiction even when exercised by a Full Court. For it is an appeal against a decision or determination of an administrative body. Appeals from decisions or determinations of the Tribunal are dealt with in O 78 rr 22 to 30. There is no provision in that rule for a stay order in relation to the decision appealed against. The primary source of power to make such an order is s 170 of the Native Title Act although no doubt s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would also be a source of power. In s 170 the power in subs (2) to order a stay or to make an order otherwise affecting the operation of a decision or determination appealed against is conditioned upon the requirement that the Court considers the order “appropriate for securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal”. That condition mandates consideration by the Court of what is appropriate for securing the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal. So if, absent a stay, the subject matter of the appeal would be lost or the relief sought rendered nugatory, then it might be said that a stay would be appropriate in the requisite sense. The applicants’ appeal puts in contention the authority of the Tribunal to conduct a substantive inquiry into whether the proposed acquisition should be done. The applicants contend, in effect, that absent a stay, the substantive hearing will proceed on its existing timetable and the benefit they seek from the appeal which, if successful, would require a return to negotiation, would be lost. For that reason a stay would not only be appropriate but necessary to secure the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal. I so characterise the applicants’ submissions more favourably than they deserve for they were directed to O 52 r 17 which does not contain the conditions set out in s 170(2).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

Full text does not contain this section.