Herriott Services Pty Ltd v Creevey
[2009] QSC 419
•21 December 2009
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Herriott Services Pty Ltd v Creevey [2009] QSC 419
PARTIES:
HERRIOTT SERVICES PTY LTD
ACN 086 980 216
(applicant)
v
JANET LOUISE CREEVEY
(first respondent)
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)FILE NO:
BS8650 of 2009
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Originating Application
DELIVERED ON:
21 December 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 October 2009
JUDGE:
Mullins J
ORDER:
The registrar of titles is directed to rectify the title in the freehold land register to the estate in fee simple of Lot 18 on RP902676 County of Fitzroy Parish of Nanango Title Reference 50152678 by restoring the applicant as the registered owner
CATCHWORDS:
REAL PROPERTY – TORRENS TITLE – INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE – EXCEPTIONS TO INDEFEASIBILITY – FRAUD OR FORGERY – where applicant seeks rectification of the title to the property in the freehold land register – where applicant seeks to be restored as the registered owner – where respondent relied on a deed of compromise alleged to have been signed by the sole director and shareholder of the applicant to sign transfer of the property on behalf of the applicant – where signatures of the sole director and shareholder of the applicant on the deed of compromise were forged – where the transfer of the property from the applicant to the respondent was registered as a result of the fraud of the respondent
Evidence Act 1977, s 59
Land Title Act 1994, s 187Duong v Vo [2009] WASC 210, considered
Gawne v Gawne [1979] 2 NSWLR 449, considered
Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647, considered
R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271, consideredCOUNSEL:
RB Dickson for the applicant
The first respondent appeared in personSOLICITORS:
Dillons Solicitors for the applicant
Ms Paula Clark claims to be the sole director of the applicant. The applicant owned the property at Knowles Street, Nanango (the property) from which it conducted its business. On 15 May 2009 Ms Creevey (the respondent) attended at the property and claimed to be the owner and handed an unsigned copy of a deed which named Ms Clark and the respondent as the parties (the May deed) to Ms Clark. It was on that day that Ms Clark then became aware that a transfer of the property from the applicant to the respondent had been registered on 8 May 2009. Ms Clark then caused her solicitors to lodge caveat 712410813 on behalf of the applicant in respect of the property on 15 May 2009. This proceeding was commenced on 11 August 2009 to prove the interest claimed under the caveat. The applicant seeks rectification of the title to the property in the freehold land register by restoring the applicant as the registered owner.
When the proceeding was commenced, it was based on the allegation made by Ms Clark that the transfer of the property was procured by the fraud of the respondent on the basis she had caused Ms Clark’s signature to be forged on the transfer as the director/secretary of the applicant. The respondent acknowledged, however, that she had executed the transfer on behalf of the applicant, but asserted that she was entitled to do so, in reliance on her ownership of the shares in the applicant and her appointment as the director of the applicant, as a result of a deed of compromise which she claimed was signed by Ms Clark on 25 April 2009 (the April deed) and the minutes of an extraordinary general meeting of the applicant held on 25 April 2009 which she also claimed were signed by Ms Clark.
The issue in this proceeding then became whether the April deed and the minutes of meeting dated 25 April 2009 (collectively exhibit 1) were signed by Ms Clark.
The April deed was typed. Under clause 1 of the April deed, Ms Clark agreed to transfer her shareholding and beneficial interests in the applicant and its subsidiaries to the respondent as at the date of the deed and, under clause 2 of the deed, the respondent agreed to make no further claims against Ms Clark in any court in Australia and to make no claims against Ms Clark’s residential property in Nanango. Under clause 5 of the deed the respondent agreed not to take physical possession of the business conducted at the property for at least 14 days from the date of the deed and to advise Ms Clark prior to her doing so. Although not named as parties to the April deed, a handwritten statement was added after the parties’ signatures on the second page of the deed to the effect that Julia Catchpole (Julia) and Cassandra Catchpole (Cassandra) (who are the respondent’s daughters) agreed to be bound by the terms of the deed in the same manner as the respondent. Julia and Cassandra signed below that statement as well as the first page of the deed and the minutes of the meeting.
The minutes of the meeting were also typed with the date of 25 April 2009 inserted in handwriting and showed Ms Clark and the respondent as the attendees. The minutes recited that an extraordinary general meeting had been convened on that day at the residential address of Ms Clark for the sole purpose of transferring the shareholding of Ms Clark to the respondent as “the newly appointed Director and Shareholder” and that the transfer of the shareholding in the applicant was “in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Deed of Compromise signed by the attendees today.”
Relevant history of dealings between the parties
The respondent is a former wife of Mr Leonard Catchpole who died on 24 December 2006. There are two children of that relationship, Julia who was born in 1988 and Cassandra who was born in 1989. The respondent and Mr Catchpole separated in 1992 and were divorced in 1997. Ms Clark married Mr Catchpole in 1999 and was still married to Mr Catchpole when he died. Mr Catchpole died intestate.
Shortly before Mr Catchpole’s death an application that had been brought in the Federal Magistrates Court by the respondent on behalf of her daughters seeking child support against Mr Catchpole was summarily dismissed by the Federal Magistrate on 7 December 2006. The respondent applied for permission to appeal the Federal Magistrate’s decision and that application was opposed by Ms Clark. That proceeding was in abeyance whilst the appointment of an administrator to Mr Catchpole’s estate remained unresolved.
Ms Clark applied to this court to be appointed as the administrator of Mr Catchpole’s estate. The respondent had lodged a caveat against Ms Clark’s application and the application was also opposed by Julia and Cassandra. On 10 October 2008, Ms Clark, the respondent, Julia and Cassandra entered into a deed (the October deed) to settle all disputes which had arisen between them including the proceedings in relation to Mr Catchpole’s estate (which at that time were being heard by the court) and those arising under the Family Law Act 1975. The respondent and her daughters did not have legal representation for the October 2008 proceedings or for the October deed. Ms Clark was represented in the October proceedings and the negotiation and execution of the October deed by the lawyers who act for the applicant in this proceeding. The October deed provided for a specified sum to be paid from the estate to each of Julia and Cassandra (which sums were paid), for certain steps to be taken in relation to the distribution of Mr Catchpole’s ashes (about which Julia and Cassandra had complaints) and recited the delivery of identified chattels by Ms Clark to Julia and Cassandra. There were mutual releases given unless the October deed and Julia and Cassandra consented to Paula being appointed administrator of Mr Catchpoles’ estate which occurred.
On 2 February 2009 orders were made in the Federal Court which required the respondent to undertake steps to progress her application for permission to appeal the Federal Magistrate’s decision, including the filing of a summary of argument by 17 April 2009. Ms Clark as the administrator of Mr Catchpole’s estate applied to Warnick J for the dismissal of the respondent’s application for permission to appeal the Federal Magistrate’s decision, because of non-compliance by the respondent with orders made on 2 February 2009. The application for dismissal was heard on 17 April 2009 and the respondent had not filed the summary of argument by that date. Warnick J nominated 23 April 2009 as the day for delivery of judgment and dismissed the respondent’s application on 23 April 2009. The respondent attempted to file the summary of argument on 22 April 2009. Although it was not essential to the reasoning of Warnick J, he observed that the October deed also seemed “a significant impediment to the mother’s application being pursued to success.” It is apparent from Warnick J’s reasons that the respondent was aware of the intention of Warnick J to deliver that judgment at the time it was given.
Evidence of Ms Clark
There were four affidavits of Ms Clark which were filed on behalf of the applicant in this proceeding. Ms Clark also gave oral evidence. Ms Clark was emphatic in both her affidavits and her oral evidence that she did not have any meeting with the respondent between the October 2008 proceedings and 15 May 2009 or any meeting with the respondent and either or both of her daughters on 25 April 2009 and that she did not sign the April deed on 25 April 2009 or any other date. She stated that she had not seen the respondent following the settlement of the Supreme Court proceedings on 10 October 2008 until the respondent arrived at Nanango on 15 May 2009 and handed her the May deed. The May deed was a different version of the April deed and contained clauses not found in the April deed which imposed additional obligations on Ms Clark, such as to provide evidence to support the respondent’s claims against other persons, such as Ms Clark’s solicitors.
On the evening of 26 April 2009 Ms Clark had gone into the office in her home at Nanango to look for some bank statements and could not find them and noticed that a lot of other papers were also missing and complete files were empty. Ms Clark had found the front door on the applicant’s factory unlocked on each of 18 and 19 April 2009 and she thought that may have been when the break-in to her home office also occurred. She reported the break-in at her house to police on 26 April 2009.
Despite the nature of the allegations put by the respondent during the course of her cross-examination of Ms Clark, Ms Clark did not depart in any way from her position that she did not sign the April deed or the minutes of extraordinary meeting of the applicant dated 25 April 2009.
Evidence of the respondent
The respondent swore two affidavits that she filed in this proceeding and also gave oral evidence. Much of her affidavits is objectionable or irrelevant. The fact that the respondent had prepared them herself no doubt has some bearing on the deficiencies in them. Although not legally qualified, she has had experience working in legal offices for over 20 years. It is curious that in these affidavits the respondent does not deal directly with the circumstances in which she asserts the April deed was signed by Ms Clark on 25 April 2009. The respondent has lengthy paragraphs dealing with peripheral matters, but approaches the execution of the April deed obliquely. An example of this is paragraph 15 of the respondent’s affidavit filed on 17 September 2009 (document 5). This affidavit is responsive to the earlier affidavit of Ms Clark. Paragraph 15 states:
“I strongly refute the, or any, allegation of forgery. The signature on the document in question, is my signature as I declared at the time. My daughters did not fly down to Brisbane and drive out to Nanango with me for a social visit to Paula Catchpole. For all we knew, she could have been out of town, but for the fact that there had been dialogue preceding the agreed time for the signing of the Deed. Though we could never trust any undertaking by Paula Catchpole, we had every reason to believe that she would uphold the terms of the Deed, if for no other reason, but to avoid the very strong likelihood of her losing much more property than Herriott Services, including her residence.”
Another example of an oblique reference to the execution of the April deed is the opening sentence of paragraph 3 of the respondent’s affidavit filed on 30 September 2009 (document 23) (the second affidavit):
“Neither the girls nor I ever trusted Paula Clark at the time of signing the Deed, but concluded that she would comply with the terms, when considering the alternative.”
The respondent’s version of the circumstances that resulted in the signing of the April deed is suggested in her second affidavit. In summary, the respondent asserts that she was investigating aspects of the evidence that Ms Clark had given in the October 2008 proceedings, she had evidence that Ms Clark had put false evidence before the court in that proceeding and she raised these matters with Ms Clark when she visited her at her home on 18 April 2009. The respondent asserts that she left some documents with Ms Clark (including a draft deed of compromise and a list of key points about contradictions between facts and Ms Clark’s testimony) and told her that if she had not heard from her by the following Wednesday that she would take certain action in relation to the alleged false evidence. The respondent claims that she was telephoned by Ms Clark on Tuesday 21 April 2009 and informed by Ms Clark that she agreed to enter into the deed that had been proposed by the respondent.
In her oral evidence the respondent said that she and Cassandra walked up the back stairs of Ms Clark’s house and they went into the kitchen and the documents were signed on the bench in the kitchen and that Ms Clark was standing up (without bending over), as she signed.
The respondent was a most unimpressive witness. When a discrepancy in events or documents was pointed out to her in cross-examination, she mostly responded with an incredible explanation. A good example is in relation to the transfer of the property from the applicant into her name. She had signed the transfer on behalf of the applicant in the name of “Catchpole” and her signature was witnessed by one justice of the peace. On the same date she signed the transfer as transferee in the name of “Creevey” with a different justice of the peace witnessing her signature. Her lengthy and complicated explanation (at Transcript 1-89 to 1-90) is extraordinary and unbelievable. I have concluded that I should be cautious about acting on the respondent’s evidence, particularly where it is not supported by other evidence which I accept.
Evidence of the respondent’s daughters
The respondent had filed affidavits of Julia and Cassandra and both of them gave evidence by video link. The loyalty they feel for the respondent is evident.
There was much in their affidavits that was irrelevant and inadmissible.
I accept that Julia and Cassandra accompanied the respondent to Nanango on the weekend of 25 and 26 April 2009. They travelled by motor vehicle. On Saturday 25 April 2009 Julia remained in their vehicle that was parked outside Ms Clark’s residence while the respondent and Cassandra went inside the residence. Julia stated in paragraph 5 of her affidavit:
“I only saw Paula on the veranda when we came and when we left.”
During cross-examination, Julia clarified that she did not actually see Ms Clark on this occasion, but assumed that an arm she saw was Ms Clark’s arm (at Transcript 1-10):
“I saw an arm, an extra arm in – when I turned to my right when I was sitting in the vehicle, I saw an arm, my sister, my mother’s parts of their bodies, their shoulder side-views. This is all I could say I saw.
…
Well, I saw the arm of to me what looked like a female arm at Paula’s colouring and a bit of shirt, so yes I assumed that was Paula’s arm on her property, so-----”
Julia therefore provides no corroboration of her mother’s version about meeting Ms Clark and getting her to sign the April deed and minutes of meeting on 25 April 2009.
Cassandra set out her recollection of the signing of the April deed in paragraph 5 of her affidavit (document 24):
“We arrived at Paula's house later in the afternoon. Julia stayed in the car and mum and I went to the back verandah where Paula was standing. We went in to the kitchen to sign the documents. Mum had two copies, one for Paula and one for her. There was an argument about a bank form mum wanted. Paula said mum could have it when she took over the business. Mum said no. Mum said she wanted the form. Paula then went to her office and I followed her a bit of the way and saw my grandmother's lamp in one of the bedrooms and I said I wanted it. Paula told me to get out. Paula has shoved me to the ground before, so as angry as I was, I wasn't going to argue with her. There was another argument because the form had not been filled out. Mum filled out the form, making Paula bring out more documents to make sure it was correct. It was then agreed that we would come back the next day to get the form, once it was signed by Noel Baker and other documents mum wanted. I think I remember mum writing a list of what she wanted and left it with Paula. Paula said she wanted me and Julia to sign the Deed as well and we all signed on the kitchen bench and I took the Deeds out to the car for Julia to sign. We gave Paula her copy and left.”
When Cassandra was being cross-examined, I intervened in an attempt to draw out her recollection of what occurred when she attended at Ms Clark’s house, including what was said and by whom. Cassandra dealt with her entry into the house (at Transcript 1-62):
“Well, we parked at the side. I remember I walked around. I saw her on the back porch. I walked around the back and up the back stairs. I walked in to near where the kitchen is, that was when I went into the house. It was the only place I remember being in the house. We used her breakfast bar bench thing to lay the two documents out, both originals, copies like of the same thing.”
When I asked Cassandra to say what she heard said, she stated:
“Honestly, I don't remember everything that was said, and under oath I would rather - I honestly on my life could not remember word for word what was said.”
Cassandra stated that she first saw Ms Clark standing in the back porch and when asked whether anyone said anything to anyone, she stated that she believed her mother was talking to Ms Clark when she was looking around the property and the following evidence was the given (at Transcript 1-63):
“So you weren't with your mother when she was talking----? -- I was right next to her. I just don't recall word for word what was said, that's all, and I don't want to try and remember because the whole thing, I just wish it was over. I remember looking around and we walked around the porch and then up the stairs, which are opposite to where we parked, and I walked up there through the back door kind of thing into the kitchen breakfast bench where we laid two documents out. Mum did actually, I just stood next to her. Paula read them through thoroughly. I was looking around.
So you were there?-- I was looking------
So you were there and saw Ms Clark read the documents?-- Yes. Yes, and I was looking around at the inside of her house. I wasn't walking. I was just looking, because there is a lot of things that I miss of my Dad's and stuff I am not sure where they ended up. So she went to her bedroom and I followed her down the hallway and looked in and saw my grandmother's lamp and she said to me "Get out", and I went back to the kitchen area and there is glass in the front of where the breakfast bar is and I was looking out at the Valley, there is a large Valley. My Mum was then signing at that point and Paula had come back out to join us, and they were actually discussing a document, that's right, and that's what I think she went to get it, I don't know. She came back and they decided to pick - I think - I don't know what was said word for word, I am afraid, but I remember her coming back out to the breakfast bench and then she signed because Mum had signed. She had read it. Mum had signed, she signed or whatever, and then that was pretty well it. Then Paula suggested that I sign, so I did, and - well, that both of us sign, so I did, and then I took them, both documents out to my sister to sign, and then I came back and my Mum met me on the stairs because she was outside the house by that point, and then Paula got a copy and we took - Mum took one, I should say, and I just remember leaving, walking back to the car and my sister was driving and that was it.”
Cassandra was cross-examined on another document that had been lodged with the registrar of titles in respect of the property. It was the settlement notice 712665095 lodged on 17 August 2009 in respect of a transfer of the property from the respondent to Cassandra. The settlement notice shows a signature that looks like “C Catchpole” with an execution date of 17 August 2009 inserted. The signature on the settlement notice bears no resemblance to Cassandra’s signature on her affidavit or the April deed. When asked in cross-examination whether the transferee’s signature on the settlement notice was her signature, she responded (at Transcript 1-66) that it may have been and that it resembled her signature in a hurry. When I asked whether she had signed any settlement notice for the Titles Office in August 2009, Cassandra stated (at Transcript 1-66):
“No, not that I remember, but there was a lot of documents - when I see my Mum, I don't really go up to Cairns often and we have been going to this Court thing for so long now and when I go up there she usually has a lot of things for me to read and sign and I could have quite possibly signed that and not remember, but that does resemble my signature.”
Cassandra was then shown and cross-examined on the transfer of the property from the applicant to the respondent. Her attention was drawn to the transferor’s signature which looks like “C Catchpole.” She was asked to look at the signature and the observation was made by Mr Dickson of Counsel that it looked like the signature in the settlement notice as she was then asked (at Transcript 1-71) whether the signature on the transfer was her signature. She responded in the affirmative. That was the signature that the respondent admitted placing on the transfer in the capacity of the director and secretary of the applicant.
Cassandra was very emotional whilst giving her evidence. Cassandra was only three years old when her parents separated and therefore for almost all her life has endured the acrimony arising from her parents’ dispute over child support and the subsequent proceedings on the death of her father between her mother and Ms Clark. In the course of giving her evidence she displayed intense loyalty to her mother and I concluded that she was inclined to say in her evidence what she thought would be most helpful for her mother (even if she did not have a true recollection of the matter about which she was giving evidence). The fact that she asserted that the signature in the name of Catchpole on the transfer was her signature, when it was her mother’s signature, confirms the conclusion that I reached about Cassandra’s evidence that it was unreliable. The fact that she could clearly recall the layout of the interior of Ms Clark’s home, but recalled little conversation that she could attribute to Ms Clark, suggests that Cassandra did enter Ms Clark’s home, but without Ms Clark being there.
Evidence of the forensic document examiner
Although the applicant commissioned and paid for the report from forensic document examiner Mr Heath, the report was tendered at the hearing by the respondent and was marked exhibit 3. Mr Heath was called by the respondent, attended at the hearing and gave oral evidence.
Mr Heath was given the April deed to examine to determine whether the questioned signatures “Paula A Clark” contained on the April deed were false or genuine signatures. Mr Heath was provided with eight documents containing original signatures of Ms Clark, two copy documents containing original signatures of Ms Clark and a sheet of prepared specimen signatures of Ms Clark. As a result of his examinations, Mr Heath concluded that the questioned signatures “Paula A Clark” on the April deed were written by the one writer, and the specimen signatures “Paula A Clark” and “Paula Clark” written on the other documents (apart from one of the copy signatures) were written by the one writer. The exception was the copy signature which was too poor to be used for examination purposes. Mr Heath concluded that the three questioned signatures “Paula A Clark” contained on the April deed and minutes of meeting were genuine signatures written by the provider of the specimen signatures which was Ms Clark.
Mr Heath made the following observations in his report:
“The questioned signatures appear more slowly and carefully completed than the specimen signatures examined.
Questioned signature number 1 is somewhat fragmented in completion whilst still containing letter formations consistent with the other questioned and specimen signatures provided.
It is noted that the lower case 'r' contained in the last name 'Clark' appears to be a different construction to the 'r' formation present in the specimen signatures. An examination of handwriting contained on document 5 [Statutory Declaration 20.05.09] illustrates a sample of the particular style of 'r' formation present in the questioned signatures.
It is noted that the full stop present between the 'A' and last name 'Clark' of the questioned signatures, appears as a horizontal stroke whereas the specimen signatures often illustrate a vertical stroke or a dot formation.
An examination of the specimen handwriting contained on document 5 [Statutory Declaration 20.05.09] reveals that the specimen provider often uses a horizontal stroke to dot the 'i' formation and uses the horizontal stroke formation in document 2.
This difference between questioned and specimen signatures is not considered to be evidence of different authorship.
It is noted that both questioned and specimen signatures are very consistent in the construction of the remaining letters contained in the signature.”
Mr Heath concluded that the questioned signatures are genuine signatures and that the possible scenarios that were most applicable to these signatures were his scenarios 2 and 3:
“2.The questioned signatures are genuine signatures modified by the writer in some obvious features for later disavowal.
3. The questioned signatures are normal natural signatures containing some unusual letter variations not generally used by the writer.”
Mr Heath in his oral evidence confirmed that he was certain that the signatures on the April deed were written by the author of the specimen signatures, Ms Clark, and that he would exclude entirely the possibility that Ms Clark did not sign the April deed. Mr Heath accepted that there were some slight variations in the signatures when compared to some of the specimen signatures and that “there is some degree of slowness in their completion”, but that the signatures were “fluent and natural” and that, if they were forgeries “they are very, very good ones and no-one is going to tell that they are.”
Did Ms Clark sign the April deed and accompanying minutes?
As Ms Clark is claiming that she did not sign the April deed, she is alleging fraud against the respondent. That is a serious allegation which must be taken into account in determining whether Ms Clark has proved her claim on the balance of probabilities: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-362. The issue of whether Ms Clark signed the April deed must be decided by considering all the evidence: Gawne v Gawne [1979] 2 NSWLR 449, 453, 454-455, 456. Mr Heath’s opinion is one aspect only of the evidence and it would be erroneous in a case where there is contrary evidence to treat the expert evidence as being decisive, merely because it is described as expert evidence: Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647 at [155] and Duong v Vo [2009] WASC 210 at [129].
The trier of fact is entitled to compare disputed handwriting with any handwriting that is genuine and act upon its own conclusions in relation to whether the disputed handwriting is genuine: s 59(2) Evidence Act 1977. Where there is evidence from a handwriting expert, that task should be undertaken, however, by the trier of fact paying particular attention to the expert evidence on the issue: R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271, 280 [61].
When considering whether Ms Clark signed the April deed and accompanying minutes, the timing of the events is critical. Ms Clark and the respondent had compromised all proceedings between them by the October deed. Although the respondent in breach of that deed was continuing with her application in the Family court, Ms Clark was seeking to bring that litigation to an end by an application that was heard on 17 April 2009, when the respondent asserts she made her first visit to Nanango to raise the allegations that she claims convinced Ms Clark to enter into the April deed. By that date the respondent was in breach of the directions to file a summary of argument in the Family Court, and yet the respondent asserts that Ms Clark agreed to enter into the April deed on 21 April 2009. If that was the case, why would the respondent seek to file her summary of argument in the Family Court on 22 April 2009? It strains belief that Ms Clark who had lawyers acting for her in the Family Court proceeding would be dealing separately with the respondent, at the time when the respondent was in default in complying with orders in the Family Court application. The fact that the respondent was not dealing directly with the respondent in April 2009 was confirmed by the immediate response of Ms Clark to engage her solicitors to protect the interest of the applicant on being provided with the May deed on 15 May 2009 that resulted in this proceeding.
I found Ms Clark’s evidence to be straightforward and much more convincing than the respondent’s evidence relating to the April deed. Despite the support gained for the respondent’s evidence by Mr Heath’s report, I am satisfied that this matter is one of those examples where the handwriting expert’s opinion is displaced by the evidence of the circumstances prevailing at the time that the April deed was alleged to have been signed. After all, Mr Heath’s opinion is based on a comparison of signatures and is not more than an opinion.
I am satisfied that Ms Clark did not sign the April deed and accompanying minutes and the signatures which purport to be her signatures on those documents are forgeries and were caused to be placed there by the respondent. Those forged documents were then relied on by the respondent to complete and lodge the transfer of the property dated 7 May 2009 and the subsequent settlement notice. .
Order
As the transfer of the property from the applicant to the respondent was registered, as a result of the fraud of the respondent, it is appropriate to make an order pursuant to s 187(1) of the Land Title Act 1994. I order that the registrar of titles be directed to rectify the title in the freehold land register to the estate in fee simple of Lot 18 on RP902676 County of Fitzroy Parish of Nanango Title Reference 50152678 by restoring the applicant as the registered owner.
I will hear submissions on costs.
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