Hermann and Victor
[2008] FamCA 462
•26 June 2008
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HERMANN & VICTOR | [2008] FamCA 462 |
| FAMILY LAW – ORDERS – Contravention – mother changed children’s school without consent of father or Court contrary to injunction – previously found mother contravened order without reasonable excuse – whether serious disregard of obligation under order – serious disregard not established – matter to be determined under Subdivision E – appropriate penalty – consideration of decision of Full Court in Elspeth & Peter; Mark & Peter and John & Peter (Penalty and Costs) (2007) FLC 93-341 regarding availability of bonds for less serious contraventions – order pursuant to s 70NEB(1)(a) that mother attend assessment for and, if suitable, attend post- separation parenting program. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 65LB, 70NAC, 70NAE, 70NAF, 70NEB, 70NEC, 70NFA, 70NFB & 70NFF |
| Dobbs and Brayson (2007) FLC 93-346 Elspeth & Peter; Mark & Peter and John & Peter (Penalty and Costs) (2007) FLC 93-341 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Hermann |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Victor |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Legal Services Commission |
| FILE NUMBER: | ADF | 3753 | of | 1999 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 26 June 2008 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Adelaide |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Dawe J |
| HEARING DATE: | 31 March 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | N/A |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Self-Represented |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Lee |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Croydons |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | N/A |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Legal Services Commission |
Orders
The mother Ms Victor must within 21 days contact the program provider Anglicare KidsAreFirst at … and arrange an appointment on or before 29 August 2008 for an initial assessment as to the suitability for their post-separation program.
The mother must attend the appointment for the initial assessment at any reasonable time and place nominated by the provider.
If assessed as suitable, to attend the programs nominated by Anglicare.
Leave is given to the father and Independent Children’s Lawyer to provide the KidsAreFirst program with a copy of this order, the Reasons for Judgment made this day and Reasons for Judgment made the 31 March 2008.
It is requested that the KidsAreFirst program provide a certificate relating to the attendance of the mother following the completion of the program.
The Court to provide a copy of this order to the program provider.
Liberty to the mother to apply to vary the time and dates in this order if the program provider cannot provide suitable appointments.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Hermann & Victor is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
FILE NUMBER: ADF 3753 of 1999
| Mr Hermann |
Applicant
And
| Ms Victor |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The father brought proceedings against the mother alleging that she contravened an order of the Court which restrained her from changing the children’s school enrolment without his consent or order of the Court. The mother admitted the contravention but claimed that she had reasonable excuse.
Hearing
The contravention proceedings were heard on 14 and 31 March 2008. The father was unrepresented. The mother was represented by Ms Lee. At the commencement of the contravention proceedings the Court excused the Independent Children’s Lawyer from attendance at the contravention hearing.
On the 31 March 2008 I made findings and determined that the mother had contravened the order without reasonable excuse (see earlier judgment).
I reserved my decision on the questions of serious disregard of the mother’s obligation under the order and the penalty to be imposed. This was necessary due to the need to consider the implications of the Full Court decisions of Dobbs and Brayson (2007) FLC 93-346 and Elspeth & Peter; Mark & Peter and John & Peter (Penalty and Costs) (2007) FLC 93-341.
Background and Chronology
The contravention application brought by the father was filed on 4 February 2008 (document 98). It asserts that the mother enrolled the children J and P in S Primary School in January 2008 contrary to the orders of 27 July 2006. The orders of 27 July 2006 include paragraph 14 “that the mother be restrained from changing the children’s enrolment from [E] Primary School without the consent of the father or by order of this Court.”
The children of the parties are J born in July 1998 (now aged 9) and P born in March 2000 (now aged 8).
There has been considerable litigation between the parties. There are now 109 documents on the file.
The current proceedings in relation to parenting orders commenced in December 2005. At the time of the hearing before me on 14 March 2008 the final parenting orders trial had been listed as a pool matter on 17 March 2008. It was not reached. The trial date was vacated with a direction for the matter to be listed at the next available date. It was necessary to conclude the contravention proceedings before the trial concerning the final parenting orders could proceed.
The issue of the children’s schooling has been a contentious matter before the Court on previous occasions. The order in paragraph 14 of the July 2006 order was not made by consent but was made upon the father’s oral application and was made to apply “until further order”.
The orders of 27 July 2006 provided:
“NOT BY CONSENT BUT NOT OPPOSED IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:-
1.That the parents consult and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision in relation to the children [J] born on […] July 1998 (“[J]”) and [P] born on […] March 2000 (“[P]”) in relation to major long term issues including:-
(i)education;
(ii)health and;
(iii)changes to childrens’(sic) living arrangements.
2.That the children live with the mother.
3.That the children spend time with the father as follows:-
(i)each alternate weekend from Friday after school until Monday before school extended to Tuesday before school if the preceding Monday is a public holiday;
(ii)each intervening Wednesday from after school until Thursday before school;
(iii)for the first half of each short school holiday period from the conclusion of school on the last day of term until 4.00 pm Saturday in the intervening weekend;
(iv)from 3.30 pm until 7.30 pm on each of the children’s birthdays if such birthday falls on a non school day and from after school to 5.30 pm if such birthday falls on a school day provided that the father shall permit the children to spend time with the mother upon the same terms on any occasion that their birthdays fall during time spent with the father;
(v)for the second half of the Christmas school holiday period until 4.00 pm the Thursday before the commencement of the school year and for this purpose the parties shall calculate the total number of school holiday days excluding special occasion contact and ensure that each party shall have equal days;
(vi)for the Christmas period from 2.30 pm Christmas Eve to 2.30 pm Christmas Day;
(vii)for Easter from 10.00 am Easter Thursday to 5.00 pm Easter Monday commencing Easter 2008 and each alternate year thereafter;
(viii)Father’s Day each year from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm PROVIDED THAT in the event Mother’s Day falls during the time the children spend with the father the father shall return the children to the mother at 9.00 am until 5.00 pm;
(ix)by telephone communication each Tuesday and Thursday at 6.30 pm with the father to telephone the children PROVIDED THAT the mother shall be permitted to telephone the children on the same terms during any week the children are with the father.
4.That the father’s time spent with the children as set out in paragraphs 3(i) and 3(ii) be suspended during all school holidays and shall recommence on the first weekend of the school term.
5.That the father be at liberty to contact the children’s school and the mother do authorise the school to provide to the father copies of all school reports, newsletters and the like and the father be at liberty to attend all school functions to which parents are normally entitled to attend PROVIDED THAT the father attend at a separate time than the mother.
6.That all handovers that cannot take place at school occur inside the [H] Police Station with the mother to be at liberty to have her partner Mr [D] to attend or such other representative.
7.That the party delivering the children remain inside the Police Station for at least five (5) minutes after the party or their agent departs with the children at such handovers.
8.That each party be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining either of them from physically disciplining the children.
9.That the mother be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining her from permitting the said children to spend time with the maternal grandfather unless supervised by her.
10.That both parties shall refer any major long term issues where agreement cannot be reached to legal aid conferencing to be arranged by the child representative.
11.That all previous Orders be discharged.
12.That the mother shall continue to participate in counselling and shall in particular follow all such reasonable directions and recommendation with respect to the mother’s mental health as proposed by the mother’s treating psychiatrist.
13.That all interim proceedings are dismissed.
AND UPON THE FATHER’S ORAL APPLICATION IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:
14.That the mother be restrained from changing the children’s enrolment from [E] Primary School without the consent of the father or by Order of this Court.”
The mother resides with her partner Mr D. In March 2008 the mother was six months pregnant. She also had an 18 month old child with her partner.
The father does not now seek an order changing the children’s school back to E Primary School. He expressed concerns about the number of changes of school the children have undergone.
The Law
Division 13A “Consequences of failure to comply with orders and other obligations that affect children” forms part of Part VII relating to children. Sections 70NAA to 70NFJ are the sections which deal with contraventions.
Section 70NAC sets out the meaning of contravened an order:
“A person is taken for the purposes of this Division to have contravened an order under this Act affecting children if, and only if:
(a) where the person is bound by the order--he or she has:
(i) intentionally failed to comply with the order; or
(ii) made no reasonable attempt to comply with the order”
Section 70NAE sets out the meaning of reasonable excuse for contravening an order. The relevant provisions are:
“(1)The circumstances in which a person may be taken to have had, for the purposes of this Division, a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under this Act affecting children include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set out in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6) and (7)
…
(7)A person (the respondent ) is taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening a parenting order to which section 65P applies by acting contrary to section 65P if:
(a)the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that the action constituting the contravention was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the child); and
(b)the period during which, because of that action, a person in whose favour the order was made was hindered in or prevented from discharging responsibilities under the order was not for longer than was necessary to protect the health or safety of the person referred to in paragraph (a)”
Section 70NAF states:
“(1)Subject to subsection (3), the standard of proof to be applied in determining matters in proceedings under this Division is proof on the balance of probabilities.
(2)Without limiting subsection (1), that subsection applies to the determination of whether a person who contravened an order under this Act affecting children had a reasonable excuse for the contravention.
(3) The Court may only make an order under:
(a) paragraph 70NFB(2)(a), (d) or (e); or
(b) paragraph 70NFF(3)(a);
if the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the grounds for making the order exist.”
There is considerable difficulty with this section and its interpretation.
Sub-section 70NFB (2)(a) relates to a community services order. Sub-section (2)(d) relates to a fine. Sub-section (2)(e) relates to a sentence of imprisonment.
Section 70NFF (3)(a) relates to procedure for enforcing community service orders or bonds providing power to impose a fine.
Sections 70NFB and 70NFF are within sub-division F of Division 13A which applies to contraventions without reasonable excuse where the Court has either previously imposed a sanction for an earlier contravention or is satisfied that the person has behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of his or her obligations under the order. (Sections 70NFA).
The provisions of Section 70NAF and the standard of proof were discussed by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Dobbs and Brayson (Supra) (see paragraphs 31 to 62).
Whatever the proper or possible interpretation of section 70NAF the standard of proof required to establish reasonable excuse is on the balance of probabilities. If such reasonable excuse is not established then it is necessary to determine if there has been “serious disregard”. (This must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before the penalties mentioned in section 70NAF(3) can be imposed).
Summary of mother’s claim for reasonable excuse and whether serious disregard is established
Following the order of 27 July 2006 the mother and her partner chose to move to S for financial reasons. The mother attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate with the father to change the school. Initially transport was supplied by her partner. This came to an end in late January 2008 because her partner had in November 2007 applied for a position.
The mother asserts that the only other transport available to her was public transport which would require onerous times spent on buses with her three children whilst she is pregnant. Although she has a driver’s licence she asserts that she was unable to find anyone else to assist her with a car. The mother asserted that part of her reasonable excuse was that S Primary School was closer and more convenient for her and the children than the husband’s preferred school of B Primary School.
I accept that the mother believed that it was more convenient for her and the children if they attended S Primary School rather than E Primary School.
I accept that the mother preferred S Primary School to the school preferred by the father namely B Primary School.
The mother was aware that the father would transport the children to and from E Primary School if asked to do so. The mother was also aware that the father was strongly opposed to the children changing schools without his consent.
Any arrangement to be made to transport the children from the mother’s chosen residence in S to E Primary School would need only to have been a temporary arrangement pending appropriate application to the Family Court for variation of the order.
The mother only instructed her solicitor to make such an application on 25 January 2008 but changed the children’s school (sending them to S Primary School on 30 January 2008) when she was well aware that no application or order had been made.
The following facts have been proved:
1.The mother was aware of the terms of Paragraph 14 of the order of the July 2006 and that it required that she have either the consent of the father or an order of the Court before the children were enrolled in a school other than E Primary School. Notwithstanding this order the mother chose to move with the children to a home in S in September 2007.
2.No application was filed in the Family Court of Australia seeking to discharge the order notwithstanding the unsuccessful negotiations between the mother and father about possible change of school.
3.Whilst the ongoing conflict of the mother and the father may have resulted in the mother being reluctant to seek the assistance of the father the evidence does not suggest that such assistance by the father would have placed either of the children at risk or have been an inappropriate arrangement in the short term.
4.I was therefore not satisfied that the mother established on the balance of probabilities that she had reasonable excuse to contravene the order of 27 July 2006.
5.On the mother’s admission the contravention is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The mother failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that she had reasonable excuse.
The facts however do not establish beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities that the mother has shown serious disregard for her obligations under the order.
The consequences must therefore be determined under Subdivision E which deals with “less serious contraventions”. (Sections 70NEA to 70NEG).
Both the father and mother’s counsel submitted that an appropriate penalty would be a bond.
Relevant parts of Section 70NEB and 70NEC provide:
“Powers of Court
(1) If this Subdivision applies, the Court may do any or all of the following:
(a) make an order directing:
(i) the person who committed the current contravention; or
(ii) that person and another specified person;
to attend a post‑separation parenting program;
…
(c)adjourn the proceedings to allow either or both of the parties to the primary order to apply for a further parenting order under Division 6 of Part VII that discharges, varies or suspends the primary order or revives some or all of an earlier parenting order;
(d)make an order requiring the person who committed the current contravention to enter into a bond in accordance with section 70NEC;
…
(f)make an order that the person who committed the current contravention pay some or all of the costs of another party, or other parties, to the proceedings under this Division; and
(g)if the Court makes no other orders in relation to the current contravention--order that the person who brought the proceedings in relation to the current contravention pay some or all of the costs of the person who committed the current contravention.
Note 1: The Court may also vary the primary order under Subdivision B.
Note 2 Paragraph (1)(a)--before making an order under this paragraph, the Court must consider seeking the advice of a family consultant about the services appropriate to the person's needs (see section 11E).
(2)The Court must not make an order under paragraph (1)(a) directed to a person other than the person who committed the current contravention unless:
(a)the person brought the proceedings before the Court in relation to the current contravention or is otherwise a party to those proceedings; and
(b)the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to direct the order to the person because of the connection between the current contravention and the carrying out by the person of his or her parental responsibilities in relation to the child or children to whom the primary order relates.
(3)If the Court makes an order under paragraph (1)(a), the principal executive officer of the Court must ensure that the provider of the program concerned is notified of the making of the order.
…
…(6)In deciding whether to adjourn the proceedings as mentioned in paragraph (1)(c), the Court must have regard to the following:
(a) whether the primary order was made by consent;
(b)whether either or both of the parties to the proceedings in which the primary order was made were represented in those proceedings by a legal practitioner;
(c)the length of the period between the making of the primary order and the occurrence of the current contravention;
(d) any other matters that the Court thinks relevant.
(7) The Court must consider making an order under paragraph (1)(g) if:
(a)the person (the applicant ) who brought the proceedings in relation to the current contravention has previously brought proceedings in relation to the primary order or another primary order in which the applicant alleged that the person (the respondent ) who committed the current contravention committed a contravention of the primary order or that other primary order; and
(b)on the most recent occasion on which the applicant brought proceedings of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), the Court before which the proceedings were brought:
(i) was not satisfied that the respondent had committed a contravention of the primary order or that other primary order; or
(ii) was satisfied that the respondent had committed a contravention of the primary order or that other primary order but did not make an order under section 70NDB, 70NDC, 70NEB, 70NFB or 70NBA in relation to the contravention.
Section 70NEC
Bonds
(1)This section provides for bonds that a Court may require a person to enter into under paragraph 70NEB(1)(d).
(2) A bond is to be for a specified period of up to 2 years.
(3) A bond may be:
(a) with or without surety; and
(b) with or without security.(4)The conditions that may be imposed on a person by a bond include (without limitation) conditions that require the person:
(a)to attend an appointment (or a series of appointments) with a family consultant; or
(b) to attend family counselling; or
(c) to attend family dispute resolution; or(d)to be of good behaviour.
(5)If a Court proposes to require a person to enter into a bond, it must, before making the requirement, explain to the person, in language likely to be readily understood by the person:
(a) the purpose and effect of the proposed requirement; and
(b) the consequences that may follow if the person:
(i) fails to enter into the bond; or
(ii)having entered into the bond--fails to act in accordance with the bond.”
In Elspeth & Peter; Mark & Peter and John & Peter (Penalty Costs) (Supra) the Full Court said at page 81,839:
“29. In 2006 the Act was again amended to what is now its present form. Contraventions of parenting orders continue to be classified within the same two stages though are more explicitly labelled as “less serious contraventions” (Subdivision E of Division 13A of Part VII) and “more serious contraventions” (Subdivision F of Division 13A of Part VII).
30.The ability to require a person to enter into a bond was introduced in relation to the Subdivision E or less serious contraventions and the power is contained in s 70NEB(1)(d). Subdivision F relating to more serious contraventions contains sanctions not available for less serious contraventions. These include the ability of the Court to make orders for community service, the imposition of a fine or a term of imprisonment.
31.Section 70NEC deals with the bonds imposed in relation to Subdivision E or less serious contraventions and contains the subsection reproduced above in paragraph 19 requiring explanation of the consequences of not entering into a bond and of failing to act in accordance with a bond. While this section substantively mirrors the section dealing with bonds in relation to Subdivision F or more serious contraventions, there is no follow-up section similar to s 70NFF in Subdivision F (in substance the former s 70NN) which outlines the consequences of failing to act in accordance with a bond. Further, there are no provisions regarding the consequences of failing to enter into a bond in relation to either less serious contraventions or more serious contraventions.
32.It seems to us curious that the present legislation, when dealing with a less serious contravention, still requires the Court to provide an explanation of the consequences that may follow if a person who is required to enter into a bond fails to do so, but does not set out or explain anywhere what those consequences might be. We are unable to discern what those consequences might be.
33.That being so, even though in this case the mother has indicated that her faith does not in any way prevent her from entering into an undertaking with the Court to do all actions to affect compliance with the court orders, if we were to require her to enter into such a bond we could not meet our legislative obligation to explain to her the consequences of her failure to do so, other than to say that there are no apparent consequences. In the circumstances it seems pointless to create an obligation that is likely to be ignored.
34.Whilst there is scope for an argument that the failure to comply with an order that required a person to enter into a bond might itself constitute a contempt of court that could attract the imposition of a sanction under s 112AP of the Act it seems unlikely that the legislature intended such an outcome when it established a graduated scale of penalties to be applied for breaches of parenting orders depending on the seriousness of the contravention. If the legislature anticipated that the failure to enter into a bond ought to attract a more condign penalty than we would expect the legislation to clearly say so.
35.The mother also seeks that we spell out precisely what it is that we would require her to do to ensure compliance with the orders should she enter into such a bond. We resist the temptation to undertake that task. The mother’s obligation is to obey the orders of the Court. The extent to which she has to go to obey those orders of the Court has already been spelt out by the Full Court in Stevenson and Hughes (1993) FLC 92-363; (1993) 16 Fam LR 433. We do not think it is helpful to add any further gloss to that case at this time.
36.The only effective way of now dealing with the proven contravention is to require the mother to make a contribution towards the father’s costs and to remind the mother that any further proven contraventions may be dealt with under Subdivision F of Division 13A of Part VII and may attract a fine or a period of imprisonment. “
The Full Court decision is binding on this Court. However I considered the possibility of distinguishing the matter before me on the following grounds:
(1)that I am able to explain to the mother that if she fails to enter into the bond (when so ordered) she may face the consequences applicable to a breach of a Court order under Section 112AD which provides:
“Sanctions for failure to comply with orders
(1)If a court having jurisdiction under this Act is satisfied that a person has, without reasonable excuse, contravened an order under this Act, the court may make an order for the imposing, in respect of the person, of one or more of the sanctions available to be imposed under subsection (2), being a sanction or sanctions that the court considers to be the most appropriate in the circumstances.
(1A)The power given to the court under subsection (1) in respect of a contravention of a maintenance order applies even if the order has been complied with before the matter of the contravention comes before the court.
(2)The sanctions that are available to be imposed by the court are:
(a)to require the person to enter into a bond in accordance with section 112AF; or
(b)to impose a sentence by order on the person, or make an order directed to the person, in accordance with section 112AG; or
(c)to fine the person not more than 60 penalty units; or
(d)subject to subsection (2A), to impose a sentence of imprisonment on the person in accordance with section 112AE.
(2A)The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment on the person under paragraph (2)(d) in respect of a contravention of a maintenance order unless the court is satisfied that the contravention was intentional or fraudulent.
(3)An order under subsection (1) may be expressed to take effect immediately, or at the end of a specified period or on the occurrence of a specified event.
(4)Where a court makes an order under subsection (1), the court may make such other orders as the court considers necessary to ensure compliance with the order that was contravened.
(2)In the matter before me it is not correct to say “in the circumstances it seems pointless to create an obligation that is likely to be ignored” because counsel for the mother suggested a bond would be an appropriate penalty (see paragraph 32 of Elspeth & Peter; Mark & Peter and John & Peter (Penalty Costs) (Supra).
(3)The consequences of the mother failing to obey a condition of the bond would be the forfeiture of the sum of money.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Full Court decision appears to remove these options. If a bond were an option available to the Court then I consider that placing the mother on a bond with conditions would be an appropriate consequence. However the Full Court decision reduces the available consequences.
Section 70NEB(1)(a) provides that the Court may order the person to attend a “post-separation parenting program”.
“Post-separation parenting program” is defined in Section 4 as:
“(a) that is designed to help people to resolve problems that adversely affect the carrying out of their parenting responsibilities (including by providing counselling services or by teaching techniques to resolve disputes); and
(b)that consists of lectures, discussions (including group discussions) or other activities; and
(c) that is provided by an organisation that meets the conditions in section 65LB.”
Section 65LB provides:
“Conditions for providers of post-separation parenting programs
(1)An organisation meets the conditions in this section if:
(a) it is a recipient organisation (see subsection (2)); or
(b)there is a recipient organisation in relation to the organisation (see subsection (3)).
(2)An organisation is a recipient organisation for the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) if it receives, or has been approved to receive, funding under a program or a part of a program designated by the Minister under subsection (4) in order to provide services that include post‑separation parenting programs.
(3)An organisation is a recipient organisation in relation to another organisation for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b) if:
a) both:
(i) the other organisation is a member of the organisation; and
(ii)the organisation receives, or has been approved to receive, funding under a program or a part of a program designated by the Minister under subsection (4) in order that the organisation's members may provide services that include post‑separation parenting programs; or
(b) both:
(i)the organisation acts on behalf of a group of organisations that includes the other organisation; and
(ii)the organisation receives, or has been approved to receive, funding under a program or a part of a program designated by the Minister under subsection (4) in order that the organisations on whose behalf it acts may provide services that include post‑separation parenting programs.
(4)The Minister may, in writing, designate for the purposes of this section:
(a) a program; or
(b) part of a program;
administered by or on behalf of the Commonwealth Government under which money appropriated by the Parliament is provided to organisations for the purposes of making post‑separation parenting programs available.
(5)An instrument under this section is not a legislative instrument.”
I have considered seeking the advice of a Family Consultant about the services appropriate to the mother’s needs but have determined that, in this matter, this is not necessary or appropriate.
Anglicare currently provide post-separation parenting programmes through KidsAreFirst which has programmes based in the northern suburbs. The mother should attend for assessment and if assessed as suitable attend the programme.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Dawe.
Associate:
Date: 26 June 2008
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