Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson (No 4)

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & anor (No 4) [2020] QDC 224

PARTIES:

HERITAGE BANK LIMITED
ACN 32 087 652 024
(plaintiff/respondent)

v

JAROD LUKE GLEESON (AKA JAROD LUKE)
(first defendant)

SHEREE AMY TAYLOR
(second defendant/applicant)

FILE NO/S:

3066/18

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

15 September 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

29 July 2020

JUDGE:

Porter QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.    Order 4 of the Amended Order of Koppenol DCJ issued 12 May 2020 be set aside and the endorsement on the file be altered to delete reference to that Order; and

2.   The parties bear their own costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – where the defendants had defaulted on mortgage repayments – where default judgment was entered against the defendants following service under an order for substituted service – where the defendants applied to set aside an order of substituted service – where the court ordered that the application to set aside the order for substituted service be listed for hearing not before 28 May 2020 – where a mention limited only to the issue of production and access to subpoenas was listed on 23 April 2020 – where the orders made on that day and initially endorsed on the file and included in a sealed order taken out by the plaintiff related only to the subpoena issues – where the plaintiff’s solicitors approached the associate without notice to the defendants seeking the orders be amended to add an order dismissing the substantive application – where the initial sealed order was amended to add an order dismissing the substantive application without notice to the defendants – whether the amended order was properly made – whether the amended order should be set aside

Legislation

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r. 667(2)

Cases

Legal Services Commissioner v Trost [2019] QCAT 357

Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & anor [2019] QDC 119

Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & anor (No 2) [2020] QDC 36

COUNSEL:

Applicants self-represented
G Koning (sol) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Applicants self-represented
Dentons Australia for the respondent

  1. This is an application by the first and second defendants to set aside order 4 of the amended order of Koppenol DCJ issued 12 May 2020 and apparently made on 23 April 2020 (Order 4).  For the reasons which follow, Order 4 should be set aside and the endorsement added to the Court file including that order should be deleted.

Factual background

  1. The procedural history of this matter up to 29 June 2019 is detailed in Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & anor [2019] QDC 119 (my first judgment) from paragraphs [1] to [19].  So far as is relevant to today, that judgment records:

    [1]On 23 August 2018 the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the District Court of Queensland seeking possession, under…

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Details
Case
[2020] QDC 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson (No 4) involved the plaintiff, Heritage Bank Limited, who had commenced proceedings against the defendants, Jarod Luke Gleeson and Sheree Amy Taylor, seeking possession of a house and land under a registered mortgage and judgment for sums owing under a loan agreement. The defendants had defaulted on mortgage repayments, leading to the entry of default judgment against them following service under an order for substituted service. The defendants then applied to set aside the substituted service order. The legal issues before the court were whether the amended order dismissing the substantive application was properly made and whether it should be set aside.

The court found that the amended order was not properly made as it was done without notice to the defendants, which contravened the principles of procedural fairness. The court held that the order dismissing the substantive application should be set aside. The court emphasised that the proper procedure for amending orders is for the party seeking the amendment to give notice to all other parties involved and allow them an opportunity to be heard on the proposed amendment. The court also noted that the defendants had not had a fair opportunity to respond to the proposed amendment, which further supported the conclusion that the amended order was improperly made.

In light of the findings, the court set aside Order 4 of the Amended Order issued by Koppenol DCJ on 12 May 2020 and directed that the endorsement on the file be altered to delete reference to that Order. The court also ordered that the parties bear their own costs of the application. This decision highlights the importance of procedural fairness and the need for strict adherence to court procedures when amending orders in civil proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 4 of the Amended Order of Koppenol DCJ issued 12 May 2020 be set aside and the endorsement on the file be altered to delete reference to that Order; and

2. The parties bear their own costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The procedural history of this matter up to 29 June 2019 is detailed in Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & anor [2019] QDC 119 (my first judgment) from paragraphs [1] to [19]. So far as is relevant to today, that judgment records:[1]On 23 August 2018 the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the District Court of Queensland seeking possession, under a registered mortgage, of a certain house and land (the house) and judgment for sums owing under a loan agreement secured by the mortgage. The first defendant, Jarod Luke Gleeson, is the husband of the second defendant, Sheree Amy Taylor although they have not lived as husband and wife for some time. Mr Gleeson, is the registered proprietor and mortgagor of the house. [2]The house came to be owned by him in its current form, in general terms, in this way. Mr Gleeson and Ms Taylor began living together in a domestic relationship in around 2004. In 2006 they bought a piece of land and obtained funding to build a house on it. They married in late 2012. The house was funded by lending from Heritage Bank Limited (the Bank), along with some part of the purchase of the land.[3]There have been various dealings between Mr Gleeson and Ms Taylor and the Bank since then, but they are not of great significance to this particular application. By about early 2018, the Bank was asserting that the loan was in default and it was seeking to realise its security. Thus the plaintiff commenced proceedings on 23 August 2018 seeking possession under the terms of the mortgage and section 78 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) and judgment for amounts due under the loan agreement. [4]Ms Taylor, as I have a said, was not a registered proprietor or a mortgagor. She was, however, a joint borrower with Mr Gleeson of the funds which are secured by the mortgage. Between August and November 2018, the Bank undertook efforts to cause the proceedings to be personally served on Mr Gleeson and Ms Taylor. Those efforts are described in affidavits of Mr Phillips and Mr Veivers, the process servers. ...[13]The above evidence of attempted service was put before her Honour Judge Richards of this Court and her Honour made orders for substituted service on 9 November 2018. Her Honour’s orders were that personal service be dispensed with and under the relevant rule service be effected by posting the claim and the statement of claim to the property, delivering a copy of the documents to the house, and notifying the defendants by SMS to a certain mobile that that had occurred. I presume that that mobile number was Mr Gleeson’s mobile number. The service of the statement of claim was deemed to have occurred five business days after those steps were taken.[14]... [15]It is not disputed that Her Honour’s substituted service order was complied with and that default judgment was entered on 30 January 2019. Default judgment was ordered both for possession of the land and for a sum said to be due under the loan agreement. The Bank sought an enforcement warrant. The warrant has been executed and the Bank is in possession.[16]Mr Gleeson seemed to respond to the proceedings from time to time with documents which were misconceived. Things took a rather more disciplined turn when Ms Taylor found out about the default judgment and the enforcement warrant. Her evidence is that the proceedings did not come to her attention as a result of compliance with the substituted service orders. I am willing to accept that that was so based on the fact that Ms Taylor’s industry, since 24 April 2019 when she says she did find out about the default judgment and enforcement warrant, has been consistent and energetic. [17]It is, of course, irrelevant to the validity of the substituted service order as such, that the documents did not come to her attention as long as that order was properly made. If default judgment has been regularly entered following substituted service it will only be set aside if there is an arguable defence on the merits.[18]Ms Taylor applied to set aside the default judgment on 24 April 2019. On 8 May 2019 Ms Taylor sought to stay the enforcement warrant and various consequential orders. However the fundamental requirement for Ms Taylor was always to set aside the default judgment, upon which the enforcement warrant for possession was based.[19]There were some adjournments of those applications for Ms Taylor to obtain legal assistance. Ultimately she has obtained that assistance from Ms Chekirova. The application is supported by a great deal of material. The structure of the application is really this: (a)Has the judgment been regularly entered? If not, the default judgment should be set aside. (b)If it has been regularly entered, is there a sufficiently arguable defence on the merits to justify setting aside the default judgment?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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