Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson (No 3)

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson & Anor (No 3) [2020] QDC 217

PARTIES:

HERITAGE BANK LIMITED
ACN 32 087 652 024
(plaintiff/applicant)

v

JAROD LUKE GLEESON (AKA JAROD LUKE)
(first defendant/first respondent)

SHEREE AMY TAYLOR
(second defendant/second respondent)

FILE NO:

3066/18

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

4 September 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

 Heard on the papers

JUDGE:

Porter QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The subpoena to Peter Lock, Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Bank Limited dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

2.   The subpoena to Dentons Australia Limited, C/O Gary Koning dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

3.   The subpoena to William Robert Veivers dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

4.   The subpoena to Wise McGrath, C/O proper officer dated 22 July be set aside.

5.   Costs be reserved.

 CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE – SUBPOENAS AND NOTICE TO PRODUCE AT HEARING – SETTING ASIDE OR OTHER RELIEF – where the defendants had defaulted on mortgage repayments – where substituted service orders were made against both defendants –  where default judgment was entered against the defendants in respect of the default – where the defendants sought to set aside the default judgment by challenging the validity of the substituted service order – where the defendants issued subpoenas to the plaintiff and  non- parties – where subpoenas are issued in interlocutory proceedings – where the defendants have previously issued subpoenas – where leave had been refused to inspect documents produced under the previous subpoenas – whether the further subpoenas issued  were be an abuse of process – whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the previous hearing – where the subpoenas seek evidence relevant to re-litigate matters already dealt with in previous judgment refusing to set aside the default judgment – whether the subpoenas are  an abuse of process – whether the subpoenas should be set aside

Legislation

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr. 414(2); 414(6); 416; 420; 667(2)(b); 668;

Cases

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc. (1981) 148 CLR 170
Adelaide Steamship Co v Spalvins 24 ACSR 536
Castillon v P&O Ports Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 219
D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582
Hudson v Branir Pty Ltd [2005] NTCA 5
Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Western Metals Resources Limited [2001] 1 Qd R 261
Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139
SG v State of Queensland [2004] QCA 461
Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251
Rippon v Chilcotin [2001] NSWCA 142

Secondary Sources

Elegals Litigators Toolkit (Jackson and Pastellas)

Handley Spenser Bower & Handley Res Judicata (4th edn) at 9.12.

COUNSEL:

Applicants self-represented
G Koning (sol) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Applicants self-represented
Dentons Australia for the respondent

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Details
Case
[2020] QDC 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court in Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson (No 3) involved a dispute regarding the validity of a substituted service order and the subsequent default judgment entered against the defendants. The defendants, having defaulted on mortgage repayments, faced proceedings brought by Heritage Bank Limited. Substituted service orders were made against the defendants, and a default judgment was entered against them. The defendants sought to set aside the default judgment, challenging the validity of the substituted service order. As part of their challenge, the defendants issued subpoenas to the plaintiff and non-parties. The central legal issues before the court were whether the issuance of further subpoenas by the defendants constituted an abuse of process and whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the previous hearing.

The court considered the nature of interlocutory applications and the principles governing their conduct, as established in Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc. The court acknowledged the need to control interlocutory steps in civil proceedings to ensure efficient litigation. The court further noted that interlocutory orders based on undertakings must remain within the control of the court, which retains the power to release a party from an undertaking if new facts emerge that render enforcement unjust. The court examined the evidence provided by the defendants to challenge the substituted service order and the default judgment. The court found that the photograph taken by the process server was authentic and that the defendants' evidence was not persuasive enough to warrant setting aside the order. The court also considered the defendants' application to set aside the substituted service order on the basis of fraud. However, the court found that there was no evidence of fraud and dismissed the application.

The court found that the defendants' issuance of further subpoenas constituted an abuse of process. The subpoenas sought evidence relevant to re-litigate matters already dealt with in previous judgments. The court held that the defendants' actions were an abuse of the court process and that the subpoenas should be set aside. The court ordered that the subpoenas to Peter Lock, Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Bank Limited, Dentons Australia Limited, William Robert Veivers, and Wise McGrath be set aside, and costs be reserved. The court's decision emphasised the importance of controlling interlocutory steps in civil proceedings and preventing the abuse of court process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The subpoena to Peter Lock, Chief Executive Officer of Heritage Bank Limited dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

2. The subpoena to Dentons Australia Limited, C/O Gary Koning dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

3. The subpoena to William Robert Veivers dated 22 July 2020 be set aside.

4. The subpoena to Wise McGrath, C/O proper officer dated 22 July be set aside.

5. Costs be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

Interlocutory applications by their very nature are not final judgments. They do not give rise to judgment estoppels, merger of causes of action in judgment, nor to issue estoppels. Accordingly, in theory, the same interlocutory application could be brought on several occasions in the one proceeding. However it is self-evident that the efficient conduct of civil litigation requires some brake on that conduct. The starting point for identifying how the Courts control interlocutory steps in civil proceedings is the High Court decision in Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc. (1981) 148 CLR 170. That case concerned an appeal to the High Court from a judgment of a trial judge involving a matter of practice and procedure which was overturned by the Full Court. In a passage with relevance to a number of aspects of this matter, the majority[2] held as follows:There is no reason to doubt that the disputed decision of Smithers J concerned a matter of practice and procedure. The essence of such a matter is described in terms which are sufficient for present purposes in (1981) 35 ALR 625 at 629Salmond on Jurisprudence (10th ed) p 476: “Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated.” …Nor is there any serious dispute between the parties that appellate courts exercise particular caution in reviewing decisions pertaining to practice and procedure. Counsel for Brown urged that specific cumulative bars operate to guide appellate courts in the discharge of that task. Not only must there be error of principle, but the decision appealed from must work a substantial injustice to one of the parties. The opposing view is that such criteria are to be expressed disjunctively. Cases can be cited in support of both views: for example, on the one hand, Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd[1978] VR 431 at 440 ; on the other hand, De Mestre v A D Hunter Pty Ltd (1952) 77 WN (NSW) 143 at 146 . For ourselves, we believe it to be unnecessary and indeed unwise to lay down rigid and exhaustive criteria. The circumstances of different cases are infinitely various. We would merely repeat, with approval, the oft-cited statement of Sir Frederick Jordan in Re Will of F B Gilbert (deceased) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 : “… I am of opinion that, … there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal”: see also Brambles Holdings Ltd v Trade Practices Commission(1979) 28 ALR 191 at 193 ; Dougherty v Chandler (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 370 at 374 . It is safe to say that the question of injustice flowing from the order appealed from will generally be a relevant and necessary consideration. We mention these matters in order to clarify and confine the matters that are in issue between the parties. Considerable argument was directed to the question whether a court has power, otherwise than in the case of mistake operative at the time of giving it to release a party from an undertaking, at least in the absence of the consent of the other party. But in our opinion a court undoubtedly has such a power. Just as an interlocutory injunction continues “until further order”, so must an interlocutory order based on an undertaking. A court must remain in control of its interlocutory orders. A further order will be appropriate whenever, inter alia, new facts come into existence or are discovered which render its enforcement unjust:… Of course, the changed circumstances must be established by evidence: Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd, supra . [2] Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ[underlining added]

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The background of the matter up to 25 June 2019 is set out in my judgment Heritage Bank Limited v Gleeson [2019] QDC 119 at [1] to [19] (my first judgment). In that judgment, Ms Taylor applied to set aside an order for substituted service and the default judgment against her. She did so on three grounds. I dismissed her application. That order has never been appealed. For present purposes, the only relevant ground raised on that occasion was that the evidence of one of the process servers (Mr Vievers) was false or misleading. For the reasons given on that occasion, I dismissed the Ms Taylor’s application. My reasons for doing so in relation to the false or misleading allegation are relevant to the disposition of this application. The submission of Ms Taylor and my reasons were as follows:[5]Mr Veivers tried to serve Ms Taylor at the address of the house on 4 September at 4.25pm and on 7 September at 7.45am. Both attempts at service were ineffective. At the time of his second attempt at service he took a photograph of certain notices in the vicinity of the front door. Those notices fairly aggressively asserted that the property was private property. There was to be no trespass. There was no consent to anyone coming on the land. The notices had a flavour of threat in them, in the sense of asserting aggressively rights, powers, privileges and immunities and so on. [6]Ms Taylor, by her affidavit, suggests that this photograph must be mistaken because it shows a switch which she says was not there at the time this photograph was purportedly taken on 7 September. Her evidence, as it was explained to me in her affidavit, was that the light switch was removed, perhaps, up to a year before this photograph was supposed to have been taken. However, her other evidence about whether there was one notice or two notices leaves it open to conclude that there were two notices at the time the photograph was taken. [7]It seems extraordinarily improbable that the photograph was concocted. The photograph itself shows notices which her evidence does not exclude might have been there and are certainly consistent with Mr Gleeson’s apparent approach to dealing with potential trespassers, evident from other documents before me. It seems to me the more probable inference is that she is mistaken about the timing of events relating to this photograph. This is not least because, at the time she says the switch was removed, nobody (at least no process server) would have had any cause to be taking photographs of the front window. I am persuaded the photograph is authentic. On 11 March 2020, the defendants filed a further application to set aside the substituted service order (the 11 March application). It was supported by an affidavit of Ms Taylor (CD 49) which sets out the basis for the application. There is also an affidavit of Jarod Luke (CD 50) which sets out further matters. The applicants contended that the order ought to be set aside pursuant to rr. 667(2)(b) and 668 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) on the basis that the order was obtained by fraud.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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