Herbert Neumann v Sons of the Desert SL

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Herbert Neumann to registration of trade mark application 977941 El Nino Terifa & Logo proceeding in the name of Sons of the Desert SL.

Delegate:

Iain Thompson

Representation:

Opponent

Jurgen Bebber of Griffith Hack.

Applicant

Did not appear or provide written submissions

Decision:

ATMO 14/07

1. section 52 opposition, sections 42 and 58. Copyright, alleged Spanish contractual agreement or understanding, fiduciary duty and ownership. Parol evidence rule applied. Opposition not established on evidence before hearing officer.

2 Costs ordered against opponent.

Background

  1. In this matter, Sons of the Desert SL, of Tarifa (Cadiz) in Spain, has applied to register the following trade mark

    Reg No:               977941

    Priority Date:  11 November 2003 (‘the relevant date’)

    Goods/Services:              Class: 16 Publications and printed matter, adhesives for stationery or household purposes, instructional and teaching material (except apparatus), plastic material for moulding and packaging (not included in other classes), office requisites (except furniture), paper and stationery, cardboard, photographs, printers material, painting brushes, typewriters, artists material

    Class: 25 Clothing, footwear, headgear

    Trade Mark:  

  2. I will refer to the scowling recumbent figure in the trade mark as ‘the MAN device’ and the trade mark as a whole as ‘the opposed trade mark’.

  3. The words EL NINO appearing in the trade mark are the Spanish language words for ‘the boy’ and the word TARIFA is the name of a town on the southernmost Spanish coast.

  4. The application was accepted for possible registration on 30 March 2004 and advertised as such in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 22 April 2004. On 21 July 2004, Herbert Neumann, an Austrian national of Tarifa (Cadiz), filed Notice of Opposition to the registration of the trade mark. The terms of the Notice of Opposition are broad and, at the hearing, the opponent relied on sections 42 and 58 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’

  5. Evidence in support, answer, and reply was served and filed by the parties.  As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, I heard the matter at a hearing in Melbourne on 7 March 2007.  Mr Jurgen Bebber of Griffith Hack represented the opponent.  The applicant did not appear and was not represented at the hearing.  However, the applicant’s attorneys, Watermark, wrote bringing a decision of the New Zealand Assistant Commissioner involving the same parties and an identical trade mark to my attention shortly before the hearing.

  6. The opponent, subsequent to the hearing, made written representations that the New Zealand decision is evidence and should be excluded from my considerations as it had not been properly served and filed.  I wrote to the parties advising that the New Zealand decision is material which is not only on the public record, but is obviously known to the parties so it would be material that I should consider in making my decision.  I allowed the opponent two weeks to prepare and file written submissions for my consideration concerning…

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Details
Case
[2007] ATMO 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Herbert Neumann (the applicant) against Sons of the Desert SL (the opponent) before the Registrar of Trade Marks. The dispute centred on the ownership of certain trade marks, with the opponent asserting co-ownership on a worldwide basis. The Registrar considered various statutory declarations and correspondence filed by both parties, as well as contractual documents.

The primary legal issue before the Registrar was whether there was a contractual term, either express or implied, by which the parties agreed to jointly own the trade marks throughout the world. The opponent sought to rely on pre-contractual verbal agreements, contemporaneous understandings, or past negotiations to establish this joint ownership, despite the existence of written contracts.

The Registrar determined that the written contracts appeared to be entire and did not contain any reference to extrinsic material such as parol agreements. Applying the parol evidence rule, as articulated in *Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor* (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252 and approved in *Dent v Moore* [1919] HCA 11; (1919) 26 CLR 316, the Registrar held that evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that would add to or vary the written contract was inadmissible. The Registrar found no written contractual term, express or implied, supporting the claim of worldwide co-ownership. The Registrar also noted that the opponent's own Spanish trade mark attorney's declaration did not fully support the claim of worldwide co-ownership.

The Registrar concluded that the opponent's attempts to imply a pre-contractual understanding or verbal agreement into the written contracts must fail. Consequently, there was no agreement, express or implied, in evidence as to the worldwide ownership of the opposed trade mark or the MAN trade mark.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the end, although the result here is the same as that in the New Zealand proceedings, it is arrived at for quite different reasons and I do not rely on the New Zealand decision. Accordingly, I informed the opponent that I do not require written submissions.Evidence Summary The following statutory declarations have been served and filed by the parties: The opponent filed the following statutory declarations in support of its opposition:ØJose Garrido Pastor dated 8 February 2005 with exhibits JGP-1 to JPG-35ØHerbert Neumann dated 18 February 2005 The applicant served and filed the following declaration in answer:ØBrian Morton Hendy dated 21 December 2005 with Exhibit BMH-1 Exhibit BMH-1 constitutes:·Statement by Paul David Tortoise.·Statement by Manuel-Angel Fernandez Muniz.And copies of correspondence ·Copy of correspondence dated 16 May 2005 from the opponent to Mr Galdeano.·Copy of correspondence dated 16 May 2005 between Javier Guerra and Andoni Galdeano.·Copy of court decision dated 30 March 2005.·Declaration by Joseba Andoni Galdeano Del Sel date 21 March 2006 with Exhibit AD-1 The opponent served and filed the following declaration as evidence in reply:ØInigo Elosegui dated 22 March 2006 Mr Bebber submitted at the hearing that I should put a low weight on the statements of Mr Tortoise and Mr Muniz as they are not in declaratory form. However, the statements and associated correspondence appear to me to be logical, probative, and relevant to these proceedings. Further, the statements appear to have been sworn before notaries under Spanish law. I note both that the New Zealand Assistant Commissioner appears to have accepted the statements and correspondence in the form that they are and that regulation 21.15 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 provides:21.15 Hearings by Registrar(1)This regulation applies if the Act or these regulations provide for a person to be heard by the Registrar.(2)A request for a hearing by the Registrar must be in an approved form.(3)On request, or on his or her own initiative, the Registrar may:(a)fix a time, date and place for the hearing; and(b)give the parties to the hearing at least 10 days’ notice in writing of the hearing and of the time, date and place fixed for the hearing.(4)A party must, as soon as practicable after being notified of a hearing, inform the Registrar in writing whether the party wants to be heard.(5)A party may attend a hearing in person or by such means as the Registrar reasonably allows.(6)A party may make representations in writing before or during a hearing.(7)A hearing must be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of the Act and these regulations and a proper consideration of the matters before the Registrar, allow.(8)The Registrar is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform himself or herself on any matter that is before him or her in any way that the Registrar reasonably believes to be appropriate.(9)The Registrar may adjourn a hearing by notifying each party to the hearing accordingly.(10)Subject to these regulations, the Registrar may give a direction that is reasonably necessary for the conduct of the hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Moreover, the opponent’s Spanish trade mark attorney whose declaration is said to buttress the opponent’s claims of world wide co-ownership as he had prosecuted ‘most of the registrations’, avers that he has acted for Mr Galdeano and Mr Neumann as co-owners in relation to Spanish registrations 2,140,497, 2,190,047 and 2,190,048. This is not half of the registrations and does not therefore support the claim.Conclusion In the light of the above considerations, my perusal of the contracts, the sworn declarations of both the parties, and the arguments put to me at the hearing, I conclude that there is no written contractual term, either express or implied, by which the parties agreed that they would jointly own the trade marks throughout the world. Mr Bebber (and Mr Neumann) would rather have me imply a term based on some pre-contractual verbal agreement, contemporaneous understanding, or past negotiation. However, this would add to, or vary, the terms of the written contract(s) and be a breach of the parol evidence rule which was formulated in the following way by Innes J in Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252 at page 262[1] where he said:“Where a contract is reduced into writing, where the contract appears in the writing to be entire, it is presumed that the writing contains all of the terms of it and evidence will not be admitted of any previous or contemporaneous agreement which would have the effect of adding to or varying the contract.”[1] See also, for example, Pollock CB in Knight v. Barber 16 M. & W., at p. 69, “I think it is a conclusion of law, that where parties are making an agreement by parol, and subsequently reduce it into writing, the writing constitutes the contract.” cited with approval in Dent -v- Moore [1919] HCA 11; (1919) 26 CLR 316 by Barton, Isaac and Rich JJ. The contracts in evidence appear to be entire contracts – there is no reference within them to extrinsic material such as parol agreements, nor do they appear to me to be only ‘partly written’ contracts. The contracts appear to be quite certain in their import and it is not submitted by Mr Bebber that they are the result of some mistake or are invalid. It must follow that the opponent’s attempts to convince me to imply some pre-contractual understanding or verbal agreement into the contracts as to joint ownership of the trade marks worldwide must fail. Nor am I willing to imply the separate existence of a prior parol agreement whose terms are so significantly at variance with the written contracts (see also footnote 1 in this regard). I further remark that the opponent, Mr Neumann, must be presumed to be a businessperson who is alert to such matters, and informed by legal advice, who would not execute several written contracts which are at such variance with the purported prior parol agreement or understanding. There is thus no agreement, express or implied, in evidence as to the worldwide ownership of the opposed trade mark or the MAN trade mark.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established