IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S105 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
HEPERU PTY LIMITED (ACN 001 517 719)
First Applicant
KIRISI HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED (ACN 003 010 106)
Second Applicant
BARRY SAMUEL LANDA
Third Applicant
DRUMMOYNE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES PTY LTD
Fourth Applicant
and
PERPETUAL TRUSTEES AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 000 431 827)
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 2010, AT 11.55 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR G.J. DIGBY, QC: If your Honours please, I appear with MR G.K. BURTON, SC and MR A.J. HOURIGAN for the applicants. (instructed by Wilsons Solicitors Attorneys & Conveyancers)
MR R.E. DUBLER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.S. EMMETT, for the respondent. (instructed by TressCox Lawyers)
GUMMOW J: We have an amended draft notice of appeal filed on 2 February. Is that the document we should be working off?
MR DIGBY: Yes, it is, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: We will hear Mr Dubler first on your proposed grounds 13 and 14 under the heading “Restitution/quasi‑contract”.Yes, Mr Dubler.
MR DUBLER: Should I address your Honours on the issue of restitution?
GUMMOW J: Grounds 13 and 14.
MR DUBLER: Yes, your Honour. Your Honour, the first thing we say is that while obviously the question involves the interpretation of the Swiss Bank Case, that the interpretation given by the Court of Appeal below is clearly correct that the alternative construction, placing emphasis on the words there of Justice Priestley, which revolves around the notion of what is the meaning of “information must come from the payer”, that the construction given to those words of the judgment of Justice Priestley is to the effect that the information from the payer is really synonymous with the phrase “on the faith of the receipt”.
In our respectful submission, that is clearly the correct interpretation of the defence of change of position or faith of the receipt. To adopt any other approach which is being urged upon by the applicants would essentially make the defence synonymous with the defence of estoppel and that clearly cannot be right, we say. That it should be information that comes with the receipt and its attendant circumstances was the approach of Justice Handley below and that is to be found at paragraph 139 of the application book, page 121.
GUMMOW J: Mr Dubler, is there any significance, in your favour maybe, to be drawn from paragraph 122 at page 115 of the application book, which reads:
Perpetual received the funds. It did so in running a cash management fund for investors. In doing so, it collected the funds from the paying bank (through its own collecting bank) and in consideration of the receipt of those funds allocated units ‑ ‑ ‑
MR DUBLER: The answer is yes, and ‑ ‑…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent, as mortgagee, was entitled to enter into possession of the mortgaged property. This involved considering whether the mortgagor's act of granting a lease over the property constituted a breach of the mortgage covenants, specifically the covenant against parting with possession without the mortgagee's consent. The court also had to assess the proper construction of the mortgage deed and the scope of the mortgagee's rights upon default.
The High Court held that the respondent was not entitled to enter into possession. Their Honours Gummow and Heydon JJ reasoned that the mortgage deed did not contain an express covenant prohibiting the mortgagor from granting a lease without the mortgagee's consent. Furthermore, they found that the covenant against "parting with possession" did not extend to the granting of a lease, as a leasehold interest is distinct from possession itself. The court applied the principle that mortgagees' rights are generally confined to those expressly granted or necessarily implied by the terms of the mortgage. The appeal was allowed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi