Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 1)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 1) [2019] FCA 2060

File number: QUD 280 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 13 September 2019
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 5.32

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Limited v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited (2013) 250 CLR 303

Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625

Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199

Date of hearing: 13 September 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Native Title
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 13
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P Somers
Solicitor for the Applicants: Trevor Hauff Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Atkinson QC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr V D Sternbeck
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Irish Bentley Lawyers
Counsel for the Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents did not appear
Counsel for the Sixth Respondent: Mr J Waters
Solicitor for the Sixth Respondent: Just Us Lawyers
Counsel for the Intervener: Ms H Blattman
Solicitor for the Intervener:  Crown Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 280 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BEATRICE MAUD HENRY

First Applicant

ELIZABETH JOHNSTON

Second Applicant

GREGORY EMMERSON (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

SANDLEWOOD ABORIGINAL PROJECTS LIMITED ACN 095 897 565

First Respondent

RUSSELL DOCTOR

Second Respondent

JASON JARRO (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The adjournment application be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. On 21 June 2019, the applicants filed an interlocutory application for summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) or, alternatively, for judgment in default under r 5.23(2)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 against Russell Doctor, Jason Jarro and Kerry-Anne Lacey, who are respectively the second, third and fourth respondents.  Mr Doctor was not named in the prayer in the interlocutory application as a person against whom relief was sought by reason of his default.  However, Mr Doctor’s new solicitor did not oppose the applicants seeking default judgment against his client when the interlocutory application was argued today.

    The adjournment application

    (a) Mr Doctor’s submissions

  2. Today, Mr Doctor’s solicitor spoke to his written submissions and a draft interlocutory application that he provided to the Court and the parties late yesterday, in which Mr Doctor, first, seeks an adjournment of the hearing of today’s interlocutory application and, secondly, if that is unsuccessful, opposes the relief sought in it and seeks to file an amended defence.  As Mr Doctor’s solicitor accepted, there is no evidence at all from Mr…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2060
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 1), the applicant, Mr Doctor, sought an adjournment of an interlocutory application that was set down for hearing. The application was brought before the court due to Mr Doctor's failure to comply with orders made on 25 March 2019, which extended the time for him to provide proper particulars by 8 April 2019. The court was required to determine whether the interests of justice would be served by granting the adjournment.

The legal issue the court had to decide was whether an explanation for the delay in filing a defence was sufficient to justify an adjournment. The court referred to the principles set out in Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, which stated that an explanation for the delay should be provided by the moving party, not merely their solicitor or counsel. The court found that Mr Doctor had not provided a satisfactory explanation for his delay, and an adjournment would result in other parties being subjected to an adjournment, time being wasted, and other litigants missing out on having their cases heard.

The court concluded that the interests of justice would not be served by granting the adjournment and dismissed the application. The court's decision was based on the fact that Mr Doctor had not provided a satisfactory explanation for his delay, and the potential negative consequences of granting the adjournment. The court found that it would not be appropriate to transfer the interlocutory application to another judge for an earlier hearing.

The final order made by the court was that the adjournment application be dismissed. The court referred to Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 for the entry of orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The adjournment application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, the interests of justice would not be served by the grant of an adjournment. I am not satisfied that Mr Doctor has made out any appropriate basis for an adjournment of this interlocutory application that has been set down for hearing today and where he is, and has been, in default since he failed properly to comply with the orders made on 25 March 2019 that extended the time for him to provide proper particulars, in accordance with the Rules, by 8 April 2019. Conclusion For these reasons, I refuse the application for adjournment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although Mr Doctor’s application to file a defence is not strictly an application to amend, that, in substance, is what it is. This is because he seeks to have placed on the Court record a defence that is not presently there, which necessarily will be in an altered form from what that which I struck out. (b) Consideration Ordinarily, where the Court is asked to exercise a discretion to allow an amendment to pleadings or to grant an adjournment to a party, an explanation for the delay of the party in bringing such an application is required. In Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2016) 332 ALR 199 at 226 [153]-[160], Gilmour, Perram and Beach JJ set out the principles applicable to the consideration of the grant of an application for an amendment in terms that I consider to be apposite to the present application to adjourn the proceeding in order for Mr Doctor to rectify his default in the proper pleading of a defence. Their Honours identified that the explanation called for, necessarily, will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case but said that, ordinarily, it should be given by or on behalf of the moving party. In some cases, affidavit evidence may not be necessary and in others an explanation by the party’s lawyer may be acceptable. However, as their Honours pointed out at [155]:It must be borne in mind that the explanation required is that of the moving party, not merely their solicitor or counsel. The client may very well know of matters relevant to the explanation for delay which are not known by the lawyers.(emphasis added) Here, Mr Doctor’s solicitor has said, as his previous solicitor had told me earlier, that Mr Doctor has had some illness issues. There is no medical evidence as to the way in which any such illness may, or may not, have affected his ability to act in his own interest (before or) after I struck out his defence on 28 May 2019 with effect from 8 April 2019. If I were to allow Mr Doctor’s application to adjourn the hearing of the interlocutory application, the consequence would be that the other parties who are ready for it to be heard today and disposed of will be subjected to an adjournment. Mr Doctor has not said that he is prepared, or in a position, to pay any costs thrown away as a result of any adjournment. But, in any event, a party’s ability to pay costs or to meet an order for costs is not, anymore, necessarily determinative of the exercise of the Court’s discretion in the case management of proceedings. An adjournment, if granted, would entail that time I set aside today to hear the interlocutory application will be wasted, other litigants would have missed out on having their cases heard and, by reason of the state of my docket, I will not be in a position to deal with the interlocutory application for quite some time. Given my familiarity with the detail of the proceeding, ordinarily, it would not be appropriate to transfer the interlocutory application to another judge for an earlier hearing.