Hennessey, P.G. v The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation
[1987] FCA 772
•16 Dec 1987
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;IUDG!viENT No. -?-!!..W-
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NOS. G3294 TO 3297 of 1987 )
DIVISION GENERAL ) BETWEEN : PETER G . HENNESSY
Appellant
. m:
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER
JUDGE : FOX J. DATE OF ORDER: 16 DECEMBER 1987 WHERE MADE: Sydney . THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The four appeals be dismissed and it conflrms the
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
assessments in each case.
2 . The appellant pay the respondent's costs.
Note: Settlement and entry or orders is dealt with in
.
NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
1
NEN SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY Nos. G3294 to 3297 of 1987
DIVISION GENERAL ) B B :
PETER G. HENNESSY
. c
Appellant
m:
.. THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
CORAM: FOX J.
- DATE: 16 DECEMBER 1988
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(M TEMPORE) FOX J.
There are now before me four appeals from the refusal by
the Commissioner of Taxation of objections to assessments to income tax made by him. In each case, the assessments showed credits of amounts due to the taxpayer, taxation having been paid
by him or on his behalf under the pay as you earn system. The
question which arises in each case is the same. The appellant
has appeared before me in person and has argued his own case very competently. The substantial question centres around the Income Tax
Assessment Act 1936 ("the Act"), s.79A and the following sections related to zone rebates. The appellant is not himself in any of
the zones and the assessments were prepared and have been sustained on the basis of the other provlsions of the Act whlch have affected him. His argument is, however, to the effect that
the Commissioner in calculating his assessment has acted contrary
to two provisions of the Constitution, namely s.Sl(ii.1 and s . 9 9 .
It is not necessary to set these out or deal separately with them. One in terms relates to not discrimlnating between States
or parts of States and the other deals with preferences not belng given to one. e. The appellant does not challenge the validity of s.79A,
but rather relied on it and related provisions, and claims that
to accord with the Constitution the concessions for which it provides must be available more broadly. It is not said or argued that the Commissioner acted otherwise than in accordance with the Act as, in terms, it applies to the taxpayer. He does
not seek an application of s.79A itself. Put another way. the
challenge really is to the legislation under which he was
assessed, and it is a challenge of a broad nature.
The appellant has concentrated on the assessments and he
submits that they are wrong because the Commissioner should have
acted in a way which, accepting the presence (and validity) ofs.79A, would nevertheless lead to a situation in which there was
no breach of the constitutional provisions to which I have
referred. There can however be no basis on which the
Commissioner. could do as the appellant has suggested namely,
allow a rebate to the taxpayer s if he were in a zone.
.
3 .
Whichever way the matter is looked at, it does seem to
me that the appellant is in difficulties. He based hlmself largely on the Commissioner of Taxation v. Clvne (1958-59) 100 CLR 246. In that case, the Commissioner sued for Income tax and demurrers were brought leading to the argument of questions
before the full High Court. So far as concerns s.79A, the
majority of the court in that case was prepared to assume for the purposes of argument, but certainly did not decide, that it was invalid. The taxpayer in that case, however, sought to use the argued invalidity of s.79A to bring down the rest of the Act, or I. .. at least all material parts of it. The majority of the High Court held that, even if s.79A
were invalid, this would not bring down the rest of the Act and that being so, the taxpayer in that case (he had not been assessed under s.79A) would not have standing to argue anything
about the section. Webb 3. considered the validity of the
section and held it to be valid. The taxpayer in Clvne’s case was hoping for consequences to flow, just as the appellant in the
present case is, but one was by challenge to validity, whereas the appellant here does not challenge validity, but, on an argued
application of the Constitution, he claims a concession. This would not only lead in effect to wholesale amendments to the Act,
but amendments which would be impossible to express or apply. It seems to me that the taxpayer, the appellant in these
cases, does npt have a sound case in law.
I $herefore dismiss the four appeals and confirm the
assessments in each case.
I will order that the appellant pay the respondent's
costs of the appeals.
I certify that thls and the three ( 3 ) preceding pages are
a true copy of the Reasons
for Judgment herein of hisHonour Mr. Justice Fox.
e.
Associate: -. \L.- &&L- Date: 16 December 1987
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G. Hennessy Solicitors for the Appellant: Mr G. Hennessy
Counsel for the R spondent: Mrs R. Sharp Solicitors for the R spondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of hearing: Sydney: 16 December 1987 Date judgment delivered: Sydney: 16 December 1987
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