Hendrix & Haroldson
[2025] FedCFamC1A 160
•8 September 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Hendrix & Haroldson [2025] FedCFamC1A 160
Appeal from: Hendrix & Haroldson [2025] FedCFamC1F 269 Appeal number: NAA 244 of 2025 File number: SYC 2244 of 2021 Judgment of: AUSTIN, BAUMANN & WILLIAMS JJ Date of judgment: 8 September 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Property – Where at the hearing of the appeal the appellant abandoned all but one ground of appeal – Where the appellant asserts the primary judge did not provide adequate reasons for an adjustment under s 75(2) – Where the pathway of reasoning is clear – No error established – Appeal dismissed Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 75 Cases cited: Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; [1990] FamCA 148
Dickons & Dickons (2012) Fam LR 244; [2012] FamCAFC 154
Tomasetti and Tomasetti (2000) FLC 93-023; [2000] FamCA 314;Number of paragraphs: 18 Date of hearing: 26 August 2025 Place: Heard in Sydney, delivered in Newcastle Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Hartwell Solicitor for the Appellant: D M Wright & Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Trost (direct brief) ORDERS
NAA 244 of 2025
SYC 2244 of 2021FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR HENDRIX
Appellant
AND: MS HAROLDSON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN, BAUMANN & WILLIAMS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That the appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant shall pay party and party costs to the respondent fixed in the sum of $13,200 within thirty (30) days.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hendrix & Haroldson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AUSTIN, BAUMANN & WILLIAMS JJ:
By an Amended Notice of Appeal filed 28 May 2025 the appellant husband appeals orders for property alteration made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) on 30 April 2025.
The respondent opposes the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed, with costs, for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
The parties were in a relationship for approximately three and a half years (at [349]) before their separation in November 2014 and have one child now aged 12 years.
The hearing before the primary judge occupied five days, although because no challenge to the parenting orders is raised, and where only one ground of appeal (from the original 10 grounds) was pursued, further contextual background is not required, save to observe that the major issue in contention at the hearing before the primary judge in relation to the property proceedings was whether a property owned by the appellant was held by him as trustee. That property constituted over 93% of the gross pool (excluding superannuation) (at [337]).
THE APPEAL
Having abandoned Grounds 2 to 10 inclusive, the only ground of appeal argued by the appellant was Ground 1. Furthermore, prior to the hearing, the appellant discontinued his application to adduce further evidence in the appeal.
The appellant’s Amended Summary of Argument filed 19 August 2025 was further narrowed by the appellant not pressing arguments raised at paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2. As a result, the assertion in Ground 1 that “the learned trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for her decision” concerned only the adjustment of 10% of the known asset pool in favour of the respondent.
A holistic examination of the carefully reasoned judgment of the primary judge reveals no basis for the asserted error.
The appellant’s attack on the reasons was limited to paragraphs 415 and 416 which stated:
415.Overall, I would have made a further adjustment in favour of [the appellant] due to his more advanced age but for his egregious non-disclosure. I am satisfied that balancing all of the s75(2) factors identified warrants a further adjustment in favour of [the respondent] of 10 per cent because [the appellant’s] conduct in failing to make full and frank disclosure resulted in the parties’ true financial situation remaining opaque.
416.In my view absent such an adjustment, the conduct of [the appellant] in ensuring the lack of clarity as to the financial affairs post separation, would result in an outcome that is not just and equitable. Due to the non-disclosure, I infer that there is more in the property pool than has been evidenced in these proceedings and that this warrants the order that has been made.
The Summary of Argument, having abandoned two elements of the inadequate reasons claim, was of little assistance, however counsel for the appellant articulated the remaining argument as a failure to identify how the adjustment of 10% was assessed.
The primary judge had identified the relevant considerations under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) – being the age of the appellant (a factor in his favour), to be weighed against his “egregious non-disclosure” (a factor in the respondent’s favour).
The appellant contended, not that other factors were relevant, but that inadequate reasons were given for the final adjustment of 10%.
The test for adequacy of reasons is well settled and depends upon the circumstances of the case, however the reasons will be inadequate if the appellate court is unable to ascertain the reasoning upon which the finding is made or justice is not seen to be done (Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 at 78,266).
The appellant submitted the primary judge should have identified what “percentage” adjustment was made for the appellant’s age and shorter ability to earn income and what percentage was made for his non-disclosure.
We disagree. Such an approach has been rejected relating to contribution arguments (Dickons & Dickons (2012) Fam LR 244) and also in respect of factors considered under s 75(2) of the Act. In Tomasetti and Tomasetti (2000) FLC 93-023 the Full Court observed that:
113.…[W]e consider that it is wrong in principle to determine, separately, the percentage adjustment called for by each of a series of factors favouring one party, and then to arrive at the overall adjustment by just adding up the components thus arrived at. To do that has at least the potential for double counting, since some of these factors overlap …
No ground of appeal articulated that the adjustment of 10% (or a differential of approximately $200,000) was excessive, but in our view it was not in any event.
Ground 1 has no merit. Accordingly, the appeal must fail.
COSTS
The respondent sought costs in the event the appeal failed, fixed in the sum of $13,200, which assessment the appellant did not dispute. An order in those terms, payable in thirty days is appropriate.
I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Austin, Baumann and Williams. Associate:
Dated: 8 September 2025
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