Henderson v McSharer

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Henderson v McSharer [2013] FCA 414

Citation: Henderson v McSharer [2013] FCA 414
Parties: SUSAN JANE HENDERSON and KIM HENDERSON v WILLIAM BERNARD MCSHARER, HAILEY MARIE MCSHARER and ASTRAEA GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 152 730 526)
File number: WAD 176 of 2012
Judges: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 6 May 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to strike out paragraphs of statement of claim – whether statement of claim defective in certain respects – application for proceeding to be referred to mediation and other programming orders – whether orders sought are conducive to efficient resolution of proceeding
Legislation:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) R 4.12(1), R 16.02(1)(b), R 16.02(1)(c), R 16.02(1)(d), R 16.02(1)(e), R 16.02(3)

Cases cited: Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 164 CLR 662
Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344
Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221
Bryson v Bryant (1992) 29 NSWLR 188
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353
Hoyt’s Proprietary Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133
Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68; (2001) 208 CLR 516
Date of hearing: 26 April 2013
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 99
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr D Wee
Solicitor for the Respondents: Chan Galic

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 176 of 2012

BETWEEN:

SUSAN JANE HENDERSON
First Applicant

KIM HENDERSON
Second Applicant

AND:

WILLIAM BERNARD MCSHARER
First Respondent

HAILEY MARIE MCSHARER
Second Respondent

ASTRAEA GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 152 730 526)
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MAY 2013

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Paragraphs 44 commencing with the word “Fraud” to the word “fraud” immediately before [44.1], as well as paragraphs 44.1 to 44.7 of the substituted statement of claim filed 22 April 2013 be struck out.

2.Paragraphs 35, 42, 46 and 49 also be struck out, but with leave to replead in respect of those paragraphs.

3.Leave be granted to amend the originating application filed 31 July 2012.

4.The applicants’ interlocutory application filed 25 February 2013 be dismissed.

5.The amended originating application and any amended substituted statement of claim be filed and served by 14 June 2013.

6.A referral certificate be issued to the applicants pursuant to R 4.12(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

7.The matter be listed for further directions on 21 June 2013 at 10:45am.

8.The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the respondents’ interlocutory application filed 19 February 2013 to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 176 of 2012

BETWEEN:

SUSAN JANE HENDERSON
First Applicant

KIM HENDERSON
Second Applicant

AND:

WILLIAM BERNARD…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 414
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Henderson v McSharer, the applicants sought various orders, including declarations and damages, related to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. The case was heard and determined by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary focus of the decision was on the adequacy of the applicants' pleadings and the appropriateness of striking out certain parts of their statement of claim.

The court had to decide whether the applicants' pleadings were sufficiently clear and complied with the relevant procedural rules. The respondents argued that the applicants' statement of claim was excessively long, contained unnecessary narrative, and failed to distinguish between material facts and evidence. Additionally, the respondents contended that certain parts of the pleadings quoted statutory and common law verbatim, rather than merely referring to them.

The court considered the arguments and examined the specific paragraphs cited by the respondents. While acknowledging some issues with the narrative content, the court found that most of the disputed paragraphs provided relevant context and did not contravene the procedural rules. However, certain paragraphs were identified as containing verbatim quotations of statute and common law, which the court deemed inappropriate. Consequently, these paragraphs were struck out. The court also addressed the applicants' interlocutory application, which sought various procedural orders, and determined that it was not conducive to the efficient resolution of the proceeding.

The court concluded that the main body of the applicants' statement of claim need not be struck out, but certain paragraphs should be. Leave to replead was granted for the applicants to make refinements. The respondents were awarded costs for their strike-out application. Additionally, a referral certificate was issued to assist the self-represented applicants. The court ordered that the applicants file and serve their amended pleadings and set a further directions hearing to program the proceeding for trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view, while lengthy, the pleading is, subject to what follows, sufficiently clear in its identification of the issues that the applicants want the Court to resolve, and so in accordance with R 16.02(1)(c), that it is not appropriate to strike the pleading out on the basis of its length. PLEAS OF EVIDENCE The respondents also draw attention to R 16.02(1)(d), which requires a pleading to state the material facts on which a party relies that are necessary to give the opposing party fair notice of a case to be made against that party at trial, but not the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved. The respondents complain that numerous paragraphs or subparagraphs of the substituted statement of claim state evidence, rather than material facts, in contravention of this Rule. The first example provided by the respondents is [6.14] of the substituted statement of claim that is pleaded in a long paragraph containing some 15 subparagraphs and dealing with the topic of “The York Farm Land”. As I would apprehend it, the pleading concerning the York farm land is intended to provide context to their later pleaded financial dealings with the individual respondents and the circumstances in which the third respondent came to be formed or the parties came to gain some indirect or direct interests in it. In that context, the various subparagraphs of [6] dealing with the York farm land are reasonably narrative. They have much to do with the fact that at some time prior to the applicants meeting the individual respondents, they had themselves obtained an extractive industries license in respect of the York farm land. In that regard, in the course of narrating material facts, [6.14] pleads that:Prior to 18 May 2010, DVC had provided Traffic Engineering drawings to Bonthorpe with regard to upgrading the entrance to the York farm from the Main Road, being the Great Southern Highway in Gilgering in the Shire of York. In my view, one could spend quite some time debating whether or not that paragraph is a case of the stating of evidence rather than a material fact. In my judgment, [6.14] is part of the narrative that sets the context that is arguably relevant to the substantive causes of action which the applicants seek to press at the trial of this proceeding. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that [6.14] offends the Rules. As to some 29 additional examples of where the respondents say evidence has been stated rather than material facts, suffice it to say that I have considered each of the examples given and by and large I am satisfied that none of those paragraphs should be struck out on the ground contended for. In some cases, the impugned paragraph is expressed as a particular of a material fact, as for example in the second example offered by the respondents at [11.3]. I would, therefore, decline to strike out the paragraphs mentioned in [6] of the respondents’ written submissions on the ground contended for.PLEAS OF LAW The respondents complain that statute and common law are also quoted verbatim instead of their provisions merely being referred to, citing some 10 paragraphs or subparagraphs of the pleading.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would strike out [44.1] to [44.7] and [45].CONCLUSION ON STRIKE OUT APPLICATIONS In all these circumstances the main body of the substituted statement of claim need not be struck out and may be pleaded to, although certain paragraphs should be. Leave to replead some paragraphs will be appropriate for the applicants to make refinements along the lines of the objections or amendments identified in these reasons. It would also be appropriate when the applicants file an amended substituted statement of claim in accordance with the orders made, that they file an amended originating application that includes within it all the claims and remedies that they now have sought in the amended substituted statement of claim. The respondents are entitled to their costs on their strike out application.REFERRAL CERTIFICATE In all the circumstances of this case I also consider it to be appropriate to issue a referral certificate under R 4.12(1) of the Rules for the benefit of the applications who are currently self‑represented.APPLICANTS’ INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION Finally, with respect to the applicants’ interlocutory application filed 25 February 2013, I am not satisfied that the orders sought are the most conducive to the efficient resolution of the proceeding and as such I would dismiss the application. Instead, I would order that the applicants file and serve their amended originating application and amended substituted statement of claim, and then order a further directions hearing with a view to programming the proceeding to a fixed trial date.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established