SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 5957of 2000
| ROBERT HARRY HEMLEY & ANOR | Applicants |
| v | |
| MEDICAL INDEMNITY PROTECTION SOCIETY | Respondents |
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JUDGE: | HEDIGAN, J. | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 October 2000 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 23 November 2000 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | As Above | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2000] VSC 496 | |
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Preliminary discovery of documents – Order 32.05 – Applicants having sufficient information to enable a decision whether to commence proceeding to be made – Applicants arguably having already made decision to sue – Court not satisfied of requirements – Application refused.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
For the Applicants | Mr J.A. Santamaria, Q.C. | Tress Cocks & Maddocks |
| For the Respondent | Mr M. Colbran, Q.C. | Blake Dawson Waldron |
REASONS
HIS HONOUR:
This is an application by originating motion and summons by two medical practitioners (the applicants) for an order for preliminary discovery of documents against the Medical Indemnity Protection Society Ltd. ("MIPS"). The respondent MIPS is said to be a non-profit mutual society. The application is made pursuant to Order 32.05 of this Court's Rules. That Rule permits discovery from a prospective defendant where (1) there is reasonable cause to believe the applicant has or may have the right to obtain relief from an ascertained person; (2) the making of "all reasonable inquiries has not produced sufficient information" to enable the applicant to decide whether to commence the proceeding; and (3) there is reasonable cause to believe the ascertained person is likely to have documents "relating to the question whether the applicant has the right to obtain the relief". As the language of the Rule implies, it is within the discretion of the Court as to whether or not an order of this kind should be made and it is incumbent upon the applicants to demonstrate that the discretion of the Court should be exercised in their favour.
The Rule and the jurisdiction have come under not inconsiderable judicial notice in the last decade. I refer to Paxus Services v. People Bank Pty. Ltd.[1]; Gibson v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd.[2]; Scarletti Pty. Ltd. & Ors v. Milwood Printing Co. Pty. Ltd.[3]; United Energy Ltd. v. Energy Risk Management Pty. Ltd;[4] FAI Home Security Pty Ltd v Price & Ors.[5]
[1](1990) 99 A.L.R. 728.
[2]Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria (Gobbo, J.) 30 August 1991.
[3]Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Appeal Division, 28 July 1994.
[4][1998] VSC 133 (unreported, Gillard, J., 13 June 1998).
[5][1999] VSC 274 (unreported, Byrne J., 20 August 1999).
I briefly encapsulate the facts of the matter. The first applicant Hemley had been a member of the Medical Protection Society of the United Kingdom ("MPS UK") since 1979. The respondent MIPS became an incorporated mutual society on 9 September 1988 and the first applicant became a concurrent member of MPS UK and MIPS. Shortly after that, MPS UK and MIPS entered into an arrangement whereby the UK society agreed to meet "all court awards and settlements made…
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- Case
- [2000] VSC 496
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the applicants satisfied the requirements of Order 32.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. This order permits a party to apply for a preliminary discovery order if they do not have enough information to decide whether to commence proceedings. The court needed to assess whether the applicants had sufficient information, and if they had arguably already made a decision to sue, which would disqualify them from the application. The court's role was to ensure that the order was not misused as a tool for obtaining documents in circumstances where the applicant already possessed enough information to decide whether to proceed with a claim.
The court found that the applicants had sufficient information to enable them to decide whether to commence proceedings, and arguably had already made that decision. The applicants had been involved in a dispute with the respondent for several years, had received legal advice, and had made decisions on other related matters. This indicated that they had already decided to sue, which was inconsistent with the requirements for a preliminary discovery order. Consequently, the court was not satisfied that the applicants met the necessary criteria for the order, and the application was refused. The court emphasised the importance of the order being used appropriately to prevent its misuse as a discovery tool in cases where a decision to sue had already been made.
The court did not make any orders for costs, as the application was dismissed on its merits. The applicants were left to consider their position in light of the decision, and the respondent was spared the burden of complying with a potentially unnecessary discovery order. The judgment serves as a reminder to parties that preliminary discovery orders are not to be used as a substitute for making a decision on whether to commence a proceeding, and that the court will closely scrutinise applications to ensure they comply with the statutory requirements.
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