Heli-Muster Pty Limited v Johnson Wire Forming Pty Limited
[2000] NSWSC 949
•13 October 2000
CITATION: Heli-Muster Pty Limited v Johnson Wire Forming Pty Limited [2000] NSWSC 949 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20307 of 2000 HEARING DATE(S): 5 September 2000 JUDGMENT DATE: 13 October 2000 PARTIES :
HELI-MUSTER PTY LIMITED
A.C.N. 000 759 603
(Plaintiff)v
JOHNSON WIRE FORMING PTY LIMITED
t/as SOLITARY ISLANDS HELICOPTER SERVICES
A.C.N. 001 431 463
(Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Levine J
COUNSEL : D E Grieve Q.C.
A Shand Q.C.
T Blackburn
(Plaintiff)
A Mountfort
(Defendant)SOLICITORS: Norton White
Matthews Williams
(Plaintiff)
(Defendant)CATCHWORDS: Imputations - capacity - particulars - SCR Pt 67 r 12(1)(e) - aggravated damages - corporated plaintiff CASES CITED: Amalgamated Television Services Pty Limited v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158
Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (1980) 2 NSWLR 225
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Limited (1988) A Def R 50,030DECISION: See paragraph 47
DLJ: 1
[2000] NSWSC 949
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
DEFAMATION LIST
No. 20307 of 2000
JUSTICE DAVID LEVINE
FRIDAY 13 OCTOBER 2000
HELI-MUSTER PTY LIMITED
A.C.N. 000 750 603
(Plaintiff)v
JOHNSON WIRE FORMING PTY LIMITED
t/as SOLITARY ISLANDS HELICOPTER SERVICES
A.C.N. 001 431 463
(Defendant)
JUDGMENT (Imputations - capacity - particulars - SCR Pt 67 r 12(1)(e) - aggravated damages - corporate plaintiff)
1 By a Statement of Claim filed on 7 July 2000, the plaintiff sues in respect of two letters. The first is dated 21 November 1997, the second is pleaded as dated “in or about October 1997”. 2 The first matter complained of is a letter written by the solicitors for the defendant to the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (“CASA”) bearing the heading “Re Civil Aviation Safety Matters”. The concluding paragraph of the communication indicates that a copy of the letter was sent to Mr L Foley of the CASA Board and to the Minister, the Hon. Mr M Vaille. It is alleged that it was a natural and probable consequence of the publication of this letter to the person described as the Acting Chairman of CASA that it was re-published to Board Members of CASA, the General Manager, Corporate Relations of CASA, the Acting Director of CASA and what is described as other members of the staff of CASA whose identity is yet to be ascertained. 3 The material sued upon is the letter: this is said because the letter refers to enclosures none of which is incorporated in the pleading. 4 The text of the first matter complained of is appended hereto as Appendix A. 5 It is pleaded that in its natural and ordinary meaning this letter conveys the following defamatory imputations of the plaintiff:6 Further, imputations by way of true innuendo are pleaded as follows:
“6.
(a) that the plaintiff was so grossly deficient in its maintenance of Kawasaki KH4 helicopters that it had repeatedly put human life at risk;
(b) that the plaintiff was so grossly deficient in its maintenance of Kawasaki KH4 helicopters that it had caused a number of such helicopters to crash;
(c) that the plaintiff was so grossly deficient in its maintenance of Kawasaki KH4 helicopter VH-KEB that it had caused the helicopter to crash and thereby had nearly killed the pilot;
(d) the plaintiff had been grossly negligent in its maintenance of Kawasaki KH4 helicopter VH-KEB.
(e) the plaintiff had been so grossly negligent in its maintenance of Kawasaki KH4 helicopter VH-KEB that it had sold that helicopter without detecting a dangerous defect in its cooling fan;
(f) that plaintiff had sold a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter VH-KEB knowing that it had a dangerous defect, and without informing the purchaser”.
7 The second matter complained of bears a date 16 October 1997 and is on the letterhead of the defendant. It is a document apparently hand printed in capitals to CASA Coffs Harbour addressed to Mr Bob Hoy. Its text is appended hereto and marked Appendix B. 8 The plaintiff sues only upon the letter, there not being appended to the Statement of Claim any of the annexures referred to in that letter. 9 Re-publication is again alleged in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim to the five categories of people referred therein, it being contended (in paragraph 10) that such re-publication was the natural and probable consequence of the publication to Mr Hoy. 10 The plaintiff pleads the following defamatory imputations as arising from the natural and ordinary meaning:
“7.
(a) the plaintiff had sold a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter claiming that it was fitted with safely overhauled components, knowing that one of the components was in fact in a dangerous condition;
(b) the plaintiff had been so negligent that it had sold a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter claiming that it was fitted with safely overhauled components, when in fact one of the components was in a dangerous condition;
(c) that by reason of the plaintiff lying about the condition of the components in a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter it had sold, it had caused the helicopter to crash and nearly killed the pilot;
(d) that by reason of the plaintiff’s negligence in selling a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter while claiming it was fitted with safely overhauled components, when in fact one of the components was in a dangerous condition, the helicopter crashed and nearly killed the pilot.
Particulars of Extrinsic Facts
‘Zero time’ is a phrase used in the aviation industry to mean time limited parts which, although not new, have been overhauled to ‘as new’ standard, and which may lawfully be regarded as ‘zero time’ and used as the new components”.
11 By reason of the same extrinsic facts referred to in relation to the first matter complained of the following true innuendo is also pleaded:
“11.
(a) that the plaintiff deliberately exercised its power in the helicopter industry to prevent the reporting of incidents and accidents which had been caused by its grossly deficient maintenance practices;
(b) the plaintiff had been criminally negligent in its maintenance of a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter;
(c) the plaintiff had fitted worn out components to a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter, while at the same time issuing fraudulent documents indicating that the components had been overhauled to ‘as new’ standard;
(d) that the plaintiff’s maintenance practices were so criminally negligent that they caused helicopters to crash and kill people;
(e) that the plaintiff’s criminally negligent maintenance procedures had caused many helicopter crashes; and
(f) that the plaintiff was such a degraded and dishonest organisation that it used its power in the helicopter industry to prevent the reporting of incidents and accidents caused by its criminally negligent maintenance procedures”.
12 The claim for damages is in the following terms:
“12.
(a) the plaintiff had deliberately issued fraudulent documents stating that a Kawasaki KH4 helicopter offered by it for sale was fitted with components that, for maintenance purposes could lawfully be treated as new components, but which were in fact worn out”.
13 There have been, I gather from correspondence handed up during the course of submissions, various areas of dispute between the parties. 14 The first issue concerns a response to the usual request for particulars as to the part or parts of the matter complained of relied upon by the plaintiff. It is said that the “whole” of the letter is relied upon in support of the pleaded imputations. The defendant contends that “it will not know the arguments” upon which the plaintiff will rely in the presentation of its case to the jury. As at the time of the institution of these proceedings there was no requirement on the part of the plaintiff to provide these particulars. It was a matter of practice that they were sought and in the normal course provided. The new rule SCR Pt 67 r 12(1)(e) makes specific provision for the inclusion of such particulars in the Statement of Claim. One purpose of this is to seek to eliminate costs unnecessarily incurred in the exchange of request for particulars and to embody in a rule what has become over the last three to five decades a matter of practice. By complying with this new rule the plaintiff indicates the case it proposes to make on the issue of capacity and fact as to the carrying by the matter complained of pleaded imputations. As it turns out the defendant has not been compromised in any real sense by the answer the plaintiff has chosen to make in correspondence namely, reliance upon the letter only “as a whole”, because both written and oral submissions have clearly indicated that the plaintiff does in fact rely on specific parts of the matter complained of in addition to each as a whole. In the event of the plaintiff being required to replead, a direction will be given that there be compliance with SCR Pt 67 r 12(1)(e). 15 Further, I gather that there have been requests and refusals in relation to the enclosures, annexures or schedules referred to in the respective letters but not pleaded. There is little that I can do about that at this stage. If the defendant is of the view that a “strike in” application should be made (Gordon v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Limited (1980) 2 NSWLR 410) it can take that course. 16 The principal matters in dispute before me were the questions of capacity of the letters to carry the pleaded imputations (to be determined by consent under SCR Pt 31 r 2) and the propriety of the claim in respect of aggravated damages given the corporate status of the plaintiff. As to this latter aspect there was further disputatious correspondence as to the identification of the precise nature of the claim for damages being made. This can be resolved in due course. 17 I turn to the arguments in respect of the imputations pleaded in relation to the first matter complained of. 18 The defendant contends that that matter is incapable of conveying imputation 6(a), (b), (c) and (d). That is founded upon the words “grossly deficient” in (a), (b) and (c), and “grossly negligent” in imputation (d). It is further contended that 6(a) and (b) do not differ in substance. 19 Dealing with the difference in substance point first it was seriously suggested by the plaintiff that a difference in substance arises because a “helicopter may be involved in a minor crash that may not endanger human life”. Indeed, during the course of submissions reference was made to a helicopter blowing upon the tarmac and not endangering human life. These concepts, with the utmost respect, are quite ingenuous. The ordinary reasonable reader bringing to bear general knowledge of the affairs of the world would view anything that imperils the safety of either a helicopter or any aircraft as imperilling human life. Furthermore, insofar as the plaintiff relies upon the whole of the matter complained of it would only be understood by the ordinary reasonable reader as expressing concern as to the imperilling of human life. Imputation 6(b) is struck out as contravening SCR Pt 67 r 11(3). 20 It was in support of the capacity of the remaining imputations presently under consideration that the plaintiff, in effect, gave those particulars, the absence of which was the subject of complaint by the defendant. The opening paragraph of the letter refers to a “serious” safety problem which was also apparently an ongoing problem. The nature of the problem was identified as involving the fitting of parts to Kawasaki helicopters which either were not suitable to that aircraft, had not been properly checked or maintained and checked in accordance with the appropriate bulletins. The information in the matter complained of was provided pursuant to a request by Mr Dick Smith in relation to breaches of safety standards. There are expressions of “concern” and more concern because a helicopter had crashed in Western Australia. 21 The nature of the damage done to the particular helicopter is identified. It is described as “severe” and the observations made that the pilot was lucky to escape with his life. 22 I am not persuaded by the submissions for the defendant, on a capacity argument - the essence of the test of which is “reasonableness” (Amalgamated Television Services Pty Limited v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158) when reading the letter as a whole and the particular components to which the plaintiff pointed in the course of submissions is incapable of carrying imputations 6(a) and (c) and (d). 23 There is no complaint about imputations (e) and (f) in paragraph 6. 24 The approach adopted by the plaintiff was to look at the matter complained of from a “macro” perspective and from a “micro” perspective. From that I understand that the ordinary reasonable reader would note generalities and particular matters by a reading of the whole of the letter. This is, in my view, an acceptable approach conformable with principle. 25 Whether in the end the jury finds as a matter of fact the pleaded imputations are conveyed will be a matter for that tribunal. 26 I am of the view that the tenor of the matter complained of, that is, from the “macro” point of view and the “micro” analysis, gives rise to a situation where minds may well differ and thus brings it about that the question is pre-eminently one for the jury. I am not persuaded that the matter complained of is incapable of carrying imputations (a), (c), (d), (e) and (f). 27 I turn to the true innuendos pleaded in paragraph 7. The extrinsic fact relied upon is what is understood by the expression “zero time”. 28 If the plaintiff pitches its imputations at a “high level” provided that as a matter of law such “high” imputations are capable of being carried, it does so at its peril in terms of the ultimate finding by the jury on the question of fact. 29 The true innuendos under challenge are 7(a) and 7(c). The basis for the challenge is that taking into account knowledge of the extrinsic fact nothing in the matter complained of is capable of giving rise to the suggestion that the plaintiff had sold the relevant helicopter “knowing” that one of its components in fact was in a dangerous condition. Nor is it capable of conveying anything that suggestions that the plaintiff “lied” about the condition of the component - that is it made a statement about the condition of the component knowing that at the time of making that statement that it was false. 30 These imputations are pleaded at a very “high” level. 31 When one reads the four imputations pleaded by way of true innuendo one notes that, in effect, the charges are made at two levels which may be, in short term, described as active concealment on the one hand or negligence on the other. 32 Imputations 7(a) and 7(c) have caused me a great deal of difficulty, I must confess. In the end however I am not persuaded that it can be said as a matter of law, when one reads the whole of the letter and the component parts identified by the plaintiff in the course of submissions, that it is incapable of conveying to an ordinary reasonable reader the imputations under challenge. Whether in the end the jury will be so persuaded as a matter of fact will remain to be seen. I hold that imputation 7(a), (b), (c) and (d) are capable of being carried by the first matter complained of, are capable of being defamatory and will go to the jury. 33 I turn to the second matter complained of. The defendant, of course, is confronted with difficulties in relation to this publication not the least of which is, as I think it fairly can be described, the author “pulled no punches” in saying what he had to say. 34 I have no difficulty in coming to the view that imputations 11(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are capable of arising, capable of being defamatory and should go to the jury and so find. 35 Imputation 11(f), which was the subject of dispute, contains in the use of the expression “degraded and dishonest” rhetorical invective components which must defeat its availability as an imputation capable as a matter of law of being carried. 36 This is, in my view, a clear cut example of a plaintiff pitching an imputation at a level that cannot be sustained on any ordinary reasonable reading of the matter complained of. I find therefore that the matter complained of is incapable of carrying imputation 11(f). 37 Imputation 12(a) I find to be capable of being carried. 38 Complaint is made, as I have said, as to the particulars of aggravated damages. 39 It is not necessary, in the usual course under the new procedures, for a plaintiff’s case on aggravated damages fully to be particularised at the time the Statement of Claim is filed. Particulars should be provided, but the nature of a claim for aggravated damages is one of a continuing kind which imposes upon a plaintiff an obligation “continually” to particularise the facts, matters and circumstances upon which it relies in support of such a claim, such particulars including the identification of the characterisation of the conduct that founds the claim for aggravated damages. 40 Here, of course, the plaintiff is a corporation and thus no component of the “hurt to feelings” can be available to it (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v 2KY Broadcasters Pty Limited (1988) A Def R 50,030 at 40,163). Sub-particular (a) relating to the falsity of the imputations raises a false issue. Normally a non-corporate plaintiff legitimately can raise in aggravation of damages that that plaintiff’s hurt was increased by that plaintiff’s knowledge of the falsity of the imputations. It was rightly argued on behalf of the defendant that particulars (b) and (c) if available on the issue of damages would go to ordinary compensatory damages. The order I propose to make is that the particulars purportedly given in aggravation of damages are struck out. 41 As indicated earlier in these reasons there was some dispute between the parties as to the nature of the claim for damages the corporate plaintiff is making. A corporate plaintiff can, of course, claim damages for injury in its business reputation. It can claim special damages in the ordinarily understood meaning of that expression. It can claim damages that are described as damages by way of loss of business and custom (see, for example, Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (1980) 2 NSWLR 225). 42 As I read the correspondence, the position at present is that the plaintiff is merely making a claim for compensatory damages by reason of it having been injured in its business reputation by the publication of the matters complained of. 43 If the plaintiff suffers special damages or can assert a claim for a general loss of business and custom there will be an obligation on the plaintiff to make that claim and provide proper particulars of it with the consequential interlocutory procedures by way of discovery and interrogatories, the obtaining of independent accountants’ opinions and the like. At present the matter rests, as I see it, as no more than the plaintiff making the ordinary compensatory damages claim but in the wrong way indicating two matters at least (the mode and manner of the publication and the extent of publication) upon which it proposes to rely on that subject. 44 An Amended Statement of Claim will have to be filed to clear up various aspects; paragraph 5 will have to be re-worded to eliminate the word “first” where it first appears; imputation 6(f) will have to be corrected to read “dangerous defect”; the particulars of aggravated damages should be eliminated. Further, I note in passing that the plaintiff claims a “retraction” of the first and second matters complained of and, but no claim for interest is made. Whether the plaintiff proposes to re-cast that formal part of the Statement of Claim will be a matter for it. 45 Overall, the plaintiff has succeeded on the principal issues as to capacity. Time was spent on argument in relation to aggravated damages upon which issue the plaintiff failed and as I have said the form and structure of the Statement of Claim, in an amended form, will have to be attended to in the light of my reasons and observations. 46 The appropriate order is that the defendant pay two thirds of the plaintiff’s costs. 47 The formal orders are:
“13. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the plaintiff has been gravely injured in its trading reputation and has been brought into hatred ridicule and contempt, and has suffered loss and damage, including aggravated damages.
Particulars of Aggravation
a. The falsity of the imputations.
b. The sensational and extravagant tone of the allegations made in each of the matters complained of; and/or
c. The unnecessary publication of the first matter complained of to the chairman of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority”.
1. Imputations 6(a), (c), (d), (e), (f); 7(a), (b), (c), (d); 11(a), (b), (c), (d), (e); 12(a) are capable of being carried and of being defamatory.2. Imputation 11(f) is incapable of being carried.
3. Imputation 6(b) is struck out.
4. The Particulars of Aggravated Damages are struck out.
5. The plaintiff has leave to file an Amended Statement of Claim in accordance with these reasons within 14 days and is to comply with SCR Pt 67 r 12(1)(e).
6. Practice Note 114 is to apply to this action.
7. The defendant is to pay two thirds of the plaintiff’s costs.
8. The matter is listed for Directions in the Defamation List on 10 November 2000.
(Letterhead)
Appendix AMatthews Williams
SOLICITORS AND CONVEYANCES
Est. 1891
Reply to: FORBES
Our Ref: AJP: PB 9580
Your Ref:21 November, 1997
The Chairman
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
GPO BOX 2005
CANBERRA CITY ACT 25601(STAMP: BOARD SECRETARIAT
26 NOV 1997
No. M97/735)
Dear Sir,RE: Civil Aviation Safety Matters
We have been instructed by our client Mr Robert Johnson of Solitary Island Helicopter Services, to write to you in respect of a serious safety problem that he has encountered and which also appears to be an ongoing problem. It involves the fitting of parts to Kawasaki KH4 helicopters which are either not suitable to that aircraft, have not been properly checked or have not been maintained and checked in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletins.
In a recent letter to all licensed pilots (which the writer is one) Mr Dick Smith requested information about possible breaches of safety standards. Our client has instructed us that he wants us to make you aware of the problems he has recently encountered. He has become even more concerned because another Kawasaki KH4 helicopter crashed in Western Australian within the last two weeks due to the same problem, namely a failed cooling fan and it is believed it was serviced by the same organisation.
Our client purchased a Kawasaki KH4 registered VH/KEB in August, 1994, from Heli Muster Pty Limited at Warnervale. He specified that all component parts were to be zero time and it had been advertised as such. He took delivery of the helicopter in late August, 1994. It was involved in an accident involving a truck at Port Aero Maintenance Unit at Port Macquarie. It was fixed up and our client took delivery of it on 9 November, 1994, after it had received a 100 hourly service.
The helicopter was engaged in Charter operations in the Coffs Harbour area. When it had done a little over 40 hours in service after the 100 hour inspection, the pilot, Paul Tobias, took two passengers to the Moonee Creek area for a picnic where they were to be met by others. He dropped the passengers off at Moonee Creek and, fortunately, took off alone to return to Coffs Harbour. The cooling fan failed, it lost two blades in the process and severe damage was done to the control system of the helicopter. The pilot was unable to control it but did manage to auto-rotate into the water. When he tried to flare, because the control system had been so severely damaged, the helicopter turned upside down. Fortunately he was landing in the water and the water acted in deceleration of the rotor blades saving his life. He was able to extricate himself safely.
Subsequent investigations have shown that on installation the cooling fan had a three inch fatigue crack in it near the base. Attached hereto is a copy of an investigatory report conducted by Accident Investigation & Research Inc. of Ontario, Canada. The investigator was Mr Max Vermij of that firm.
It is apparent from that report that the cooling fan was not dye tested prior to installation. It is also a matter of grave concern that the cooling fan was spray painted with an epoxy spray paint prior to assembly thereby covering up the fatigue crack.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Service Bulletin No. KS8/Bell/305 dated 5 July, 1969, a copy of which is enclosed, relates to the cooling fan maintenance on this type of helicopter. It clearly states that the fan should be dye tested at every 100 hourly inspection and should also be visually inspected on a daily basis for cracks. It is obvious that it is impossible to inspect for metal fatigue cracks if the fan is painted and it is impossible to do a dye check when the fan is painted. You will also note that the Service Bulletin was dated 5 July, 1969, so it had been around for a long time.
It is also a matter of grave concern that this cooling fan was not the recommended cooling fan for the Turbo charged Kawasaki KH4. In that regard, we enclose a copy of a technical report from Kawasaki Heavy Industries dated 25 November, 1966, attached to their letter of 26 November, 1996.
Another matter of concern was that Heli Muster Pty Limited were maintaining the helicopter as if it was a non-turbo charged Bell 47. The log book entries refer repeatedly to Bell 47 as the requirement document and that the overhauls were carried out in accordance with Bell 47 M and O/H. Kawasaki have their own Service Bulletins and Manuals and the Aircraft should have been serviced in accordance with them. Our client has also expressed his deep disappointment in the investigation carried out by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation. It failed to get anywhere near the root of the problem and he had great difficulty getting any information out of them except under the Freedom of Information Act. For that reason, and because of the very consideration influence Heli Muster Pty Limited has on the helicopter industry of Australia, he was forced to go to an expert in Canada to carry out the necessary scientific investigation. Having decided to do that he went to the best, the firm that handles a lot of the Boeing investigations. The photographs produced by Mr Vermij are so graphic, they show on a chip of paint removed from the damaged fan that the paint had in fact been sprayed over the crack. The micro-photography is excellent. For that reason we have gone to the trouble to have those photographs laser copied for the purpose of this letter.
Our client is involved in litigation with Heli Muster arising out of this accident. For that reason he was constrained not to take this action before. However, he has conducted investigations himself and he has found that there have been several other accidents more than likely caused by cooling fan failures in Kawasaki KH4 helicopters. The recent accident in Western Australia has added to his concern. Our client has been able to identify six accidents which would appear to relate to failure of cooling fans. One of great concern related to one registered VH/AWG destroyed at Ramingining in the Northern Territory on 2 July, 1989, when two people were killed.
We are sending a copy of this letter to Mr L Foley of the CASA Board and to the Minister, the Honourable Mr M Vaille.
Yours faithfully,
MATTHEW WILLIAMSPer: (signed)
A. J. Palmerencl’s.
Appendix B(Letterhead)
Solitary Islands Helicopter Services(address details)16.10.97
C.A.S.A. Coffs HarbourDear Sir, Bob Hoy
I am supplying you with this information because of my concern of dangerous helicopters that are still flying and hoping you will following this through personally.
The company involved is Heli-Muster and I don’t have to tell you how much weight they pull in the industry. This is why I had to go overseas for some reports and information owing to the fact that there were very few people in Australia that were game to take Heli-Muster on and this is why there are a lot of accidents and incidents that have not been reported.
There are many other helicopters which have crashed with cooling fan failures which have been serviced or re-built by Heli-Muster.
JWQ James Knight Heli-North
SUC Graham Davidson Heli-Scene
JWI Steve Groves Darwin
KEB Bob Johnson
JWG B.A.S.I. Report
There are companies like Kawasaki, Japan which are not happy owing to the fact that Heli-Muster are not servicing their aircraft as per their manuals and bulletins.
I also have a lot more reports and literature which I could make available.
We can start with my own experience with Heli-Muster when I contracted them to supply a Kawasaki KH4 which had been totally re-built to zero-time for the use in general air charter and joy flights out of Coffs Harbour.
Document 1
From Heli-Muster which they supplied with the aircraft stating components (?) zero-time not just a second-hand helicopter which you will find fraudulent and misleading as are the log-books supplied with the helicopter.
Document 2
Gives you some idea of the damage done to Kawasaki helicopter KH4 KEB which was not repaired in a satisfactory manner as per Kawasaki manuals.
Document 3
Photos of components that B.A.S.I. had for their report, also photos of damage to flight controls, flight control mountings broken etc.
Document 4
A.I.R.’s accident report on the reason why the fan failed and took out the flight controls and caused KEB to crash.
Document 5
One of the reports from Kawasaki stating that the fan was not a Kawasaki part and should not have been fitted to the helicopter which is criminal negligence on Heli-Musters part for knowingly fitting a damaged-painted-worn-out fan not supplied by Kawasaki.
Document 6
Heli-Tech’s document stating that the zero-time transmission on K.E.B. was completely worn-out.
Document 7
A report from an investigation done by another company on .K.E.B.
Document 8
A section of a B.A.S.I. report on a helicopter crash in which 2 people were killed that had cooling fan repairs done in Heli-Muster’s workshop previous to the accident.
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